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on Business Economics |
| By: | Hermalin, Benjamin E. (University of California); Weisbach, Michael S. (Ohio State University) |
| Abstract: | In public-policy discussions about corporate disclosure, more is typically judged better than less. In particular, better disclosure is seen as a way to reduce the agency problems that plague firms. We show that this view is incomplete. In particular, our theoretical analysis shows that increased disclosure is a two-edged sword: More information permits principals to make better decisions; but it can, itself, generate additional agency problems and other costs for shareholders, including increased executive compensation. Consequently, there can exist a point beyond which additional disclosure decreases firm value. We further show that larger firms will tend to adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms, ceteris paribus. Firms with better disclosure will tend, all else equal, to employ more able management. We show that governance reforms that have imposed greater disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both CEO compensation and CEO turnover rates. |
| Keywords: | Corporate governance; Corporate disclosure |
| JEL: | D82 D83 G30 L20 M42 |
| Date: | 2010–09–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sifrwp:0076&r=bec |
| By: | Alex Coad (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany); Agustí Segarra (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Grup de Recerca d’Indústria i Territori, Avda. Universitat 1, 43204 Reus, Spain); Mercedes Teruel (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Grup de Recerca d’Indústria i Territori, Avda. Universitat 1, 43204 Reus, Spain) |
| Abstract: | Our empirical literature review shows that little is known about how firm performance changes with age, presumably because of the paucity of data on firm age. For Spanish manufacturing firms, we analyse the firm performance related to firm age between 1998 and 2006. We find evidence that firms improve with age, because ageing firms are observed to have steadily increasing levels of productivity, higher profits, larger size, lower debt ratios, and higher equity ratios. Furthermore, older firms are better able to convert sales growth into subsequent growth of profits and productivity. On the other hand, we also found evidence that firm performance deteriorates with age. Older firms have lower expected growth rates of sales, profits and productivity, they have lower profitability levels (when other variables such as size are controlled for), and also that they appear to be less capable to convert employment growth into growth of sales, profits and productivity. |
| Keywords: | firm age, firm growth, LAD, financial structure, vector autoregression |
| JEL: | L25 L20 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2010-10&r=bec |
| By: | Bornukova, Kateryna |
| Abstract: | In the U.S. economy hours and productivity are negatively correlated, and volatility of hours is two times higher than volatility of productivity. In the standard one shock RBC model hours are positively correlated with productivity, and hours are two times less volatile than productivity. This paper is an attempt to replicate the co-movement of hours and productivity observed in the post-war U.S. data using one shock model. I explore the real business cycles in the model with two-person household and home production.} The model economy has a representative household of two agents. Agents allocate their time among leisure, work on the market and home production. There is a fixed cost of working on the market, and agents may choose not to work. The fluctuations in the model are driven by aggregate technology shock. I calibrate the model to U.S. data, solve and simulate it. I find that in the model hours are 2 times more volatile than productivity, and that hours and productivity are negatively correlated. The model replicates well the co-movement of hours and productivity observed in the U.S. data. |
| Keywords: | Computable General Equilibrium; Business Cycles; Home Production; Labor Supply |
| JEL: | E32 E24 J22 |
| Date: | 2009–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25113&r=bec |
| By: | Guo, Jang-Ting; Sirbu, Anca-Ioana; Suen, Richard M. H. |
| Abstract: | Eusepi (2009, International Journal of Economic Theory 5, pp. 9-23) analytically finds that a one-sector real business cycle model may exhibit positive co-movement between consumption and investment when the equilibrium wage-hours locus is positively-sloped and steeper than the household's labor supply curve. However, we show that this condition does not imply expectations-driven business cycles will emerge in Eusepi's model. Specifically, a positive news shock about future productivity improvement leads to an aggregate recession whereby output, employment, consumption and investment all fall in the announcement period. |
| Keywords: | Expectations-Driven Business Cycles; Production Externalities. |
| JEL: | E32 C62 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24989&r=bec |
| By: | Ciliberto, Federico; Schenone, Carola |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings on product market competition using data from the US airline industry. We find that bankrupt airlines permanently downsize their national route structure, their airport-specific networks, and their route-specific flight frequency and capacity. We also find that bankrupt airlines lower their route-specific prices while under bankruptcy protection, and increase them after emerging. We do not find robust evidence of significant changes by the bankrupt airline's competitors along any of the dimensions above. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that bankruptcy is the result of a war of attrition over capacity and network cutbacks. |
| Keywords: | Airline Industry; Bankruptcy; Product Market Competition; Chapter 11; War of Attrition; Capacity Reduction |
| JEL: | K2 G3 L1 |
| Date: | 2010–08–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24914&r=bec |
| By: | Marinelli, Federico (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | Diversified firms are supposed to be valued less than the sum of their parts because of the diversification discount, but subsequent research has found that the relationship between diversification and shareholder value is not causal. We analyze the relationship between diversification and shareholder value taking into consideration the persistence of profit over the long term. We offer new insights and a complementary view for investors: single segment firms do not generate more shareholder value than diversified firms, and in some situations the opposite is true. Moreover, we find that the relationship between diversification and shareholder value is not causal, but clearly depends on the capacity of the firm to generate a long-term persistent outstanding performance. Finally, we demonstrate that in comparison to diversified firms, single segment firms might be considered "growth stocks" whose return is explained by higher volatility and a higher size premium. |
| Keywords: | diversification; performance persistence; shareholder value; conditional variance; |
| Date: | 2010–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0853&r=bec |
| By: | Viral V. Acharya; Hamid Mehran; Anjan Thakor |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how much capital banks should optimally hold. Our model encompasses different kinds of moral hazard studied in banking: asset substitution (or risk shifting, e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans), managerial rent seeking (e.g., shirking or investing in inefficient “pet” projects that yield private benefits), and the free cash flow problem (manifesting as inefficient consumption of cash for perquisites by the manager). The privately optimal capital structure of the bank balances the benefit of leverage as reflected in the market discipline imposed by uninsured creditors on rent seeking on the one hand and the cost of leverage as reflected in the asset substitution induced at high levels of leverage on the other hand. Under some conditions, the capital structure resolves all the moral hazard problems we study, but under other conditions, the goal of having the market discipline of leverage clashes with the goal of having the benefit of equity capital in attenuating asset substitution moral hazard. In this case, private contracting must tolerate some form of inefficiency and bank value is not maximized as it is in the first best. Despite this, there is no economic rationale for regulation. However, when bank failures are correlated and en masse failures can impose significant social costs, regulators may intervene ex post via bank bailouts. Anticipation of this generates multiple Nash equilibria, one of which features systemic risk in that all banks choose inefficiently high leverage, take excessively correlated asset risk, and, because debt is paid off by regulators when banks fail en masse, market discipline is compromised. While a simple minimum (tier-1) capital requirement suffices to restore efficiency under some conditions, there are also conditions under which an optimal arrangement to contain the build-up of systemic risk takes the form of the regular (tier-1) capital requirement plus a “special capital account” that involves 1) building up capital via dividend payout restrictions, 2) investment of the retained earnings in designated assets, and 3) contingent distribution provisions. |
| Keywords: | Bank capital ; Bank reserves ; Financial leverage ; Systemic risk ; Bank failures |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednsr:469&r=bec |
| By: | Sly, Nicholas |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how global integration influences worker behavior regarding skill acquisition, as well as firm behavior regarding incentive contracts and occupational diversity. The approach integrates several key components of international trade and the wage distribution in developed countries: namely heterogeneous firms, trade in similar goods, and performance payments to workers that endogenously obtain different skill levels. Greater trading opportunities reduce aggregate prices, causing workers to experience a greater marginal utility derived from income, as well as the skills that aid them in fulfilling performance contracts. Firms respond to skill accumulation among the labor force by adjusting the provision of incentive contracts, and the types of jobs they offer. Labor market adjustment to trade liberalization is characterized by a more steep, but less extensive, provision of incentive contracts among the labor force; higher overall wage inequality exhibiting a U-shaped differential; and job polarization across skill-groups. |
| Keywords: | Job Polarization; Performance Pay; Trade Adjustment |
| JEL: | F16 J8 J24 |
| Date: | 2010–08–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25004&r=bec |
| By: | Attiya Y. Javid; Robina Iqbal (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics) |
| Abstract: | In this study the relationship between corporate governance and corporate valuation, ownership structure and need of external financing for the Karachi Stock Market is examined for the period 2003 to 2008. To measure the firm- level governance a rating system is used to evaluate the stringency of a set of governance practices and cover various governance categories: such as board composition, ownership and shareholdings and transparency, disclosure and auditing. The sample consists of 60 non-financial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange and comprises more than 80 percent of market capitalization at Karachi Stock Market in 2007. The results confirms the theoretical notion that firms with better investment opportunities and larger in size adopt better corporate governance practice. The proposition that ownership concentration is a response to poor legal protection is also validated by the results. The more investment opportunities lead to more concentration of ownership and the ownership concentration is significantly diluted as the firm size expands. The findings are consistent with theoretical argument claiming that family owners, foreign owners and bring better governance and monitoring practices which is consistent with agency theory. The results suggest that firms which need more equity financing practice good governance. The results show that firms with high growth and large in size are in more need of external finance. The relationship between external financing and ownership concentration is negative. The results reveal that the firms which practice good governance, with concentrated ownership, need more external finance which have more profitable investment opportunities and are larger in size are valued higher. The interaction term of any variable with law enforcement term are not significant in any model suggesting that firm performance is not affected by rule of law in countries where legal environment is weak. These results adds an important link to the explanation of the consequences weak legal environment for external financing, corporate valuation and corporate governance. The results show that Corporate Governance Code 2002 potentially improves the governance and decision making process of firms listed at KSE. |
| Keywords: | Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, External Financing, Panel Data |
| JEL: | G3 F3 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:govern:2297&r=bec |
| By: | Hwa Ryung Lee |
| Abstract: | This study establishes the potential positive relationship between multimarket contact (MMC) and sustainable collusive profits under demand fluctuations. In particular, I focus on the correlation structure between demand shocks over multiple markets and show how it can lead to a positive link between collusive profit and MMC. Simple theoretical models show that, regardless of whether demand shocks are observable or not, MMC may improve collusive profits through diversification of demand shocks over overlapping markets. If firms meet in multiple markets and link those markets in the sense that deviation in any market will trigger simultaneous retaliations in every market, then a cheating firm will optimally deviate in every market. Demand fluctuation that a firm is facing in its markets in total will be reduced as the number of markets increases, unless demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated between the markets. The reduction of demand fluctuations can boost collusion (1) by reducing the temptation to deviate in the period of high demand when demand shocks are observable and (2) by reducing the frequency of costly punishment on the equilibrium path when demand shock is unobservable. The conclusion in the case of observable demand shock provides us with a new testable implication that price competition will be muted by MMC in periods of high demand. |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:501&r=bec |
| By: | Elijah Brewer, III; William E. Jackson, III; Julapa Jagtiani |
| Abstract: | Few transactions have the potential to generate revelations about the market value of corporate assets and liabilities as mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Corporate governance and control mechanisms such as independent directors, independent blockholders, and managerial share ownership are usually important predictors of the size and distribution of the incremental wealth generated by M&A transactions. The authors add to this literature by investigating these relationships using a sample of banking organization M&A transactions over the period 1990-2004. Unlike research on nonfinancial firms, the impact of independent directors, share ownership of the top five managers, and independent block holders on bank merger purchase premiums in this environment is likely to be measured more consistently because of industry operating standards and regulations. It is also the case that research on banks in this area has not received adequate attention. The authors model controls for risk characteristics of the target banks, the deal characteristics, and the economic environment. Their results are robust. They support the hypothesis that independent directors may provide an important internal governance mechanism for protecting shareholders' interests, especially in large-scale transactions such as mergers and takeovers. The authors also find the results to be consistent with the hypothesis that independent blockholders play an important role in the market for corporate control as does managerial share ownership. But these effects dampen the impact of independent directors on target shareholders' merger prices. Their overall findings would support policies that promote independent outside directors on the board of banking firms in order to provide protection for shareholders and investors at large. |
| Keywords: | Corporate governance ; Bank mergers |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:10-26&r=bec |
| By: | Kim, Jaesoo; Sly, Nicholas |
| Abstract: | We examine the problem of designing performance contracts with multiple agents when principals must compete for quality teams from a heterogeneous pool of agents. The trade-off principals face between good recruiting and good team performance provides micro foundations for agents to form stable matches, and for initially identical principals to adopt different organizational schemes. The equilibrium pattern of team formation exhibits two distinct, and inversely related, forms of assortative matching. We find that a greater share of principals offering diverse performance incentives across teammates (extensive margin), leads to a lesser degree of heterogeneity in abilities within teams on average (intensive margin). We apply the model to firm behavior to examine the mix of jobs offered and the degree of performance pay in a general equilibrium environment. At the aggregate level, increases in the supply of high-skilled workers leads to a polarization of jobs offered, i.e. relatively greater use of high- and low- skill occupations, consistent with changing labor demands in recent history. Moreover, skill accumulation among the labor force induces more firms to offer a steep set of performance contracts. |
| Keywords: | Multi-Agent Contracting; Matching; Job Design |
| JEL: | D86 D2 C78 |
| Date: | 2010–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25006&r=bec |
| By: | Argandoña, Antonio (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | The traditional theories of the firm leave no room for love in business organizations, perhaps because it is thought that love is only an emotion or feeling, not a virtue, or because economic efficiency and profit making are considered to be incompatible with the practice of charity or love. In this paper we show, based on a theory of the firm, that love can and must be lived in companies for companies to operate efficiently, be attractive to those who take part in them and act consistently in the long run. (Also available in Spanish) |
| Keywords: | Charity; Firm; Organization; Theory of action; Theory of the firm; Virtues; |
| Date: | 2010–04–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0856&r=bec |
| By: | van Eijkel, Remco (University of Groningen); Moraga-González, Jose L. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse firms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic firms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the incentives to sell forward for risk-hedging reasons. However, if strategic motives are also relevant, then an increase in the number of players strengthens the incentives to sell forward. This difference provides the analyst with a way to identify whether strategic considerations are important at motivating firms to sell forward. Using data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas, where we observe the number of players, spot and forward sales, and churn rates, we find evidence that strategic reasons play an important role in explaining the observed firms' (inverse) hedge ratios. The data also lend support to the existence of a learning effect by wholesalers. |
| Keywords: | market power; risk-hedging; forward contracts; spot market; over-thecounter trade; market transparency; churn rates; |
| JEL: | D43 G13 L13 L95 |
| Date: | 2010–06–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0864&r=bec |
| By: | Fabian Herweg |
| Abstract: | The so called flat-rate bias is a well documented phenomenon caused by consumers' desire to be insured against fluctuations in their billing amounts. This paper shows that expectation-based loss aversion provides a formal explanation for this bias. We solve for the optimal two-part tariff when contracting with loss-averse consumers who are uncertain about their demand. The optimal tariff is a flat rate if marginal cost of production is low compared to a consumer's degree of loss aversion and if there is enough variation in the consumer's demand. Moreover, if consumers differ with respect to the degree of loss aversion, firms' optimal menu of tariffs typically comprises a flat-rate contract. |
| Keywords: | Consumer Loss Aversion; Flat-Rate Tariffs; Nonlinear Pricing; Uncertain Demand |
| JEL: | D11 D43 L11 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse14_2010&r=bec |
| By: | Jean-Olivier Hairault (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor); François Langot (IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor, GAINS-TEPP - Université du Mans, CEPREMAP - Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications); Sophie Osotimehin (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the welfare cost of business cycles implied by matching frictions. First, using the reduced-form of the matching model, we show that job finding rate fluctuations generate intrinsically a non-linear effect on unemployment: positive shocks reduce unemployment less than negative shocks increase it. For the observed process of the job finding rate in the US economy, this intrinsic asymmetry increases average unemployment, which leads to substantial business cycles costs. Moreover, the structural matching model embeds other non-linearities, which alter the average job finding rate and consequently the welfare cost of business cycles. Our theory suggests to subsidizing employment in order to dampen the impact of the job finding rate fluctuations on welfare. |
| Keywords: | Business cycle costs; Unemployment dynamics; Matching |
| Date: | 2010–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00516832_v1&r=bec |
| By: | Wennberg, Karl (The Ratio Institute and Stockholm School of Economics); Nordqvist, Mattias (Jönköping International Business School); Bau’, Massimo (University of Udine); Hellerstedt, Karin (Jönköping International Business School) |
| Abstract: | In considering firm succession as the acts of both entrepreneurial exit and entry, this paper adds to work that seeks to integrate entrepreneurship and family business research. We provide a comprehensive literature review of succession research over the past 35 years and identify seven thematical clusters within which succession can be understood as a distinct part of the entrepreneurial process, and three areas of particular interest for future research seeking to advance the literatures on entrepreneurship, family firms, and governance in private firms. The paper explores theoretical, conceptual, and methodological ways of integrating these findings into the research on entrepreneurship and family business. |
| Keywords: | Family firms; Succession; Entrepreneurship |
| JEL: | L26 M13 |
| Date: | 2010–09–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0157&r=bec |
| By: | Seelos, Christian (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | The ambiguity surrounding model-based science is exemplified by the proliferation of meanings of the term "business model". We argue that a clearer specification of the analytical, theoretical and ontological validity of models is an opportunity to learn about and understand complex organizational phenomena more systematically. We apply this to research on social entrepreneurship and pro-poor business models that has been criticized as being overly theoretical and conceptually ambiguous. Business models are presented as narratives that integrate various actors, actions, stories, and outcomes, without a clear perspective of why these elements were selected and what we can learn from them. This paper outlines an explicit modeling process as an investigative tool that enables transparent and systematic theorizing of business models. Using an illustrative case study, we develop a generative model that accounts for the social mechanisms that explain how business models achieve multiple strategic objectives and multiple dimensions of economic and social value creation. |
| Keywords: | Business model; social mechanisms; generative model; retroduction; |
| Date: | 2010–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0857&r=bec |
| By: | Auriol, Emmanuelle; Brilon, Stefanie |
| Abstract: | Intrinsic motivation of workers may arise from different individual motives. While some workers care about the mission of an organization and derive an intrinsic benefit from advancing this mission ("good" workers), others derive pleasure from some form of destructive or anti-social behavior ("bad" workers). We show that mission-oriented organizations can take advantage of the intrinsic motivation of good workers. Compared to profit-oriented organizations, lower bonus payments and lower monitoring are necessary in order to achieve a high output. However, as soon as there are bad workers, mission-oriented organizations may become more vulnerable to their anti-social behavior than profit-oriented organizations. We analyze the optimal wage contracts and monitoring levels for both types of organization and discuss appropriate measures of ex ante candidate screening to overcome the problems caused by bad workers. -- |
| Keywords: | motivated agents,non-profit,sabotage,candidate selection |
| JEL: | D21 D23 L31 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:40&r=bec |
| By: | Bent Jesper Christensen (Aarhus University and CREATES); Paolo Santucci de Magistris (University of Pavia and CREATES) |
| Abstract: | We propose a simple model in which realized stock market return volatility and implied volatility backed out of option prices are subject to common level shifts corresponding to movements between bull and bear markets. The model is estimated using the Kalman filter in a generalization to the multivariate case of the univariate level shift technique by Lu and Perron (2008). An application to the S&P500 index and a simulation experiment show that the recently documented empirical properties of strong persistence in volatility and forecastability of future realized volatility from current implied volatility, which have been interpreted as long memory (or fractional integration) in volatility and fractional cointegration between implied and realized volatility, are accounted for by occasional common level shifts. |
| Keywords: | Common level shifts, fractional cointegration, fractional VECM, implied volatility, long memory, options, realized volatility. |
| JEL: | C32 G13 G14 |
| Date: | 2010–09–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:create:2010-60&r=bec |
| By: | Arribas Fernández Iván (University of Valencia; Ivie); Vila Gisbert José E. (University of Valencia) |
| Abstract: | This working paper analyzes the role played by two dimensions of entrepreneurs’ private social capital in the performance of an entrepreneurial venture: local size and degree of preferential linking. To fulfill this objective, we build a bi-dimensional measure of social capital based on network models and a methodology to estimate this measure for any group of entrepreneurs. Based on a survey of service entrepreneurs who launched their business in the city of Shanghai, we show that social capital or guanxi is relevant for business success. Moreover, we show that roles played by each dimension are quite different. A large local network, i.e. a large set of agents able to advise or support the entrepreneur, increases the chances of survival of the new venture but has no impact to make it go beyond a self-employment business. To reach this level, entrepreneurs need to generate a high degree of preferential attachment; in other words, they need to generate a social network that allows them to get advice and support from those agents placed in critical positions within Shanghai’s global socio-economic network. This finding has relevant political and managerial implications and generates new questions to be answered in future research. |
| Keywords: | Social capital, network analysis, entrepreneurship in China |
| Date: | 2010–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fbb:wpaper:20103&r=bec |
| By: | Lokshin, Boris (Maastricht University, and UNU-MERIT); Mohnen, Pierre (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University, and CIRANO) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of the R&D fiscal incentive program on R&D by Dutch firms. Taking a factor-demand approach we measure the elasticity of firm R&D capital accumulation to its user cost. Econometric models are estimated using a rich unbalanced panel of firm data covering the period 1996-2004 with firm-specific R&D user costs varying with tax incentives. Using the estimated user cost elasticity, we perform a cost-benefit analysis of the R&D incentive program. We find some evidence of additionality suggesting that the level-based program of R&D incentives in the Netherlands is effective in stimulating firms' investment in R&D. However, the hypothesis of crowding out can be rejected only for small firms. The analysis also indicates that the level-based nature of the fiscal incentive scheme leads to a substantial social dead-weight loss. |
| Keywords: | R&D tax credits; panel data; crowding out; user-cost elasticity |
| JEL: | O32 O38 H25 H50 C23 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2010040&r=bec |
| By: | Patrick A. Pintus; Yi Wen |
| Abstract: | Investment booms and asset "bubbles" are often the consequence of heavily leveraged borrowing and speculations of persistent growth in asset demand. We show theoretically that dynamic interactions between leveraged borrowing and persistent asset demand can generate a multiplier-accelerator mechanism that transforms a one-time technological innovation into large and long-lasting boom-bust cycles. The predictions are consistent with the basic features of investment booms and the consequent asset-market crashes led by excessive credit expansion. |
| Keywords: | Asset pricing ; Credit |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2010-027&r=bec |
| By: | Jeroen Rombouts; Lars Peter Stentoft |
| Abstract: | This paper uses asymmetric heteroskedastic normal mixture models to fit return data and to price options. The models can be estimated straightforwardly by maximum likelihood, have high statistical fit when used on S&P 500 index return data, and allow for substantial negative skewness and time varying higher order moments of the risk neutral distribution. When forecasting out-of-sample a large set of index options between 1996 and 2009, substantial improvements are found compared to several benchmark models in terms of dollar losses and the ability to explain the smirk in implied volatilities. Overall, the dollar root mean squared error of the best performing benchmark component model is 39% larger than for the mixture model. When considering the recent financial crisis this difference increases to 69%. <P>Dans le présent document, nous avons recours aux modèles hétéroscédastiques asymétriques avec mélange de distributions normales pour ajuster les données sur les rendements et fixer les prix des options. Les modèles peuvent être estimés directement par le maximum de vraisemblance, ils comportent un ajustement statistique élevé quand ils sont utilisés sur les données de rendement de l’indice S&P 500, et ils permettent de tenir compte d’une asymétrie négative importante et des moments d’ordre élevé variant dans le temps liés à la distribution du risque nul. Dans le cas des prévisions hors-échantillonnage concernant une vaste gamme d’options sur indice entre 1996 et 2009, nous constatons des améliorations substantielles, par rapport à plusieurs modèles de référence, en termes de pertes exprimées en dollars et de capacité d’expliquer le caractère ironique des volatilités implicites. En général, la racine de l’erreur quadratique moyenne du modèle de référence à composantes le plus efficace est 39 % plus grande que dans le cas du modèle à mélange. Dans le contexte de la récente crise financière, cette différence augmente à 69 %. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric heteroskedastic models, finite mixture models, option pricing, out-of-sample prediction, statistical fit , modèles hétéroscédastiques asymétriques, modèle à mélanges finis, fixation des prix des options, prédiction hors-échantillonnage, ajustement statistique |
| JEL: | C11 C15 C22 G13 |
| Date: | 2010–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2010s-38&r=bec |
| By: | Breitmoser, Yves |
| Abstract: | In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F's opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F's opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why "important" coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others. |
| Keywords: | coalition formation; non-cooperative bargaining; core |
| JEL: | C78 D72 C72 |
| Date: | 2010–09–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24995&r=bec |
| By: | Hwa Ryung Lee |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how financial distress affects competition and how incumbent bankruptcy affects the growth of rivals, specifically in the context of airline bankruptcies. I begin by studying whether bankrupt airlines put competitive pressures on rivals by cutting fares and maintaining or expanding capacity on the 1000 most popular domestic routes from 1998-2008. The results suggest that, although bankrupt legacy airlines reduce fares, they also reduce capacities significantly. Low-cost carrier (LCC) rivals do not match the fare cuts and expand capacities by 13-18% above trend growth. The significant capacity reductions associated with legacy airline bankruptcies create growth opportunities for LCC rivals. This indicates the existence of barriers that have limited LCCs from expanding faster and more extensively. The LCC expansion during rivals' bankruptcies is even greater when I consider the 200 most popular airports instead of the 1000 most popular routes. During legacy airlines' bankruptcy, non-LCC rivals reduce capacities on the routes affected by the bankruptcy but expand at the affected airports. A likely explanation for this result is that non-LCCs avoid 'bankruptcy' routes as more competitive pressure is expected with increasing presence of LCCs, but they pick up the gates or time slots given up by the bankrupt airlines to expand on other routes. On balance the total route capacity on the 1000 popular routes shows only a modest decrease during bankruptcy and eventually recovers, but the capacity mix changes in favor of LCCs. Overall, I find little evidence that distressed airlines toughen competition and lower industry profitability. LCC's capacity growth during legacy rivals' bankruptcy suggests the existence of market frictions in competition. |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:502&r=bec |