New Economics Papers
on Banking
Issue of 2013‒02‒03
twenty-two papers chosen by
Christian Calmès, Université du Québec en Outaouais

  1. Recent Developments in Financial Economics and Econometrics:An Overview By Chia-Lin Chang; David E Allen; Michael McAleer
  2. Do Stock Markets Discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just Monitoring, or also Inuencing? By L. BAELE; V. DE BRUYCKERE; O. DE JONGHE; R. VANDER VENNET
  3. Real Sector and Banking System: Real and Feedback Effects. A Non-Linear VAR Approach By Stefano Puddu
  4. Bank Regulation and Supervision in 180 Countries from 1999 to 2011 By James R. Barth; Gerard Caprio, Jr.; Ross Levine
  5. Understanding Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses By Stijn Claessens; M. Ayhan Kose; Luc Laeven; Fabián Valencia
  6. Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks By Daron Acemoglu; Asuman Ozdaglar; Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi
  7. Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis By V. DE BRUYCKERE; M. GERHARDT; G. SCHEPENS; R. VANDER VENNET
  8. The minimal confidence levels of Basel capital regulation By Alexander Zimper
  9. Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies By Sebastian Poledna; Stefan Thurner; J. Doyne Farmer; John Geanakoplos
  10. Optimal Weights and Stress Banking Indexes By Stefano Puddu
  11. Some Economics of Banking Reform By John Vickers
  12. On the Distribution of Links in the Interbank Network: Evidence from the e-Mid Overnight Money Market By Daniel Fricke; Thomas Lux
  13. Bank Pay Caps, Bank Risk, and Macroprudential Regulation By John Thanassoulis
  14. DebtRank-transparency: Controlling systemic risk in financial networks By Stefan Thurner; Sebastian Poledna
  15. Banks, free banks, and U.S. economic growth By Matthew Jaremski; Peter Rousseau
  16. Notes on financial system development and political intervention By Song. Fenghua; Thakor, Anjan
  17. Micro-finance Competition: Motivated Micro-lenders, Double-dipping and Default By Brishti Guha; Prabal Roy Chowdhury
  18. Green Microfinance. Characteristics of microfinance institutions involved in environmental management By Marion Allet; Marek Hudon
  19. Implications of Alternative Banking Systems By Cagri S. Kumruy; Saran Sarntisartz
  20. Financial Restructuring after the 1997 Crisis and Impact of the Lehman Shock: Path Dependence of Financial Systems in Korea and Thailand By Okabe, Yasunobu
  21. Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation? By Annelise Riles
  22. The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Efficiency and Productivity of the Banking System in South Africa By Andrew Maredza and Sylvanus Ikhide

  1. By: Chia-Lin Chang (Department of Applied Economics Department of Finance National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan); David E Allen (School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Edith Cowan University); Michael McAleer (Econometric Institute Erasmus School of Economics Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands and Institute of Economic Research Kyoto University, Japan and Department of Quantitative Economics Complutense University of Madrid, Spain)
    Abstract: Research papers in empirical finance and financial econometrics are among the most widely cited, downloaded and viewed articles in the discipline of Finance. The special issue presents several papers by leading scholars in the field on “Recent Developments in Financial Economics and Econometrics”. The breadth of coverage is substantial, and includes original research and comprehensive review papers on theoretical, empirical and numerical topics in Financial Economics and Econometrics by leading researchers in finance, financial economics, financial econometrics and financial statistics. The purpose of this special issue on “Recent Developments in Financial Economics and Econometrics” is to highlight several novel and significant developments in financial economics and financial econometrics, specifically dynamic price integration in the global gold market, a conditional single index model with local covariates for detecting and evaluating active management, whether the Basel Accord has improved risk management during the global financial crisis, the role of banking regulation in an economy under credit risk and liquidity shock, separating information maximum likelihood estimation of the integrated volatility and covariance with micro-market noise, stress testing correlation matrices for risk management, whether bank relationship matters for corporate risk taking, with evidence from listed firms in Taiwan, pricing options on stocks denominated in different currencies, with theory and illustrations, EVT and tail-risk modelling, with evidence from market indices and volatility series, the economics of data using simple model free volatility in a high frequency world, arbitrage-free implied volatility surfaces for options on single stock futures, the non-uniform pricing effect of employee stock options using quantile regression, nonlinear dynamics and recurrence plots for detecting financial crisis, how news sentiment impacts asset volatility, with evidence from long memory and regime-switching approaches, quantitative evaluation of contingent capital and its applications, high quantiles estimation with Quasi-PORT and DPOT, with an application to value-at-risk for financial variables, evaluating inflation targeting based on the distribution of inflation and inflation volatility, the size effects of volatility spillovers for firm performance and exchange rates in tourism, forecasting volatility with the realized range in the presence of noise and non-trading, using CARRX models to study factors affecting the volatilities of Asian equity markets, deciphering the Libor and Euribor spreads during the subprime crisis, information transmission between sovereign debt CDS and other financial factors for Latin America, time-varying mixture GARCH models and asymmetric volatility, and diagnostic checking for non-stationary ARMA models with an application to financial data.
    Keywords: Dynamic price integration, local covariates, risk management, global financial crisis, credit risk, liquidity shock, micro-market noise, corporate risk taking, options, volatility, quantiles, news sentiment, contingent capital, value-at-risk, inflation targeting, size effects, exchange rates, realized range, equity markets, sub-prime crisis, sovereign debt CDS, mixture models, asymmetry, diagnostic checking..
    JEL: G11 G12 G13 G15 G18
    Date: 2013–01
    Abstract: This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar business model characteristics, and a valuation signal when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics (using respectively a stochastic frontier and multiplicative heteroscedasticity model). We show that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion and specialization. Next, we show, using a partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long- term target value of key strategic variables and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret this as evidence of stock market inuencing. Finally, we show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect inuencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, or wholesale depositors.
    Keywords: monitoring, inuencing, stochastic frontier, multiplicative heteroscedasticity regression, partial adjustment, opaqueness, earnings forecast dispersion, bank risk
    JEL: G21 G28 L25
    Date: 2012–12
  3. By: Stefano Puddu (Institute of economic research IRENE, Faculty of Economics, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland)
    Abstract: This paper assesses the relationship between the macroeconomic system and the banking sector by estimating two separate non-linear Vector Autoregressive models (VAR) for the US and Switzerland. The model specification includes the output gap, the interest rate, the in ation rate and a banking quality measure. Impulse response functions are estimated by using the local projections approach. The results highlight the existence of the real effect (going from the macroeconomic system to the banking sector), and of the feedback effect (going from the the banking sector to macroeconomic system). The findings are robust to the sample period, the size of the shocks as well as to the Cholesky decomposition employed.
    Keywords: Financial Stability, Non-Linear VAR, Local Projections Methods
    JEL: C32 E44 E47 G21 G32
    Date: 2013–01
  4. By: James R. Barth; Gerard Caprio, Jr.; Ross Levine
    Abstract: In this paper and the associated online database, we provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011. The data include and the measures are based upon responses to hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning. The dataset also provides information on the organization of regulatory agencies and the size, structure, and performance of banking systems. Since the underlying surveys are large and complex, we construct summary indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies to facilitate cross-country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies over time.
    JEL: G21 G28 O5
    Date: 2013–01
  5. By: Stijn Claessens (International Monetary Fund); M. Ayhan Kose (International Monetary Fund); Luc Laeven (International Monetary Fund); Fabián Valencia (International Monetary Fund)
    Abstract: The global financial crisis of 2007-09 has led to an intensive research program analyzing a wide range of issues related to financial crises. This paper presents a summary of a forthcoming book, Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, that includes 19 contributions examining these issues and distilling policy lessons. The book covers a wide range of crises, including banking, balance-of-payments, and sovereign debt crises. It reviews the typical patterns prior to crises, considers lessons on their antecedents, and analyzes their evolution and aftermath. It also provides valuable policy lessons on how to prevent, contain and manage financial crises.
    Keywords: global financial crisis, sudden stops, debt crises, banking crises, currency crises, defaults, restructuring, welfare cost, asset price busts, credit busts, prediction of crises.
    JEL: E32 F44 G01 E5 E6 H12
    Date: 2013–01
  6. By: Daron Acemoglu; Asuman Ozdaglar; Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi
    Abstract: We provide a framework for studying the relationship between the financial network architecture and the likelihood of systemic failures due to contagion of counterparty risk. We show that financial contagion exhibits a form of phase transition as interbank connections increase: as long as the magnitude and the number of negative shocks affecting financial institutions are sufficiently small, more “complete” interbank claims enhance the stability of the system. However, beyond a certain point, such interconnections start to serve as a mechanism for propagation of shocks and lead to a more fragile financial system. We also show that, under natural contracting assumptions, financial networks that emerge in equilibrium may be socially inefficient due to the presence of a network externality: even though banks take the effects of their lending, risk-taking and failure on their immediate creditors into account, they do not internalize the consequences of their actions on the rest of the network.
    JEL: D85 G01
    Date: 2013–01
    Abstract: This paper investigates contagion between bank risk and sovereign risk in Europe over the period 2006-2011. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. We provide empirical evidence that various contagion channels are at work, including a strong home bias in bank bond portfolios, using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks. We find that banks with a weak capital and/or funding position are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion.
    Keywords: Contagion, bank risk, sovereign risk, bank business models, bank regulation, sovereign debt crisis
    JEL: G01 G21 G28 H6
    Date: 2012–12
  8. By: Alexander Zimper (Department of Economics, University of Pretoria)
    Abstract: The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision sets the official confidence level at which a bank is supposed to absorb annual losses at 99.9%. However, due to an inconsistency between the notion of expected losses in the Vasicek model, on the one hand, and the practice of Basel regulation, on the other hand, actual confidence levels are likely to be lower. This paper calculates the minimal confidence levels which correspond to a worst case scenario in which a Basel-regulated bank holds capital against unexpected losses only. I argue that the probability of a bank failure is significantly higher than the official 0.1% if, firstly, the bank holds risky loans and if, secondly, the bank was previously affeected by substantial write-offs.
    Keywords: Banking Regulation, Probability of Bank Failure, Definition of Expected Losses, Financial Stability
    JEL: G18 G32
    Date: 2013–01
  9. By: Sebastian Poledna; Stefan Thurner; J. Doyne Farmer; John Geanakoplos
    Abstract: We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II, which also imposes interest rate spreads on loans and haircuts on collateral, and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options that are paid for by the funds. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: Risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with a maximum leverage of roughly four, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with a high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle II.
    Date: 2013–01
  10. By: Stefano Puddu (Institute of economic research IRENE, Faculty of Economics, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland)
    Abstract: The goal of this paper is to provide alternative approaches to generate indexes in order to assess banking distress. Specifically, we focus on two groups of indexes that are based on the signalling approach and on the zero in ated Poisson models. The results show that the indexes based on these approaches perform better than those constructed by using the variance-equal and the factor analysis methods. Specifically, they are better at capturing relevant events, signalling distress episodes and forecasting properties. The importance of this study is two-fold: first, we contribute extra information that can be useful for forecasting banking system soundness in the aim of preventing future financial crises; second we provide alternative methods for measuring banking distress.
    Keywords: Stress-banking indexes, Signalling approach, Limited dependent variable methods
    JEL: C16 C25 G21 G33 G34
    Date: 2013–01
  11. By: John Vickers
    Abstract: Where do we stand, five years on from the start of the crisis, on progress towards banking reform? Major advances have been made, but a lot of unfinished business remains, notably on structural reform of banks. Following a stock-take of current reform initiatives, the paper reviews some economics of public policy towards banks, starting with the rationale for deposit guarantees and lender-of-last-resort support but concentrating on why governments feel compelled to provide solvency support in crisis. It then covers the economics of capital requirements – and loss-absorbency more generally – and examines why such regulation is a better approach than taxation to address systemic risk externalities, and why the public interest requires much more capital than banks would choose. The role of structural regulation in making banking systems safer is then analysed, in particular forms of separation between retail and investment banking such as ring-fencing (as in current UK reforms) and complete separation (as in the US before the repeal of Glass-Steagall). The paper concludes with some reflections on the wider European policy debate in the light of the Liikanen Report on structural reform. A central theme of the analysis is that banking reform needs a well-designed combination of policies towards loss-absorbency and structural reform.
    Keywords: Banking, bail-outs, capital requirements, deposit guarantees, Glass-Steagall, resolution, ring-fencing, structural reform, Volcker rule
    JEL: G21 G28 L51
    Date: 2012–11–30
  12. By: Daniel Fricke; Thomas Lux
    Abstract: Previous literature on statistical properties of interbank loans has reported various power-laws, particularly for the degree distribution (i.e. the distribution of credit links between institutions). In this paper, we revisit data for the Italian interbank network based on overnight loans recorded on the e-MID trading platform during the period 1999-2010 using both daily and quarterly aggregates. In con- trast to previous authors, we find no evidence in favor of scale-free networks. Rather, the data are best described by negative Binomial distributions. For quarterly data, Weibull, Gamma, and Exponential distributions tend to provide comparable ts. We find comparable re- sults when investigating the distribution of the number of transactions, even though in this case the tails of the quarterly variables are much fatter. The absence of power-law behavior casts doubts on the claim that interbank data fall into the category of scale-free networks
    Keywords: interbank market, network models
    JEL: G21 G01 E42
    Date: 2013–01
  13. By: John Thanassoulis
    Abstract: This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets onbank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks' riskand raise banks' values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market.The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1increase. The cap encourages diversi cation and reduces the need a bank has to focus ona limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulationto encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail bankingsector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remunerationwould have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra tier 1 for UBS, forexample.
    Keywords: Remuneration, compensation, bonuses, capital conservation, systemic bank risk
    JEL: G01 G21 G28 G32
    Date: 2012–12–17
  14. By: Stefan Thurner; Sebastian Poledna
    Abstract: Banks in the interbank network can not assess the true risks associated with lending to other banks in the network, unless they have full information on the riskiness of all the other banks. These risks can be estimated by using network metrics (for example DebtRank) of the interbank liability network which is available to Central Banks. With a simple agent based model we show that by increasing transparency by making the DebtRank of individual nodes (banks) visible to all nodes, and by imposing a simple incentive scheme, that reduces interbank borrowing from systemically risky nodes, the systemic risk in the financial network can be drastically reduced. This incentive scheme is an effective regulation mechanism, that does not reduce the efficiency of the financial network, but fosters a more homogeneous distribution of risk within the system in a self-organized critical way. We show that the reduction of systemic risk is to a large extent due to the massive reduction of cascading failures in the transparent system. An implementation of this minimal regulation scheme in real financial networks should be feasible from a technical point of view.
    Date: 2013–01
  15. By: Matthew Jaremski (Department of Economics, Colgate University); Peter Rousseau (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)
    Abstract: The “Federalist financial revolution†may have jump-started the U.S. economy into modern growth, but the Free Banking System (1837-1862) did not play a direct role in sustaining it. Despite lowering entry barriers and extending banking into developing regions, we find in county-level data that free banks had little or no effect on growth. The result is not just a symptom of the era, as state-chartered banks seem to have strong and positive effects on manufacturing and urbanization.
    Keywords: Free banking; antebellum banking; financial liberalization; finance-led growth
    JEL: E0 N0
    Date: 2012–12–13
  16. By: Song. Fenghua; Thakor, Anjan
    Abstract: The paper studies the impact of political intervention on a financial system that consists of banks and financial markets and develops over time. In this financial system, banks and markets exhibit three forms of interaction: they compete, they complement each other, and they co-evolve. Coevolution is generated by two new ingredients of financial system architecture relative to the existing theories: securitization and risk-sensitive bank capital. The authors show that securitization propagates banking advances to the financial market, permitting market evolution to be driven by bank evolution, and market advances are transmitted to banks through bank capital. Then they examine how politicians determine the nature of political intervention designed to expand credit availability. The authors find that political intervention in banking exhibits a U-shaped pattern, where it is most notable in the early stage of financial system development (through bank capital subsidy in exchange for state ownership of banks) and in the advanced stage (through direct lending regulation). Despite expanding credit access, political intervention results in an increase in financial system risk and does not contribute to financial system evolution. Numerous policy implications are drawn out.
    Keywords: Access to Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,Debt Markets,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Financial Intermediation
    Date: 2013–01–01
  17. By: Brishti Guha (Department of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903); Prabal Roy Chowdhury
    Abstract: We develop a tractable model of competition among socially motivated MFIs, so that the objective functions of the MFIs put some weight on their own clients' utility. We nd that the equilibrium involves double-dipping, i.e. borrowers taking multiple loans from different MFIs, whenever the MFIs are relatively profit-oriented. Further, double-dipping necessarily leads to default and inefficiency, and moreover, borrowers who double-dip face relatively higher transactions costs and are actually worse off compared to those who do not. Interestingly, an increase in MFI competition can increase the extent of doubledipping and default. Further, the interest rates may go either way, with the interest rate likely to increase if the MFIs are very socially motivated.
    Keywords: Micro-finance competition, motivated MFIs, double-dipping, default, subsidized credit, interest cap.
    JEL: C72 D40 D82 G21
    Date: 2013–01
  18. By: Marion Allet; Marek Hudon
    Abstract: In recent years, development practice has seen that microfinance institutions (MFIs), beyond their financial and social objectives, start considering their environmental bottom line. Yet, little is known on the characteristics of institutions involved in environmental management. For the first time, this paper empirically identifies the characteristics of these ‘green’ MFIs on a sample of 160 microfinance institutions worldwide. Basing our analysis on various econometric tests, we find that larger MFIs and MFIs registered as banks tend to perform better in environmental policy and environmental risk assessment. Furthermore, more mature MFIs tend to have a better environmental performance, in particular in the provision of green microcredit and environmental non-financial services. On the other hand, financial performance is not significantly related to environmental performance, suggesting that ‘green’ MFIs are not more or less profitable than other microfinance institutions.
    Keywords: Microfinance; Environment; Microcredit; Corporate Social Responsibility; Size; Financial Performance
    JEL: G21 D20 Q01 Q56
    Date: 2013–01–25
  19. By: Cagri S. Kumruy; Saran Sarntisartz
    Abstract: A signicant number of individuals are unwilling to deposit their savings into the banking sector since it does not operate according to their religious beliefs. In this paper we provide a model that aims to answer the following questions: First, under what conditions an alternative banking system would arise? Second, what are the growth, and welfare implications of these banking systems? Our model shows that an alternative banking system would arise if individuals have religious concerns. Moreover, we show that in an economy populated with a certain number of religiously concerned individuals, the existence of an alternative baking system can generate relatively higher growth and improve welfare.
    JEL: E21 E62 H55
    Date: 2013–01
  20. By: Okabe, Yasunobu
    Abstract: After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea (Korea) and Thailand implemented financial restructuring in a similarly successful manner and regained the healthiness of their banking sectors. However, when the Lehman shock hit their financial markets in 2008, its impact on the two countries was quite different. Korea, which had performed better in the financial restructuring than Thailand, was driven to the brink of a second financial crisis in 2008 while Thailand weathered the shock easily. This paper addresses this paradoxical contrast from the path dependence perspective, focusing on different historical paths of formation and change of the respective financial systems. It concludes that the successful state-led financial restructuring in Korea fostered banksf propensity of active lending while the private sector-led reform in Thailand only reinforced banksf conservative lending behavior. Furthermore, betraying the critical juncture theory, the severe economic crises helped reinforce the institutional legacies in the two countries, resulting in aggressive foreign borrowing by Korean banks and timid borrowing by Thai banks. These differences explain their contrasting vulnerability to the Lehman shock.
    Keywords: financial crisis , path dependence , institutional legacy , financial system , Korea , Thailand
    Date: 2013–01–09
  21. By: Annelise Riles (Jack G. Clarke Professor of Far East Legal Studies, Cornell Law School (E-mail:
    Abstract: A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today is how to manage the impact of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This article focuses on the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and proposes a new research agenda regarding the FSBfs emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of New Governance (NG), a variety of approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclusion is that NG tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of problems in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable to all problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise conditions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be effective are necessary. It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG model.
    Keywords: International Financial Regulation, Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Financial Stability Board, Regulatory Reform, New Governance, Regulatory Pluralism
    JEL: K23 K33
    Date: 2013–01
  22. By: Andrew Maredza and Sylvanus Ikhide
    Abstract: South Africa‘s financial sector is believed to have weathered the contagion and catastrophic effects of the 2008 world wide financial crisis partly on account of a sound regulatory framework and solid macroeconomic policies. In this paper, we seek to measure efficiency and productivity changes during the period of the crisis through an analysis of bank performance over the period 2000 — 2010 using a two stage methodology framework. The recently developed Hicks-Moorsteen total factor productivity (TFP) index approach developed by O‘Donnell (2010a) as opposed to the popular Malmquist TFP was utilised. Our first stage results showed that during the crisis period there was a noticeable but mild deviation of total factor productivity and efficiency measures. Second stage analysis using the censored Tobit model showed that the financial crisis was the main determinant of bank efficiency, indicating that total factor productivity efficiency was 16.96% lower during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period.
    Keywords: Bank efficiency, data envelopment analysis, global financial crisis, Hicks-Moorsteen, Malmquist, South African banking, total factor productivity efficiency, censored Tobit model
    JEL: G01 G21 C14 C24
    Date: 2013

This issue is ©2013 by Christian Calmès. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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