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on Business Economics |
| By: | Philipp Meinen; Pierpaolo Parrotta; Davide Sala; Erdal Yalcin |
| Abstract: | How does “what managers know” affect firm performance on international markets? This question is of considerable importance in the international economic literature. Answering it will be key for comprehending the way firms’ varying performance on international markets is shaped by the human factor. This paper proposes managerial mobility as an integral part of such an answer. Catering products to an international customer base entails a learning process, which, to a large degree, stems from the experience of doing it. Therefore, different employers immensely contend for managers’ highly valuable export experience. As managers can accept better and better positions from several offers, they may become highly mobile, thus having a notable impact on possibly multiple firms’ internationalization. Exploiting a rich panel data set, the paper thoroughly tests this idea by discriminating between knowledge ascribable to managers’ former job experience and that attributable to their personal background. The paper uses a novel identification strategy grounded in on-the-job search theory to correct estimates for the presence of self-selected mobility flows. A core finding of the paper is that the maximum return to expertise acquisition is realized for those managers with previous experience in commercializing differentiated products in specific markets. |
| Keywords: | management, mobility, experience, export |
| JEL: | F14 F16 F23 M12 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7126&r=bec |
| By: | Ata Atay (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences); Tamas Solymosi (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest) |
| Abstract: | We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989). |
| Keywords: | Bargaining set, core, matching market, assignment game, cooperative game |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1805&r=bec |
| By: | Cecile Gaubert; Oleg Itskhoki |
| Abstract: | Large firms play a pivotal role in international trade, shaping the export patterns of countries. We propose and quantify a granular multi-sector model of trade, which combines fundamental comparative advantage across sectors with granular comparative advantage embodied in outstanding individual firms. We develop an SMM-based estimation procedure, which takes full account of the general equilibrium of the model, to jointly estimate these fundamental and granular forces using French micro-data with information on firm domestic and export sales across manufacturing industries. We find that granularity accounts for about 20% of the variation in realized export intensity across sectors, and is more pronounced in the most export-intensive sectors. In turn, idiosyncratic firm dynamics accounts for a large share of the evolution of a country's comparative advantage over time. Governments face strong incentives to target trade policy at large individual foreign exporters, and to use lenient antitrust regulation at home to substitute for beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy. |
| JEL: | D20 D43 F10 F40 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24807&r=bec |
| By: | Elise Coudin (CREST; INSEE); Sophie Maillard (INSEE); Maxime Tô (Institut des Politiques Publiques; University College London; Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how two main channels explaining the gender wage gap, namely the heterogeneity of firm pay policies and sex-specific wage consequences of parenthood, interact. We explore the firm heterogeneity channel by applying the model proposed by Card, Cardoso, and Kline 2016. After controlling for individual and firm heterogeneity, we show that the sorting of women into lower-paying firms accounts for 11 % of the average gender wage gap in the French private sector, whereas within-firm gender inequality does not contribute to the gap. Performing these decompositions all along workers’ life cycle, we find evidence that this sorting mechanism activates shortly after birth. These gender-specific and dynamic firm choices generate wage losses all along mothers’ careers, in addition to direct child wage penalties. After birth, mothers tend to favor firms with more flexible work hours and home proximity, which may be detrimental to their labor market opportunities, as, within these contexts, firms may gain relative monopsonic power. |
| Keywords: | gender wage gap, gender inequalities, linked employer-employee, data, two-way fixed effect models, discrimination |
| JEL: | J31 J71 J16 |
| Date: | 2018–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crs:wpaper:2018-09&r=bec |
| By: | Chris Edmond; Virgiliu Midrigan; Daniel Yi Xu |
| Abstract: | We study the welfare costs of markups in a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and endogenously variable markups. We find that the welfare costs of markups are large. We decompose the costs of markups into three channels: (i) an aggregate markup that acts like a uniform output tax, (ii) misallocation of factors of production, and (iii) an inefficiently low rate of entry. We find that the aggregate markup accounts for about two-thirds of the costs, misallocation accounts for about one-third, and the costs due to inefficient entry are negligible. We evaluate simple policies aimed at reducing the costs of markups. Subsidizing entry is not an effective tool in our model: while more competition reduces individual firms' markups it also reallocates market shares towards larger firms and the net effect is that the aggregate markup hardly changes. Size-dependent policies aimed at reducing concentration can reduce the aggregate markup but have the side effect of greatly increasing misallocation and reducing aggregate productivity. |
| JEL: | D04 E02 L1 O4 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24800&r=bec |
| By: | Pedro Carvalho |
| Abstract: | This paper presents empirical evidence on the impact of competition on firm productivity for the Portuguese economy. To that effect, firm-level panel data comprising information between 2010 and 2015 gathered from the Integrated Business Accounts System (Portuguese acronym: SCIE) is used. The database enables the construction of economic and financial indicators, which allow for isolating the impact of competition on firm-level productivity. We find a positive relationship between competition and both total factor productivity and labor productivity. This relationship is found to be robust to different specifications and in accordance with the results in the literature obtained for other countries. |
| Keywords: | Competition, Productivity, Portugal |
| JEL: | D40 D24 O47 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mde:wpaper:00108&r=bec |
| By: | Shusen Qi (Xiamen University); Steven Ongena (University of Zurich, Swiss Finance Institute, KU Leuven, and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)); Hua Cheng (University of Texas at Austin) |
| Abstract: | We study discrimination against female entrepreneurs. We analyze bank lending to 6,422 firms in 22 transition countries, both at the extensive and intensive margin. We find that gender discrimination occurs only if a firm is both managed and owned by females, especially in localities where gender bias is acute or more domestic banks are present. In contrast if either the top manager or owner is male, we find no evidence of discrimination. Importantly, these results are not driven by females having inferior skills to males. |
| Keywords: | Access to credit, gender, discrimination, entrepreneurship |
| JEL: | G21 J16 L26 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1801&r=bec |
| By: | Najda-Janoszka, Marta |
| Abstract: | As markets become increasingly more competitive firms systematically move away from hierarchical integrated supply chains toward fragmented networks of strategic partnerships with external partners. Business practice indicate a growing number of busi-nesses relying on the platform organizational structures. For such constructs superior pro-duct quality and customer appeal maintain necessary but it is the breadth of the ecosystem of related product and services that has become a prerequisite for success. It implies the focus on third parties, complementors, who develop and deliver diverse content to plat-forms as well as enhance platform’s generativity. Although complementary relations should be the main reference while considering the network dynamics from different angles, the attention in the extant research gravitates toward inter-platform competition with platform owners as the central object. Thus, with the objective to contribute to the emerging lite-rature on industry platforms, this conceptual article discusses main challenges concerned with orchestrating arm’s length relationships with complementors, by departing from plat-form-owner-centered approach and focusing on behavior of interdepended contributors. |
| Keywords: | digital platform, value capture, value creation, complements, boundary resources |
| JEL: | M15 O32 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:87440&r=bec |
| By: | Iammarino, Simona; McCann, Philip; Ortega-Argilés, Raquel |
| JEL: | R14 J01 L81 |
| Date: | 2018–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:86626&r=bec |
| By: | Fremeth, Adam; Richter, Brian; Schaufele, Brandon |
| Abstract: | Populist clamor and recent Supreme Court decisions have renewed calls for increased regulation of corporate money in politics. Few empirical estimates exist, however, on the implications of existing rules on firms' political spending. Exploiting within firm-cycle cross-candidate variation and across firm-cycle variation, we demonstrate that the regulation of PAC campaign contributions generates large spillovers into other corporate political expenditures such as lobbying. Using both high dimensional fixed effects and regression discontinuity designs, we demonstrate that firms constrained by campaign contribution limits spend between $549,000 and $1.6M more on lobbying per election cycle, an amount that is more than 100 times the campaign contribution limit. This empirical results demonstrate that, similar to regulations in other domains of the economy, constraining specific corporate political activities often yields unintended effects. |
| Keywords: | Campaign finance regulation; corporate political activity; election law |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K39 |
| Date: | 2018–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:87612&r=bec |
| By: | Yagi, Michiyuki; Kokubu, Katsuhiko |
| Abstract: | In recent years, material flow cost accounting (MFCA) has gradually been recognized in Asia by the standardization of ISO 14051 and 14052 and by the project of dissemination undertaken by the Asian Productivity Organization (APO). However, MFCA is still not used across the board. This study analyzes the characteristics of material flow (MF) management to facilitate the expanded use of MFCA. The research framework of this study investigates the degree of MF management and the sequential relationships among financial factors, MF management, and waste performance, based on a questionnaire survey of non-financial listed companies in Thailand. Fifty-eight percent of the respondent firms answer that they are managing MF information (self-rating). Meanwhile, 50%, 49%, 29%, and 24% of the firms actually disclose the amounts of total waste, hazardous waste, raw materials consumed, and recycled waste, respectively. The results of this study show that respondent firms with MF management (self-rating) are more likely to manage/disclose total waste, hazardous waste, and raw materials consumed than those without it. In terms of financial factors, cost ratio and profitability are likely to affect firm decisions regarding whether to manage the MF. Additionally, MF management is likely to decrease the hazardous waste ratio. The series of results shows that firms in Thailand are more likely to be concerned about hazardous waste management than resource efficiency. Therefore, hazardous waste should probably be thoroughly managed, as a preliminary step in the promotion of MFCA. |
| Keywords: | Material flow management; Thailand; Waste performance; Material flow cost accounting; Data envelopment analysis |
| JEL: | M11 Q53 Q56 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:87926&r=bec |
| By: | Rüdiger Fahlenbrach (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Hyemin Kim (Nanyang Technological University); Angie Low (Nanyang Technological University) |
| Abstract: | Directors are more likely to obtain additional directorships or be promoted if the CEO and peer directors of their current board are well-connected. The impact of CEO and peer director connections is stronger for additional appointments and promotions at firms in the CEO’s and peer directors’ networks. CEO connections are particularly important for directors with a weaker labor market. There is no evidence that the appointments of referred directors are less well-received by the market than other appointments. Overall, connections are important in the director labor market. Access to additional networks provides strong incentives for directors to join corporate boards. |
| Keywords: | board of directors, social connections, director labor market |
| JEL: | G30 G34 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1828&r=bec |