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on Banking |
| By: | Rita Babihuga; Marco Spaltro |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the determinants of bank funding costs for a sample of internationally active banks from 2001–12. We find that changes in banks’ unsecured funding costs are associated with bank-specific characteristics such as an institution’s credit worthiness and the return on its market value, and importantly, on the level and quality of capital. Similarly, market factors such as the level of investor risk appetite, as well as shocks to financial markets—notably the US subprime crisis and the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis—have also been key drivers of the sharp rise in bank funding costs. We also find evidence that large systemically important institutions have enjoyed a funding advantage, and that this advantage has risen since the onset of the two crises. With the exception of Euro Area periphery banks, by end-2012 the rise in funding costs had generally been reversed for most major banks as a result of improvments in bank asset quality as well as steps taken to increase resilience, notably higher capitalization. Our results suggest increased capital buffers may potentially support bank lending to the real economy by reducing bank funding costs. |
| Keywords: | International banks;Euro Area;Sovereign debt;Credit risk;Financial crisis;Banking systems;Capital;bank funding, bank lending, financial crises, capital, deposit, wholesale funding. |
| Date: | 2014–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:14/71&r=ban |
| By: | Thierry Tressel; Thierry Verdier |
| Abstract: | We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles. |
| Keywords: | Bank supervision;Bank capital;Regulatory forbearance;Prudential bank regulations;Political economy;Moral hazard;Banking Regulation, Regulatory Forbearance, Political Economy. |
| Date: | 2014–05–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:14/90&r=ban |
| By: | Anginer, Deniz; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli |
| Abstract: | This paper distinguishes among various types of capital and examines their effect on system-wide fragility. The analysis finds that higher quality forms of capital reduce the systemic risk contribution of banks, whereas lower quality forms can have a destabilizing impact, particularly during crisis periods. The impact of capital on systemic risk is less pronounced for smaller banks, for banks located in countries with more generous safety nets, and in countries with institutions that allow for better public and private monitoring of financial institutions. The results show that regulatory capital is effective in reducing systemic risk and that regulatory risk weights are correlated with higher future asset volatility, but this relationship is significantly weaker for larger banks. The paper also finds that increased regulatory risk-weights not correlated with future asset volatility increase systemic fragility. Overall, the results are consistent with the theoretical literature that emphasizes capital as a potential buffer in absorbing liquidity, information, and economic shocks reducing contagious defaults. |
| Keywords: | Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Finance,Banking Law,Debt Markets,Financial Intermediation |
| Date: | 2014–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6948&r=ban |
| By: | Mehdi Mili; Jean-Michel Sahut; Hatem Trimeche |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the factors influencing the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of foreign banks’ subsidiaries. We use data from 340 subsidiaries of 123 multinational banks and test whether the subsidiaries’ capital ratio depends on the |
| Keywords: | Capital Adequacy Ratio, Multinational Banks, Interbank Market |
| JEL: | F15 F34 G21 |
| Date: | 2014–06–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-366&r=ban |
| By: | Jeanne Gobat; Mamoru Yanase; Joseph Maloney |
| Abstract: | As part of Basel III reforms, the NSFR is a new prudential liquidity rule aimed at limiting excess maturity transformation risk in the banking sector and promoting funding stability. The revised package has been issued for public consultation with a plan of making the rule binding in 2018. This paper complements earlier quantitative impact studies by discussing the potential impact of introducing the NSFR based on empirical analysis of end-2012 financial data for over 2000 banks covering 128 countries. The calculations show that a sizeable percentage of the banks in most countries would meet the minimum NSFR prudential requirement at end-2012, and, further, that larger banks tend to be more vulnerable to the introduction of the NSFR. Additionally, by comparing the NSFR to other structural funding mismatch indicators, we find that the NSFR is a relatively consistent regulatory measure for capturing banks’ funding risk. Finally, the paper discusses key policy issues for consideration in implementing the NSFR. |
| Keywords: | Banking sector;Liquidity;Financial risk;Risk management;Banking, Bank Regulation, Financing, Firm Size, Policy |
| Date: | 2014–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:14/106&r=ban |
| By: | Luc Laeven; Lev Ratnovski; Hui Tong |
| Abstract: | The proposed SDN documents the evolution of bank size and activities over the past 20 years. It discusses whether this evolution can be explained by economies of scale or “too big to fail†subsidies. The paper then presents evidence on the extent to which bank size and market-based activities contribute to systemic risk. The paper concludes with policy messages in the area of capital regulation and activity restrictions to reduce the systemic risk posed by large banks. The analysis of the paper complements earlier Fund work, including SDN 13/04 and the recent GFSR chapter on “too big to fail†subsidies, and its policy message is in line with this earlier work. |
| Keywords: | Systemic risk;Systemic risk assessment;Too-big-too-fail;Bank capital;Bank regulations;Corporate governance;Financial crisis;Bank financing;Bank deposits;Financial Structure; Financial Regulation |
| Date: | 2014–05–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfsdn:14/4&r=ban |
| By: | Stefan Arping (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | This article presents a model in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, competi- tion can make banks more reluctant to take excessive risks: As competition intensifies and margins decline, banks face more-binding threats of failure, to which they may respond by reducing their risk-taking. Yet, at the same time, banks become riskier. This is because the direct, destabilizing effect of lower margins outweighs the disciplining effect of competition; moreover, a substantial rise in competition reduces banks’ incentive to build precautionary capital buffers. A key implication is that the effects of competition on risk-taking and on failure risk can move in opposite directions. |
| Keywords: | Charter Value Hypothesis, Bank Franchise Value, Bank Competition, Financial Stability, Capital Requirements |
| JEL: | G2 G3 |
| Date: | 2014–05–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20140059&r=ban |
| By: | Eugenio Cerutti; Stijn Claessens; Lev Ratnovski |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a definition of global liquidity consistent with its meaning as the “ease of financing†in international financial markets. Using a longer time series and broader sample of countries than in previous studies, it identifies global factors driving cross-border bank flows, alongside country-specific factors. It confirms the explanatory power of US financial conditions, with flows decreasing in market volatility (VIX) and term premia, and increasing in bank leverage, growth in domestic credit and M2. A new finding is that similar variables for other systemic countries – the UK and the Euro Area – are also important, sometimes even more so, consistent with the dominant role of European banks in cross-border banking. Furthermore, recipient country characteristics are found to affect not only the level of country-specific flows, but also the cyclical impact of global liquidity, with sensitivities of flows to banks decreasing with stronger macroeconomic frameworks and better bank regulation, but less so for flows to non-financial firms. |
| Keywords: | International banking;Banks;Liquidity;Capital flows;Bank regulations;Bank supervision;Cross country analysis;Global Liquidity, International Banking, Capital Flows. |
| Date: | 2014–04–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:14/69&r=ban |
| By: | Ewa Stanisławska (Narodowy Bank Polski) |
| Abstract: | The paper employs on individual bank data with aim to analyse interest rate pass-through from money market rates to banks’ deposits and lending rates. In the first step, the speed and completeness of interest rate adjustment is assessed. As the sample covers period prior to and after the outburst of the financial crisis, some comparisons of interest rate transmission process in these periods are made. In the second step, the influence of individual banks characteristics, like size, strength of deposit base, quality of credit portfolio, etc., on the features of interest rate transmission is examined. It seems that t heir impact i s not strong, as they affect rather the speed of adjustment than its scale in the long term. |
| Keywords: | interest rates pass-through, monetary policy transmission mechanism, interest rate channel |
| JEL: | E52 E43 G21 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:179&r=ban |
| By: | Haar, Brigitte |
| Abstract: | This is a chapter for a forthcoming volume Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press 2014) (eds. Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, and Jennifer Payne). It provides an overview of EU financial regulation from the first banking directive up until its most recent developments in the aftermath of the financial crisis, focusing on the multiple layers of multi-level governance and their characteristic conceptual difficulties. Therefore the paper discusses the need to accommodate cross-border capital flows following from the EU internal market and the resulting regulatory strategies. This includes a brief overview of the principle of home country control and the ensuing Financial Services Action Plan. Dealing with the accommodation of cross-border capital flows and their regulation necessarily require an orchestration of the underlying supervisory structures, which is therefore also discussed. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09 an additional aspect of necessary orchestration has emerged, that is the need to control systemic risk. Specific attention is paid to microprudential supervision by the newly established European Supervisory Authorities and macroprudential supervision in the European Banking Union, the latter's underlying drivers and the accompanying Single Supervisory Mechanism, including the SSM's institutional framework as well as the consideration of its rationales and the Single Resolution Mechanism closely linked to it. -- |
| Keywords: | Financial regulation,systemic risk,microprudential supervision,European Banking Authority,macroprudential supervision,European Systemic Risk Board,European Banking Union,Single Supervisory Mechanism |
| JEL: | G21 G28 G38 K22 K23 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:57&r=ban |
| By: | Heiko Hesse; Ferhan Salman; Christian Schmieder |
| Abstract: | One of the challenges of financial stability analysis and bank stress testing is how to establish scenarios with meaningful macro-financial linkages, i.e., taking into account spillover effects and other forms of contagion. We come up with an approach to simulate the potential impact of spillover effects based on the “traditional†design of macro-economic stress tests. Specifically, we examine spillover effects observed during the financial crisis and simulate their impact on banks’ liquidity and capital positions. The outcome suggests that spillover effects have a highly non-linear impact on bank soundness, both in terms of liquidity and solvency. |
| Keywords: | Spillovers;Europe;Financial contagion;Financial systems;Stress testing;Regression analysis;Econometric models;Macro-financial linkages, Stress testing, Scenarios, Spillover, Contagion |
| Date: | 2014–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:14/103&r=ban |
| By: | Alessandri, Piergiorgio; Masciantonio, Sergio; Zaghini, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We develop a methodology to identify and rank systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Our approach is consistent with that followed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) but, unlike the latter, it is free of judgment and it is based entirely on publicly available data, thus filling the gap between the official views of the regulator and those that market participants can form with their own information set. We apply the methodology to annual data on three samples of banks (global, EU and euro area) for the years 2007-2012. We examine the evolution of the SIFIs over time and document the shifs in the relative weights of the major geographic areas. We also discuss the implication of the 2013 update of the identification methodology proposed by the FSB. -- |
| Keywords: | G-SIFIs,systemic risk,too-big-to-fail,financial crisis |
| JEL: | G21 G01 G18 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfswop:463&r=ban |
| By: | Pierluigi Balduzzi (Boston College); Emanuele Brancati (LUISS University of Rome); Fabio Schiantarelli (Boston College and IZA) |
| Abstract: | We test whether financial fluctuations affect firmsÕ decisions through their impact on banksÕ cost of funding. We exploit two shocks to Italian banksÕ CDS spreads and equity valuations: the 2007Ð 2009 financial crisis and the 2010Ð2012 sovereign debt crisis. Using newly available data linking over 3,000, mostly privately held, non-financial firms to their bank(s), we find that increases in banksÕ CDS spreads, and decreases in their equity valuations, lead younger and smaller firms to cut investment, employment, and borrowing. We conclude that financial market fluctuations affect even private firms through their banksÕ cost of funding. |
| Keywords: | Financial crisis, sovereign-debt crisis, banks, credit-default swaps, volatility, investment, employment, borrowing. |
| JEL: | D92 G21 J23 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:casmef:1404&r=ban |
| By: | Anastasia Cozarenco; Ariane Szafarz |
| Abstract: | In most developed countries, regulators have imposed loan ceilings to subsidized microfinance institutions (MFIs). Micro-entrepreneurs in need of above-ceiling loans are left with the co-financing option, which means securing the aboveceiling share of the loan with a regular bank, and getting a ceiling-high loan from the MFI. Co-financing is attractive to MFIs because it allows them to free-ride on the regular banks' screening process. Therefore, loan ceilings can have the perverse effect of facilitating the co-financing of large projects at the expense of micro-entrepreneurs who need below-ceiling loans only. This is the gist of our theoretical model. We test the predictions of this model by exploiting the natural experiment of a French MFI that became subject to the French EUR 10,000 loan ceiling in April 2009. Difference-in-differences probit estimations confirm that imposing loan ceilings to MFIs can have unexpected and socially harmful consequences. |
| Keywords: | Microcredit; regulation; developed countries; loan size; natural experiment |
| JEL: | G21 L51 G28 O52 L31 I38 C25 M13 |
| Date: | 2014–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/172183&r=ban |
| By: | Livshits, Igor; MacGee, James; Tertilt, Michèle |
| Abstract: | Financial innovations are a common explanation for the rise in credit card debt and bankruptcies. To evaluate this story, we develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions: asymmetric information about borrowers’ risk of default and a fixed cost of developing each contract lenders offer. Innovations that ameliorate asymmetric information or reduce this fixed cost have large extensive margin effects via the entry of new lending contracts targeted at riskier borrowers. This results in more defaults and borrowing, and increased dispersion of interest rates. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances and Federal Reserve Board interest rate data, we find evidence supporting these predictions. Specifically, the dispersion of credit card interest rates nearly tripled while the “new” cardholders of the late 1980s and 1990s had riskier observable characteristics than existing cardholders. Our calculation suggest these new cardholders accounted for over 25% of the rise in bank credit card debt and delinquencies between 1989 and 1998. |
| Keywords: | Credit Cards , Endogenous Financial Contracts , Bankruptcy |
| JEL: | E21 E49 G18 K35 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:35935&r=ban |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department |
| Abstract: | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hong Kong SAR’s (HKSAR) financial sector is one of the largest and most developed in the world, ranking number one in the World Economic Forum Financial Development Index. The banking system, with assets of US$2 trillion and equivalent to 705 percent of GDP, is highly capitalized, profitable, and liquid. The securities markets are deep, liquid, and efficient, with total stock market capitalization of 1,000 percent of GDP. The insurance sector has high penetration (now ranked the second in Asia after Japan), and is well capitalized. The sector is very well regulated, with the capacity to withstand a diversity of shocks. While the financial sector faced significant stress during the early stages of the 2008 global financial crisis, market confidence recovered quickly, aided by the decisive measures adopted by the Hong Kong authorities to mitigate its impact. The sector, however, faces major risks, which puts a significant premium on effective liquidity management, macroprudential oversight and microprudential supervision. The anticipated exit from unconventional monetary policy in the United States could increase capital market volatility and reduce system-wide liquidity. A correction of property prices, which now stand at historical highs, poses risks for both borrowers and banks. The increasing economic and financial integration between HKSAR and Mainland China offers considerable expansion opportunities, but, at the same time, generates significant spillover risks, especially if a significant financial disruption or economic slowdown were experienced. Stress tests suggest that banks are well positioned to absorb a significant realization of risks. Banks’ aggregate capitalization would remain well above the Basel III’s minimum capital requirement, and the banking sector (including foreign branches) has sufficient liquidity to withstand large deposit and wholesale funding withdrawals. At the same time, the tests highlight that a few smaller banks might be slightly more vulnerable under a severe economic scenario, and, reflecting the nature of their businesses, foreign branches are relatively more sensitive to withdrawals of wholesale funding. This underscores the need for continued vigilance in these areas. The authorities have actively deployed macroprudential policies to mitigate systemic risks. In particular, in the face of a doubling of house prices, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) introduced tighter limits on loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-servicing (DSR) ratios. Going forward, it will be important that the authorities strengthen their capacity for systemic risk analysis at both the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and Insurance Authority (IA) to complement the analysis undertaken by the HKMA. This would help ensure that cross-sectoral interconnections are adequately captured when considering systemic risks. |
| Keywords: | Financial system stability assessment;Financial sector;Financial risk;Banks;Spillovers;Bank resolution;Bank supervision;Stress testing;Macroprudential Policy;Hong Kong SAR; |
| Date: | 2014–05–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:14/130&r=ban |
| By: | Longmei Zhang; Edda Zoli |
| Abstract: | In recent years, macroprudential policy has become an increasingly active policy area. Many countries have adopted it as a tool to safeguard financial stability, in particular to deal with the credit and asset price cycles driven by global capital flows. This paper reviews the use of key macroprudential instruments and capital flow measures in 13 Asian economies and 33 economies in other regions since 2000, and constructs various macroprudential policy indices, aggregating sub-indices on key instruments. Asian economies appear to have made greater use of macroprudential tools, especially housing-related measures, than their counterparts in other regions. The effects of macroprudential policy are then assessed through an event study, cross-country macro panel regressions and bank-level micro panel regressions. The analysis suggests that macroprudential policy and capital flow measures have helped curb housing price growth, equity flows, credit growth, and bank leverage. The instruments that have been particularly effective in this regard include loan-to-value ratio caps, housing tax measures, and foreign currency-related measures. |
| Keywords: | Macroprudential Policy;Asia;Capital flows;Credit expansion;Asset prices;Inflation;Business cycles;Monetary policy;macroprudential policy; capital flow measures; credit growth; housing price |
| Date: | 2014–02–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:14/22&r=ban |
| By: | Ivo Krznar; James Morsink |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of the policy measures taken by Canadian authorities to address the housing boom. We find that the the last three rounds of macroprudential policies implemented since 2010 were associated with lower mortgage credit growth and house price growth. The international experience suggests that—in addition to tighter loan-to-value limits and shorter amortization periods—lower caps on the debt-to-income ratio and higher risk weights could be effective if the housing boom were to reignite. Over the medium term, the authorities could consider structural measures to further improve the soundness of housing finance. |
| Keywords: | Macroprudential Policy;Canada;Housing;Credit expansion;Housing prices;housing market, mortgage insurance, macroprudential regulation |
| Date: | 2014–05–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:14/83&r=ban |
| By: | Jean-Bernard Chatelain (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Kirsten Ralf (ESCE - International Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the identification, the determinacy and the stability of ad hoc, "quasi-optimal" and optimal policy rules augmented with financial stability indicators (such as asset prices deviations from their fundamental values) and minimizing the volatility of the policy interest rates, when the central bank precommits to financial stability. Firstly, ad hoc and quasi-optimal rules parameters of financial stability indicators cannot be identified. For those rules, non zero policy rule parameters of financial stability indicators are observationally equivalent to rule parameters set to zero in another rule, so that they are unable to inform monetary policy. Secondly, under controllability conditions, optimal policy rules parameters of financial stability indicators can all be identified, along with a bounded solution stabilizing an unstable economy as in Woodford (2003), with determinacy of the initial conditions of non-predetermined variables. |
| Keywords: | Identification, financial stability, monetary policy, optimal policy under commitment, augmented Taylor rule. |
| JEL: | C61 C62 E43 E44 E47 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14034&r=ban |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept. |
| Abstract: | The Paraguayan banking system compares relatively well with other Latin American banking systems. Banks are well capitalized, have ample access to deposit funding sources, and are profitable. Most importantly, the authorities have taken a number of decisive steps to strengthen supervision and ensure stability in the financial system within the last decade. Nevertheless, the credit delivery system still appears somewhat weak with little improvement in key metrics in recent years. The consolidation process has resulted in a slightly more concentrated banking system with substantially lower levels of foreign participation. Nevertheless, effective interest rate margins have declined by a small amount as concentration ratios increased. This suggests that greater concentration has not had a negative impact on competition in the sector. Indeed, the panel regressions indicated that increases in system wide concentration levels actually reduced effective margins. In addition, the regressions demonstrate that banks which gained market share also ended up lowering effective spreads. The impact of credit risks, in the form of NPLs, on margins has been relatively minor. |
| Keywords: | Banking sector;Dollarization;Monetary policy;Economic models;Selected issues;Paraguay; |
| Date: | 2014–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:14/61&r=ban |
| By: | Jean-Michel Sahut; Mehdi Mili |
| Date: | 2014–06–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-349&r=ban |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept. |
| Abstract: | In recent years, the IMF has released a growing number of reports and other documents covering economic and financial developments and trends in member countries. Each report, prepared by a staff team after discussions with government officials, is published at the option of the member country. |
| Keywords: | Financial system stability assessment;Banking sector;Insurance;Stress testing;Bank supervision;Insurance supervision;Securities regulations;Housing;Financial safety nets;Canada;mortgage insurance, credit risk, market risk, life insurance, life insurers, risk assessment, securities markets, insurance companies, deposit insurance, mortgage insurers, regulatory agencies, capital requirements, policyholders, risk-weighted assets, supervisory framework, life insurance companies, underwriting, casualty insurance, risk management, insurance system, insurance industry, risk premium, supervisory authorities, portfolio insurance, financial systems, motor insurance, supervisory agencies, regulatory approaches, emerging markets, international supervisory standards, health insurance, internal controls, government insurance, contingency planning, consumer protection, risk transfer, risk sharing, level playing field, risk assessments, insurance regulation, pension funds, insurance agents, underwriting standards, insurance products |
| Date: | 2014–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:14/29&r=ban |
| By: | Emanuele Brancati (LUISS University of Rome) |
| Abstract: | Financial frictions represent a severe obstacle to firmsÕ innovativeness. This paper shows the existence and quantifies the effects of financial barriers to the innovation propensity of Italian SMEs. Employing direct measures of financial constraints and a credit-score estimated ad hoc, I find financially-constrained firms have a probability of innovating that is significantly lower than sound companies (-30%). Results document the existence of a feedback-effect of innovation on firmsÕ financial position, resulting into an additional reduction in firmsÕ propensity to innovate. The paper also highlights the role of soft information in mitigating financial obstacles to innovation by improving the financial condition of more opaque (small) borrowers. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, financial constraints, relationship lending, SMEs. |
| JEL: | O31 L25 G21 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:casmef:1403&r=ban |