|
on Business Economics |
By: | Alessandra Chirco (Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Economia, Università del Salento, Italy); Caterina Colombo (Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università di Ferrara, Italy); Marcella Scrimitore (Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Economia, Università del Salento, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy) |
Abstract: | We consider the choice of price/quantity by a public and a private firm in a mixed differentiated duopoly. First, we study the way in which the strategic choice of the market variable is affected by different given organizational structures (managerial or entrepreneurial) of the public and the private firm. Second, we investigate how the price/quantity choice interacts with the endogenous choice of the organizational structure, thus determining a subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms choose to behave as price-setters and to adopt a managerial structure. |
Keywords: | mixed duopoly; strategic delegation; price competition; quantity competition |
JEL: | D43 L22 L32 |
Date: | 2013–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimwps:27_13&r=bec |
By: | Stephen Ross Yeaple |
Abstract: | A growing literature seeks to understand how the characteristics of firms shape the manner in which they serve foreign markets. We consider an environment in which multiproduct firms can sell their products in multiple countries from multiple locations. We show that there are strong empirical regularities in the expansion strategies of U.S. multinational firms and that simple extensions of standard models do not explain these regularities. We augment these models by introducing a framework in which organizational capital is a scarce input within the firm that has to be allocated to particular products and production locations and show that the standard model, so amended, is consistent with the data. We then use the model to analyze the productivity effect of changes in international frictions both within and across firms. |
JEL: | F1 F12 F23 |
Date: | 2013–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19166&r=bec |
By: | Qingfang Wang |
Abstract: | The number of ethnic minority and women-owned businesses has increased rapidly during the past few decades. However, the characteristics of these businesses and their owners differ by race, ethnicity, and gender. Using a confidential national survey of ethnic minority and women-owned businesses in the United States, this study examines ethnic minority- and women-owned businesses segmented by industrial sectors. Consistent with gender occupational segregation, male- and female- owned businesses have distinctive sectoral concentration patterns, with ethnic minority women- owned businesses highly concentrated in a limited number of industrial sectors. However, the relationship between business sectoral concentration and business performance is not uniform across ethnic and gender groups. Concentration in specific industrial sectors does not necessarily mean poor performance when measured by sales, size of employment or payrolls. However, for women-owned businesses, those sectors obviously pay less and have marginal profits, especially if considering the size of the firms. |
Keywords: | ethnic business, female entrepreneurship, labor market segmentation, gender |
Date: | 2013–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:13-34&r=bec |
By: | Maria Bas |
Abstract: | This paper investigates the relationship between the reform of energy, telecommunications and transport services in India in the mid-1990s and manufacturing firms’ export performance. The empirical analysis relies on exogenous indicators of regulation of Indian services sectors and detailed firm-level data from India in the 1994-2004 period. I find that the reform of upstream services sector has increased the probability of exporting and export sales shares of firms producing in downstream manufacturing industries. The results suggest that the effect of services liberalization on manufacturing firms’ export performance is stronger for initially more productive firms. These empirical findings are robust to alternative econometric specifications that control for other reforms, industry, firm characteristics and that deal with potential reverse causality concerns. |
Keywords: | Services liberalization;manufacturing firms’ export performance;firm heterogeneity;firm level data |
JEL: | O10 O12 F1 L8 |
Date: | 2013–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2013-17&r=bec |
By: | Vivien D. Procher (Jackstaedt Center of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal); Diemo Urbig (Jackstaedt Center of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal); Christine Volkmann (Jackstaedt Center of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal) |
Abstract: | For a sample of 1243 European companies, we analyse the link between firm type and foreign direct investment (FDI) locations. We find substantial empirical evidence that being a family firm does not only affect the overall propensity for FDI but that this effect is also specific to target regions. Overall, family firms invest more than managerial-led firms, particularly in Europe and North America. Furthermore the BRIC countries Brazil, Russia, India and China do not constitute a homogenous attractiveness cluster for FDI. |
Keywords: | foreign direct investment, family firms, BRIC |
JEL: | D21 F23 L22 |
Date: | 2013–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:schdps:sdp13004&r=bec |
By: | Dessi, Roberta (IDEI, Toulouse School of Economics); Miquel-Florensa, Pepita (Toulouse School of Economics) |
Abstract: | We study the role of status in an experimental Principal-Agent game.Status is awarded to subjects based on either talent or luck. In each randomly matched principal-agent pair, the principal chooses the agent's status-contingent piece rate for a task in which talent matters for performance (an IQ test). We perform the experiment in Cambridge (UK) and in HCMV (Vietnam). We find that in Cambridge piece rate others are significantly higher for high-status agents (only) when status signals talent. However, these higher offers are not payoff-maximizing for the principals.In contrast, Vietnam piece rate offers are significantly higher for high-status agents (only) when status is determined by luck. We explore possible explanations, and the implications for status and incentives. |
Keywords: | , , incentives, status, identity, piece rate, principal-agent, signaling, culture. |
Date: | 2013–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:27275&r=bec |
By: | Bruhn, Miriam; McKenzie, David |
Abstract: | The majority of microenterprises in most developing countries remain informal despite more than a decade of reforms aimed at making it easier and cheaper for them to formalize. This paper summarizes the evidence on the effects of entry reforms and related policy actions to promote firm formalization. Most of these policies result only in a modest increase in the number of formal firms, if at all. Less is known about the impact of other forms of business regulations on the performance of low-scale enterprises. Most informal firms appear not to benefit on net from formalizing, so ease of formalization alone will not lead to most of them formalizing. Increased enforcement of rules can increase formality. Although there is a fiscal benefit of doing this with larger informal firms, it is unclear whether there is a public rationale for trying to formalize subsistence enterprises. |
Keywords: | Microfinance,Small Scale Enterprise,E-Business,Business in Development,Competitiveness and Competition Policy |
Date: | 2013–06–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6507&r=bec |