New Economics Papers
on Banking
Issue of 2010‒01‒16
twenty-one papers chosen by
Christian Calmès, Université du Québec en Outaouais

  1. A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions By Luigi Zingales; Oliver Hart
  2. Leverage Causes Fat Tails and Clustered Volatility By Stefan Thurner; J. Doyne Farmer; John Geanakoplos
  3. Regulatory Constraints on Bank Leverage: Issues and Lessons from the Canadian Experience By Etienne Bordeleau; Allan Crawford; Christopher Graham
  4. The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition in the Banking Industry By Cerasi, Vittoria; Chizzolini, Barbara; Ivaldi, Marc
  5. Risk-Factor Portfolios and Financial Stability By Garita, Gus
  6. Fair Value Accounting By Michel Magnan; Daniel Thornton
  7. The collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the financial market turmoil By Samuel Cheun; Isabel von Köppen-Mertes; Benedict Weller
  8. The Loan Contract with Costly State Verification and Subjective Beliefs By Carsten Krabbe Nielsen
  9. A modified Panjer algorithm for operational risk capital calculations By Dominique Guegan; Bertrand Hassani
  10. Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Countercyclical Regulatory Requirements? By Gerard Caprio, Jr
  11. What explains the surge in euro area sovereign spreads during the financial crisis of 2007-09? By Maria-Grazia Attinasi; Cristina Checherita; Christiane Nickel
  12. The Demand for Excess Reserves in the Euro Area and the Impact of the Current Credit Crisis By Fátima Teresa Sol Murta; Ana Margarida Garcia
  13. Double Impact on CVA for CDS: Wrong-Way Risk with Stochastic Recovery By Li, Hui
  14. A Guide to Modeling Credit Term Structures By Arthur M. Berd
  15. Relative indicators of default risk among UK residential mortgages By Mitropoulos, Atanasios; Zaidi, Rida
  16. Valuing the Treasury's Capital Assistance Program By Paul Glasserman; Zhenyu Wang
  17. Who Disciplines Bank Managers? By Andrea M. Maechler; Martin Cihák; Klaus Schaeck; Stéphanie Marie Stolz
  18. On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan By Mariassunta Giannetti; Andrei Simonov
  19. Firm volatility and banks: evidence from U.S. banking deregulation By Ricardo Correa; Gustavo A. Suarez
  20. Measuring the Interdependence of Banks in Hong Kong By Tom Fong; Laurence Fung; Lillie Lam; Ip-wing Yu
  21. Credit Calibration with Structural Models: The Lehman case and Equity Swaps under Counterparty Risk By Damiano Brigo; Massimo Morini; Marco Tarenghi

  1. By: Luigi Zingales (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Oliver Hart (Harvard University & NBER)
    Abstract: We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we require that they maintain an equity cushion sufficiently great that their own credit default swap price stays below a threshold level, and a cushion of long term bonds sufficiently large that, even if the equity is wiped out, the systemically relevant obligations are safe. If the CDS price goes above the threshold, the LFI regulator forces the LFI to issue equity until the CDS price moves back down. If this does not happen within a predetermined period of time, the regulator intervenes. We show that this mechanism ensures that LFIs are always solvent, while preserving some of the disciplinary effects of debt.
    Keywords: Banks, Capital Requirement, Too Big to Fail
    JEL: G21 G28
    Date: 2009–12
  2. By: Stefan Thurner (Dept. of Mathematics, University of Vienna); J. Doyne Farmer (Sante Fe Institute); John Geanakoplos (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called "value investing," i.e. systematically attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the asset are normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. All this changes when the funds are allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, to purchase more assets than their wealth would otherwise permit. During good times competition drives investors to funds that use more leverage, because they have higher profits. As leverage increases price fluctuations become heavy tailed and display clustered volatility, similar to what is observed in real markets. Previous explanations of fat tails and clustered volatility depended on "irrational behavior," such as trend fol­lowing. Here instead this comes from the fact that leverage limits cause funds to sell into a falling market: A prudent bank makes itself locally safer by putting a limit to leverage, so when a fund exceeds its leverage limit, it must partially repay its loan by selling the asset. Unfortunately this sometimes happens to all the funds simultaneously when the price is already falling. The resulting nonlinear feedback amplifies large downward price movements. At the extreme this causes crashes, but the effect is seen at every time scale, producing a power law of price disturbances. A standard (supposedly more sophisticated) risk control policy in which individual banks base leverage limits on volatility causes leverage to rise during periods of low volatility, and to contract more quickly when volatility gets high, making these extreme fluctuations even worse.
    Keywords: Systemic risk, Clustered volatility, Fat tails, Crash, Margin calls, Leverage
    JEL: E32 E37 G12 G14
    Date: 2010–01
  3. By: Etienne Bordeleau; Allan Crawford; Christopher Graham
    Abstract: The Basel capital framework plays an important role in risk management by linking a bank's minimum capital requirements to the riskiness of its assets. Nevertheless, the risk estimates underlying these calculations may be imperfect, and it appears that a cyclical bias in measures of risk-adjusted capital contributed to procyclical increases in global leverage prior to the recent financial crisis. As such, international policy discussions are considering an unweighted leverage ratio as a supplement to existing risk-weighted capital requirements. Canadian banks offer a useful case study in this respect, having been subject to a regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio since the early 1980s. The authors review lessons from the Canadian experience with leverage constraints, and provide some empirical analysis on how such constraints affect banks' leverage management. In contrast to a number of countries without regulatory constraints, leverage at major Canadian banks was relatively stable leading up to the crisis, reducing pressure for deleveraging during the economic downturn. Empirical results suggest that major Canadian banks follow different strategies for managing their leverage. Some banks tend to raise their precautionary buffer quickly, through sharp reductions in asset growth and faster capital growth, when a shock pushes leverage too close to its authorized limit. For other banks, shocks have more persistent effects on leverage, possibly because these banks tend to have higher buffers on average. Overall, the authors' results suggest that a leverage ceiling would be a useful tool to complement risk-weighted measures and mitigate procyclical tendencies in the financial system.
    Keywords: Financial institutions; Financial stability; Financial system regulation and policies
    JEL: G28 G21
    Date: 2009
  4. By: Cerasi, Vittoria; Chizzolini, Barbara; Ivaldi, Marc
    Abstract: This paper analyses the relation between competition and concentration in the banking sector. The empirical answer is given by testing a monopolistic competition model of bank branching behaviour on individual bank data at county level (départements and provinces) in France and Italy. We propose a measure of the degree of competiveness in each local market that is function also of market structure indicators. We then use the econometric model to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers among incumbent banks on competition and discuss when, depending on the pre-merger structure of the market and geographic distribution of branches, the merger is anti-competitive. The paper has implications for competition policy as it suggests an applied tool to evaluate the potential anti-competitive impact of mergers.
    JEL: G21 L13 L59
    Date: 2009–11
  5. By: Garita, Gus
    Abstract: This paper defines a risk-stability index (RSI) that takes into account the extreme dependence structure and the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF) among risk factors in a portfolio. In combination, both the RSI and CPJF provide a valuable tool for analyzing risk from complementary perspectives; thereby allowing the measurement of (i) common distress of risk factors in a portfolio, (ii) distress between specific risk factors, and (iii) distress to a portfolio related to a specific risk factor. With an application to a financial system comprised of 18 banks from around the world, the results herein show that financial stability must be viewed as a continuum, since risk varies from period to period. The risk-stability index indicates that U.S. banks tend to cause the most stress to the global financial system (as defined herein), followed by Asian and European banks. The results also show that Asian banks seem to experience the most persistence of distress, followed by U.S. and European banks. The panel VAR results show that monetary policy should "lean against the wind", since it has a significant effect in reducing the (potential) instability of a financial system.
    Keywords: Conditional probability of joint failure; contagion; dependence structure; distress; multivariate extreme value theory; panel VAR; persistence
    JEL: F15 C10 E44 F36
    Date: 2009–12–11
  6. By: Michel Magnan; Daniel Thornton
    Abstract: The paper provides a genesis of fair value accounting (FVA) and reviews some research and empirical evidence that are relevant to the debate surrounding its use. We also comment on FVA’s role in the financial crisis: was it just the messenger of bad news or was it “procyclical,” contributing to the sad state of the economy in addition to reporting on it? We briefly characterize FVA as comprising three levels of valuation: level 1 for assets/liabilities for which market values are directly observable, level 2 for assets/liabilities for which market-derived inputs, but not prices, are observable and level 3 for assets/liabilities which value is derived from models. We conclude that the use of FVA by regulators was probably procyclical for level 1 FVA assets, i.e., those assets which accounting values were based upon directly observable market prices. In contrast, accounting values for FVA assets that were not actively traded (levels 2 and 3) probably lagged market developments and were likely biased in their valuation. Our analysis also suggests that the appropriateness of FVA-derived valuation is conditional upon market conditions (efficiency and liquidity), and that fundamental valuation drivers such as an asset/ liability underlying cash flows are still relevant valuation inputs despite the existence of concurrent market prices. The paper concludes with some observations regarding the role of auditors, regulators, standard-setters and investors regarding FVA-derived information. <P>Le document présente une genèse de la comptabilisation à la juste valeur et revoit certains travaux de recherche et certaines preuves empiriques qui sont pertinents dans le cadre du débat entourant le recours à cette méthode. Nous commentons aussi le rôle de la comptabilisation à la juste valeur dans le contexte de la crise financière : a-t-elle simplement été un indicateur de mauvaises nouvelles ou a-t-elle été « procyclique », c’est-à-dire a-t-elle contribué à la triste situation économique en plus d’informer sur celle-ci ? Nous décrivons brièvement la comptabilisation à la juste valeur comme étant constituée de trois niveaux d’évaluation : le niveau 1 pour les actifs/passifs dont la valeur de marché est directement observable ; le niveau 2 pour les actifs/passifs dont les données issues du marché, mais non les prix, sont observables ; et le niveau 3 pour les actifs/passifs dont la valeur est obtenue à partir de modèles. Nous concluons que le recours à la méthode de comptabilisation à la juste valeur par les organismes de réglementation a probablement été procyclique dans le cas des éléments d’actif du niveau 1 évalués selon cette méthode, c’est-à-dire les actifs dont les valeurs comptables était fondées sur les prix du marché directement observables. En comparaison, les valeurs comptables établies selon la comptabilisation à la juste valeur dans le cas des éléments d’actif qui n’étaient pas fortement négociés (niveaux 2 et 3) ont probablement pris du recul par rapport à l’évolution du marché et ont vraisemblablement fait l’objet d’opinions biaisées quant à leur estimation. Notre analyse permet aussi de penser que la pertinence de l’évaluation selon la comptabilisation à la juste valeur est tributaire des conditions du marché (efficience et fluidité) et que les facteurs d’évaluation fondamentaux, dont les flux de trésorerie sous-jacents aux actifs/passifs, sont toujours pertinents malgré l’existence de prix du marché parallèles. En terminant, le document offre des observations au sujet du rôle des vérificateurs, des organismes de réglementation et de normalisation, ainsi que des investisseurs en ce qui a trait à l’information qui se dégage de la comptabilisation à la juste valeur.
    Keywords: Fair value accounting, procyclicality, liquidity crisis, fair market value, market efficiency, bubble, comptabilisation à la juste valeur, procyclicalité, crise de liquidité, juste valeur marchande, efficience du marché, bulle
    Date: 2009–12–01
  7. By: Samuel Cheun (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, United States of America.); Isabel von Köppen-Mertes (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Benedict Weller (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.)
    Abstract: In response to the turmoil in global financial markets which began in the second half of 2007, central banks have changed the way in which they implement monetary policy. This has drawn particular attention to the type of collateral used for backing central banks’ temporary open market operations and the range of counterparties which can participate in these operations. This paper provides an overview of the features of the different operational and collateral frameworks of three central banks that have been significantly affected by the crisis: the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England. The paper describes the factors that shaped the three frameworks prior to the turmoil. It then describes the actions the three central banks took in response to the turmoil and analyses to what extent these actions were dependent on the initial design of the operational and collateral framework. JEL Classification: E52, E58, G01, G20.
    Keywords: Collateral Framework, Central Bank Repo Auctions, Collateral, Open Market Operations, Financial Market Turmoil 2007-2009.
    Date: 2009–12
  8. By: Carsten Krabbe Nielsen (Istituto Politica Economica, Universita Cattolica and Korea University)
    Abstract: We generalize the characterization of the loan contract due to Gale and Hellwig (1985) to the case of risk aversion of the borrower and diverse subjective beliefs about the outcome of the investment. We continue to assume costly state verification (Townsend, 1979) i.e. that the lender must incur costs in order to observe the outcome of the project. Contract terms now reflect returns on capital as well as risk sharing and trade on the differences in probabilities. Because there are no financial markets where agents could purchase insurance for state contingencies, private contracting replaces markets for contingent claims. This also means that verification states are not necessarily interpreted as "default" states. We characterize the optimal contract showing that (i) the contractual payoff in verification states varies by states in accord with risk aversion and probability belief of the two parties, and (ii) the verification region may consist of several intervals. We provide conditions and examples to show that when the borrower is more optimistic than the bank, there may be fewer verification regions.
    Keywords: Loan Contract, Costly State Verification, Subjective Beliefs
    Date: 2009
  9. By: Dominique Guegan (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Bertrand Hassani (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
    Abstract: Operational risk management inside banks and insurance companies is an important task. The computation of a risk measure associated to these kinds of risks lies in the knowledge of the so-called loss distribution function (LDF). Traditionally, this LDF is computed via Monte Carlo simulations or using the Panjer recursion, which is an iterative algorithm. In this paper, we propose an adaptation of this last algorithm in order to improve the computation of convolutions between Panjer class distributions and continuous distributions, by mixing the Monte Carlo method, a progressive kernel lattice and the Panjer recursion. This new hybrid algorithm does not face the traditional drawbacks. This simple approach enables us to drastically reduce the variance of the estimated value-at-risk associated with the operational risks and to lower the aliasing error we would have using Panjer recursion itself. Furthermore, this method is much less timeconsuming than a Monte Carlo simulation. We compare our new method with more sophisticated approaches already developed in operational risk literature.
    Keywords: Operational risk ; Panjer algorithm ; Kernel ; numerical integration ; convolution.
    Date: 2009–10
  10. By: Gerard Caprio, Jr (Williams College, USA)
    Abstract: Most explanations of the crisis of 2007-2009 emphasize the role of the preceding boom in real estate and asset markets in a variety of advanced countries. As a result, an idea that is gaining support among various groups is how to make Basel II or any regulatory regime less procyclical. This paper addresses the rationale for and likely contribution of such policies. Making provisioning (or capital) requirements countercyclical is one way potentially to address procyclicality, and accordingly it looks at the efforts of the authorities in Spain and Colombia, two countries in which countercyclical provisioning has been tried, to see what the track record has been. As explained there, these experiments have been at best too recent and limited to put much weight on them, but they are much less favorable for supporting this practice than is commonly admitted. The paper then addresses concerns and implementation issues with countercyclical capital or provisioning requirements, including why their impact might be expected to be limited, and concludes with recommendations for developing country officials who want to learn how to make their financial systems less exposed to crises.
    Keywords: Safe, Sound Banking, Regulatory Requirements
    JEL: G10 G11 G14 G15
  11. By: Maria-Grazia Attinasi (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Cristina Checherita (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Christiane Nickel (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.)
    Abstract: This paper uses a dynamic panel approach to explain the determinants of widening sovereign bond yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany in selected euro area countries during the period end-July 2007 to end-March 2009, when the financial turmoil developed into a full-blown financial and economic crisis. Emphasis is given to the role of fiscal fundamentals and government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages. The paper finds that higher expected budget deficits and/or higher government debt ratios relative to Germany contributed to higher government bond yield spreads in the euro area during the analysed period. More importantly, the announcements of bank rescue packages have led to a re-assessment, from the part of investors, of sovereign credit risk, first and foremost through a transfer of risk from the private financial sector to the government. JEL Classification: E62, E43, G12.
    Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Spreads, Fiscal Announcements.
    Date: 2009–12
  12. By: Fátima Teresa Sol Murta (Faculdade de Economia/GEMF, Universidade de Coimbra); Ana Margarida Garcia (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra)
    Abstract: One of the risks that banks need to manage, in their financial intermediation activities, is liquidity risk. Thus, banks hold reserves for precautionary reasons, in order to keep enough cash to meet their obligations. In this work, we analyze the demand for excess reserves by Euro Area banks, since the change in the framework of the single monetary policy in March 2004. Our main conclusions are that there is a positive relationship between the demand for reserves and its financing cost and also that the environment of uncertainty present in the credit crisis is not significant in the demand for excess reserves: the ECB achieved control over the money market tensions.
    Keywords: banks; excess reserves; liquidity risk
    JEL: G21 E52 E58
    Date: 2010–01
  13. By: Li, Hui
    Abstract: Current CVA modeling framework has ignored the impact of stochastic recovery rate. Due to the possible negative correlation between default and recovery rate, stochastic recovery rate could have a doubling effect on wrong-way risk. In the case of a payer CDS, when counterparty defaults, the CDS value could be higher due to default contagion while the recovery rate may also be lower if the economy is in a downturn. Using our recently proposed model of correlated stochastic recovery in the default time Gaussian Copula framework, we demonstrate this double impact on wrong-way risk in the CVA calculation for a payer CDS. We also present a new form of Gaussian copula that correlates both default time and recovery rate.
    Keywords: Counterparty Risk, Credit Valuation Adjustment, Wrong-Way Risk, Default Time Copula, Gaussian Copula, Default Correlation, Stochastic Recovery, Spot Recovery, Credit Default Swap
    JEL: G13
    Date: 2009–12–31
  14. By: Arthur M. Berd
    Abstract: We give a comprehensive review of credit term structure modeling methodologies. The conventional approach to modeling credit term structure is summarized and shown to be equivalent to a particular type of the reduced form credit risk model, the fractional recovery of market value approach. We argue that the corporate practice and market observations do not support this approach. The more appropriate assumption is the fractional recovery of par, which explicitly violates the strippable cash flow valuation assumption that is necessary for the conventional credit term structure definitions to hold. We formulate the survival-based valuation methodology and give alternative specifications for various credit term structures that are consistent with market observations, and show how they can be empirically estimated from the observable prices. We rederive the credit triangle relationship by considering the replication of recovery swaps. We complete the exposition by presenting a consistent measure of CDS-Bond basis and demonstrate its relation to a static hedging strategy, which remains valid for non-par bonds and non-flat term structures of interest rates and credit risk.
    Date: 2009–12
  15. By: Mitropoulos, Atanasios; Zaidi, Rida
    Abstract: We have assembled a unique loan-level performance dataset for mortgages originated in the UK to study the differences in default likelihood between loans of varying borrower and loan characteristics. We can broadly confirm the relevance of most commonly known riskfactors and find that most drivers of default for prime are also relevant for non-conforming, drivers of repossessions are largely similar to drivers of arrears and information on adverse borrower information dominates any other risk factor. Our study provides many more details and compares results with recent studies for the US and other European countries.
    Keywords: residential mortgages; loan defaults; consumer behaviour; logistic regression; United Kingdom
    JEL: D14 G21
    Date: 2009–12–22
  16. By: Paul Glasserman; Zhenyu Wang
    Abstract: The Capital Assistance Program (CAP) was created by the U.S. government in February 2009 to provide backup capital to large financial institutions unable to raise sufficient capital from private investors. Under the terms of the CAP, a participating bank receives contingent capital by issuing preferred shares to the Treasury combined with embedded options for both parties: the bank gets the option to redeem the shares or convert them to common equity, with conversion mandatory after seven years; the Treasury earns dividends on the preferred shares and gets warrants on the bank's common equity. We develop a contingent claims framework in which to estimate market values of these CAP securities. The interaction between the competing options held by the buyer and issuer of these securities creates a game between the two parties, and our approach captures this strategic element of the joint valuation problem and clarifies the incentives it creates. We apply our method to the eighteen publicly held bank holding companies that participated in the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (the stress test) launched together with the CAP. On average, we estimate that, compared to a market transaction, the CAP securities carry a net value of approximately 30 percent of the capital invested for a bank participating to the maximum extent allowed under the terms of the program. We also find that the net value varies widely across banks. We compare our estimates with abnormal stock price returns for the stress test banks at the time the terms of the CAP announced; we find correlations between 0.78 and 0.85, depending on the precise choice of period and set of banks included. These results suggest that our valuation aligns with shareholders' perception of the value of the program, prompting questions about industry reactions and the overall impact of the program.
    Keywords: Bank capital ; Securities ; Stock - Prices ; Federal Reserve System ; Bank holding companies
    Date: 2009
  17. By: Andrea M. Maechler; Martin Cihák; Klaus Schaeck; Stéphanie Marie Stolz
    Abstract: We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.
    Date: 2009–12–16
  18. By: Mariassunta Giannetti (Stockholm School of Economics); Andrei Simonov (Eli Broad Graduate School of Management, Michigan State University and CEPR)
    Abstract: Exploiting the Japanese banking crisis as a laboratory, we provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of bank bailouts. Government recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized banks. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their clients and some firms increase investment, but do not create more jobs than comparable firms. Most importantly, recapitalizations allow banks to extend larger loans to low and high quality firms alike, and low quality firms experience higher abnormal returns than other firms. Interestingly, recapitalizations by private investors have similar effects. Moreover, bank mergers engineered to enhance bank stability appear to hurt the borrowers of the sounder banks involved in the mergers.
    Keywords: Recapitalization, Merger, Banking Crisis
    JEL: G21 G34
    Date: 2009–11
  19. By: Ricardo Correa; Gustavo A. Suarez
    Abstract: This paper exploits the staggered timing of state-level banking deregulation in the United States during the 1980s to study the causal effect of banking integration on the volatility of non-financial corporations. We find that firm-level employment, production, sales, and cash flows are less volatile after interstate banking deregulation, particularly for firms that have limited access to external finance. This finding suggests that bank-dependent firms exploit wider access to finance after deregulation to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks. In fact, short-term credit becomes less pro-cyclical after out-of-state bank entry is permitted. Finally, lower volatility in real-side variables after deregulation translates into lower idiosyncratic risk in stock returns.
    Date: 2009
  20. By: Tom Fong (Research Department, Hong Kong Monetary Authority); Laurence Fung (Research Department, Hong Kong Monetary Authority); Lillie Lam (Research Department, Hong Kong Monetary Authority); Ip-wing Yu (Research Department, Hong Kong Monetary Authority)
    Abstract: This paper assesses systemic linkages among banks in Hong Kong using the risk measure "CoVaR" derived from quantile regression. The CoVaR measure captures the co-movements of banks¡¯ default risk by taking into account their nonlinear relationship when the banks are in distress. Based on equity price information, our estimation results show that the default risks of the banks were interdependent during the recent crisis. Although local banks are generally smaller, their systemic importance is found to be similar to their international and Mainland counterparts, which may be due to a higher degree of commonality in the risk profile of local banks. Regarding the impact of external shocks on the banks, international banks are more likely to be affected by the equity price fall in the US market, while local banks are relatively more responsive to funding liquidity risk.
    Keywords: Value-at-Risk, Systemic Risk, Risk Spillovers, Quantile Regression
    JEL: G21 G14
    Date: 2009–12
  21. By: Damiano Brigo; Massimo Morini; Marco Tarenghi
    Abstract: In this paper we develop structural first passage models (AT1P and SBTV) with time-varying volatility and characterized by high tractability, moving from the original work of Brigo and Tarenghi (2004, 2005) [19] [20] and Brigo and Morini (2006)[15]. The models can be calibrated exactly to credit spreads using efficient closed-form formulas for default probabilities. Default events are caused by the value of the firm assets hitting a safety threshold, which depends on the financial situation of the company and on market conditions. In AT1P this default barrier is deterministic. Instead SBTV assumes two possible scenarios for the initial level of the default barrier, for taking into account uncertainty on balance sheet information. While in [19] and [15] the models are analyzed across Parmalat's history, here we apply the models to exact calibration of Lehman Credit Default Swap (CDS) data during the months preceding default, as the crisis unfolds. The results we obtain with AT1P and SBTV have reasonable economic interpretation, and are particularly realistic when SBTV is considered. The pricing of counterparty risk in an Equity Return Swap is a convenient application we consider, also to illustrate the interaction of our credit models with equity models in hybrid products context.
    Date: 2009–12

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