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on Business Economics |
| By: | Hart, Oliver; Zingales, Luigi |
| Abstract: | We study an economy where the lack of a simultaneous double coincidence of wants creates the need for a relatively safe asset (money). We show that, even in the absence of asymmetric information or an agency problem, the private provision of liquidity is inefficient. The reason is that liquidity affects prices and the welfare of others, and creators do not internalize this. This distortion is present even if we introduce lending and government money. To eliminate the inefficiency the government must restrict the creation of liquidity by the private sector. |
| Keywords: | banking; liquidity; money |
| JEL: | E41 E51 G21 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8525&r=bec |
| By: | Paul Beaudry; Franck Portier |
| Abstract: | Business cycles reflect changes over time in the amount of trade between individuals. In this paper we show that incorporating explicitly intra-temporal gains from trade between individuals into a macroeconomic model can provide new insight into the potential mechanisms driving economic fluctuations as well as modify key policy implications. We first show how a "gains from trade" approach can easily explain why changes in perceptions about the future (including "news" about the future) can cause booms and bust. We then turn to fiscal policy, and discuss under what conditions fiscal multipliers can be observed. While much of our analysis is conducted in a flexible price environment, we also present implications of our model for a sticky price environments, as it allows to understand stable-inflation boom-bust cycles. The source of the explicit gains from trade in our setup derives from simply assuming that in the short run workers are not perfect mobile across all sectors of the economy. We provide evidence from the PSID in support of this modeling assumption. |
| JEL: | E32 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17291&r=bec |
| By: | Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde; Pablo Guerron-Quintana; Keith Kuester; Juan Rubio-Ramirez |
| Abstract: | The authors study the effects of changes in uncertainty about future fiscal policy on aggregate economic activity. Fiscal deficits and public debt have risen sharply in the wake of the financial crisis. While these developments make fiscal consolidation inevitable, there is considerable uncertainty about the policy mix and timing of such budgetary adjustment. To evaluate the consequences of this increased uncertainty, the authors first estimate tax and spending processes for the U.S. that allow for time-varying volatility. They then feed these processes into an otherwise standard New Keynesian business cycle model calibrated to the U.S. economy. The authors find that fiscal volatility shocks have an adverse effect on economic activity that is comparable to the effects of a 25-basis-point innovation in the federal funds rate. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy ; Fiscal policy ; Uncertainty |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:11-32&r=bec |
| By: | Michael B. Devereux; Viktoria Hnatkovska |
| Abstract: | A basic prediction of effcient risk-sharing is that relative consumption growth rates across countries or regions should be positively related to real exchange rate growth rates across the same areas. We investigate this hypothesis, employing a newly constructed multi-country and multi-regional data set. Within countries, we find signifcant evidence for risk sharing: episodes of high relative regional consumption growth are associated with regional real exchange rate depreciation. Across countries however, the association is reversed: relative consumption and real exchange rates are negatively correlated. We identify this failure of risk sharing as a border effect. We find that the border effect is substantially (but not fully) accounted for by nominal exchange rate variability. We then ask whether standard open economy macro models can explain these features of the data. We argue that they cannot. To explain the role of the nominal exchange rate in deviations from cross country consumption risk sharing, it is necessary to combine multiple sources of shocks, ex-ante price setting, and incomplete financial markets. |
| JEL: | F3 F4 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17288&r=bec |
| By: | Darrell Duffie |
| Abstract: | Here, I present and discuss a “10-by-10-by-10” network-based approach to monitoring systemic financial risk. Under this approach, a regulator would analyze the exposures of a core group of systemically important financial firms to a list of stressful scenarios, say 10 in number. For each scenario, about 10 such designated firms would report their gains or losses. Each reporting firm would also provide the identities of the 10, say, counterparties with whom the gain or loss for that scenario is the greatest in magnitude relative to all counterparties. The gains or losses with each of those 10 counterparties would also be reported, scenario by scenario. Gains and losses would be measured in terms of market value and also in terms of cash flow, allowing regulators to assess risk magnitudes in terms of stresses to both economic values and also liquidity. Exposures would be measured before and after collateralization. One of the scenarios would be the failure of a counterparty. The “top ten” counterparties for this scenario would therefore be those whose defaults cause the greatest losses to the reporting firm. In eventual practice, the number of reporting firms, the number of stress scenarios, and the number of major counterparties could all exceed 10, but it is reasonable to start with a small reporting system until the approach is better understood and agreed upon internationally. |
| JEL: | G28 G32 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17281&r=bec |
| By: | Satyajit Chatterjee; Burcu Eyigungor |
| Abstract: | The authors construct a quantitative equilibrium model of the housing sector that accounts for the homeownership rate, the average foreclosure rate, and the distribution of home-equity ratios across homeowners prior to the recent boom and bust in the housing market. They analyze the key mechanisms that account for these facts, including the preferential tax treatment of housing and in ation. The authors then use the model to gain a deeper understanding of the recent housing and mortgage crisis by studying the consequence of an unanticipated increase in the supply of housing (overbuilding shock). They show that the model can account for the observed decline in house prices and much of the increase in the foreclosure rate if two additional forces are taken into account: (i) the lengthening of the time to complete a foreclosure (during which a defaulter can stay rent-free in his house) and (ii) the tightening of credit constraints in the market for new mortgages. |
| Keywords: | Foreclosure ; Global financial crisis ; Mortgage loans |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:11-26&r=bec |
| By: | Joachim Wagner (Institute of Economics, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper documents the relationship between firm survival and three types of international trade activities – exports, imports and two-way trade. It uses unique new representative data for manufacturing enterprises from Germany, one of the leading actors on the world market for goods, that merge information from surveys performed by the Statistical Offices and administrative data collected by the Tax Authorities. It contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence on the role of imports and two-way trading for firm survival in a highly developed country. Descriptive statistics and regression analysis (with and without explicitly taking the rare events nature of firm exit into account) point to a strong positive link between firm survival on the one hand and imports and two-way trading on the other hand, while exporting alone does not play a role for exiting the market or not. |
| Keywords: | Exports, imports, firm survival |
| JEL: | F14 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lue:wpaper:211&r=bec |
| By: | Perotti, Enrico C; Ratnovski, Lev; Vlahu, Razvan |
| Abstract: | The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an unintended e¤ect of enabling banks to take more tail risk without the fear of breaching the minimal capital ratio in nontail risky project realizations. The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation. |
| Keywords: | Capital regulation; Keywords: Banking; Risk; Risk-taking; Systemic risk; Tail risk |
| JEL: | G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8526&r=bec |
| By: | Michael B. Devereux; Viktoria Hnatkovska |
| Abstract: | This paper documents some previously neglected features of sectoral shares at business cycle frequencies in OECD economies. In particular, we find that the nontraded sector share of output is as volatile as aggregate GDP, and that for most countries, the nontraded sector is distinctly countercyclical. While the standard international real business cycle model has difficulty in accounting for these properties of the data, an extended model which allows for sectoral adjustment along both the intensive and extensive margins does a much better job in replicating the volatilities and co-movements in the data. In addition, the model provides a closer match between theory and data with respect to the correlation between relative consumption growth and real exchange rate changes, a key measure of international risk-sharing. |
| JEL: | F3 F4 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17289&r=bec |
| By: | Darrell Duffie; Bruno Strulovici |
| Abstract: | We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between asset markets that are distinguished only by the levels of capital invested in each. Investment in that market with the greatest amount of capital earns the lowest risk premium. Intermediaries optimally trade off the costs of intermediation against fees that depend on the gain they can offer to investors for moving their capital to the market with the higher mean return. Those fees also depend on the bargaining power of the investor, in light of potential alternative intermediaries. In equilibrium, the speeds of adjustment of mean returns and of capital between the two markets are increasing in the degree to which capital is imbalanced between the two markets. |
| JEL: | D4 D53 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17296&r=bec |
| By: | Burda, Michael C; Hunt, Jennifer |
| Abstract: | Germany experienced an even deeper fall in GDP in the Great Recession than the United States, with little employment loss. Employers’ reticence to hire in the preceding expansion, associated in part with a lack of confidence it would last, contributed to an employment shortfall equivalent to 40 percent of the missing employment decline in the recession. Another 20 percent may be explained by wage moderation. A third important element was the widespread adoption of working time accounts, which permit employers to avoid overtime pay if hours per worker average to standard hours over a window of time. We find that this provided disincentives for employers to lay off workers in the downturn. Although the overall cuts in hours per worker were consistent with the severity of the Great Recession, reduction of working time account balances substituted for traditional government-sponsored short-time work. |
| Keywords: | extensive vs intensive employment margin; Germany; Great Recession; Hartz reforms; short time work; unemployment; working time accounts |
| JEL: | E24 E32 J6 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8520&r=bec |
| By: | Melvyn G. Coles; Dale T. Mortensen |
| Abstract: | A rich but tractable variant of the Burdett-Mortensen model of wage setting behavior is formulated and a dynamic market equilibrium solution to the model is defined and characterized. In the model, firms cannot commit to wage contracts. Instead, the Markov perfect equilibrium to the wage setting game, characterized by Coles (2001), is assumed. In addition, firm recruiting decisions, firm entry and exit, and transitory firm productivity shocks are incorporated into the model. Given that the cost of recruiting workers is proportional to firm employment, we establish the existence of an equilibrium solution to the model in which wages are not contingent on firm size but more productive employers always pay higher wages. Although the state space, the distribution of workers over firms, is large in the general case, it reduces to a scalar that can be interpreted as the unemployment rate in the special case of homogenous firms. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique. As the dimension of the state space is equal to the number of firms types in general, an (approximate) equilibrium is computable. |
| JEL: | D83 E24 J31 J6 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17284&r=bec |
| By: | Yanhui Wu |
| Abstract: | This paper embeds a principal-agent firm in an otherwise standard trade model a la Melitz (2003) to investigate the impact of globalization on the provision of managerial incentives and on the distribution of managerial compensation. Facing contractual frictions due to limited liability, firms with heterogeneous productivity endogenously sort into different pay structures to mitigate different levels of agency problems. More productive firms use a higher-powered incentive contract while less productive firms use a lowered- powered one. International trade within an industry enhances market competition, inducing resources reallocated from low productivity domestic firms to high productivity exporting .rms. The uneven effects of international trade on firms that differ in their exporting status and pay structure result in more prevalence of high-powered incentive pay, a larger wage gap between managers and production workers, and a higher level of wage inequality among managers. |
| Keywords: | trade, heterogeneous firms, pay contracts, managerial incentives, managerial compensation, wage inequality |
| JEL: | D2 F1 J3 L1 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1066&r=bec |
| By: | Yanhui Wu |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a simple theory of pay structures and pay levels across heterogeneous agents by bringing together optimal contracts inside the firm and competitive resource allocation in the market. The central idea is that more talented people tend to create greater value but face larger conflicts of interest in their employment relationship, and different pay contracts are optimally designed to mitigate different levels of agency problems. Sorted by their talent, people are stratified into production workers, self-employed, salaried managers with low-powered performance pay, and CEOs with high-powered equity-based pay. In a general equilibrium framework, I show that the sorting of managerial talent into pay contracts is tied to firm size. The theory highlights that high-powered incentive pay and large scales of operations cause the disproportionately large wage earnings at the top, and are the main source of income inequality. Market forces that reallocate resources from smaller to larger firms tend to increase the threshold talent for becoming a manager, increase the prevalence of high-powered incentive pay, raise the top earnings, and spread out the wage distribution. |
| Keywords: | Managerial Talent, Limited Liability, Provision of Incentives, Pay Structure, CEOPay, Wage Distribution |
| JEL: | D2 J3 L1 L2 M5 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1067&r=bec |
| By: | Armen Hovakimian; Ayla Kayhan; Sheridan Titman |
| Abstract: | Default probability plays a central role in the static tradeoff theory of capital structure. We directly test this theory by regressing the probability of default on proxies for costs and benefits of debt. Contrary to predictions of the theory, firms with higher bankruptcy costs, i.e., smaller firms and firms with lower asset tangibility, choose capital structures with higher bankruptcy risk. Further analysis suggests that the capital structures of smaller firms with lower asset tangibility, which tend to have less access to capital markets, are more sensitive to negative profitability and equity value shocks, making them more susceptible to bankruptcy risk. |
| JEL: | G3 G33 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17290&r=bec |
| By: | Kazuaki Okamura (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities and Economics, Kochi University) |
| Abstract: | Under asymmetric information conditions regarding worker productivity between current and prospective employers, a worker's promotion signals his/her productivity. In this Paper, we tested the signalling role of promotion, using Japanese micro-level data. We found that among lower-level positions, promotion seems to signal a worker's ability, and both the business cycle and foreign-capital ratio of his/her company significantly strengthen this effects. These results suggest that external labour market conditions (i.e. asymmetric information regarding a worker's abilities between a current and prospective employer) affect the economic differences among workers in the internal labour market. |
| Keywords: | Strategically delayed promotion, Signalling, Wage growth, Japan. |
| JEL: | C23 J31 L22 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1112&r=bec |
| By: | Fujimoto, Shouji; Ishikawa, Atushi; Mizuno, Takayuki; Watanabe, Tsutomu |
| Abstract: | We propose a new method for estimating the power-law exponent of a firm size variable, such as annual sales. Our focus is on how to empirically identify a range in which a firm size variable follows a power-law distribution. As is well known, a firm size variable follows a power-law distribution only beyond some threshold. On the other hand, in almost all empirical exercises, the right end part of a distribution deviates from a power-law due to finite size effect. We modify the method proposed by Malevergne et al. (2011) so that we can identify both of the lower and the upper thresholds and then estimate the power-law exponent using observations only in the range defined by the two thresholds. We apply this new method to various firm size variables, including annual sales, the number of workers, and tangible fixed assets for firms in more than thirty countries. -- |
| Keywords: | Econophysics,power-law distributions,power-law exponents,firm size variables,finite size effect |
| JEL: | C16 D20 E23 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201129&r=bec |
| By: | Caliendo, Lorenzo; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban |
| Abstract: | A firm's productivity depends on how production is organized given the level of demand for its product. To capture this mechanism, we develop a theory of an economy where firms with heterogeneous demands use labor and knowledge to produce. Entrepreneurs decide the number of layers of management and the knowledge and span of control of each agent. As a result, in the theory, heterogeneity in demand leads to heterogeneity in productivity and other firms' outcomes. We use the theory to analyze the impact of international trade on organization and calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. Our results indicate that, as a result of a bilateral trade liberalization, firms that export will increase the number of layers of management and will decentralize decisions. The new organization of the average exporter results in higher productivity, although the responses of productivity are heterogeneous across these firms. In contrast, non-exporters reduce their number of layers, decentralization, and, on average, their productivity. The marginal exporter increases its productivity by about 1% and its revenue productivity by about 1.8%. |
| Keywords: | Communication Costs; Cost function; Hierarchies; Knowledge; Management; Trade Liberalization; Wage Distribution |
| JEL: | D21 D24 F12 F13 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8535&r=bec |
| By: | Susan Herbst-Murphy |
| Abstract: | Providing efficiency and cost-savings over paper payments (cash and checks), commercial payment cards are among the fastest growing card segments in recent years. Today, they account for nearly one in every five dollars spent using general-purpose payment cards. And since business and government payments are three times larger than consumer transactions, there is ample room for future growth. Adoption by government and small business has been especially noteworthy. Adoption among large companies, which account for half of commercial expenditures, has been more modest. This paper provides an overview of the commercial card product set, its successes and challenges, and the adaptations that have been made to meet market demands and expectations. |
| Keywords: | Point-of-sale-systems ; Small business - Finance |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpdp:11-01&r=bec |
| By: | Siebert, W. Stanley (University of Birmingham); Peng, Fei (University of Birmingham); Maimaiti, Yasheng (University of Birmingham) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses HRM practices of family-run workplaces using the 2004 WERS. Family-ownership and management within workplaces in the corporate sector is our focus. This family-run group represents nationally about 26% of workplaces and 14% of employment. We find that employees in this group have stronger feelings of job security and loyalty, which we relate to family companies' HRM practices such as stronger support for long-term employment – an "inclusivity" linked to long-term orientation. We also find that family-owned and managed workplaces have better financial and quality performance measures than non-family, to which family-related HRM practices contribute. |
| Keywords: | job security, loyalty, family business, HRM practices, financial performance |
| JEL: | J01 L26 M54 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5899&r=bec |
| By: | Mikko Packalen (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo) |
| Abstract: | A market share exclusion contract between a seller and a buyer prevents rival sellers from competing for a share of the buyer's purchases. For non-discriminatory contracting we show that, unlike exclusion through exclusive dealing, market share exclusion can be profitable even when buyers coordinate on the best equilibrium in the contract-acceptance subgame. The condition for the profitability of market share exclusion is characterized in terms of straightforward economic concepts. With discriminatory contracting market share exclusion contracts are generally less profitable than exclusive dealing contracts. The motive for employing market share exclusion contracts, which welfare impacts have not been well understood, instead of exclusive dealing contracts, which have been the focus of both theory and policy, may thus often be the avoidance of scrutiny by competition authorities rather than some more direct economic advantage of market share exclusion over exclusive dealing. However, we also show that market share exclusion decreases both buyer and total surplus. Hence, competition authorities should not view exclusion through exclusive dealing as a pre-requisite for the possibility of anti-competitive effects from exclusionary contracting. |
| JEL: | L42 K11 K21 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wat:wpaper:1103&r=bec |
| By: | Steven J. Davis; Jason Faberman; John C. Haltiwanger |
| Abstract: | Many theoretical models of labor market search imply a tight link between worker flows (hires and separations) and job gains and losses at the employer level. Partly motivated by these theories, we exploit establishment-level data from U.S. sources to study the relationship between worker flows and job flows in the cross section and over time. We document strong, highly nonlinear relationships of hiring, quit and layoff rates to employer growth in the cross section. Simple statistical models that capture these cross-sectional relationships greatly improve our ability to account for fluctuations in aggregate worker flows. We also evaluate how well various theoretical models and views fit the patterns in the data. Aggregate fluctuations in layoffs are well captured by micro specifications that impose a tight cross-sectional link between worker flows and job flows. Aggregate fluctuations in quits are not. Instead, quit rates rise and fall with booms and recessions across the distribution of establishment growth rates, but more so at shrinking employers. Finally, we use our preferred statistical models – in combination with data on the cross-sectional distribution of establishment growth rates – to construct synthetic JOLTS-type measures of hires, separations, quits and layoffs back to 1990. |
| JEL: | E24 J63 J64 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17294&r=bec |
| By: | Besley, Timothy J.; Ghatak, Maitreesh |
| Abstract: | We explore the consequence for taxation and regulation of bonus pay when investors are protected by taxpayers from downside risk. The paper develops a model where workers in financial sector firms make decisions about effort and risk-taking which are influenced by the structure of bonus pay. Bailouts lead to too little effort, too much risk taking and increase inequality. We show that the optimal structure of bonuses can be implemented by a combination of a regulation on the structure of bonuses and a tax on their level. |
| Keywords: | bonus; incentives; taxation |
| JEL: | D53 D86 H21 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8532&r=bec |
| By: | Guangling (Dave) Liu; Nkhahle E. Seeiso |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impacts of bank capital regulation on business cycle fluctuations. To do so, we adopt the Bernanke et al. (1999) "financial accelerator" model (BGG), to which we augment a banking sector to study the procyclical nature of Basel II claimed in the literature. We first study the impacts of a negative shock to entrepreneur's net worth and a positive monetary policy shock on business cycle fluctuations. We then look at the impacts of a negative shock to the entrepreneurs' net worth when the minimum capital requirement increases from 8 percent to 12 percent. Our comparison studies between the augmented BGG model with Basel I bank regulation and the one with Basel II bank regulation suggest that, in the presence of credit market frictions and bank capital regulation, the liquidity premium effect further ampliflies the financial accelerator effect through the external finance premium channel, which in turn, contributes to the amplification of Basel II procyclicality. Moreover, under Basel II bank regulation, in response to a negative net worth shock, the liquidity premium and the external finance premium rise much more if the minimum bank capital requirement increases, which in turn, amplify the response of real variables. Finally, small adjustments in monetary policy can result in stronger response in the real economy, in the presence of Basel II bank regulation in particular, which is undesirable. |
| Keywords: | Business cycle fluctuations, Financial accelerator, Bank capital requirement, Monetary policy |
| JEL: | E32 E44 G28 E50 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:221&r=bec |
| By: | Francesco Nava; Pasquale Schiraldi |
| Abstract: | Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon that has been documented in several product markets. Regularities in such periodic price reductions appear to suggest that the phenomenon cannot be entirely attributed to random variations in supply, demand, or the aggregate price level. Certain sales are traditional and so well publicized that it is difficult to justify them as devices to separate informed from uninformed consumers. This paper presents a model in which sellers want to reduce prices periodically in order to improve their ability to collude over time. In particular, the study shows that if buyers have heterogeneous storage technologies, periodic sales may facilitate collusion by magnifying intertemporal linking in consumers' decisions. The stability and the profitability of different sale strategies is then explored. The optimal sales discount and timing of sales are characterized. A trade-off between cartel size and aggregate profits arises. |
| Keywords: | Storage, sales, collusion, cartel size, repeated games |
| JEL: | L11 L12 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stitep:/2011/549&r=bec |
| By: | Frederic Marty (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques - FNSP) |
| Abstract: | La convergence numérique a des effets ambivalents sur la concurrence. D'une part, elle renforce la contestabilité des positions acquises en redéfinissant les frontières des marchés. D'autre part, elle peut favoriser des stratégies anticoncurrentielles de forclusion des marchés au travers notamment de stratégies de préemption. Celles-ci sont particulièrement observables en matière de droits audio-visuels, notamment les droits dits premium portant sur les contenus les plus attractifs aux yeux des téléspectateurs à l'instar des championnats de football ou des blockbusters hollywoodiens. Il s'agit ici d'analyser les effets des clauses d'exclusivité sur la dynamique de la concurrence et de s'interroger sur les capacités des autorités en charge de l'application des règles de concurrence à prévenir les risques de forclusion des marchés. En filigrane, se pose la question de la répartition des rôles entre mise en oeuvre des règles de concurrence et politiques de régulation sectorielle. |
| Keywords: | clauses d'exclusivité, convergence numérique, forclusion, politiques de concurrence, régulation sectorielle |
| Date: | 2011–08–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00614348&r=bec |