nep-bec New Economics Papers
on Business Economics
Issue of 2007‒10‒20
27 papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
University of Quebec in Ottawa

  1. Director Independence as Strategic Behavior By Alexander F. WAGNER
  2. Modeling the Effects of Financial Constraints on Firm´s Investment By Tomat, Gian Maria
  3. Pre-emptive horizontal mergers: theory and evidence By Molnar, Jozsef
  4. Stock Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions By Dirk Hackbarth; Erwan Morellec
  5. Investigating New Technology Based Firm (NTBF) Internationalization: the Impact on Performance, the Process and the Antecedents By Kiederich A.
  6. Openess to trade and industry cost dispersion: Evidence from a panel of Italian firms By Massimo Del Gatto; Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano; Marcello Pagnini
  7. Openness, Technology Capital, and Development By Ellen McGrattan; Edward C. Prescott
  8. News and Business Cycles in Open Economies By Jaimovich, Nir; Rebelo, Sérgio
  9. Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly By Sergio Currarini; Francesco Feri
  10. A Simple Business-Cycle Model with Shumpeterian Features By Costa, Luís F.; Dixon, Huw
  11. Hard and Soft Locational Factors, Innovativeness and Firm Performance : An Empirical Test of Porter's Diamond Model at the Micro-Level By Alexander Eickelpasch; Anna Lejpras; Andreas Stephan
  12. Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets By James B. Bushnell; Erin T. Mansur; Celeste Saravia
  13. The cyclical behaviour of job and worker flows By Giuseppe Tattara; Marco Valentini
  14. Entry Threat and Entry Deterrence: The Timing of Broadband Rollout By Mo Xiao; Peter F. Orazem;
  15. House Prices, Real Estate Returns and the Business Cycle By Ivan Jaccard
  16. Liquidity Constraints and Entrepreneurial Performance By Hvide, Hans K.; Møen, Jarle
  17. Family ownership and growth: The case of French SMEs By Anaïs Hamelin; Joseph Trojman
  18. Organisational status and efficiency: The case of the spanish SOE Paradores By Magda Cayón Costa; Joaquim Vergés Jaime
  19. Unmeasured Investment and the Puzzling U.S. Boom in the 1990s By Ellen R. McGrattan; Edward C. Prescott
  20. First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice By David Encaoua; Abraham Hollander
  21. Stock Market Volatility and Learning By Adam, Klaus; Marcet, Albert; Nicolini, Juan Pablo
  22. Financing and Takeovers By Erwan Morellec; Alexei Zhdanov
  23. The Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages By Wiji Arulampalam; Michael P Devereux; Giorgia Maffini
  24. The marketability of bank assets and managerial rents: implications for financial stability By Fecht, Falko; Wagner, Wolf
  25. Internal and External Restructuring over the Cycle: A Firm-Based Analysis of Gross Flows and Productivity Growth in Portugal By Carlos Carreira; Paulino Teixeira
  26. The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Profit: a Survey of Empirical Evidence By Michael P Devereux
  27. Computing Stochastic Dynamic Economic Models with a Large Number of State Variables: A Description and Application of a Smolyak-Collocation Method By Benjamin Malin; Dirk Krueger; Felix Kubler

  1. By: Alexander F. WAGNER (University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the independence of boards of directors as an optimally chosen, non-contractible behavior. A board behaves loyally to a CEO when it agrees to a negative NPV-project, giving the CEO private benefits. While the CEO benefits from competent directors because they help him make better decisions, the analysis reveals that loyalty is endogenously easier to obtain from a less competent board. The model implies that shareholders face a tradeoff between higher CEO pay and more inefficient board loyalty. It also holds predictions for how firm characteristics, other corporate governance features, and the business environment affect endogenous board competence.
    Keywords: Corporate governance, boards of directors, relational contracts
    JEL: D23 G34 M51
    Date: 2007–04
  2. By: Tomat, Gian Maria
    Abstract: The paper develops a model of firm´s investment under uncertainty with financial market imperfections and analyzes the effects of financial constraints on firm´s investment. Firm´s investment is an increasing function of the firm´s marginal q, however the investment function is characterized by an upper bound that depends on the firm´s borrowing capabilities. The firm´s marginal q is the sum of the expected value of the marginal profitability of the physical capital stock and of a positive external finance premium. In the presence of financial market imperfections the firm forms expectations about future financial conditions and these expectations raise the firm´s current marginal q. Similarly, the shadow price of firm´s debt is the sum of the interest cost of debt repayment and of a provision for external finance that depends on the firm´s expectations over future financial conditions.
    Keywords: firm´s investment, financial constraints, Tobin´s marginal q, uncertainty
    JEL: D92 E22
    Date: 2007
  3. By: Molnar, Jozsef (Bank of Finland Research)
    Abstract: This paper proposes and tests an explanation as to why rational managers seeking to maximize shareholder value can pursue value-decreasing mergers. It can be optimal to overpay for a target firm and decrease shareholder value if the loss is less than in an alternative where the merger is undertaken by a product market rival. This paper presents a model based on synergies, market power and competition for merger targets. Consistent with the model the empirical results obtained here show a strong correlation between the returns of acquiring firms and close rivals around merger events.
    Keywords: acquisitions; auction; event study; oligopoly; preemption
    JEL: D43 D44 G14 G34 L13
    Date: 2007–10–11
  4. By: Dirk Hackbarth (Washington University, St. Louis - John M. Olin School of Business); Erwan Morellec (University of Lausanne - Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF))
    Abstract: This paper develops a real options framework to analyze the behavior of stock returns in mergers and acquisitions. In this framework, the timing and terms of takeovers are endogenous and result from value-maximizing decisions. The implications of the model for abnormal announcement returns are consistent with the available empirical evidence. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding the dynamics of firm-level betas for the time period surrounding control transactions. Using a sample of 1090 takeovers of publicly traded US firms between 1985 and 2002, we present new evidence on the dynamics of firm-level betas, which is strongly supportive of the model's predictions.
    Keywords: takeovers, real options, stock returns, firm-level betas
    JEL: G13 G14 G31 G34
    Date: 2006–10
  5. By: Kiederich A.
    Abstract: While researchers have extensively studied the born global and international new venture phenomena, the related field of NTBF internationalization has been left untouched, giving rise to an investigation aimed at filling this gap in the international business literature. The investigation covers the impact that internationalization has on performance, the process of internationalization and the antecedents of successful internationalization. Being conceptual in nature, this paper lays the theoretical foundation for future empirical research on NTBF internationalization. The theory development is based on an analysis of several factors, including organizational and environmental characteristics, founders, financing, ownership and network ties of NTBFs.
    Date: 2007–04
  6. By: Massimo Del Gatto (University of Cagliari); Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano (University of Bologna); Marcello Pagnini (Bank of Italy)
    Abstract: We use Italian firm-level data to investigate the impact of trade openness on the distribution of firms across marginal cost levels. In so doing, we implement a procedure that allows us to control not only for the standard transmission bias identified in firm-level TFP regressions but also for the omitted price bias due to imperfect competition. We find that more open industries are characterized by a smaller dispersion of costs across active firms. Moreover, in those industries the average cost is also smaller.
    Keywords: Cost dispersion, openness to trade, firm-level data, firm selection, total factor productivity.
    JEL: F12 F15 R13
    Date: 2007–06
  7. By: Ellen McGrattan; Edward C. Prescott
    Abstract: In this paper, we extend the growth model to include firm-specific technology capital and use it to assess the gains from opening to foreign direct investment. A firm's technology capital is its unique know-how from investing in research and development, brands, and organization capital. What distinguishes technology capital from other forms of capital is the fact that a firm can use it simultaneously in multiple domestic and foreign locations. Foreign technology capital is exploited by permitting foreign direct investment by multinationals. In both steady-state and transitional analyses, the extended growth model predicts large gains to being open.
    JEL: F23 F41 O11 O32
    Date: 2007–10
  8. By: Jaimovich, Nir; Rebelo, Sérgio
    Abstract: It is well known that the neoclassical model does not generate comovement among macroeconomic aggregates in response to news about future total factor productivity. We show that this problem is generally more severe in open economy versions of the neoclassical model. We present an open economy model that generates comovement both in response to sudden stops and to news about future productivity and investment-specific technical change. We find that comovement is easier to generate in the presence of weak short-run wealth effects on the labour supply, adjustment costs to labour, and/or investment, and whenever the real interest rate faced by the economy rises with the level of net foreign debt.
    Keywords: comovement; news; open economy
    JEL: F4
    Date: 2007–10
  9. By: Sergio Currarini (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari and School for Advanced Studies in Venice); Francesco Feri (University of Innsbruck)
    Abstract: We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of private signals. Using the general model developed by Raith (1996), we show that if firms are allowed to make bilateral exclusive sharing agreements, then some degree of information sharing is consistent with equilibrium, and is a constant feature of equilibrium when the number of firms is not too small. Our result is to be contrasted with the traditional conclusion that no information is shared in common values situations with strategic substitutes - such as Cournot competition with demand shocks - when firms can only make industry-wide sharing contracts (e.g., a trade association).
    Keywords: Networks, Information sharing, oligopoly, networks, Bayesian equilibrium
    JEL: D43 D82 D85 L13
    Date: 2007
  10. By: Costa, Luís F.; Dixon, Huw (Cardiff Business School)
    Abstract: We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of imperfect competition where a sunk cost of creating a new product regulates the type of entry that dominates in the economy: new products or more competition in existing industries. Considering the process of product innovation is irreversible, introduces hysteresis in the business cycle. Expansionary shocks may lead the economy to a new 'prosperity plateau,' but contractionary shocks only affect the market power of mature industries.
    Keywords: Entry; Hysteresis; Mark-up
    JEL: E62 L13 L16
    Date: 2007–10
  11. By: Alexander Eickelpasch; Anna Lejpras; Andreas Stephan
    Abstract: This paper investigates predictions of Porter's Diamond model regarding the impact of locational factors on innovativeness and performance at the firm level. We formulate a structural equation model based on the relationships between locational conditions, e.g., transportation infrastructure, proximity to universities and research institutes, qualified labour, on the one hand, and innovativeness measured by new product or process development, number of patents, and firm performance in terms of market growth or profit assessment, on the other hand. Based on a sample of about 2,100 East German firms, we apply the partial least squares path modelling approach to test the proposed relationships. We find that particularly cooperation intensity at the local level spurs the innovativeness of firms; whereas in contrast to Porter's predictions, our results indicate that strong local competition and a locally focused market appear to impede the innovativeness and performance of firms.
    Keywords: Hard and soft locational factors, innovativeness, firm performance, East German firms, structural equation modelling, partial least squares approach
    JEL: R30 L25 O30
    Date: 2007
  12. By: James B. Bushnell; Erin T. Mansur; Celeste Saravia
    Abstract: This paper examines vertical arrangements in electricity markets. Vertically integrated wholesalers, or those with long-term contracts, have less incentive to raise wholesale prices when retail prices are determined beforehand. For three restructured markets, we simulate prices that define bounds on static oligopoly equilibria. Our findings suggest that vertical arrangements dramatically affect estimated market outcomes. Had regulators impeded vertical arrangements (as in California), our simulations imply vastly higher prices than observed and production inefficiencies costing over 45 percent of those production costs with vertical arrangements. We conclude that horizontal market structure accurately predicts market performance only when accounting for vertical structure.
    JEL: L11 L13 L94
    Date: 2007–10
  13. By: Giuseppe Tattara (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari); Marco Valentini (Tolomeo srl)
    Abstract: This research exploits a large employer-level panel dataset in order to analyse employment and worker flows. Excess reallocation, the difference between worker and job flows at the firm level, is substantial and has a definite cyclical pattern. Both accessions and separations are cyclical in contrast to the conventional wisdom that assumes separation to be countercyclical. Separations increase in upswing, following the accession increase, and decline in recession. Unemployment during recession is not, to a large extent, due to an increase in the rate at which workers separate from their employers, as traditionally assumed among macroeconomists, but to the decline in job creations.
    Keywords: Job Flows, Worker Flows, Reallocation, Cyclical behaviour
    JEL: E24 E32 J21 J44
    Date: 2007
  14. By: Mo Xiao (Eller College of Management, University of Arizona); Peter F. Orazem (Department of Economics, Iowa State University);
    Abstract: Past empirical literature provides strong evidence that competition increases when new firms enter a market. However, rarely have economists been able to examine how competition changes with the threat of entry. This paper uses the evolution of the zip code level market structure of facilities-based broadband providers from 1999 to 2004 to investigate how a firm adjusts its entry strategy when facing the threat of additional entrants. We identify the potential entrant into a local market as threatened when a neighboring market houses more than firms providing broadband services. We first document that such a market is more likely to accommodate more than firms in the long run. Taking account of endogeneity of entry into neighboring markets, we find that the first 1 to 3 entrants significantly delay their entrance into an open local market facing entry threat. We do not find evidence of delayed entry for firms following the 3rd entrant. The evidence suggests that the mere threat of entry may curb market power associated with oligopolistic market structure.
    Keywords: Entry, Entry Threat, Broadband Providers
    JEL: L13 L8
    Date: 2007–09
  15. By: Ivan Jaccard (Wharton School of Finance)
    Abstract: The main objective of this work is to develop a general equilibrium business cycle model linking financial and real estate markets to the macroeconomy. The ability of a production economy to account simultaneously for asset pricing, business cycle and real estate market facts is then evaluated by comparing the model predictions to the empirical facts. The observed high volatility of house prices, the equity premium and the difference between equity and real estate excess returns can be explained without giving rise to excessive risk-free rate variation.
    Keywords: house prices, real estate returns, equity premium, business cycles, production economies.
    JEL: E30 E22 G12
    Date: 2006–12
  16. By: Hvide, Hans K. (University of Aberdeen, Business School); Møen, Jarle (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: If entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow to operate on an efficient scale, those with more personal wealth should do better than those with less wealth. We investigate this hypothesis using a unique dataset from Norway. Consistent with liquidity constraints being present, we find a strong positive relationship between founder prior wealth and start-up size. The relationship between prior wealth and start-up performance, as measured by profitability on assets, increases for the main bulk of the wealth distribution and decreases sharply at the top. We estimate that profitability on assets increases by about 8 percentage points from the 10th to the 75th percentile of the wealth distribution. This suggests an entrepreneurial production function with a region of increasing returns. Liquidity constraints may then stop entrepreneurs from being able to exploit a "hump" in marginal productivity. From the 75th to the 99th percentile returns drops by about 10 percentage points. This suggests that an abundance of liquidity may to do more harm than good.
    Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Household Finance; Private benefits; Start-ups; Wealth
    JEL: G14 L26 M13
    Date: 2007–09–21
  17. By: Anaïs Hamelin (Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Business School, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels and Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg, France.); Joseph Trojman (Caisse Nationale des Caisses d’Epargne)
    Abstract: This article aims to analyse the relationship between family ownership and growth in a very large sample representative of French SMEs. Firms are differentiated from each other according to the degree of family ownership, ranging from total control by family members to minority control. The relationship between the degree of control and the firm’s growth takes into account the effect of firm’s size, age, sector, and financial solvency. The objective is to observe if family ownership has an impact on firm growth, and if this impact is not only due to a preference for financial independence. Results show that the more the family controls the firm, the less the firm is prone to sustain a high rate of sales growth, even if the availability of internal financial resources allows sustaining a larger growth rate.
    Date: 2007–08
  18. By: Magda Cayón Costa (Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona); Joaquim Vergés Jaime (Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
    Abstract: Purpose of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the issue of the effect on public enterprises economic performance of the introduction of some given changes in organisational status and management practices, while keeping the enterprises under public control. Approach. Our approach is case study type and relies on comparative efficiency literature. We identify relevant changes on the organisational status of a State owned large hotel group along a period of twenty years, next we measure its annual efficiency indicators, and then evaluate to which extent the observed changes in economic performance can be attributable to the corresponding management reforms carried out. Findings. As a result we find that the formally more relevant change in organisational status (the enterprise passing to be a Limited Company), which implied a substantial increase in the enterprise autonomy, did not produce a significant improvement in its economic performance; a finding contrary to what we expected according to agency theory. However, a second relevant organisational change –five years later- when both the principal (government) and the agent (firm’s CEO) changed is consistently related to a significant improvement in economic performance. Research implication. As a research implication we abide for use more precise agency theory statements; and as a practical implication we argue here that potentialities of improvement brought about by a formal-legal change in the status of the enterprise may require also –in order to actually improve firm’s efficiency- some changes in the firm’s key personal positions: supervisor (principal) and CEO (agent), in the sense that a change to a greater-autonomy for the enterprise it seems should come together a parallel new ‘management culture’. Practical implications. Management good practises to apply to other public enterprise’s restructuring in order to improve their efficiency. Original paper. It’s the first study on organizational changes and efficiency for an important Spanish public enterprise.
    Keywords: State owned Enterprise, Organisational status reforms, Efficiency measurement, Agency theory, Management control, Hotel sector
    Date: 2007–10
  19. By: Ellen R. McGrattan; Edward C. Prescott
    Abstract: The basic neoclassical growth model accounts well for the postwar cyclical behavior of the U.S. economy prior to the 1990s, provided that variations in population growth, depreciation rates, total factor productivity, and taxes are incorporated. For the 1990s, the model predicts a depressed economy, when in fact the U.S. economy boomed. We extend the base model by introducing intangible investment and non-neutral technology change with respect to producing intangible investment goods and find that the 1990s are not puzzling in light of this new theory. There is compelling micro and macro evidence for our extension, and the predictions of the theory are in conformity with U.S. national products, incomes, and capital gains. We use the theory to compare current accounting measures for labor productivity and investment with the corresponding measures for the model economy with intangible investment. Our findings show that standard accounting measures greatly understate the boom in productivity and investment.
    JEL: E24 E32 O47
    Date: 2007–10
  20. By: David Encaoua (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]); Abraham Hollander (Université de Montréal - [Université de Montréal])
    Abstract: The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of quality, the discriminatory regime is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of such two-stage game. In contrast to the case of horizontal differentiation, the discriminatory equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-dominated by a bilateral commitment to uniform pricing. Also, the quality choices of perfectly discriminating duopolists are welfare maximizing. The paper explains why a threat of entry may elicit price discrimination by an incumbent monopolist.
    Keywords: competition in pricing regimes, duopoly, quality choice
    Date: 2007
  21. By: Adam, Klaus; Marcet, Albert; Nicolini, Juan Pablo
    Abstract: Introducing bounded rationality into a standard consumption based asset pricing model with a representative agent and time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though we restrict consideration to learning schemes that imply only small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the particular learning rule used and the value chosen for the single free parameter introduced by learning, provided agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.
    Keywords: asset pricing puzzles; consumption-based asset pricing; learning
    JEL: D84 G12
    Date: 2007–10
  22. By: Erwan Morellec (University of Lausanne, Swiss Finance Institute and CEPR); Alexei Zhdanov (School of Management, George Mason University)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of takeovers in which the financing strategies of bidding firms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a commitment device, and determines the outcome of the acquisition contest. We demonstrate that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in financing policies with endogenous leverage, bankruptcy, and takeover terms, in which the bidder with the lowest leverage wins the takeover contest. Based on the resulting equilibrium, the model generates a number of new predictions. In particular, the model predicts that the leverage of the winning bidder is below the industry average and that acquirers should lever up after the takeover consummation. The model also relates the dispersion in leverage ratios to various industry characteristics, such as the volatility of cash flows, effective tax rates, and bankruptcy costs.
    Keywords: takeovers, option games, real options, capital structure
    JEL: G13 G32 G34
    Date: 2006–10
  23. By: Wiji Arulampalam (University of Warwick and Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation); Michael P Devereux (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation); Giorgia Maffini (University of Warwick and Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation)
    Abstract: We examine the extent to which taxes on corporate income are shifted onto the workforce in the form of lower wages. We use data on 23,000 companies located in 10 countries over the period 1993-2003. We identify two channels by which taxes can affect wages: indirectly through a lower capital stock, and more directly through wage bargaining for net of tax, location-specific rents. We find that a significant part of the effective incidence of the tax falls on wages. Our central estimate is that 54% of any additional tax is passed on in lower wages, even in the short run; other estimates are larger than this. In the longer run, a $1 rise in the tax liability results in a fall in total employee compensation in excess of $1.
    Date: 2007
  24. By: Fecht, Falko; Wagner, Wolf
    Abstract: Ongoing financial innovation and greater information availability increase the tradability of bank assets and reduce banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue that this has two effects on banks, with opposing implications for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks' capital structure needs to be less concerned with disciplining the management. Deposits -the most effective disciplining device- can be reduced, increasing banks' resilience to adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers' rents, reducing their incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers, with adverse implications for asset quality. Thus, even though the improved marketability of bank assets allows banks to adopt a safer capital structure, the default risk of banks does not necessarily decline.
    Keywords: Marketability, Incentives, Financial Innovations, Financial Stability
    JEL: G21 G28 G32
    Date: 2007
  25. By: Carlos Carreira (GEMF and Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra); Paulino Teixeira (GEMF and Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra)
    Abstract: This paper discusses the role played by internal restructuring vis-à-vis external restructuring in industry productivity growth, arguing that the contribution of these two components is expected to be sensitive to the economic cycle. The study describes gross flows (job and output) over a period of one decade, and analyses the productivity differential among continuing, entering and exiting firms in the Portuguese manufacturing sector. The results of the decomposition of industry productivity growth suggest that the share of external restructuring is stronger in recession, while internal restructuring seems to be predominant in expansion. The strong and positive contribution of the cleansing effect, in 1991-1994, was not followed by any passive learning effect of equivalent magnitude in the 1994-1997 sub-period. The active learning effect, measured by the within effect, is, as expected, stronger when output growth is at its peak, but in no case large enough to turn productivity growth procyclical.
    Keywords: Cleansing, Active and passive learning, Internal restructuring, External restructuring, Productivity growth
    JEL: L60 L11 O47 O12
    Date: 2007
  26. By: Michael P Devereux (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, IFS, CEPR and CESifo)
    Date: 2007
  27. By: Benjamin Malin; Dirk Krueger; Felix Kubler
    Abstract: We describe a sparse grid collocation algorithm to compute recursive solutions of dynamic economies with a sizable number of state variables. We show how powerful this method may be in applications by computing the nonlinear recursive solution of an international real business cycle model with a substantial number of countries, complete insurance markets and frictions that impede frictionless international capital flows. In this economy the aggregate state vector includes the distribution of world capital across different countries as well as the exogenous country-specific technology shocks. We use the algorithm to efficiently solve models with 2, 4, and 6 countries (i.e., up to 12 continuous state variables).
    JEL: C68 C88 F41
    Date: 2007–10

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