New Economics Papers
on Banking
Issue of 2014‒03‒22
twenty-six papers chosen by
Christian Calmès, Université du Québec en Outaouais

  1. Do private signals of a bank’s creditworthiness predict the bank’s CDS price? Evidence from the Eurosystem's overnight loan rates By Tölö , Eero; Jokivuolle, Esa; Viren, Matti
  2. Market Discipline at Thai Banks before the Asian Crisis By Jiranyakul, Komain; Opiela, Timothy
  3. Bank Failures and the Source of Strength Doctrine By Vincent Bouvatier; Michael Brei; Xi Yang
  4. Banking Fragility in Colombia: An Empirical Analysis Based on Balance Sheets By Ignacio Lozano; Alexander Guarín
  5. The Development of the Hungarian Banking Sector Prior to Basel II By Csizmazia, Roland Attila
  6. Consumer Loans in Cambodia: Implications on Banking Stability By Meng, Channarith
  7. bank capital regulation model By cho, hyejin
  8. Financial stability policies for shadow banking By Adrian, Tobias
  9. International transmission of liquidity shocks between parent banks and their affiliates: the host country perspective By Małgorzata Pawłowska; Dobromil Serwa; Sławomir Zajączkowski
  10. Did consumers want less debt? Consumer credit demand versus supply in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis By Gropp, Reint; Krainer, John; Laderman, Elizabeth
  11. Liquidity policies and systemic risk By Adrian, Tobias; Boyarchenko, Nina
  12. Soft Information and Default Prediction in Cooperative and Social Banks By Simon Cornée
  13. Heterogeneous monetary transmission process in the Eurozone: Does banking competition matter? By Aurélien Leroy; Yannick Lucotte
  14. Bank Cash Holdings and Investor Uncertainty By Benoît D'Udekem
  15. The capital and loss assessment under stress scenarios (CLASS) model By Hirtle, Beverly; Kovner, Anna; Vickery, James; Bhanot, Meru
  16. Frictions in the interbank market and uncertain liquidity needs: Implications for monetary policy implementation By Bucher, Monika; Hauck, Achim; Neyer, Ulrike
  17. The over-the-counter theory of the fed funds market: a primer By Afonso, Gara M.; Lagos, Ricardo
  18. The efficiency of Chinese local banks: a comparison of DEA and SFA By Benjamin Miranda Tabak; Daniel Oliveira Cajueiro; Marina V. B. Dias
  19. Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts By Beyhaghi, Mehdi; Mahmoudi, Babak; Mohammadi, Ali
  20. Global financial stability - the road ahead By Dudley, William
  21. Rating Agencies By Harold Cole; Thomas F. Cooley
  22. Varying the Money Supply of Commercial Banks By Martin Shubik; Eric Smith
  23. Networked relationships in the e-MID Interbank market: A trading model with memory By Giulia Iori; Rosario N. Mantegna; Luca Marotta; Salvatore Micciche'; James Porter; Michele Tumminello
  24. Leverage and Beliefs: Personal Experience and Risk Taking in Margin Lending By Peter Koudijs; Hans-Joachim Voth
  25. Liquidity-adjusted Intraday Value at Risk modeling and Risk Management: an Application to Data from Deutsche Börse By Georges Dionne; Maria Pacurar; Xiaozhou Zhou
  26. Offshore financial centers and bank secrecy By Patrice Pieretti; Jacques-François Thisse; Skerdilajda Zanaj

  1. By: Tölö , Eero (Bank of Finland Research); Jokivuolle, Esa (Bank of Finland Research); Viren, Matti (Bank of Finland Research)
    Abstract: We investigate the relationship between the daily average interbank overnight borrowing rate (AOR) and the credit default swap price (CDS) of 60 banks using the Eurosystem’s proprietary data from mid-2008 to mid-2013. We find that the AOR which is observable only by the competent Eurosystem authorities leads the CDS at least by one day. The lead was concentrated on days of market stress for banks which mainly borrow from “relationship” lender banks. Such borrower banks are typically smaller, have weak ratings, and likely reside in crisis countries.
    Keywords: overnight loans rates; credit default swap; TARGET2; Eurosystem; early-warning indicators
    JEL: G01 G14 G21
    Date: 2014–02–26
  2. By: Jiranyakul, Komain; Opiela, Timothy
    Abstract: This paper tests the effect of systemic risk on deposit market discipline by interacting proxies for systemic risk with bank-specific default-risk variables. Discipline is measured by estimating a supply of deposit funds function at Thai banks from 1992 to 1997. The results show that supply decreases as bank-specific risk increases. Also, the sensitivity of funds to changes in bank-specific risk increases as systemic risk rises. Additionally, depositors decrease their sensitivity to deposit rates, decreasing the ability of banks to offset deposit drains by raising rates. Although banking system risk increases, discipline decreases the share of deposits at the riskiest banks.
    Keywords: Market discipline, market monitoring, systemic risk, banking and currency crises
    JEL: E44 G21
    Date: 2014–03
  3. By: Vincent Bouvatier; Michael Brei; Xi Yang
    Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of bank failures in the US banking system during the recent financial crisis. The analysis employs a dataset on the financial statements of FDIC-insured commercial banks and their bank holding companies, along with information on bank failures, mergers, and acquisitions. The econometric evidence suggests that failed banks have been characterized by significantly higher loan growth rates, well ahead of the financial crisis, coupled with higher exposures to the mortgage market segment and to funding in the form of brokered deposits. We also find evidence that commercial banks have been less likely to fail, when they belonged to well-capitalized and profitable bank holding companies with lower exposures to short-term funding. Our results provide empirical support for the recent modifications in bank regulation and supervision which introduce countercyclical components for capital buffers and a more comprehensive supervision of consolidated banking groups.
    Keywords: financial crises, bank failures, bank regulation
    JEL: G21 E58 G32
    Date: 2014
  4. By: Ignacio Lozano; Alexander Guarín
    Abstract: In this paper, we study the empirical relationship between credit funding sources and the financial vulnerability of the Colombian banking system. We propose a statistical model to measure and predict banking-fragility episodes associated with credit funding sources classified into retail deposits and wholesale funds. We compute the probability of financial fragility for both the aggregated banking system and the individual banks. Our approach performs a Bayesian averaging of estimated logit regression models with monthly balance sheet data between 1996 and 2013. The results show the increasing use of wholesale funding to support credit expansion is a potential source of financial fragility. Therefore, monitoring credit funding sources could provide an additional tool to warn against banking disruptions. Classification JEL: C11, C23, C52, C53, G01, G20, G21
    Date: 2014–03
  5. By: Csizmazia, Roland Attila
    Abstract: Although the economic transition started in the early of 1990s, Hungary had a pioneer role in introducing the two-tier banking system within the former Soviet Eastern Block. The modernization of the banking system was unexpectedly far-reaching as Western banks were allowed to participate in the market. The Hungarian banking system was widely government run before the first commercial bank was opened by the National Bank of Hungary and five foreign commercial banks were established in 1979. The pioneer role was maintained even during the transition years when foreign-owned commercial banks could establish their subsidiaries. This paper attempts to examine the performance of the Hungarian banking sector once foreign investments occurred, and its functions as well as its stability in the transition period before the implementation of the Basel II Accord. It also reveals the doubts policy makers had about the Basel II Accord and its affect on the lending behavior of banks.
    Keywords: Basel II; Hungary; privatization; foreign ownership; banking stability; pro-cyclicity
    JEL: G21 G28
    Date: 2014–02–15
  6. By: Meng, Channarith
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the fast development of consumer loans including housing loans in Cambodia to check whether or not such a development posts any stability risk to banking system in Cambodia. Using stress-testing method, the paper finds that current level of consumer loans provided by banks does yet creates a big threat to the banking stability in Cambodia. Rather, the surge reflects consequences of positive development in the banking system and economy as a whole, including the rise of middle-income class, changing family structure, stronger competition among banks, and more widespread financial literacy.
    Keywords: Housing loans, consumer loans, stress testing, banking stability, Cambodia, financial crisis
    JEL: E58 G01 G21 G28 O16
    Date: 2014–03–05
  7. By: cho, hyejin
    Abstract: The motivation of this article is to induce the bank capital management solution for banks and regulation bodies on commercial bank. The goal of the paper is intended to mitigate the risk of banking area and also provide the right incentive for banks to support the real economy.
    Keywords: Demand Deposit, Risks of on-the-balance-sheet and off-the-balance sheet, Portfolio composition, minimum equity capital regulation.
    JEL: G00
    Date: 2014–03–12
  8. By: Adrian, Tobias (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
    Abstract: This paper explores financial stability policies for the shadow banking system. I tie policy options to economic mechanisms for shadow banking that have been documented in the literature. I then illustrate the role of shadow bank policies using three examples: agency mortgage real estate investment trusts, leveraged lending, and captive reinsurance affiliates. For each example, the economic mechanisms are explained, the potential risks emanating from the activities are described, and policy options to mitigate such risks are listed. The overarching theme of the analysis is that any policy prescription for the shadow banking system is highly specific to the particular activity.
    Keywords: shadow bank policies; systemic risk; financial intermediation
    JEL: E44 G00 G01 G28
    Date: 2014–02–01
  9. By: Małgorzata Pawłowska (Narodowy Bank Polski and Warsaw School of Economics); Dobromil Serwa (Narodowy Bank Polski and Warsaw School of Economics); Sławomir Zajączkowski (Narodowy Bank Polski)
    Abstract: In this study we analyze how funding liquidity shocks affecting large international banks were transmitted to Polish subsidiaries and branches of these banks in recent years. We investigate differences in the effects of liquidity shocks on banks owned by both Polish and foreign institutions. All Polish banks reacted to liquidity shocks after Lehman Brothers failure; however, only Polish subsidiaries and branches of foreign parent banks adjusted their funding after liquidity shocks had taken place during the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone. Mortgage lending in foreign currencies was also affected by liquidity shocks during the crisis. Our results suggest that the intragroup links between banking institutions can serve both as an important channel for international transmission of liquidity shocks and as a stabilizing mechanism during liquidity crises.
    Keywords: liquidity shocks, international transmission, parent banks, affiliate banks, Poland
    JEL: E44 F34 G32
    Date: 2014
  10. By: Gropp, Reint; Krainer, John; Laderman, Elizabeth
    Abstract: We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth. --
    Keywords: credit supply,deleveraging,households,financial crisis
    JEL: E21 G21
    Date: 2014
  11. By: Adrian, Tobias (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Boyarchenko, Nina (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
    Abstract: The growth of wholesale-funded credit intermediation has motivated liquidity regulations. We analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which liquidity and capital regulations interact with the supply of risk-free assets. In the model, the endogenously time-varying tightness of liquidity and capital constraints generates intermediaries’ leverage cycle, influencing the pricing of risk and the level of risk in the economy. Our analysis focuses on liquidity policies’ implications for household welfare. Within the context of our model, liquidity requirements are preferable to capital requirements, as tightening liquidity requirements lowers the likelihood of systemic distress without impairing consumption growth. In addition, we find that intermediate ranges of risk-free asset supply achieve higher welfare.
    Keywords: liquidity regulation; systemic risk; DSGE; financial intermediation
    JEL: E02 E32 G00 G28
    Date: 2014–12–01
  12. By: Simon Cornée
    Abstract: In this paper, to begin with, we define soft information as qualitative, subjective information produced by banks through the establishment of long-term lending relationships. We then highlight the importance of soft information for cooperative and social banks in the screening, pricing and monitoring of their borrowers as a result of their institutional features (governance, values, etc.) and the specificities of their clientele. We finally emphasise the value of qualitative (economic, social and/or environmental) factors stemming from the production of soft information in predicting credit default events.
    Keywords: Relationship Lending; Soft Information; Credit Rating; Cooperative and Social Banking
    JEL: G21 L22 M21 P13
    Date: 2014–02–12
  13. By: Aurélien Leroy (Laboratoire d’Economie d’Orléans); Yannick Lucotte (ESG Management School; Department of Economics,)
    Abstract: This paper examines the implications of banking competition for the interest rate channel in the Eurozone over the period 2003-2010. Using an Error Correction Model (ECM) approach to measure the long-run and short-run relationships between money market rates, bank interest rates, and our competition proxy, namely, the Lerner index. We find that competition (i) reduces the bank lending interest rates, (ii) increases the long-term interest pass-through and (iii) speeds up the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium in the short-run. Therefore, increased competition would improve the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission through the interest rate channel, and from this point of view should be fostered in the Eurozone. Because the 2007-2009 financial crisis has undoubtedly led to a modification of the monetary policy and an increase of the heterogeneity in the Eurozone, we control and extend our results by considering many other aspects than the market structures that can affect the interest rate pass-through. Even if we observe that other factors (economic heterogeneity, systemic risk, banking stability, and capitalization) matter for monetary policy transmission, bank competition remains a key determinant of the pass-through.
    Keywords: interest rate pass-through; bank competition; Lerner index; euro area countries; error-correction model
    JEL: C23 D4 E43 E52 G21 L10
    Date: 2014
  14. By: Benoît D'Udekem
    Abstract: Cash holdings have often been presumed to help resolve the inherent uncertainty of assessing banks. Nonetheless, extant empirical evidence is inconclusive. The present paper adopts a novel approach to assessing the level of stockholder uncertainty associated with the cash holdings reported by European banks before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The paper finds that stockholder uncertainty may be significant when cash holdings exceed or fall short of the levels warranted to meet depositor demands. It concludes that investors monitor bank cash holdings in relation to short-term liabilities. Cash holdings may thus contribute to making banks more opaque.
    Keywords: Banks; liquidity; opaque assets; stockholder uncertainty
    JEL: G21 G24 G32
    Date: 2014–01–16
  15. By: Hirtle, Beverly (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Kovner, Anna (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Vickery, James (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Bhanot, Meru (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
    Abstract: The CLASS model is a top-down capital stress testing framework that projects the effect of different macroeconomic scenarios on U.S. banking firms. The model is based on simple econometric models estimated using public data and also on assumptions about loan loss provisioning, taxes, asset growth, and other factors. We use this framework to calculate a projected industry capital gap relative to a target ratio at different points in time under a common stressful macroeconomic scenario. This estimated capital gap began rising four years before the financial crisis and peaked at the end of 2008. The gap has since fallen sharply and is now significantly below precrisis levels. In the cross-section, firms projected to be most sensitive to macroeconomic conditions have higher capital ratios, consistent with a “precautionary” view of bank capital.
    Keywords: capital; stress testing
    JEL: G01 G17 G21
    Date: 2014–02–01
  16. By: Bucher, Monika; Hauck, Achim; Neyer, Ulrike
    Abstract: This paper shows that depending on the distribution of banks' uncertain liquidity needs and on how monetary policy is implemented, frictions in the interbank market may reinforce the effectiveness of monetary policy. The frictions imply that with its lending and deposit facilities the central bank has an additional effective instrument at its disposal to impose an impact on bank loan supply. Lowering the rate on the deposit facility has, taken for itself, a contractionary effect. This result has interesting implications for monetary policy implementation at the zero lower bound. --
    Keywords: interbank market,monetary policy,monetary policy implementation,zero lower bound,loan supply
    JEL: E52 E58 G21
    Date: 2014
  17. By: Afonso, Gara M. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Lagos, Ricardo (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
    Abstract: We present a dynamic over-the-counter model of the fed funds market, and use it to study the determination of the fed funds rate, the volume of loans traded, and the intraday evolution of the distribution of reserve balances across banks. We also investigate the implications of changes in the market structure, as well as the effects of central bank policy instruments such as open market operations, the Discount Window lending rate, and the interest rate on bank reserves.
    Keywords: Fed funds market; search; bargaining; over-the-counter
    JEL: C78 D83 E44 G1
    Date: 2014–12–01
  18. By: Benjamin Miranda Tabak; Daniel Oliveira Cajueiro; Marina V. B. Dias
    Abstract: This study investigates to which extent results produced by a single frontier model are reliable, based on the application of data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier approach to a sample of Chinese local banks. Our findings show they do produce a consistent trend on efficiency scores over the years. However, rank correlations indicate they diverge with respect to individual performance diagnosis. This shows that these models provide steady information on the efficiency of the banking system as a whole, but they become inconsistent at individual level
    Date: 2014–01
  19. By: Beyhaghi, Mehdi (College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio); Mahmoudi, Babak (School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nazarbayev University); Mohammadi, Ali (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology)
    Abstract: We provide empirical evidence of both (1) price dispersion and (2) credit rationing in the corporate loan market. We argue that these properties are caused by two factors: an adverse selection resulting from the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, and search frictions in matching borrowers with lenders. We develop a model of loan markets in which lenders post an array of heterogeneous contracts, then borrowers tradeoff terms of loan contracts and matching probability between themselves. We show that a unique separating equilibrium exists where each type of borrower applies to a certain type of contract.
    Keywords: loan contract; capital structure; debt heterogeneity; adverse selection; competitive search
    JEL: D86 G20 G21 G32
    Date: 2014–03–12
  20. By: Dudley, William (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
    Abstract: Remarks at the Tenth Asia-Pacific High Level Meeting on Banking Supervision, Auckland, New Zealand
    Keywords: global financial system; shadow banking; global systemically important financial institutions(G-SIFIs); too big to fail; Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR); single point of entry (SPE); gone concern loss absorption capacity (GLAC); lender-of-last-resort (LOLR); Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR); Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR); central counterparties (CCPs); Financial Stability Board (FSB); Data Gaps Initiative (DGI)
    JEL: F30 G28
    Date: 2014–02–26
  21. By: Harold Cole; Thomas F. Cooley
    Abstract: For decades credit rating agencies were viewed as trusted arbiters of creditworthiness and their ratings as important tools for managing risk. The common narrative is that the value of ratings was compromised by the evolution of the industry to a form where issuers pay for ratings. In this paper we show how credit ratings have value in equilibrium and how reputation insures that, in equilibrium, ratings will reflect sound assessments of credit worthiness. There will always be an information distortion because of the fact that purchasers of ratings need not reveal them. We argue that regulatory reliance on ratings and the increasing importance of risk-weighted capital in prudential regulation have more likely contributed to distorted ratings than the matter of who pays for them. In this respect, much of the regulatory obsession with the conflict created by issuers paying for ratings is a distraction.
    JEL: G1 G24
    Date: 2014–03
  22. By: Martin Shubik (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Eric Smith (Santa Fe Institute)
    Abstract: We consider the problem of financing two productive sectors in an economy through bank loans, when the sectors may experience independent demands for money but when it is desirable for each to maintain an independently determined sequence of prices. An idealized central bank is compared with a collection of commercial banks that generate profits from interest rate spreads and flow those through to a collection of consumer/owners who are also one group of borrowers and lenders in the private economy. We model the private economy as one in which both production functions and consumption preferences for the two goods are independent, and in which one production process experiences a shock in the demand for money arising from an opportunity for risky innovation of its production function. An idealized, profitless central bank can decouple the sectors, but for-profit commercial banks inherently propagate shocks in money demand in one sector into price shocks with a tail of distorted prices in the other sector. The connection of profits with efficiency-reducing propagation of shocks is mechanical in character, in that it does not depend on the particular way profits are used strategically within the banking system. In application, the tension between profits and reserve requirements is essential to enabling but also controlling the distributed perception and evaluation services provided by commercial banks. We regard the inefficiency inherent in the profit system as a source of costs that are paid for distributed perception and control in economies.
    Keywords: Commercial banking, Continuous time, Money supply
    JEL: C73 E51
    Date: 2014–03
  23. By: Giulia Iori; Rosario N. Mantegna; Luca Marotta; Salvatore Micciche'; James Porter; Michele Tumminello
    Abstract: Interbank markets are fundamental for bank liquidity management. In this paper, we introduce a model of interbank trading with memory. Our model reproduces features of preferential trading patterns in the e-MID market recently empirically observed through the method of statistically validated networks. The memory mechanism is used to introduce a proxy of trust in the model. The key idea is that a lender, having lent many times to a borrower in the past, is more likely to lend to that borrower again in the future than to other borrowers, with which the lender has never (or has in- frequently) interacted. The core of the model depends on only one parameter representing the initial attractiveness of all the banks as borrowers. Model outcomes and real data are compared through a variety of measures that describe the structure and properties of trading networks, including number of statistically validated links, bidirectional links, and 3-motifs. Refinements of the pairing method are also proposed, in order to capture finite memory and reciprocity in the model. The model is implemented within the Mason framework in Java.
    Date: 2014–03
  24. By: Peter Koudijs; Hans-Joachim Voth
    Abstract: What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Using unique archival data on collateralized lending, we show that personal experience can affect individual risk-taking and aggregate leverage. When an investor syndicate speculating in Amsterdam in 1772 went bankrupt, many lenders were exposed. In the end, none of them actually lost money. Nonetheless, only those at risk of losing money changed their behavior markedly – they lent with much higher haircuts. The rest continued as before. The differential change is remarkable since the distress was public knowledge. Overall leverage in the Amsterdam stock market declined as a result.
    Keywords: Leverage, collateralized lending, haircuts, personal experience
    JEL: G12 G23 N23 G01 G02
    Date: 2014–03
  25. By: Georges Dionne; Maria Pacurar; Xiaozhou Zhou
    Abstract: This paper develops a high-frequency risk measure, the Liquidity-adjusted Intraday Value at Risk (LIVaR). Our objective is to explicitly consider the endogenous liquidity dimension associated with order size. Taking liquidity into consideration when using intraday data is important because significant position changes over very short horizons may have large impacts on stock returns. By reconstructing the open Limit Order Book (LOB) of Deutsche Börse, the changes of tick-by-tick ex-ante frictionless return and actual return are modeled jointly using a Log-ACD-VARMA-MGARCH structure. This modeling helps to identify the dynamics of frictionless and actual returns, and to quantify the risk related to the liquidity premium. From a practical perspective, our model can be used not only to identify the impact of ex-ante liquidity risk on total risk, but also to provide an estimation of VaR for the actual return at a point in time. In particular, there will be considerable time saved in constructing the risk measure for the waiting cost because once the models have been identified and estimated, the risk measure over any time horizon can be obtained by simulation without re-sampling the data and re-estimating the model.
    Keywords: Liquidity-adjusted Intraday Value at Risk, Tick-by-tick data, Log-ACD-VARMA-MGARCH, Ex-ante Liquidity premium, Limit Order Book
    JEL: C22 C41 C53 G11
    Date: 2014
  26. By: Patrice Pieretti (CREA, Université de Luxembourg); Jacques-François Thisse (Université catholique de Louvain); Skerdilajda Zanaj (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)
    Abstract: We study the impact of an offshore financial center on the economy in the presence or absence of bank secrecy in a two-country setting with heterogeneous investors who choose where to deposit their savings. Rather than focussing on tax competition, we acknowledge that countries use two instruments to attract investors: tax rate and institu- tional infrastructure. Owing to its ability to quickly redesign its regulation environment, the small country has a comparative advantage in providing high-quality institutional in- frastructure. We show that the presence of an offshore financial center fosters competition in institutional infrastructure, which is beneficial with or without bank secrecy.
    Keywords: Offshore financial centers; portfolio investments; institutional infrastructure competition; tax competition.
    JEL: G20 H40 H54
    Date: 2014

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