nep-bec New Economics Papers
on Business Economics
Issue of 2010‒11‒27
25 papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Universite du Quebec en Outaouais

  1. Should macroeconomic forecasters use daily financial data and how? By Elena Andreou; Eric Ghysels; Andros Kourtellos
  2. Mapping capital and liquidity requirements to bank lending spreads By Michael R King
  3. Theory of the Firm: Bargaining and Competitive Equilibrium By Britz Volker; Herings Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski Arkadi
  4. Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining By Britz Volker
  5. Cash holdings, firm size and access to external finance. Evidence for the euro area By Carmen Martínez-Carrascal
  6. Financial integration, entrepreneurial risk and global dynamics By Vasia Panousi; George-Marios Angeletos
  7. The efficiency view of corporate boards: theory and evidence By Angelo Baglioni; Luca Colombo
  8. Pricing-to-market and business cycle synchronization By Luciana Juvenal; Paulo Santos Monteiro
  9. Global Sourcing of Complex Production Processes By Schwarz, Christian; Suedekum, Jens
  10. What happens when Wal-Mart comes to your country? multinational firms' entry, productivity, and inefficiency By Silvio Contessi
  11. A Search Model in a Segmented Labour Market: the Odd Role of Unions By Chiara BROCCOLINI; Marco LILLA; Stefano STAFFOLANI
  12. Economic Arguments in U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy: Two Roads Diverged By Stephen Martin
  13. Heterogeneous Exits: Evidence from New Firms By Masatoshi Kato; Yuji Honjo
  14. Home Equity, Mobility, and Macroeconomic Fluctuations By Vincent Sterk
  15. How does multinational production change international comovement? By Silvio Contessi
  16. Bundling revisited: substitute products and inter-firm discounts By Armstrong, Mark
  17. Evaluating Merger Effects in Cable TV Industry in a Difference in Difference Method By Jung, Hyun-Joon and Nahm, Jae
  18. Reporting Frequency and Substitutable Tasks By Christian Lukas
  19. Predation in Off-Patent Drug Markets By Laurent Granier; Sébastien Trinquard
  20. Regular prices and sales By Paul Heidhues; Botond Koszegi
  21. Cumulative Innovation and Competition Policy By Alexander Raskovich; Nathan H. Miller
  22. Offshoring bias in U.S. manufacturing: implications for productivity and value added By Susan Houseman; Christopher Kurz; Paul Lengermann; Benjamin Mandel
  23. Real Estate, the External Finance Premium and Business Investment: A Quantitative Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis By Jin, Yi; Leung, Charles Ka Yui; Zeng, Zhixiong
  25. Horizontal Mergers of Online Firms: Structural Estimation and Competitive Effects By Yonghong An; Michael R Baye; Yingyao Hu; John Morgan

  1. By: Elena Andreou; Eric Ghysels; Andros Kourtellos
    Abstract: We introduce easy to implement regression-based methods for predicting quarterly real economic activity that use daily financial data and rely on forecast combinations of MIDAS regressions. Our analysis is designed to elucidate the value of daily information and provide real-time forecast updates of the current (nowcasting) and future quarters. Our findings show that while on average the predictive ability of all models worsens substantially following the financial crisis, the models we propose suffer relatively less losses than the traditional ones. Moreover, these predictive gains are primarily driven by the classes of government securities, equities, and especially corporate risk.
    Keywords: MIDAS, macro forecasting, leads, daily financial information, daily factors.
    Date: 2010–11
  2. By: Michael R King
    Abstract: This study outlines a methodology for mapping the increases in capital and liquidity requirements proposed under Basel III to bank lending spreads. The higher cost associated with a one percentage point increase in the capital ratio can be recovered by increasing lending spreads by 15 basis points for a representative bank. This calculation assumes the return on equity (ROE) and the cost of debt are unchanged, with no change in other sources of income and no reduction in operating expenses. If ROE and the cost of debt are assumed to decline, the impact on lending spreads is reduced. To recover the additional cost of meeting the December 2009 proposal for the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a representative bank would need to increase lending spreads by 24 basis points. Taking into account the fall in risk-weighted assets from holding more government bonds reduces this cost to 12 basis points or less.
    Keywords: banks, regulation, Basel III, capital, liquidity, lending spreads
    Date: 2010–11
  3. By: Britz Volker; Herings Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski Arkadi (METEOR)
    Abstract: Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner''s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a well--known problem in the literature that under incomplete asset markets, a conflict about the firm''s objective function tends to arise among its owners. In this paper, we take a new approach to this problem, which is based on non--cooperative bargaining. The owners of the firm play a bargaining game in order to choose the firm''s production plan and a scheme of transfers which are payable before the uncertainty about the future state of nature is resolved. We analyze the resulting firm decision in the limit of subgame--perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Given the distribution of bargaining power, we obtain a unique prediction for a production plan and a transfer scheme. When markets are complete, the production plan chosen corresponds to the profit-maximizing production plan as in the Arrow-Debreu model. Contrary to that model, owners typically do use transfers to redistribute profits. When markets are incomplete, the production plan chosen is almost always different from the standard notion of competitive equilibrium and again owners use transfers to redistribute profits. Nevertheless, our results do support the Drèze criterion as the appropriate objective function of the firm.
    Keywords: microeconomics ;
    Date: 2010
  4. By: Britz Volker (METEOR)
    Abstract: We propose a new model to study the role of commitment as a sourceof strategic bargaining power. Two impatient players bargain aboutthe division of a pie under a standard bargaining protocol indiscrete time with time-invariant recognition probabilities.Instantaneous utility is linear, but players discount the future bya constant factor. Before bargaining starts, a player can commit notto enter into any agreement which gives him less than some utilitylevel. This commitment is perfectly binding initially. However, onceso much time has passed that even receiving the entire pie wouldyield less than the committed level of utility, then the commitmentbecomes void. Intuitively, this simply means that no player canremain committed to something which has become impossible. We use aslight refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solutionconcept. If only one player can commit, then we find an immediateand efficient agreement on a division which gives the committedplayer (strictly) between one half and the entire pie, the exactallocation being determined uniquely by the recognitionprobabilities. If both players can commit sequentially before thebargaining starts, we find a unique equilibrium division with afirst--mover advantage. Finally, we consider a version of the gamewhere both players commit simultaneously before the bargainingstarts. In this case, there is a range of equilibrium divisions.However, in the limit as the discount factor goes to one, no playerobtains less than one third of the pie, even with arbitrarily smallproposal power. Somewhat surprisingly, the equal split emerges asthe only division supported by an equilibrium for any choice of thediscount factor and the recognition probabilities.
    Keywords: microeconomics ;
    Date: 2010
  5. By: Carmen Martínez-Carrascal (Banco de España)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the empirical determinants of corporate cash holdings in the euro area as a function of firm size. The results show that there are significant differences in investment in liquid assets for firms of different size. More specifically, liquid assets for smaller firms in the euro area are more strongly linked to firm cash flow and its variability than cash holdings for larger firms, possibly as a result of their more restricted access to external funds and the need to provide for future investment needs. Likewise, results show that the link between cash holdings and tangible assets, which facilitate access to external finance, is stronger for small and medium-sized firms than for large firms. In contrast, cash holding sensitivity to variations in the spread between the return on liquid assets and alternative uses of these funds (debt repayment, in the empirical specification presented in this paper) is higher for larger firms, something that might be linked to their better access to capital markets and their lower need to keep a cash buffer for precautionary reasons.
    Keywords: cash holdings, financing constraints, panel data
    JEL: C23 E41 G31 G32
    Date: 2010–11
  6. By: Vasia Panousi; George-Marios Angeletos
    Abstract: How does financial integration impact capital accumulation, current-account dynamics, and cross-country inequality? This paper investigates this question within a two-country, general-equilibrium, incomplete-markets model that focuses on the importance of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk---a risk that introduces, not only a precautionary motive for saving, but also a wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital. Our contribution is then to show that this friction provides a simple explanation for the emergence of global imbalances, a simple resolution to the empirical puzzle that capital often fails to flow from the rich or slow-growing countries to the poor or fast-growing ones, and a distinct set of policy lessons regarding the intertemporal costs and benefits of capital-account liberalization.
    Date: 2010
  7. By: Angelo Baglioni; Luca Colombo (DISCE, Università Cattolica)
    Abstract: We build a simple model in which corporate governance may allow for institutions acting as commitment devices (e.g., the introduction of independent and minority members in the board). The model predicts that the incentive to adopt an institution — letting the general interest of shareholders prevail over private benefits of control by dominant shareholders — is decreasing in ownership concentration and increasing in free cash flow. We take the predictions of our theoretical model to the data, by providing empirical evidence on the board structure of Italian listed companies over the period 2004-2007. We find that board composition favors independent members in firms where the free cash flow is large, and executive members in firms with high ownership concentration and in family firms, supporting the view of corporate governance as a mechanism to control agency costs. More ambiguous conclusions are reached as for the link between governance and firm value, as the presence of minority lists in the board appears to improve value while that of independent members reduces performance.
    Keywords: corporate boards, agency problems, private benefits, firms’ performance.
    JEL: G32 G34 L22
    Date: 2010–07
  8. By: Luciana Juvenal; Paulo Santos Monteiro
    Abstract: There is substantial evidence that countries or regions with stronger trade linkages tend to have business cycles which are more synchronized. However, the standard international business cycle framework cannot replicate this finding. In this paper we study a multiple- country model of international trade with imperfect competition and variable markups and embed it into a real business cycle framework by including aggregate technology shocks and allowing for variable labor supply. The model is successful at replicating the empirical relation between trade and business cycle synchronization. High trade costs increase the real exchange rate volatility because firms choose to price-to-market and this volatility decouples countries' business cycle fluctuations. We find empirical evidence supporting this mechanism.>
    Keywords: International trade ; Business cycles
    Date: 2010
  9. By: Schwarz, Christian (University of Duisburg-Essen); Suedekum, Jens (University of Duisburg-Essen)
    Abstract: We develop a theory of a firm in an environment with incomplete contracts. The firm’s headquarter decides on the complexity, the organization, and the global scale of its production process. Specifically, it decides: i) on the mass of symmetric intermediate inputs that are part of the value chain, ii) if the supplier of each component is an external contractor or an integrated affiliate, and iii) if the supplier is offshored to a foreign low-wage country. Afterwards we consider a related scenario where the headquarter contracts with a given number of two asymmetric suppliers. Our model is consistent with several stylized facts from the recent literature that existing theories of multinational firms cannot account for.
    Keywords: multinational firms, outsourcing, intra-firm trade, offshoring, vertical FDI
    JEL: F12 D23 L23
    Date: 2010–11
  10. By: Silvio Contessi
    Abstract: Despite the microeconomic evidence supporting the superior idiosyncratic productivity of multinational firms (MFN) and their affiliates, cross-country studies fail to find robust evidence of a positive relationship between Foreign Direct Investment and growth. In order to study the aggregate implications of MNF entry and production, I develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with firm heterogeneity where MNF sort according to their own productivity. Entry and production of MNF contribute to aggregate productivity growth at decreasing rates over time but potentially crowd out domestic producers due to increased product and factor market competition. I compare the aggregate benefit of productivity contributions with the cost of crowding out and argue that composition and crowding-out effects can help explain the conflicting evidence on the impact of Foreign Direct Investment on growth.>
    Keywords: International business enterprises
    Date: 2010
  11. By: Chiara BROCCOLINI (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Economia); Marco LILLA (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Economia); Stefano STAFFOLANI (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Economia)
    Abstract: Assuming random matching productivity, we present a search equilibrium model where each match ends in a vacancy, in a temporary job or in a permanent job. Centralized bargaining sets the wage rate of permanent workers whereas rms decide unilaterally the wage rate of temporary workers. In this segmented labour market: a) the wage setting function can be downward sloping; b) higher union bargaining power leads to higher wage and higher unemployment; c) average worker productivity shows a maximum with respect to union bargaining power.
    Keywords: Productivity, Search Model, Temporary contract, Unemployment, Unions
    JEL: J31 J51 J64
    Date: 2010–10
  12. By: Stephen Martin
    Abstract: In this paper, I compare economic arguments in U.S. Supreme Court antitrust and EU Court of Justice competition policy decisions on four topics: refusal to deal, predation, vertical contracts, and hor- izontal interfirm relations.
    Date: 2010–10
  13. By: Masatoshi Kato (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University); Yuji Honjo (Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University)
    Abstract: This paper explores heterogeneous exits—bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger—by focusing on new firms. Using a sample of approximately 16,000 firms founded in Japan during 1997–2004, we examine the determinants of new-firm exit according to forms of exit. Regarding industry-specific characteristics, our findings indicate that new firms in capital-intensive and R&D-intensive industries are less likely to go bankrupt. In industries characterized by large amounts of capital and low price–cost margins, new firms are more likely to exit through voluntary liquidation and merger. Region-specific characteristics, such as regional agglomeration and unemployment rate, have significant effects on the hazards of exit, and their effects vary across different forms of exit. Moreover, we provide evidence that firm-specific characteristics, such as the number of employees, and entrepreneur-specific characteristics, such as educational background and age, play significantly different roles in determining each form of exit.
    Keywords: New firm; exit; bankruptcy; voluntary liquidation; merger; competing risks proportional hazards model.
    Date: 2010–11
  14. By: Vincent Sterk
    Abstract: How does a fall in house prices affect real activity? This paper presents a business cycle model in which a decline in house prices reduces geographical mobility, creating distortions in the labor market. This happens because homeowners face declines in their home equity levels, after which it becomes more difficult to provide the down-payment required for a new mortgage loan. Unemployed homeowners therefore turn down job offers that would require them to move. The model explains joint cyclical patterns in housing and labor market aggregates, as well as the puzzling breakdown of the U.S. Beveridge curve that occurred during 2009.
    Keywords: Housing Markets; Labor Markets; Refinancing Constraints
    JEL: E24 E44 R21
    Date: 2010–10
  15. By: Silvio Contessi
    Abstract: I study the aggregate implications of the entry of Multinational Firms (MNFs) in a two country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model in which firms have heterogeneous productivity in the sense of Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Unlike the extant open economy macroeconomics literature, this model endogenizes both multinational production and exports as possible strategies of internationalization of production, a feature that substantially improves the match between model-simulated moments and business cycle data along two dimensions. First, once I allow for concurrent entry (and exit) of MNFs and exporters over the business cycle, the consumption output anomaly disappears and I can successfully replicate the ranking of cross-country correlations of output and consumption found in the data. Second, I show that the model with heterogeneous MNFs is capable of bringing the simulated volatility of the Real Exchange Rate much closer to the data than previous models with either representative or heterogeneous exporters.>
    Keywords: Business cycles ; International business enterprises
    Date: 2010
  16. By: Armstrong, Mark
    Abstract: This paper extends the standard model of bundling to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, firms have an incentive to introduce bundling discounts when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. Separate firms often have a unilateral incentive to offer inter-firm bundle discounts, although this depends on the detailed form of substitutability. Bundle discounts mitigate the innate substitutability of products, which can relax competition between firms and induce an integrated firm to lower all of its prices when it follows a bundling strategy.
    Keywords: Price discrimination; bundling; oligopoly; loyalty pricing
    JEL: M31 L42 D43
    Date: 2010–11
  17. By: Jung, Hyun-Joon and Nahm, Jae (Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea)
    Abstract: Between 2005 and 2008, there had been active mergers between cable system operators in Korean. By analyzing subscription fees changes between 2004 and 2008 in a panel data set, we evaluate the merger effects. We find that mergers had occurred in relatively low prices areas; the price increase was much higher in areas where merger had occurred than in areas where competition between multiple SO had remained.
    Keywords: Merger effects, Difference in Difference, Cable Industry
    JEL: C21 L41 L52
    Date: 2010
  18. By: Christian Lukas (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)
    Abstract: The optimal reporting frequency is an important issue in accounting. In many production settings, substitution effects across periods occur. This paper shows that the optimal reporting frequency depends on the strength of the substitution effect and on the information content of performance signals. For a subset of parameter combinations - the low-chance scenario - infrequent reporting is always efficient; for other parameter combinations – the high-chance scenario - infrequent reporting is efficient as long as first-period signals show high informativeness (and substitution effects are strong). Limited commitment by the principal does not influence results.
    Keywords: dynamic agency, intertemporal aggregation, reporting frequency, performance measurement, substitubtable tasks, commitment
    JEL: D86 M12 M41 M52
    Date: 2010–11–16
  19. By: Laurent Granier (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines); Sébastien Trinquard (UNOCAM - Union nationale des organismes d'assurance maladie complémentaire - UNOCAM)
    Abstract: In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the generic firm, Zentiva. This paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo- generics. We develop a Cournot duopoly model by considering the pseudo-generics production as a mergers' catalyst. We show that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this paper is that the brand-name laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced and this production is then a predatory strategy.
    Keywords: Mergers; Pharmaceutical Market; Predation; Pseudo-Generics
    Date: 2010
  20. By: Paul Heidhues (ESMT European School of Management and Technology); Botond Koszegi (University of California, Berkeley)
    Abstract: We study the properties of a profit-maximizing monopolist's optimal price distribution when selling to a loss-averse consumer, where (following Koszegi and Rabin (2006)) we assume that the consumer's reference point is her recent rational expectations about the purchase. If it is close to costless for the consumer to observe the realized price of the product, then – in a pattern consistent with several recently documented facts regarding supermarket pricing – the monopolist chooses low and variable “sale” prices with some probability and a high and sticky “regular” price with the complementary probability. Realizing that she will buy at the sale prices and hence that she will purchase with positive probability, the consumer chooses to avoid the painful uncertainty in whether she will get the product by buying also at the regular price. If it is more costly for the consumer to observe the realized price, then – in a pattern consistent with the pricing behavior of some other retailers (e.g. movie theaters) – the monopolist chooses a sticky price and holds no sales. In this case, a sale is less tempting and hence less effective in generating an expectation to purchase with positive probability. We also show that ex-ante competition for loyal consumers leads to sticky pricing while ex-post competition leads to marginal-cost pricing, and discuss several other extensions of the model.
    Keywords: reference-dependent utility, gain-loss utility, loss aversion, sticky prices, sales, supermarket pricing
    JEL: D11 D43 D81 L13
    Date: 2010–11–22
  21. By: Alexander Raskovich (Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice); Nathan H. Miller
    Abstract: We model a “new economy” industry where innovation is sequential and monopoly is persistent but the incumbent turns over periodically. In this setting we analyze the effects of “extraction” (e.g., price discrimination that captures greater surplus) and “extension” (conduct that simply delays entry of the next incumbent) on steady-state equilibrium innovation, welfare and growth. We find that extraction invariably increases innovation and welfare growth rates, but extension causes harm under plausible conditions. This provides a rationale for the divergent treatment of single-firm conduct under U.S. law. Our analysis also suggests a rule-of-thumb, consistent with antitrust practice, that innovation proxies welfare.
    Date: 2010–09
  22. By: Susan Houseman; Christopher Kurz; Paul Lengermann; Benjamin Mandel
    Abstract: The rapid growth of offshoring has sparked a contentious debate over its impact on the U.S. manufacturing sector, which has recorded steep employment declines yet strong output growth--a fact reconciled by the notable gains in manufacturing productivity. We maintain, however, that the dramatic acceleration of imports from developing countries has imparted a significant bias to the official statistics. In particular, the price declines associated with the shift to low-cost foreign suppliers are generally not captured in input cost and import price indexes. Although cost savings are a primary driver of the shift in sourcing to foreign suppliers, the price declines associated with offshoring are not systematically observed; this is the essence of the measurement problem. To gauge the magnitude of these discounts, we draw on a variety of evidence from import price microdata from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, industry case studies, and the business press. To assess the implications of offshoring bias for manufacturing productivity and value added, we implement the bias correction developed by Diewert and Nakamura (2009) to the input price index in a growth accounting framework, using a variety of assumptions about the magnitude of the discounts from offshoring. We find that from 1997 to 2007 average annual multifactor productivity growth in manufacturing was overstated by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point and real value added growth by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage point. Furthermore, although the bias from offshoring represents a relatively small share of real value added growth in the computer and electronic products industry, it may have accounted for a fifth to a half of the growth in real value added in the rest of manufacturing.
    Date: 2010
  23. By: Jin, Yi; Leung, Charles Ka Yui; Zeng, Zhixiong
    Abstract: This paper studies the connection between the capital market and the real estate market. Empirically, we find that positive real house price shocks lower the external finance premium and stimulate nonresidential investment and real GDP. Our theoretical framework is able to mimic the volatility of the external finance premium, the relative price of real estate and capital, and the investment in real estate and capital. It also captures the cyclicality of the external finance premium and of real estate prices. The contribution of real estate price fluctuations to the variability of the external finance premium and the GDP is confirmed to be significant.
    Keywords: External Finance Premium; Residential and Corporate Real Estate; Capital Market Imperfections; Equilibrium Default; Real Estate Price Volatility.
    JEL: E44 D82 R21 R31
    Date: 2010–11
  24. By: Daniela Baglieri (University of Messina - University of Messina); Maria Cristina Cinici (University of Catania - University of Catania); Vincent Mangematin (MTS - Management Technologique et Strategique - Grenoble Ecole de Management)
    Abstract: This article investigates how anchor firms sustain high tech clusters rejuvenation by means of technological pre-adaptation. Based on evidences are drawn from the comparison of the evolution of two nano-electronics clusters, i.e., Grenoble (France) and Catania (Italy) clusters which are sharing the same anchor tenant firm STMicroelectronics. Cluster rejuvenation comes from pre-adaptation of actors (scientific and technological diversity), competition amongst anchor tenant firms, competition and overlap amongst networks and the mobilization of sleeping anchors tenant organizations to renew actors and technologies. As soon as the process of specialization (asset specificity, network specificity, technology speciation) starts, it is important to stimulate pre-adaptation to avoid lock-in of the cluster on one technological trajectory
    Keywords: rejuvenation; cluster growth; industry life cycle; anchor tenant firm, pre-adaptation
    Date: 2010–11–15
  25. By: Yonghong An (Johns Hopkins University); Michael R Baye (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business); Yingyao Hu (Johns Hopkins University); John Morgan (University of California - Berkeley)
    Abstract: This paper (1) presents a general model of online price competition, (2) shows how to structurally estimate the underlying parameters of the model when the number of competing firms is unknown or in dispute, (3) estimates these parameters based on UK data for personal digital assistants, and (4) uses these estimates to simulate the competitive effects of horizontal mergers. Our results suggest that competitive effects in this online market are more closely aligned with the simple homogeneous product Bertrand model than might be expected given the observed price dispersion and number of firms. Our estimates indicate that so long as two firms remain in the market post merger, the average transaction price is roughly unaffected by horizontal mergers. However, there are potential distributional effects; our estimates indicate that a three-to-two merger raises the average transaction price paid by price sensitive "shoppers" by 2.88 percent, while lowering the average transaction price paid by consumers "loyal" to a particular firm by 1.37 percent.
    JEL: L0
    Date: 2010–07

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