nep-bec New Economics Papers
on Business Economics
Issue of 2009‒09‒11
25 papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Universite du Quebec en Outaouais

  1. Bank Ownership, Firm Value and Firm Capital Structure in Europe By Lieven Baert; Rudi Vander Vennet
  2. Default Risk and Equity Returns: A Comparison of the Bank-Based German and the U.S. Financial System By Breig, Christoph; Elsas, Ralf
  3. How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation? By Ingolf Dittmann; Ko-Chia Yu
  4. Starting Wages Respond To Employer's Risk By Peter Berkhout; Joop Hartog; Hans van Ophem
  5. Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of Market Structure By Timothy Dunne; Shawn D. Klimek; Mark J. Roberts; Daniel Yi Xu
  6. A parsimonious macroeconomic model for asset pricing By Fatih Guvenen
  7. Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining By Christian M. Dahl; Daniel le Maire; Jakob R. Munch
  8. Dynamic Incentive Accounts By Alex Edmans; Xavier Gabaix; Tomasz Sadzik; Yuliy Sannikov
  9. Bank Competition and Firm Growth in the Enlarged European Union By Gábor Pellényi; Tamás Borkó
  10. Wage Dispersion in a Partially Unionized Labor Force By John T. Addison; Ralph W. Bailey; W. Stanley Siebert
  11. Collusion, competition and piracy By Francisco Martínez-Sánchez
  12. The impact of the global financial crisis on business cycles in Asian emerging economies By Korhonen, Iikka; Fidrmuc , Jarko
  13. Price Volatility and Risk Exposure: on the Interaction of Quota and Product Markets By Baldursson, Fridrik M.; von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M.
  14. They Are Even Larger! More (on) Puzzling Labor Market Volatilities By Hermann Gartner; Christian Merkl; Thomas Rothe
  15. Is Corporate Social Responsibility viewed as a risk factor? Evidence from an asset pricing analysis By Manescu, Cristiana
  16. Incentives for Experimenting Agents By Johannes Horner; Larry Samuelson
  17. Alternative Tilts for Nonparametric Option Pricing By Walker, Todd B; Haley, M. Ryan
  18. Incomplete Contract and Divisional Structures By Te Bao; Yongqin Wang
  19. Why Hierarchy? Communication and Information Acquisition in Organizations By Junichiro Ishida
  20. Methods versus substance: measuring the effects of technology shocks on hours By José-Víctor Ríos-Rull; Frank Schorfheide; Cristina Fuentes-Albero; Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis; Maxym Kryshko
  21. What happened to the US stock market? Accounting for the last 50 years By Michele Boldrin; Adrian Peralta-Alva
  22. Occupational Mobility Within and Between Skill Clusters: An Empirical Analysis Based on the Skill-Weights Approach By Regula Geel; Uschi Backes-Gellner
  23. An empirical study on the decoupling movements between corporate bond and CDS spreads. By Ioana Alexopoulou; Magnus Andersson; Oana Maria Georgescu
  24. Selection Wages and Discrimination By Schlicht, Ekkehart
  25. Do S&P's Corporate Ratings Reflect Credit Shocks? By Elsas, Ralf; Sabine, Mielert

  1. By: Lieven Baert; Rudi Vander Vennet
    Abstract: We investigate whether or not banks play a positive role in the ownership structure of European listed firms. We distinguish between banks and other institutional investors as shareholders and examine empirically the relationship between financial institution ownership and the performance of the firms in which they hold equity. Our main finding is that after controlling for the capital structure decision of the firms and the ownership decision of financial institutions in a simultaneous equations model, we find that there is a negative relationship between financial institution ownership and the market value of firms, measured as the Tobin's Q. This is in contradiction with the monitoring hypothesis.
    Keywords: Financial institution ownership, Firm value, Capital structure
    JEL: G32 G20
    Date: 2009
  2. By: Breig, Christoph; Elsas, Ralf
    Abstract: In this paper, we address the question whether the impact of default risk on equity returns depends on the financial system firms operate in. Using an implementation of Merton's option-pricing model for the value of equity to estimate firms' default risk, we construct a factor that measures the excess return of firms with low default risk over firms with high default risk. We then compare results from asset pricing tests for the German and the U.S. stock markets. Since Germany is the prime example of a bank-based financial system, where debt is supposedly a major instrument of corporate governance, we expect that a systematic default risk effect on equity returns should be more pronounced for German rather than U.S. firms. Our evidence suggests that a higher firm default risk systematically leads to lower returns in both capital markets. This contradicts some previous results for the U.S. by Vassalou/Xing (2004), but we show that their default risk factor looses its explanatory power if one includes a default risk factor measured as a factor mimicking portfolio. It further turns out that the composition of corporate debt affects equity returns in Germany. Firms' default risk sensitivities are attenuated the more a firm depends on bank debt financing.
    Keywords: Asset pricing; Stochastic Discount Factor; Default Risk
    JEL: G12
    Date: 2009–03–27
  3. By: Ingolf Dittmann (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Ko-Chia Yu (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain observed compensation practice surprisingly well. In particular, it justifies large option holdings and high base salaries. Our analysis suggests that options should be issued in the money. If tax effects are taken into account, the model is consistent with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a major objective in executive compensation practice.
    Keywords: Stock Options; Executive Compensation; Effort Aversion; Risk-Taking Incentives; Optimal Strike Price
    JEL: G30 M52
    Date: 2009–08–25
  4. By: Peter Berkhout (EIB Amsterdam); Joop Hartog (University of Amsterdam); Hans van Ophem (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Firms hiring fresh graduates face uncertainty on the future productivity of workers. Theory suggests that starting wages reflect this, with lower pay for greater uncertainty. We use the dispersion of exam grades within a field of education as an indicator of the unobserved heterogeneity that employers face. We find solid evidence that starting wages are lower if the variance of exam grades is higher and higher if the skew is higher: employers shift the cost of productivity risk to new hires, but pay for the opportunity to catch a really good worker. Estimating the extent of risk cost sharing between firm and worker shows that shifting to workers is larger in the market sector than in the public sector and diminishes with experience.
    Keywords: wages; risk compensation; ability; incomplete information
    JEL: J31
    Date: 2009–08–06
  5. By: Timothy Dunne; Shawn D. Klimek; Mark J. Roberts; Daniel Yi Xu
    Abstract: Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers. These decisions are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within the market. In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. The magnitude of these effects differ substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the dentist and chiropractor industries. Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits. We calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run profits by the same amount as if the firm operated in a duopoly.
    JEL: L11 L13 L84
    Date: 2009–09
  6. By: Fatih Guvenen
    Abstract: I study asset prices in a two-agent macroeconomic model with two key features: limited stock market participation and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (EIS). The model is consistent with some prominent features of asset prices, such as a high equity premium; relatively smooth interest rates; procyclical stock prices; and countercyclical variation in the equity premium, its volatility, and in the Sharpe ratio. In this model, the risk-free asset market plays a central role by allowing non-stockholders (with low EIS) to smooth the fluctuations in their labor income. This process concentrates non-stockholders' labor income risk among a small group of stockholders, who then demand a high premium for bearing the aggregate equity risk. Furthermore, this mechanism is consistent with the very small share of aggregate wealth held by non-stockholders in the US data, which has proved problematic for previous models with limited participation. I show that this large wealth inequality is also important for the model's ability to generate a countercyclical equity premium. When it comes to business cycle performance the model's progress has been more limited: consumption is still too volatile compared to the data, whereas investment is still too smooth. These are important areas for potential improvement in this framework.
    Keywords: Wealth ; Stock market
    Date: 2009
  7. By: Christian M. Dahl (School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus); Daniel le Maire (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Jakob R. Munch (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: This paper studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use a detailed panel data set covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides exogenous variation in the individual worker's wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. Consistent with predictions we find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems. However, the differences across wage-setting systems are reduced substantially when controlling for unobserved individual level heterogeneity.
    Keywords: Wage bargaining; decentralization; panel data quantile regression
    JEL: J31 J51 C23
    Date: 2009–08
  8. By: Alex Edmans; Xavier Gabaix; Tomasz Sadzik; Yuliy Sannikov
    Abstract: Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the optimal contract in a setting where the CEO can affect firm value through both productive effort and costly manipulation, and may undo the contract by privately saving. The optimal contract takes a surprisingly simple form, and can be implemented by a "Dynamic Incentive Account." The CEO's expected pay is escrowed into an account, a fraction of which is invested in the firm's stock and the remainder in cash. The account features state-dependent rebalancing and time-dependent vesting. It is constantly rebalanced so that the equity fraction remains above a certain threshold; this threshold sensitivity is typically increasing over time even in the absence of career concerns. The account vests gradually both during the CEO's employment and after he quits, to deter short-termist actions before retirement.
    JEL: D2 D3 G34 J3
    Date: 2009–09
  9. By: Gábor Pellényi; Tamás Borkó
    Abstract: We examine the impact of bank competition and institutional factors on net firm entry in a sample of European manufacturing industries over the 1995-2006 period. Taking into account industry differences in the need for external finance, we find that bank competition helps firm entry. In addition, better institutions - especially legal structure and property rights - also have a positive impact, particularly through a better functioning financial system.
    Keywords: market structure, banks, market entry, manufacturing, financial development
    JEL: D4 G21 L11 L60 O16
    Date: 2009
  10. By: John T. Addison (University of South Carolina (U.S.A.), GEMF (Portugal), and IZA); Ralph W. Bailey (University of Birmingham (U.K.)); W. Stanley Siebert (University of Birmingham (U.K.) and IZA)
    Abstract: Wage Dispersion in a Partially Unionized Labor Force This paper critiques Card’s (2001) method for analyzing wage dispersion in a partially unionized labor market based on a disaggregation of the population into skill categories. We argue that disaggregation is a good idea, the use of skill categories less so. We offer a modified model in which each worker is assigned a union-membership probability, a predicted union wage, and a predicted nonunion wage. Our model provides a natural three-way decomposition of variance, and is also suited to counterfactual analysis. By way of an application, we examine the effect of de-unionization on wage dispersion in the United Kingdom between 1983 and 1995, reporting that the decline in membership accounts for only about one-fifth of the observed increase in wage dispersion.
    Keywords: wage dispersion, three-way variance decomposition, bivariate kernel density smoothing, union membership, deunionization.
    JEL: D3 J31 J51
    Date: 2009–07
  11. By: Francisco Martínez-Sánchez (Universidad de Alicante)
    Abstract: In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on pricesin an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical productdifferentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discountfactor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We alsoshow that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higherquality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of thesenew characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous.
    Keywords: Collusion, competition, piracy, consumers, cost of copying,
    JEL: D40 K42 L13 L40 O34
    Date: 2009–01
  12. By: Korhonen, Iikka (BOFIT); Fidrmuc , Jarko (BOFIT)
    Abstract: We analyze the transmission of global financial crisis to business cycles in China and India. The pattern of business cycles in emerging Asian economies generally displays a low degree of synchronization with the OECD countries, which is consistent with the decoupling hypothesis. By contrast, however, the current financial crisis has had a significant effect on economic developments in emerging Asian economies. Applying dynamic correlations, we find wide differences for different frequencies of cyclical development. More specifically, at business cycle frequencies, dynamic correlations are typically low or negative, but they are also influenced most by the global financial crisis. Finally, we find a significant link between trade ties and dynamic correlations of GDP growth rates in emerging Asian countries and OECD countries.
    Keywords: financial crisis; business cycles; decoupling; trade; dynamic correlation
    JEL: E32 F15 F41
    Date: 2009–08–04
  13. By: Baldursson, Fridrik M. (Reykjavik University); von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M. (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)
    Abstract: We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in quota price affects firm behaviour, taking into account the impact of quota price on final-good price. The impact on the individual firm differs depending on how polluting it is - whether it is ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’- and whether it has been allocated quotas at the outset. In the absence of long-term or forward contracting, the optimal initial quota allocation turns out to resemble a grandfathering regime: clean firms are allocated no quotas - dirty firms are allocated quotas for a part of their emissions.With forward contracts and in the absence of wealth effects initial quota allocation has no effect on firm behaviour.
    Keywords: regulation; effluent taxes; tradable quotas; uncertainty; risk aversion; environmental management
    JEL: D81 H23 L51 Q28 Q38
    Date: 2009–04–22
  14. By: Hermann Gartner; Christian Merkl; Thomas Rothe
    Abstract: This paper shows that the German labor market is more volatile than the US labor market. Specifically, the volatility of the cyclical component of several labor market variables (e.g., the job-finding rate, labor market tightness, and job vacancies) divided by the volatility of labor productivity is roughly twice as large as in the United States. We derive and simulate a simple dynamic labor market model with heterogeneous worker productivity. This model is able to explain the higher German labor market volatilities by a longer expected job duration
    Keywords: multinational enterprises, firm heterogeneity, industry characteristics, sector-specific FDI, vertical and horizontal FDI
    JEL: J6 E24 E32
    Date: 2009–09
  15. By: Manescu, Cristiana (Center for Finance, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg)
    Abstract: Using detailed data on corporate social responsibility (CSR) for a long panel of large publicly traded U.S. firms during July 1992-June 2008, this study investigates whether an overall measure of CSR, aggregated over seven dimensions (community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product safety), can explain variation in stock returns, using Fama and MacBeth (1973) month-by-month cross-sectional regressions approach. Risk- factor analysis indicates a shift in the effect of CSR, with a positive effect on stock returns during July 1992 - June 2003, and a negative effect during July 2003 - June 2008. These results are robust even after controlling for ten industry-specific effects. Analysis on the disaggregated CSR measures reveals that it is only the Community and Employee Relations dimensions generating the positive e ect of CSR on stock returns during 1992-2003. The negative effect during 2003-2008 was mainly generated by the Human Rights, Product Safety, and Employee Relations dimensions. This constitutes evidence that these three CSR dimensions function as risk factors.<p>
    Keywords: responsible investments; market efficiency; three factor model; risk premium
    JEL: G12 G14 M14
    Date: 2009–09–01
  16. By: Johannes Horner (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Larry Samuelson (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian equilibrium (whose structure depends on the parameters) and characterize the set of all equilibrium payoffs, uncovering a collection of non-Markovian equilibria that can Pareto dominate and reverse the qualitative properties of the Markovian equilibrium. The prospect of lucrative continuation payoffs makes it more expensive for the principal to incentivize the agent, giving rise to a dynamic agency cost. As a result, constrained efficient equilibrium outcomes call for nonstationary outcomes that front-load the agent's effort and that either attenuate or terminate the relationship inefficiently early.
    Keywords: Experimentation, Learning, Agency, Dynamic agency, Venture Capital, Repeated principal-agent problem
    JEL: D8 L2
    Date: 2009–09
  17. By: Walker, Todd B; Haley, M. Ryan
    Abstract: This paper generalizes the nonparametric approach to option pricing of Stutzer (1996) by demonstrating that the canonical valuation methodology in- troduced therein is one member of the Cressie-Read family of divergence mea- sures. While the limiting distribution of the alternative measures is identical to the canonical measure, the finite sample properties are quite different. We assess the ability of the alternative divergence measures to price European call options by approximating the risk-neutral, equivalent martingale measure from an empirical distribution of the underlying asset. A simulation study of the finite sample properties of the alternative measure changes reveals that the optimal divergence measure depends upon how accurately the empirical distri- bution of the underlying asset is estimated. In a simple Black-Scholes model, the optimal measure change is contingent upon the number of outliers observed, whereas the optimal measure change is a function of time to expiration in the stochastic volatility model of Heston (1993). Our extension of Stutzer’s tech- nique preserves the clean analytic structure of imposing moment restrictions to price options, yet demonstrates that the nonparametric approach is even more general in pricing options than originally believed.
    Keywords: Option Pricing; Nonparametric; Entropy
    JEL: C14 G13
    Date: 2009–09–06
  18. By: Te Bao (CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam); Yongqin Wang (CCES and School of Economics, Fudan University)
    Abstract: In this paper we want to analyze the internal divisional structure within an organi-
    Keywords: organizational form; divisional structure; incomplete contract; bargaining
    JEL: D23 L22
    Date: 2009–08–25
  19. By: Junichiro Ishida
    Abstract: In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that perspective. The focus of attention is on the tradeoff between costly information acquisition and costless communication. When the agency problem concerning information acquisition is sufficiently severe, the contractual arrangement which allocates responsibility asymmetrically often emerges as the optimal organizational form, which gives rise to the chain of command pertaining to hierarchical organizations. This explains why hierarchies often prevail in firms since a relatively fixed group of members must confront with new problems and come up with solutions on the day-to-day basis, and hence the agency problem is an issue to be reckoned with.
    Date: 2009–08
  20. By: José-Víctor Ríos-Rull; Frank Schorfheide; Cristina Fuentes-Albero; Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis; Maxym Kryshko
    Abstract: In this paper, we employ both calibration and modern (Bayesian) estimation methods to assess the role of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks in generating fluctuations in hours. Using a neoclassical stochastic growth model, we show how answers are shaped by the identification strategies and not by the statistical approaches. The crucial parameter is the labor supply elasticity. Both a calibration procedure that uses modern assessments of the Frisch elasticity and the estimation procedures result in technology shocks accounting for 2% to 9% of the variation in hours worked in the data. We infer that we should be talking more about identification and less about the choice of particular quantitative approaches.
    Keywords: Business cycles ; Technology - Economic aspects
    Date: 2009
  21. By: Michele Boldrin; Adrian Peralta-Alva
    Abstract: The extreme volatility of stock market values has been the subject of a large body of literature. Previous research focused on the short run because of a widespread belief that, in the long run, the market reverts to well understood fundamentals. Our work suggests this belief should be questioned as well. First, we show actual dividends cannot account for the secular trends of stock market values. We then consider a more comprehensive measure of capital income. This measure displays large secular fluctuations that roughly coincide with changes in stock market trends. Under perfect foresight, however, this measure fails to account for stock market movements as well. We thus abandon the perfect foresight assumption. Assuming instead that forecasts of future capital income are performed using a distributed lag equation and information available up to the forecasting period only, we find that standard asset pricing theory can be reconciled with the secular trends in the stock market. Nevertheless, our studyleaves open an important puzzle for asset pricing theory: the market value of U.S. corporations was much lower than the replacement cost of corporate tangible assets from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s.
    Keywords: Stock market ; Asset pricing
    Date: 2009
  22. By: Regula Geel (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich); Uschi Backes-Gellner (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: Mobility and flexibility is increasingly demanded as structural change challenges estab-lished educational systems and traditional occupational demarcations. We use Lazear’s skill-weights approach (2003) first to operationalize the degree of specificity of skill com-binations in an innovative manner and second to derive hypotheses about the effects of occupation-specific skill combinations. In our empirical section, we find that the more specific an occupation, the smaller is the probability of an occupational change, as ex-pected. Furthermore, we are able to identify different clusters of occupations that are char-acterized by similar skill combinations within a given cluster and different skill combina-tions between clusters. We find that employees in very specific occupations have a com-paratively higher probability of changing their occupation within than between skill clus-ters. Moreover, occupational mobility within a skill cluster is accompanied by wage gains, while mobility between skill clusters results in wage losses. Not surprisingly, the more specific the former occupation is, either the higher is the resulting wage loss or the smaller is the resulting wage gain depending on whether the move is between or within skill clus-ters, respectively. Therefore, the acquired skill combination rather than the occupation per se crucially determines the mobility of an employee.
    Keywords: Skill-weights approach, mobility, skill clusters, apprenticeship training
    JEL: J62 M53
    Date: 2009–09
  23. By: Ioana Alexopoulou (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Magnus Andersson (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Oana Maria Georgescu (KfW Bankengruppe, Palmengartenstraße 5-9, D-60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.)
    Abstract: Applied to the European markets, this paper analyzes the price of credit risk on the Credit Default Swap (CDS) and corporate bond markets by comparing the sensitivity of the credit spreads on each market to systematic, idiosyncratic risk factors and liquidity. Our analysis confirms the existence of a long-run relationship between the two markets, and the tendency for CDS markets to lead corporate bond markets in terms of price discovery. We find that the outbreak of the financial turmoil in the summer of 2007 induced a substantial increase in risk aversion and a shift in the pricing of credit risk, with CDS markets becoming more sensitive to systematic risk while cash bond markets priced in more information about liquidity and idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the financial turbulence also brought about a systematic disconnection between the two markets caused by the significant change in the lead-lag relationship, with CDS markets always leading the cash bond markets. JEL Classification: G12, G14, G15.
    Keywords: Credit Default Swap Spreads, Corporate Bond Spreads, Liquidity.
    Date: 2009–08
  24. By: Schlicht, Ekkehart
    Abstract: Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differentials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profit-maximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium.
    Keywords: Discrimination; selection wages; efficiency wages; hiring standards; monopsony; employment criteria; wage posting; Reder competition; social roles; social stereotypes; social multiplier; statistical discrimination; taste discrimination
    JEL: J31 J7 B54 D13 D42
    Date: 2009–09
  25. By: Elsas, Ralf; Sabine, Mielert
    Keywords: Credit Ratings; Validation; Rating Regulation
    JEL: G14 G28 G33
    Date: 2009–08–24

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