nep-bec New Economics Papers
on Business Economics
Issue of 2007‒05‒12
24 papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
University of Quebec in Ottawa

  1. Human Capital Spillovers and Economic Performance in the Workplace in 2004: Some British Evidence By Renuka Metcalfe; Peter J. Sloane
  2. Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: Empirical evidence using microdata By Manuel Artís; Raul Ramos; Jordi Suriñach
  3. Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry By Nick Bloom; Mark Schankerman; John Van Reenen
  4. Determinants of Firm Boundaries: Empirical Analysis of the Japanese Auto Industry from 1984 to 2002 By Sadao Nagaoka; Akira Takeishi; Yoshihisa Noro
  5. The Controller's Managerial Work By Jönsson, Sten
  6. Will Privatization Reduce Costs? By Lindqvist, Erik
  7. Organizations as cognitive systems: what do they process and deliver? By Biggiero, Lucio
  8. How Many U.S. Jobs Might Be Offshorable? By Alan S. Blinder
  9. Returns to Type or Tenure? By Roland A. Amann; Tobias J. Klein
  10. Reciprocity, inequity-aversion, and oligopolistic competition By Santos-Pinto, Luís
  11. Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies By Roland Kirstein; Annette Kirstein
  12. Ageing, Labor Turnover and Firm Performance By Pekka Ilmakunnas; Mika Maliranta
  13. Employment Outcomes and the Interaction Between Product and Labor Market Deregulation: Are They Substitutes or Complements? By Giuseppe Fiori; Giuseppe Nicoletti; Stefano Scarpetta; Fabio Schiantarelli
  14. How (not) to measure competition By van der Wiel, Henry; Boone, Jan; van Ours, Jan C
  15. Changes in Workplace Segregation in the United States between 1990 and 2000: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data By Judith Hellerstein; David Neumark; Melissa McInerney
  16. Volatility, Labor Market Flexibility, and the Pattern of Comparative Advantage By Alejandro Cuñat; Marc J. Melitz
  17. Consumption and Labour Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework By Heathcote, Jonathan; Storesletten, Kjetil; Violante, Giovanni L
  18. Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry? By Luís Cabral; Thomas Ross
  19. Decomposing differences in total factor productivity across firm size By Laia Castany; Enrique López-Bazo; Rosina Moreno
  20. An Economic Analysis of Platform Sharing By Arghya Ghosh; Hodaka Morita
  21. Profiles of stress: an empirical comparison of employee stress factor diferences in Germany and the US. By Marijaana Gunkel; Edward J. Lusk; Birgitta Wolff
  22. Corporate Governance, Reputation Concerns, and Herd Behavior By Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger
  23. Search Frictions in Physical Capital Markets as a Propagation Mechanism By André Kurmann; Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau
  24. Why Are Firms Sometimes Unwilling to Reduce Costs? By X. Henry Wang; Jingang Zhao

  1. By: Renuka Metcalfe (WELMERC, University of Wales Swansea); Peter J. Sloane (WELMERC, University of Wales Swansea and IZA)
    Abstract: This paper considers the impact of education and training on both individual and co-worker pay and establishment performance using the matched employer-employee data in WERS 2004, the panel dataset 1998-2004 and the new Financial Performance Questionnaire. This enables us to assess the impact of workplace education and training using both subjective (managers’ assessments) and objective data on productivity, profits and establishment survival. We establish that workplace education and training can have positive impacts on establishment financial performance, survival and growth. In contrast to extant studies, it was found that the square and the interaction between own and co-workers years of training also have a positive and significant impact on hourly pay. We find evidence indicating that establishments with 60% or more of workers trained have a higher establishment performance and also have a powerful impact on the likelihood of establishment survival.
    Keywords: human capital, spillovers, education, training, productivity, profitability, establishment survival
    JEL: I2 J4
    Date: 2007–05
  2. By: Manuel Artís (Grup de Recerca d'Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR), Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada (IREA), Departament d'Econometria, Estadística i Economia Espanyola, Universitat de Barcelona); Raul Ramos (Grup de Recerca d'Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR), Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada (IREA), Departament d'Econometria, Estadística i Economia Espanyola, Universitat de Barcelona); Jordi Suriñach (Grup de Recerca d'Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR), Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada (IREA), Departament d'Econometria, Estadística i Economia Espanyola, Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: Using microdata, we analyse the determinants of firm relocation and conventional outsourcing decisions as a way to reduce employment. The results for a sample of 32 countries show the relevance of factors not considered previously in the literature. Firms that are below average in quality or innovation have a higher propensity to externalise part of their production through outsourcing, while lower relative profitability and longer time to market for new products each imply a higher probability of relocation.
    Keywords: Firm relocation, outsourcing, subcontracting, logit models.
    JEL: R30 M55 M51
    Date: 2006–10
  3. By: Nick Bloom; Mark Schankerman; John Van Reenen
    Abstract: Support for R&D subsidies relies on empirical evidence that R&D "spills over" between firms. But firm performance is affected by two countervailing R&D spillovers: positive effects from technology spillovers and negative business stealing effects from R&D by product market rivals. We develop a general framework showing that technology and product market spillovers have testable implications for a range of performance indicators, and then exploit these using distinct measures of a firm's position in technology space and product market space. Using panel data on U.S. firms between 1980 and 2001 we show that both technology and product market spillovers operate, but technology spillovers quantitatively dominate. The spillover effects are also present when we analyze three high tech sectors in finer detail. Using the model we evaluate the net spillovers from three alternative R&D subsidy policies.
    JEL: F23 L1 O31 O32 O33
    Date: 2007–04
  4. By: Sadao Nagaoka; Akira Takeishi; Yoshihisa Noro
    Abstract: We have assessed the determinants of the choice of integration, relational contracting (keiretsu sourcing) and market sourcing by seven Japanese automobile manufacturers (OEMs) with respect to 54 components in light of contract economics. Our major findings are the following. First, the specificity and interdependency of a component significantly promotes vertical integration over keiretsu and keiretsu over market, consistent with transaction cost economics. Second, interdependency is a more important consideration for the former choice than for the latter choice, and the reverse is the case for specificity. This suggests that the hold-up risk due to specific investment can be often effectively controlled by a relational contracting based on keiretsu sourcing, while accommodating non-contractible design changes may often require vertical integration. Third, while higher testability of a component makes the effects of specificity significantly smaller, it also promotes the choice of keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing. One interpretation of this last result is that while higher testability improves the contractibility of the component with high specificity, it simultaneously enhances the advantage of keiretsu sourcing since it provides more opportunities for the supplier to explore new information for a collaborative exploitation with an OEM.
    JEL: D23 L23 L24
    Date: 2007–04
  5. By: Jönsson, Sten (Gothenburg Research Institute)
    Abstract: This article analyses a controller’s action in a product development setting. An alliance context provides for a hybrid form of governance and for complexity. The analysis builds on the participants’ own comments to a video-recorded clip from one of their earlier meetings with a heated exchange on proper information sharing. The analysis leads up to an application of virtue ethics to the conversation showing that the situation is emotionally loaded since participants mobilise virtues as arguments for appropriateness. The situation allows non-rational arguments and the controller can do “managerial work” to reconfirm and clarify responsibility structures. The situation invites reflection on the nature of the agency-structure interface, and a more articulated managerial role for the controller in hybrid forms of control.
    Keywords: Agency; hybrid forms; Controlling; field research; direct observation
    Date: 2007–05–07
  6. By: Lindqvist, Erik (Dept. of Economic Statistics, Stockholm School of Economics)
    Abstract: I develop a model of public sector contracting based on the multitask framework by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this model, an agent can put effort into increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants, private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than public employees. However, if quality cannot be perfectly measured, providing a private firm with incentives to improve quality forces the owner of the firm to bear risk. As a result, private firms will always be cheaper for low levels of quality but might be more expensive for high levels of quality. Extending the model to allow for differences in task attractiveness, I find that public firms shun unattractive tasks, whereas private firms undertake them if incentives are strong enough.
    Keywords: Privatization; public sector contracting; incomplete contracts; contracting out
    JEL: H11 H40 L32 L33
    Date: 2007–03–05
  7. By: Biggiero, Lucio
    Abstract: The substitution of knowledge to information as the entity that organizations process and deliver raises a number of questions concerning the nature of knowledge. The dispute on the codifiability of tacit knowledge and that juxtaposing the epistemology of practice vs. the epistemology of possession can be better faced by revisiting two crucial debates. One concerns the nature of cognition and the other the famous mind-body problem. Cognition can be associated with the capability of manipulating symbols, like in the traditional computational view of organizations, interpreting facts or symbols, like in the narrative approach to organization theory, or developing mental states (events), like argued by the growing field of organizational cognition. Applied to the study of organizations, the mind-body problem concerns the possibility (if any) and the forms in which organizational mental events, like trust, identity, cultures, etc., can be derived from the structural aspects (technological, cognitive or communication networks) of organizations. By siding in extreme opposite positions, the two epistemologies appear irreducible one another and pay its own inner consistency with remarkable difficulties in describing and explaining some empirical phenomena. Conversely, by legitimating the existence of both tacit and explicit knowledge, by emphasizing the space of human interactions, and by assuming that mental events can be explained with the structural aspects of organizations, Nonaka’s SECI model seems an interesting middle way between the two rival epistemologies.
    Keywords: cognition; emergent properties; knowledge; mental states; organization
    JEL: L20
    Date: 2007–05–08
  8. By: Alan S. Blinder (Princeton University)
    Abstract: Using detailed information on the nature of work done in over 800 BLS occupational codes, this paper ranks those occupations according to how easy/hard it is to offshore the work— either physically or electronically. Using that ranking, I estimate that somewhere between 22% and 29% of all U.S. jobs are or will be potentially offshorable within a decade or two. (I make no estimate of how many jobs will actually be offshored.) Since my rankings are subjective, two alternatives are presented—one is entirely objective, the other is an independent subjective ranking. It is found that there is little or no correlation between an occupation’s “offshorability” and the skill level of its workers (as measured either by educational attainment or wages). However, it appears that, controlling for education, the most highly offshorable occupations were already paying significantly lower wages in 2004.
    Date: 2007–03
  9. By: Roland A. Amann (University of Konstanz); Tobias J. Klein (University of Mannheim and IZA)
    Abstract: We analyze the joint determination of wage levels, wage growth and firm tenure. Our analysis is built on estimating a reduced form for tenure, a structural wage level equation and a structural wage growth equation. We disentangle returns to a latent type variable from estimates of general returns to tenure and wage gains from job changes. This type is related to unobservable match quality that is allowed to vary over time and to be correlated with the returns to tenure. The obtained results for Germany indicate that the type plays a crucial role in the remuneration of employees. Those types who change jobs more often obtain steeper wage profiles but earn less on average.
    Keywords: wage growth, returns to tenure, unobserved heterogeneity, control function approach, nonseparable model
    JEL: J31
    Date: 2007–05
  10. By: Santos-Pinto, Luís
    Abstract: This paper extends the Cournot and Bertrand models of strategic interaction between firms by assuming that managers are not only profit maximizers, but also have preferences for reciprocity or are averse to inequity. A reciprocal manager responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions, while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions. An inequity averse manager likes to reduce the difference between own profits and the rivals’ profits. The paper finds that if firms with reciprocal managers compete à la Cournot, then they may be able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a constructive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare may emerge under a destructive reciprocity equilibrium. If there is Cournot competition between firms and their managers are averse to advantageous (disadvantageous) inequity, then firms are better (worse) off than if managers only care about maximizing profits. If firms compete à la Bertrand, then only under very restrictive conditions will managers’ preferences for reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on equilibrium outcomes.
    Keywords: Reciprocity; Inequity Aversion; Cournot; Bertrand.
    JEL: D43 D63 L21 L13
    Date: 2006–05–17
  11. By: Roland Kirstein (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Annette Kirstein
    Abstract: The instability of Cournot cartels can be overcome by a collective wage agreement if this agreement stipulates minimum fixed wages and piece rates that are legally enforceable. This new view on the institution of collective wage agreements is not only relevant for strategic management, it also has an important implication for economic policy: competition authorities should observe such agreements for their potentially collusive effect on product markets. Moreover, the model contributes to the explanation of the “fixed wage puzzle”, i.e., the observation that firms pay lower than efficient variable wages and higher fixed wages than predicted by contract theory.
    Keywords: Piece rate, fixed wage, collective wage agreements
    JEL: C72 C78 D43 J33 J50 K31 L41
    Date: 2007–02
  12. By: Pekka Ilmakunnas; Mika Maliranta
    Abstract: We study whether older workers are costly to firms. Our estimation equations are derived from a variant of the decomposition methods frequently used for measuring micro-level sources of industry productivity growth. By using comprehensive linked employer-employee data from the Finnish business sector, we study the productivity and wage effects, and hence the profitability effects, of hiring and separation of younger and older workers. The evidence shows that separations of older workers are profitable to firms, especially in the manufacturing ICT-industries. Robustness checks include the use of regional labor supply and other variables as instruments for the potential endogeneity of the labor flows.
    Keywords: aging, productivity, wage, profits, hiring, separation, employer-employee data
    JEL: C43 J23 J24 J63 M51
    Date: 2007–05–03
  13. By: Giuseppe Fiori (Boston College); Giuseppe Nicoletti (OECD); Stefano Scarpetta (OECD and IZA); Fabio Schiantarelli (Boston College and IZA)
    Abstract: This paper provides a systematic empirical investigation of the effect of product market liberalization on employment when there are interactions between policies and institutions in product and labor markets. Using panel data for OECD countries over the period 1980-2002, we present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin when labor market regulation is high. Moreover, there is evidence in our sample that product market deregulation promotes labor market deregulation. We show that these results are mostly consistent with the basic predictions of a standard bargaining model, such as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), extended to allow for a richer specification of the fall back position of the union and for taxation.
    Keywords: employment, competition, deregulation, liberalization, unions
    JEL: J23 J50 L50
    Date: 2007–05
  14. By: van der Wiel, Henry; Boone, Jan; van Ours, Jan C
    Abstract: We introduce a new measure of competition: the elasticity of a firm's profits with respect to its cost level. A higher value of this profit elasticity (PE) signals more intense competition. Using firm-level data we compare PE with the most popular competition measures such as the price cost margin (PCM). We show that PE and PCM are highly correlated on average. However, PCM tends to misrepresent the development of competition over time in markets with few firms and high concentration, i.e. in markets with high policy relevance. So, just when it is needed the most PCM fails whereas PE does not. From this we conclude that PE is a more reliable measure of competition.
    Keywords: competition; concentration; measures of competition; price cost margin; profit elasticity; profits
    JEL: D43 L13
    Date: 2007–05
  15. By: Judith Hellerstein; David Neumark; Melissa McInerney
    Abstract: We present evidence on changes in workplace segregation by education, race, ethnicity, and sex, from 1990 to 2000. The evidence indicates that racial and ethnic segregation at the workplace level remained quite pervasive in 2000. At the same time, there was fairly substantial segregation by skill, as measured by education. Putting together the 1990 and 2000 data, we find no evidence of declines in workplace segregation by race and ethnicity; indeed, black-white segregation increased. Over this decade, segregation by education also increased. In contrast, workplace segregation by sex fell over the decade, and would have fallen by more had the services industry - a heavily female industry in which sex segregation is relatively high - not experienced rapid employment growth.
    JEL: J15 J16 J71
    Date: 2007–05
  16. By: Alejandro Cuñat; Marc J. Melitz
    Abstract: This paper studies the link between volatility, labor market flexibility, and international trade. International differences in labor market regulations affect how firms can adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. These institutional differences interact with sector specific differences in volatility (the variance of the firm-specific shocks in a sector) to generate a new source of comparative advantage. Other things equal, countries with more flexible labor markets specialize in sectors with higher volatility. Empirical evidence for a large sample of countries strongly supports this theory: the exports of countries with more flexible labor markets are biased towards high-volatility sectors. We show how differences in labor market institutions can be parsimoniously integrated into the workhorse model of Ricardian comparative advantage of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). We also show how our model can be extended to multiple factors of production.
    JEL: F1 F16
    Date: 2007–04
  17. By: Heathcote, Jonathan; Storesletten, Kjetil; Violante, Giovanni L
    Abstract: This paper develops an analytical framework to study consumption and labour supply in a rich class of heterogeneous-agent economies with partial insurance. The environment allows for trade in non-contingent and state-contingent bonds, for permanent and transitory idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and for permanent preference heterogeneity and idiosyncratic preference shocks. Exact closed-form solutions are obtained for equilibrium allocations and for the first and second moments of the equilibrium joint distribution over wages, hours and consumption. With these expressions in hand, we show that all the structural preference and risk parameters in the model can be identified, even when productivity risk varies over time, given panel data on wages and hours, and cross-sectional data on consumption. We estimate the model on CEX and PSID data for the U.S. economy over the period 1967-1996. We then use the estimated parameter values to decompose inequality in all variables of interest, both over the life-cycle and across time, into cross-sectional variation in preferences, uninsurable wage risk, insurable wage risk, and measurement error.
    Keywords: consumption; incomplete markets; inequality; labour supply; partial insurance
    JEL: D31 D52 D58 D91 E62 G12 J22 J31
    Date: 2007–05
  18. By: Luís Cabral (New York University); Thomas Ross (University of British Columbia)
    Abstract: The received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entry— if entry fails, then the entrant, unable to recover sunk costs, incurs greater losses. In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant, sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect: they may effectively commit the entrant to stay in the market. By providing the entrant with commitment power, sunk investments may soften the reactions of incumbents. The net effect may imply that entry is more profitable when sunk costs are greater.
    Date: 2007–02
  19. By: Laia Castany (Grup de Recerca d'Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR), Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada (IREA), Universitat de Barcelona); Enrique López-Bazo (Grup de Recerca d'Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR), Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada (IREA), Departament d'Econometria, Estadística i Economia Espanyola, Universitat de Barcelona); Rosina Moreno (Grup de Recerca d'Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR), Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada (IREA), Departament d'Econometria, Estadística i Economia Espanyola, Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the extent to which the gap in total factor productivity between small and large firms is due to differences in the endowment of factors determining productivity and to the returns associated with these factors. We place particular emphasis on the contribution of differences in the propensity to innovate and in the use of skilled labor across firms of different size. Empirical evidence from a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms corroborates that both differences in endowments and returns to innovation and skilled labor significantly contribute to the productivity gap between small and large firms. In addition, it is observed that the contribution of innovation to this gap is caused only by differences in quantity, while differences in returns have no effect; in the case of human capital, however, most of the effect can be attributed to increasing differences in returns between small and large firms.
    Keywords: Total Factor Productivity; skilled labor; innovation; firm size; Oaxaca decomposition
    JEL: D24 J24 L25
    Date: 2007–03
  20. By: Arghya Ghosh; Hodaka Morita
    Abstract: We explore the managerial implications and economic consequences of platform sharing under models of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. By using a common platform across different products, firms can save on fixed costs for platform development. At the same time, platform sharing imposes restrictions on firms' ability to differentiate their products, and this reduces their profitability. It might appear that platform sharing across firms makes consumers worse off because firms cooperate in their product development processes to maximize their joint profit. We find, however, that platform sharing across firms benefits consumers in our framework because it intensifies competition in our horizontal differentiation model, and because it increases the quality of the lower-end product in our vertical differentiation model. We also show new channels through which a merger makes consumers worse off in the presence of platform sharing.
    JEL: D40 L10 L40 M20
    Date: 2007–04
  21. By: Marijaana Gunkel (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Edward J. Lusk (State University of New York, Plattsburgh, New York, USA); Birgitta Wolff (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
    Abstract: According to The HR Magazine (May, 2006 p. 14), “Today, American workers are saying that they are accomplishing less than they did a decade ago and are feeling more rushed on the job”. This is the point of departure for our study. Using a questionnaire based upon the work of Geert Hofstede, we surveyed employees of a MNC headquartered in Germany with branches in the US. We create three stress groupings: High, Middle and Low based upon selected variables meas-ured on Likert-type scales, e.g., How often do you feel nervous or tense at work? We examine these stress groups on a variety of variables to develop profiles of these three groups. The dataset with 1,300 observations on more than 75 variables provides a rich rendering of the profiles both overall and by country. For example, we find for both the German and US respondents that more stress is associated with less satisfaction in particular respecting Fringe Benefits and Having Challenging Work. And the German employees, who were classified as exhibiting high levels of stress, are less satisfied with Fringe Benefits than their US counterparts.
    Date: 2007–05
  22. By: Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
    Abstract: This paper offers an explanation for audit committee failures within a corporate governance context. We consider a setting in which the management of a firm sets up financial statements that are possibly biased. These statements are reviewed/audited by an external auditor and by an audit committee. Both agents report the result of their audit, the auditor acting first. The auditor and the audit committee use an imperfect auditing technology. As a result of their work they privately observe a signal regarding the quality of the financial statements. The probability for a correct signal in the sense that an unbiased report is labelled correct and a biased one incorrect, depends on the type of the agent. Good as well as bad agents exist in the economy. Importantly, two good agents observe identical informative signals while the signal observed by a bad agent is uninformative and uncorrelated to those of other good or bad agents. The audit committee as well as the auditor are anxious to build up reputation regarding their ability in the labor market. Given this predominate goal they report on the signal in order to maximize the market’s assessment of their ability. At the end of the game the true character of the financial statements is publicly learned and the market uses this information along with the agents’ reports to update beliefs about the agents’ type. We show that herding equilibria exist in which the auditor reports based on his signal but the audit committee .herds. and follows the auditor’s judgement no matter what its own insights suggest.
    Keywords: corporate governance, audit committee, game theory, herding
    Date: 2007–02
  23. By: André Kurmann; Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau
    Abstract: We build a Dynamic General Equilibrium model with search frictions for the allocation of physical capital and investigate its implications for the business cycle. While the model is in principle capable of generating substantial internal propagation to small exogenous shocks, the quantitative effects are modest once we calibrate the model to fit firm-level capital flows. We then extend the model with credit market frictions that lead to countercyclical default and countercyclical risk premia as in the data. Countercyclical default directly affects capital reallocation and has important general equilibrium income effects on labor supply. Yet, for calibrations in line with observed consumption dynamics, we find that even in this extended model, search frictions in physical capital markets play only a small role for business cycle fluctuations.
    Keywords: Capital allocation frictions, search and matching, credit frictions, business cycles, dynamic general equilibrium
    JEL: E22 E32 E44
    Date: 2007
  24. By: X. Henry Wang (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia); Jingang Zhao
    Abstract: This paper establishes three new results for multiproduct oligopolies: 1) it presents the first explicit expression of Nash equilibria for asymmetric multiproduct oligopolies; 2) it shows that reducing a multiproduct firms cost in Bertrand oligopolies will reduce its profits if the cost-reducing unit is sufficiently small; and 3) it demonstrates that a multiproduct firm has no incentive to eliminate a product whose sales are zero. Because a single-product firm whose sales are zero is indifferent between exiting and staying, and its cost reductions always increase its profits, our results are unique to the multiproduct firm, and they suggest that extending oligopoly studies from a single product to multi-products could be as significant as the extension of calculus from a single variable to multi-variables.
    Keywords: Effect of cost reduction, multiproduct oligopoly, price competition, quantity competition
    JEL: C63 D43 L13
    Date: 2007–01–15

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