nep-bec New Economics Papers
on Business Economics
Issue of 2012‒06‒05
27 papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Universite du Quebec en Outaouais

  1. In brief: UK chief executives: paid for performance? By Brian Bell; John Van Reenen
  2. Market Size, Competition, and the Product Mix of Exporters By Thierry Mayer; Marc J. Melitz; Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano
  3. Board size and corporate risk-taking: Further evidence from Japan By Nakano, Makoto; Nguyen, Pascal
  4. CEO Pay with Perks By Andrew Carrothers; Seungjin Han; Jiaping Qiu
  5. Competition in the workplace: An experimental investigation By Benndorf, Volker; Rau, Holger A.
  6. Large shareholders and firm risk-taking behavior By Boubaker, Sabri; Nguyen, Pascal; Rouatbi, Wael
  7. Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting By Pierre Chaigneau; Nicolas Sahuguet
  8. Market Structure and Market Performance in E-Commerce By Franz Hackl; Michael E. Kummer; Rudolf Winter-Ebmer; Christine Zulehner
  9. Unionisation, International Integration and Selection By Montagna, Catia; Nocco, Antonella
  10. Structural Changes of Japanese Firms: Strategy, organization, and behavior (Japanese) By MORIKAWA Masayuki
  11. Asymmetric long-run effects in the oil industry By Sofía B. Ramos; Helena Veiga; Chih-Wei Wang
  12. Slow Recoveries: A Structural Interpretation By Jordi Galí; Frank Smets; Rafael Wouters
  13. Economising, Strategising and the Decision to Outsource By Leahy, Dermot; Montagna, Catia
  14. Going concern opinions are not bad news: Evidence from industry rivals By Luís M. S. Coelho; Rúben M. T. Peixinho; Siri Terjensen
  15. Bargaining Failures and Merger Policy By Roberto Burguet; Ramon Caminal
  16. Legal Origin and Firm Size Effects Around the World By Bjuggren, Per-Olof; Högberg, Andreas
  17. On the Organizational Structure of Multinational Firms: Which Sourcing Mode for Which Input? By Suedekum, Jens; Nowak, Verena; Schwarz, Christian
  18. A Theory of Expert Leadership By Goodall, Amanda H.
  19. In brief: Two cheers for Anglo-Saxon financial markets? By Philippe Aghion; John Van Reenen; Luigi Zingales
  20. Do balanced skills help nascent entrepreneurs to make progress in the venture creation process? By Stuetzer, Michael; Goethner, Maximilian; Cantner, Uwe
  21. E-commerce and Productivity: An empirical analysis based on the <i>Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities</i> (Japanese) By Sanghoon AHN; YoungGak KIM; KWON Hyeog Ug
  22. Neutral technology shocks and employment dynamics: results based on an RBC identification scheme By Mumtaz, Haroon; Zanetti, Francesco
  23. Do Institutions and Culture Matter for Business Cycles? By Sumru Altug; Fabio Canova
  24. Keep to sustain or keep to exploit? Why firms keep hard evidence By Agisilaou, Panayiotis
  25. The Role of Services for Manufacturing Firms’ Exports By Lodefalk, Magnus
  26. Ambiguous Business Cycles By Cosmin Ilut; Martin Schneider
  27. Does New Entry Drive Out Incumbents? Evidence from establishment-level data in Japan By ITO Keiko; KATO Masatoshi

  1. By: Brian Bell; John Van Reenen
    Abstract: Does it matter whether you work for a successful company? And if so, does it matter who you are? To answer these questions we construct a unique panel dataset covering the pay of all CEOs, senior managers and a fully representative sample of workers for a large group of publicly-listed companies covering just under 90% of the market capitalization of the UK stock market. We show that senior management appear to have pay that is strongly associated with various measures of firm performance (such as shareholder returns and quasi-rents), while workers' pay is only weakly associated with such measures. A 10% increase in firm value is associated with an increase of 3% in CEO pay but only 0.2% in average workers' pay. Falls in firm performance are also followed by CEO pay cuts and significantly more CEO firings. This is essentially a result of the responsiveness of flexible pay to performance and only senior executives have a large enough share of pay in bonuses to generate a sizeable overall effect on pay. External control matters for pay - firms with lower levels of institutional ownership have smaller pay-performance elasticities for CEOs and do not cut their pay when performance is poor.
    Keywords: CEO, performance pay, executive pay, firms, management
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:373&r=bec
  2. By: Thierry Mayer; Marc J. Melitz; Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano
    Abstract: We build a theoretical model of multi-product firms that highlights how competition across market destinations affects both a firm's exported product range and product mix. We show how tougher competition in an export market induces a firm to skew its export sales towards its best performing products. We find very strong confirmation of this competitive effect for French exporters across export market destinations. Theoretically, this within firm change in product mix driven by the trading environment has important repercussions on firm productivity. A calibrated fit to our theoretical model reveals that these productivity effects are potentially quite large.
    Keywords: trading partners, multi product firms, trade models
    JEL: F0
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1146&r=bec
  3. By: Nakano, Makoto; Nguyen, Pascal
    Abstract: Evidence based on US firms suggests that large boards restrain risk taking. We investigate whether a similar effect exists in Japan. Our results confirm that firms with larger boards exhibit lower performance variability relative to firms with smaller boards. However, this effect is less significant when firms have plenty of investment opportunities, but considerably stronger when firms have few growth options. This new finding is consistent with recent evidence indicating that larger boards are not necessarily detrimental to firm performance. The results are shown to be robust to the endogeneity of board structure and the use of alternative risk measures and estimation methods.
    Keywords: corporate governance; board size; risk taking; investment opportunities; performance volatility; bankruptcy risk
    JEL: G34
    Date: 2012–05–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38990&r=bec
  4. By: Andrew Carrothers; Seungjin Han; Jiaping Qiu
    Abstract: This paper develops an equilibrium matching model for a competitive CEO market in which CEOs’ wage and perks are both endogenously determined by bargaining between firms and CEOs. In stable matching equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more sensitive than wage to changes in firm size if there are economies of scale in the cost of providing perks. Productivity-related perks provide common value by increasing both the CEO’s productivity and utility while non productivity-related perks provide private value by increasing the CEO’s utility only. The more perks enhance the CEO’s productivity, the faster perks increase in firm size. We test the predictions of the model using information on CEO wage and perks for S&P 500 companies and find consistent empirical evidence.
    Keywords: matching, perks, executive compensation, private benefits
    JEL: C78 J33 G30
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2012-05&r=bec
  5. By: Benndorf, Volker; Rau, Holger A.
    Abstract: We analyze competition between workers in a gift-exchange experiment where two workers are hired by the same employer. In the competition treatment the two employees simultaneously choose their effort whereas in the baseline treatment competition cannot occur since there is only one employee per employer. We find that in the competition treatment employers implicitly set tournament incentives by rewarding employees who choose higher effort levels than their co-workers. Here, employees' effort levels increase significantly faster, which can be explained by imitation learning. Furthermore we find that employers decrease their wage payments per unit of effort exerted over time when employing two workers. --
    Keywords: Gift Exchange,Competition,Internal Organization,Multiple Employees
    JEL: C91 J41 L22 M52
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:53&r=bec
  6. By: Boubaker, Sabri; Nguyen, Pascal; Rouatbi, Wael
    Abstract: We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect corporate risk-taking. Using hand-collected data on French publicly-listed companies over the period 2003-2007, we show that the presence, number and voting power of MLS, other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS), are associated with greater variability in operating performance (ROA), market value (Tobin’s Q) and stock returns. In contrast, the presence of a single LCS is associated with less variability in firm performance, especially when the divergence between the LCS’s control and cash flow rights is large. This result suggests that MLS are able to prevent the LCS from dictating her preference for low-risk projects in order to protect her future consumption of private benefits. As a consequence, firms undertake better investments regardless of their intrinsic risks, and this eventually leads them to achieve higher performance. MLS are thus confirmed to play a critical role in corporate governance.
    Keywords: Risk-taking; large shareholders; corporate governance; benefit of control
    JEL: G34 G32
    Date: 2012–05–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39005&r=bec
  7. By: Pierre Chaigneau; Nicolas Sahuguet
    Abstract: We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting with matching between firms and managers with state-contingent reservation utility. We show that the optimal contract is designed to retain and insure the manager. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. This contract can be implemented with call options based on a single performance measure which generally does not filter out luck. When costs of involuntary managerial turnover differ across firms, and the abilities of different managers are more or less precisely estimated ex-ante, the model can also explain the observed association between pay-for-luck and bad corporate governance.
    Keywords: CEO pay, corporate governance, pay-for-luck, stock-options
    JEL: D86 G34 J33
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1224&r=bec
  8. By: Franz Hackl; Michael E. Kummer; Rudolf Winter-Ebmer; Christine Zulehner
    Abstract: We investigate the causal effect of market structure on market performance in the consumer electronics. We combine data from Austria’s largest online site for price comparisons with retail data on wholesale prices provided by a major hardware producer for consumer electronics. We observe input prices of firms, and all their moves in the entry and the pricing game over the whole product lifecycle. Using this information for 70 digital cameras, we generate instrumental variables for the number of firms in the market based on the shops’ entry decisions on other product markets in the past. We find that instrumenting is particularly important for estimating the effect of competition on the markup of the price leader.
    Keywords: Retailing, Product Lifecycle, Market Structure, Market Performance, Markup, Price Dispersion
    JEL: L11 L13 L81 D43
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2012_07&r=bec
  9. By: Montagna, Catia; Nocco, Antonella
    Abstract: We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous fi rms when wage negotiations can occur at the fi rm or at the profi t-centre level. With productivity speci c wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).
    Keywords: firm selection, unionisation, wage inequality, trade liberalisation,
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:282&r=bec
  10. By: MORIKAWA Masayuki
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to overview the characteristics of Japanese firms based on an original survey. Specifically, we analyze the changes in management strategy, corporate governance, internal organization, and business behavior of Japanese firms by comparing a survey conducted in the 1990s with a recent one using the same questionnaires. These surveys cover both listed and unlisted firms, which is an important advantage of this study. There are many stable characteristics: the longer time horizon in decision making, the important role of workers and customers as stakeholders, and the reluctance to reduce employees in case of deterioration of financial performance. On the other hand, recently, Japanese firms have attached importance on profit rather than sales as a performance measure. The influence of shareholders on managerial decision making is strengthening. Japanese firms have become active in restructuring their businesses through M&A and sales of unprofitable businesses.
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:rdpsjp:12017&r=bec
  11. By: Sofía B. Ramos; Helena Veiga; Chih-Wei Wang
    Abstract: This paper analyzes long term dependence between the market value of oil firms and oil prices. Applying nonlinear cointegration, the results show that in the long-run oil price hikes and falls show different adjustments to the equilibrium. Using a momentum threshold autoregressive model (MTAR), we find that for oil producing firms, the adjustment is faster for oil price falls than for oil price hikes, but we do not find a difference on the speed of adjustment for oil integrated firms. Moreover, testing for asymmetric cointegration, we also find that oil price falls impact substantially the value of oil producers and integrated firms, but the same is not found for oil price hikes. Overall, the evidence suggests that firm value stays above equilibrium relationship when there are oil price hikes.
    Keywords: Asymmetric cointegration, ECM models, MTAR models, Oil prices, Oil industry
    JEL: G15 Q43
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:wsrepe:ws120502&r=bec
  12. By: Jordi Galí; Frank Smets; Rafael Wouters
    Abstract: An analysis of the performance of GDP, employment and other labor market variables following the troughs in postwar U.S. business cycles points to much slower recoveries in the three most recent episodes, but does not reveal any significant change over time in the relation between GDP and employment. This leads us to characterize the last three episodes as slow recoveries, as opposed to jobless recoveries. We use the estimated New Keynesian model in Galí-Smets-Wouters (2011) to provide a structural interpretation for the slower recoveries since the early nineties.
    Keywords: jobless recoveries, U.S. business cycle, estimated DSGE models, Okun's law
    JEL: E32
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:630&r=bec
  13. By: Leahy, Dermot; Montagna, Catia
    Abstract: We study the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good production requires specialised inputs. Firms’ mode of operation decision depends on both the incentive to economize on costs and on strategic considerations. We explore the strategic incentives to outsource and show that asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different modes of operation, even when they are ex-ante identical. With ex-ante asymmetries, higher cost firms are more likely to outsource. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.
    Keywords: Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, Trade Liberalisation, Oligopoly,
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:265&r=bec
  14. By: Luís M. S. Coelho; Rúben M. T. Peixinho; Siri Terjensen
    Abstract: This paper examines whether going concern audit opinions (GCO) affect the stock price performance of the announcing firms and their industry rivals. Our original evidence clearly suggests that such accounting event is asymmetrically perceived by the market depending on whether the firm is qualified by the auditor or not. In particular, firms receiving a GCO earn negative abnormal returns at the audit report’s disclosure date and over the following year whereas their industry rivals exhibit positive abnormal returns at the GCO date and in the subsequent one-month period. This is in contrast with the preevent abnormal returns, which, on average, are negative and significant for all firms operating within the industry. Overall, we highlight the relevance of audit opinions and mandatory accounting information for the timing of transactions in financial markets.
    Keywords: Audit reports, going concern, competitive effect
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp162012&r=bec
  15. By: Roberto Burguet; Ramon Caminal
    Abstract: In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.
    Keywords: endogenous mergers, merger policy, bargaining, synergies
    JEL: L13 L41
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:633&r=bec
  16. By: Bjuggren, Per-Olof (The Ratio Institute); Högberg, Andreas (Jönköpings International Business School)
    Abstract: We propose that the legal origin explanation of differences in financial indicators lacks the ability to satisfyingly describe investment performance and firm size effects. In this paper we investigate the impact of legal origin and firm size on investment performance for 20 111 firms in 58 countries between 2001 and 2010. Anglo Saxon (common law), German, French as well as Scandinavian (civil law) variants of legal systems are covered by the countries included in the study. In addition, we include a category of “old socialist countries”. We find little support for the supposed superiority of common law systems over civil law systems. In fact, the average investor performance is lower in the Anglo Saxon countries than countries with German and Scandinavian legal origin, yet higher than in French legal origin and old socialist countries. Even though limit to firm size is frequently discussed in the theoretical literature there are few empirical studies addressing this issue. In this study we specifically investigate how investment performance is affected by increasing size. We find that irrespective of legal origin a negative impact of firm size appears after a threshold size has been passed.
    Keywords: Corporate governance; firm size; legal origin; marginal q
    JEL: C23 G30 L25
    Date: 2012–05–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0191&r=bec
  17. By: Suedekum, Jens (University of Duisburg-Essen); Nowak, Verena (University of Duisburg-Essen); Schwarz, Christian (University of Duisburg-Essen)
    Abstract: Recent studies indicate that firms often outsource standard and simple tasks, while keeping complex and important inputs inside their boundaries. This observation is difficult to reconcile with the property rights approach of the firm, which suggests that important components should be outsourced in order to properly incentivize the respective suppliers. In this paper we introduce economies of scope into a property rights model where a producer contracts with two suppliers. The organizational decision is driven by two countervailing effects: the ownership rights effect favors outsourcing, while the "indirect" effect via the suppliers' costs favors vertical integration of both inputs. If production is highly component intensive, and if one input is much more important than the other, we show that vertical integration of the "more important" and outsourcing of the "less important" supplier is chosen in equilibrium. We also consider an open economy setup where the producer decides whether to offshore inputs.
    Keywords: multinational firms, outsourcing, intra-firm trade, property rights approach
    JEL: D23 F12 L23
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6564&r=bec
  18. By: Goodall, Amanda H. (IZA)
    Abstract: How much knowledge should leaders have of their organization's core business? This is an important question but not one that has been addressed in the management literature. In a new 'theory of expert leadership' (TEL), this paper blends conceptual work with recent empirical evidence. It suggests that organizations perform more effectively when led by individuals who have a deep understanding of the core business of their organization. Being a capable general manager is not sufficient. Expert leaders are those with (1) inherent knowledge, acquired through technical expertise combined with high ability in the core-business activity; (2) industry experience, which stems from time and practice within the core-business industry; and (3) leadership capabilities, which include management skills and a leader's innate characteristics. This paper criticizes the rise of the professional manager and generalist CEO. It argues that expert leaders improve organizational performance through knowledge-based strategy, by acting as a standard bearer, by creating the right environment for core workers, and, finally, by adopting the long view. The paper concludes by identifying the potential boundaries of TEL.
    Keywords: expert leaders, CEOs, inherent knowledge, core business, organizational performance
    JEL: J24 M12 M51
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6566&r=bec
  19. By: Philippe Aghion; John Van Reenen; Luigi Zingales
    Abstract: We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection.
    Keywords: Innovation, institutional ownership, career concerns, R&D, productivity
    JEL: O31 O32 O33 G20 G32
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:372&r=bec
  20. By: Stuetzer, Michael; Goethner, Maximilian; Cantner, Uwe
    Abstract: We analyze longitudinal data on innovative start-up projects and apply Lazear’s jack-of-all-trades theory to investigate the effect of nascent entrepreneurs’ balanced skills on their progress in the venture creation process. Our results suggest that those nascent entrepreneurs who exhibit a sufficiently broad set of skills undertake more gestation activities towards an operational new venture. This supports the notion that a balanced skill set is an important determinant of entrepreneurial market entry.
    Keywords: Nascent entrepreneurship; balanced skills; new venture creation
    JEL: L26 J24 M13
    Date: 2012–05–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39115&r=bec
  21. By: Sanghoon AHN; YoungGak KIM; KWON Hyeog Ug
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the determinants and effects of e-commerce on firms' productivity using the longitudinal data from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSBSA). The main findings are as follows.<br />(1) Excellent firms with higher productivity are more likely to utilize e-commerce in their purchase process, whereas inefficient firms with less productivity are likely to utilize it for selling and management. <br />(2) Excellent firms in the manufacturing sector are less likely to introduce e-commerce, whereas those in the non-manufacturing sector, such as wholesale, are more inclined to use it. <br />(3) E-commerce used in the purchase process has a positive influence on both the total factor productivity (TFP) level and TFP growth of firms, even when controlling for other firm characteristics.
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:rdpsjp:12014&r=bec
  22. By: Mumtaz, Haroon (Bank of England); Zanetti, Francesco (Bank of England)
    Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic response of labour input to neutral technology shocks. It uses a standard real business cycle model enriched with labour market search and matching frictions and investment-specific technological progress that enables a new, agnostic, identification scheme based on sign restrictions on an SVAR. The estimation supports an increase of labour input in response to neutral technology shocks. This finding is robust across different perturbations of the SVAR model. The model is extended to allow for time-varying volatility of shocks and the identification scheme is used to investigate the importance of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks to explain the reduced volatility of US macroeconomic variables over the past two decades. Neutral technology shocks are found to be more important than investment-specific technology shocks.
    Date: 2012–05–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:0453&r=bec
  23. By: Sumru Altug; Fabio Canova
    Abstract: We examine the relationship between institutions, culture and cyclical fluctuations for a sample of 45 European, Middle Eastern and North African countries. Better governance is associated with shorter and less severe contractions and milder expansions. Certain cultural traits, such as lack of acceptance of power distance and individualism, are also linked business cycle features. Business cycle synchronization is tightly related to similarities in the institutional environment. Mediterranean countries conform to these general tendencies.
    Keywords: business cycles, institutions, culture, Mediterranean countries, synchronization
    JEL: C32 E32
    Date: 2012–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:627&r=bec
  24. By: Agisilaou, Panayiotis
    Abstract: We develop a model wherein collusive firms' decisions to keep or to destroy the hard evidence is endogenous. Unlike previous literature, we assume that the administration of the cartel crucially depends on the existence of the hard evidence. Within this framework, we explore the impact of a leniency program on whether firms' incentives are to destroy or to keep the hard evidence. Moreover, we examine firms' incentives to report or not to report the hard evidence to the antitrust authority. We show that firms may willfully keep the hard evidence, even if a leniency program is not available, in order to enhance the stability of the cartel. Additionally, we prove that firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence when a leniency program is available. Finally, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to destroy the hard evidence when the collusive profits-fine ratio increases.
    Keywords: self-reporting; leniency program; hard evidence; collusion
    JEL: K40 K21 L4 L1
    Date: 2012–03–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39109&r=bec
  25. By: Lodefalk, Magnus (Department of Business, Economics, Statistics and Informatics)
    Abstract: Manufacturing firms increasingly focus on services. This trend is evident in their composition of input, in-house production and seemingly also in total sale. Firms’ services intensity may affect their productivity, and thereby competitiveness abroad. Services are also instrumental in connecting to the foreign market and can help firms to differentiate their offers. However, only bits and pieces of the relation between services and manufacturing’s exports have been analysed in previous literature. This study contributes by discussing the role of services for the firm, arriving at some conjectures and testing them empirically. Export intensity is regressed on two services parameters, applying a fractional model to a rich panel of firms in Sweden in the period 2001-2007. The microeconometric results suggest that there is an effect of services inputs, while controlling for covariates and firm heterogeneity. Raising the proportion of services in in-house production, on average, yields higher export intensity. Buying-in more services is associated with higher export intensity for firms in selected industries. Overall, the study provides new firm-level evidence of the role of services as inputs in manufacturing.
    Keywords: firm; export intensity; manufacturing; services; intangibles; innovation
    JEL: F14 L24 L25 L60 O33
    Date: 2012–05–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:oruesi:2012_010&r=bec
  26. By: Cosmin Ilut; Martin Schneider
    Abstract: This paper considers business cycle models with agents who dislike both risk and ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty). Ambiguity aversion is described by recursive multiple priors preferences that capture agents' lack of confidence in probability assessments. While modeling changes in risk typically requires higher-order approximations, changes in ambiguity in our models work like changes in conditional means. Our models thus allow for uncertainty shocks but can still be solved and estimated using first-order approximations. In our estimated medium-scale DSGE model, a loss of confidence about productivity works like `unrealized' bad news. Time-varying confidence emerges as a major source of business cycle fluctuations.
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:duk:dukeec:12-06&r=bec
  27. By: ITO Keiko; KATO Masatoshi
    Abstract: Using establishment-level data in Japan, we examine the effects of new business entries on the probability of incumbents exiting the market. In particular, we estimate how the effects vary depending on the size of both the entrants and incumbents, which has not been explored in the literature.<br />We find that while new business entries increase the probability that incumbents will exit, the effect differs significantly across sectors and depends on entrant and incumbent size. Although small establishments are the most likely to be driven out by new entries in all sectors, large incumbents are not always the most competitive, and, in the case of the tradable services sector, medium-sized establishments are the least likely to be affected by new entries.<br />Moreover, our simple regression analysis shows a positive relationship between entry rates and employment growth in a region. New entries may promote resource reallocation and stimulate regional economies, possibly resulting in regional employment growth.
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:12034&r=bec

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