New Economics Papers
on Banking
Issue of 2009‒12‒19
twenty-two papers chosen by
Roberto J. Santillán–Salgado, EGADE-ITESM


  1. Margins of international banking: is there a productivity pecking order in banking, too? By Buch, Claudia M.; Koch, Cathérine Tahmee; Koetter, Michael
  2. From soft and hard-nosed bankers: bank lending strategies and the survival of financially distressed firms By Höwer, Daniel
  3. Capital requirements and business cycles with credit market imperfections By Agénor, P.-R.; Alper, K.; Pereira da Silva, L.
  4. Controlling Banker's Bonuses: Efficient Regulation or Politics of Envy? By Matthews, Kent; Matthews, Owen
  5. The dependency of the banks' assets and liabilities: evidence from Germany By Memmel, Christoph; Schertler, Andrea
  6. Financial Stability: Overcoming the Crisis and Improving the Efficiency of the Banking Sector By Randall S. Jones; Masahiko Tsutsumi
  7. European Banking Integration under a Quadratic Loss Function By Mamatzakis, E; Koutsomanoli, A
  8. What kinds of credit associations favor introducing new financial technology? By Yamori, Nobuyoshi; Tomimura, Kei; Harimaya, Kozo
  9. Prudential Regulation and Competition in Financial Markets By Rudiger Ahrend; Jens Arnold; Fabrice Murtin
  10. What macroeconomic shocks affect the German banking system? Analysis in an integrated micro-macro model By Blank, Sven; Dovern, Jonas
  11. Banking System Control, Capital Allocation, and Economy Performance By Randall Morck; M. Deniz Yavuz; Bernard Yeung
  12. State financial institutions : mandates, governance, and beyond By Rudolph, Heinz P.
  13. Credit Default Swap Calibration and Equity Swap Valuation under Counterparty Risk with a Tractable Structural Model By Damiano Brigo; Marco Tarenghi
  14. Containing Systemic Risk By Karl Whelan
  15. The Great Depression Analogy By Michael D. Bordo; Harold James
  16. The growing importance of risk in financial regulation By Ojo, Marianne
  17. Network Analysis and Canada's Large Value Transfer System By Lana Embree; Tom Roberts
  18. Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance By Francesco Columba; Leonardo Gambacorta; Paolo Emilio Mistrulli
  19. Systematic risk of CDOs and CDO arbitrage By Hamerle, Alfred; Liebig, Thilo; Schropp, Hans-Jochen
  20. A cobweb model of financial stability in New Zealand By Paul Bedford; Chris Bloor
  21. Multiple defaults and contagion risks By Ying Jiao
  22. "Realized Volatility Risk" By David E. Allen; Michael McAleer; Marcel Scharth

  1. By: Buch, Claudia M.; Koch, Cathérine Tahmee; Koetter, Michael
    Abstract: Modern trade theory emphasizes firm-level productivity differentials to explain the cross-border activities of non-financial firms. This study tests whether a productivity pecking order also determines international banking activities. Using a novel dataset that contains all German banks' international activities, we estimate the ordered probability of a presence abroad (extensive margin) and the volume of international assets (intensive margin). Methodologically, we enrich the conventional Heckman selection model to account for the self-selection of banks into different modes of foreign activities using an ordered probit. Four main findings emerge. First, similar to results for non-financial firms, a productivity pecking order drives bank internationalization. Second, only a few non-financial firms engage in international trade, but many banks hold nternational assets, and only a few large banks engage in foreign direct investment. Third, in addition to productivity, risk factors matter for international banking. Fourth, gravity-type variables have an important impact on international banking activities. --
    Keywords: International banking,extensive and intensive margin,productivity pecking order,ordered probit,selection models
    JEL: F3 G21
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:200912&r=ban
  2. By: Höwer, Daniel
    Abstract: Do private banks act as hard-nosed bankers when firms get financially distressed compared to public banks that have the mandate to support regional economy? For German firms in the period 2000-2005, I find that the probability of leaving the market after financial distress is higher for firms financed by private banks. The effects of different lending strategies are even larger for cooperative banks than for public banks. --
    Keywords: financially distressed firms,bank lending,public banks,cooperative banks
    JEL: G21 G33 L14
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09059&r=ban
  3. By: Agénor, P.-R.; Alper, K.; Pereira da Silva, L.
    Abstract: The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. Key features of the model are that bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby reducing the probability of default, and excess capital generates benefits in terms of reduced regulatory scrutiny. Basel I and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Simulations of supply and demand shocks show that, depending on the elasticity that relates the repayment probability to the capital-loan ratio, a Basel II-type regime may be less procyclical than a Basel I-type regime.
    Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform,Debt Markets,Access to Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Emerging Markets
    Date: 2009–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5151&r=ban
  4. By: Matthews, Kent (Cardiff Business School); Matthews, Owen
    Abstract: The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control banker's bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that the cushioning of banks downside risks provide the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. Macro-prudential regulation will have a better chance of curbing excess risk taking than controlling banker's compensation.
    Keywords: Banker's bonus; risk taking; Too-big-to-Fail; macro-prudential regulation
    JEL: G21 G28
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2009/27&r=ban
  5. By: Memmel, Christoph; Schertler, Andrea
    Abstract: Developments in risk-transfer instruments and risk management techniques in the last two decades have fundamentally changed how banks manage their assets and liabilities. In this document we show that, for all three sectors of German universal banks (private commercial banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks), asset-liability dependency declined over the period 1994-2007, the decline was strongest for those banks that use more than sector-average amounts of derivatives. Only in the case of private commercial banks, we do find that lower regulatory capital has coincided with higher asset-liability dependencies. Over our sample period, the difference has diminished since poorly-capitalized private commercial banks have reduced their asset-liability dependencies more intensively than their well-capitalized counterparts. Moreover, we find that profitability matters for the asset-liability dependency but not in the same way for all three sectors. Asset-liability dependency is lower for private commercial banks with higher provision income, savings banks with lower ROE volatilities and cooperative banks with higher ROEs. --
    Keywords: Asset-liability dependency,maturity,correlation analysis
    JEL: G21 G32
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:200914&r=ban
  6. By: Randall S. Jones; Masahiko Tsutsumi
    Abstract: The crisis that originated in mid-2007 in the United States and deepened in September 2008 is the largest peace-time disruption of financial markets since the Great Depression. It was triggered by a number of factors, namely the large amount of lending to subprime borrowers, the expansion of securitisation resulting in a disconnect between loan originators and final investors, the questionable assessments of credit rating agencies and the unprecedented resort to off-balance sheet vehicles. These developments took place during a traditional credit boom and reinforced the skyrocketing of asset prices, erosion of lending standards and under-pricing of risk. The crisis had serious repercussions worldwide, particularly in Europe, given the global nature of financial markets. This paper begins by considering why the Japanese banking system was initially relatively resilient to the deterioration in the global financial system, although there were some secondary effects that are discussed in the following section. The third section outlines the emergency response of the Japanese authorities to the financial crisis, including quantitative measures by the central bank and other institutions and regulatory changes by the Financial Services Agency (FSA). At the same time, the authorities have taken steps to improve the regulatory framework. The fourth section goes beyond the crisis to consider policies to boost chronically low profitability in the banking sector. Measures to promote efficiency in the financial sector by upgrading capital markets and improving the range and quality of financial products are discussed in the following section.<P>Stabilité financière : surmonter la crise et améliorer l'efficience du secteur bancaire au Japon<BR>Les banques japonaises ont été en grande partie épargnées par les effets directs de la crise financière mondiale, grâce à leur exposition limitée aux actifs toxiques étrangers, au cadre réglementaire en place au Japon et au rôle modeste de la titrisation. Néanmoins, la forte contraction de la production et la chute des cours des actions ont indéniablement eu des répercussions préjudiciables sur le secteur bancaire. Les autorités ont réagi en prenant des mesures pour stabiliser le marché financier, injecter des capitaux dans les établissements de dépôts et préserver le crédit aux petites entreprises. Ces mesures d'urgence devraient être démantelées progressivement afin de limiter les effets de distorsion qui en découlent, une fois que la reprise sera ancrée. Il est essentiel de moderniser le cadre réglementaire en améliorant la transparence des produits titrisés, le fonctionnement des agences de notation financières et les règles relatives aux fonds propres. Il importe également de remédier à des problèmes chroniques, dont la faible rentabilité des établissements financiers, en particulier des banques régionales, et de renforcer l'efficience du secteur financier. Cela passe par diverses mesures, notamment par la privatisation des établissements financiers publics, l'amélioration de l'efficacité des services bancaires, et le renforcement de la diversité et de la qualité des produits financiers.
    Keywords: Bank of Japan, bank, Basel II, capital adequacy regulation, capital injections, capital markets, credit rating agencies, financial sector, FSA, global financial crisis, Japan, Japanese economy, regional banks, reverse mortgages, securitisation, agences de notation financières, Bâle II, Banque du Japon, banque, banques régionales, crise financière mondiale, économie japonaise, FSA, injections de capitaux, Japon, marchés de capitaux, prêts viagers hypothécaires, règles relatives aux fonds propres, secteur financier, titrisation
    JEL: Q28 Q54 Q56 Q58
    Date: 2009–12–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:738-en&r=ban
  7. By: Mamatzakis, E; Koutsomanoli, A
    Abstract: European banking markets have become increasingly integrated in recent years, but barriers to full integration, especially in retail banking, still remain. This paper covers a gap in the literature by providing a first insight into the process of financial integration in the European Union (EU) in terms of convergence in the speed of adjustment of cost inefficiency to equilibrium level. We employ a quadratic loss function specification based on forward-looking rational expectations to model the underlying dynamics of efficiency scores in the banking industry of the EU-15 region over the period 1998-2005. Results show that there is considerable variation in the speed of adjustment across banking systems, while over time it also appears that continuing efforts to advance financial integration have not as yet led to an improvement in the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium.
    Keywords: Speed of adjustment; rational expectations; cost inefficiency
    JEL: D21 G21
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:19379&r=ban
  8. By: Yamori, Nobuyoshi; Tomimura, Kei; Harimaya, Kozo
    Abstract: Since 2003, the Financial Services Agency has set relationship banking enhancement program as an important strategic task to improve the functions of regional financial institutions. In this enhancement program, the FSA recommended that regional financial institutions introduce new financial products such as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and collateralized bond obligations (CBOs). However, this was left up to each institution’s discretion rather than being mandatory. This resulted in a large difference in the introduction of new products. Therefore, this paper has analyzed what kinds of credit associations favorably increased the use of new financial products. As a result, it has been confirmed that the larger their lending shares and management scale, and the better their business conditions are, the more positively they work on the introduction of new products. Considering the fact that relationships between financial institutions and enterprises tend to be fixed in Japan, this means that medium and small enterprises will have restrictions on the financial products they can use depending on the situation of their main banks.
    Keywords: Small businesses; New financial products; Relationship banking; Credit associations; Japan.
    JEL: G32 G21
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:19355&r=ban
  9. By: Rudiger Ahrend; Jens Arnold; Fabrice Murtin
    Abstract: This paper examines how a range of stability-oriented regulatory policies for banking and insurance are related to selected stability and competition outcomes in these sectors. Based on survey information on financial market regulation, policy indicators for eight areas of prudential banking regulation are constructed, in addition to indicators for the insurance sector. Despite incomplete information on some areas that turned out to be important in the context of the recent financial crisis, the indicators correlate well with different measures of financial stability, both during the recent crisis and beyond. Furthermore, the results do not support the view that there is a general trade-off between stability-oriented regulatory policies and competition in banking and insurance.<P>Régulation prudentielle et concurrence sur les marchés financiers<BR>Cette étude examine le lien entre les politiques de régulation prudentielle des industries de la banque et de l’assurance et les résultats observés dans ces secteurs en termes de stabilité et de concurrence. Sur la base d’enquêtes portant sur la régulation des marchés financiers, des indicateurs sont construits pour évaluer les politiques touchant à huit segments différents de la régulation bancaire prudentielle, ainsi qu‘au secteur de l’assurance. En dépit de lacunes dans le renseignement de certains segments de la régulation, lacunes préjudiciables dans le contexte récent de crise financière, ces indicateurs présentent une corrélation satisfaisante avec diverses mesures de stabilité financière, à la fois dans ce contexte de crise et au-delà. En outre, les résultats ne confirment pas l’hypothèse qu’il y aurait en général un arbitrage entre la régulation prudentielle et la concurrence dans les secteurs de la banque et de l’assurance.
    Keywords: banking, competition, insurance, prudential regulation, stability, assurance, banque, concurrence, régulation prudentielle, stabilité
    JEL: E44 G14 G21 G22 G28 L11
    Date: 2009–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:735-en&r=ban
  10. By: Blank, Sven; Dovern, Jonas
    Abstract: We analyze what macroeconomic shocks affect the soundness of the German banking system and how this, in turn, feeds back into the macroeconomic environment. Recent turmoils on the international financial markets have shown very clearly that assessing the degree to which banks are vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks is of utmost importance to investors and policy makers. We propose to use a VAR framework that takes feedback effects between the financial sector and the macroeconomic environment into account. We identify responses of a distress indicator for the German banking system to a battery of different structural shocks. We find that monetary policy shocks, fiscal policy shocks, and real estate price shocks have a significant impact on the probability of distress in the banking system. We identify some differences across type of banks and different distress categories, though these differences are often small and do not show any systematic patterns. --
    Keywords: VAR,banking sector stability,sign restriction approach
    JEL: C32 E44 G21
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:200915&r=ban
  11. By: Randall Morck; M. Deniz Yavuz; Bernard Yeung
    Abstract: We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower economic and productivity growth, greater financial instability, and worse income inequality. These findings are consistent with theories that elite-capture of a country’s financial system can embed “crony capitalism”.
    JEL: G0 G21 G28 G32 O15 O16
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15575&r=ban
  12. By: Rudolph, Heinz P.
    Abstract: There is no doubt that on average the performance of state financial institutions around the world has been below the lowest expectations. Lack of governance, management skills, regulation, and transparency, and misguided incentives have contributed to discredit these institutions for supporting the development of local financial markets. However, the pro-active role that some state financial institutions have played in the recent crisis in allocating credit to sectors cyclically not attractive for commercial banks has brought back the question of whether some state ownership in the banking system would be preferable. This paper analyzes the experience of four state financial institutions that have performed relatively well in the past: Canada's Business Development Bank, Chile's BancoEstado, South Africa's Development Bank of Southern Africa, and Finland's Finnvera plc. The author finds that these institutions have different checks and balances to mitigate eventual mismanagement of resources. The author also finds that little progress has been made in measuring the policy performance of these institutions.
    Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform,Debt Markets,Access to Finance,Corporate Law,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress
    Date: 2009–11–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5141&r=ban
  13. By: Damiano Brigo; Marco Tarenghi
    Abstract: In this paper we develop a tractable structural model with analytical default probabilities depending on some dynamics parameters, and we show how to calibrate the model using a chosen number of Credit Default Swap (CDS) market quotes. We essentially show how to use structural models with a calibration capability that is typical of the much more tractable credit-spread based intensity models. We apply the structural model to a concrete calibration case and observe what happens to the calibrated dynamics when the CDS-implied credit quality deteriorates as the firm approaches default. Finally we provide a typical example of a case where the calibrated structural model can be used for credit pricing in a much more convenient way than a calibrated reduced form model: The pricing of counterparty risk in an equity swap.
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:0912.3028&r=ban
  14. By: Karl Whelan (University College Dublin)
    Abstract: Systemic risk refers to the risk of financial system breakdown due to linkages between institutions. This risk cannot be assessed by looking at how individual institutions manage risks but instead requires a full understanding of how the system as a whole operates. At present, the data available to central banks and financial regulators are not at all adequate for the task of assessing systemic risk and the new European Systemic Risk Board needs to address this issue. There is a lot of exciting ongoing research devoted to measuring systemic risk and providing signals to regulators as to when and where they should intervene. However, the tools being developed are still limited in their usefulness. More pressing than the development of these tools is the development and implementation of policy measures to make the financial system more robust. These measures should include higher capital ratios, limits on non-core funding and redesigning financial systems to be less complex.
    Keywords: Financial Risk,Systemic Risk,Banking
    Date: 2009–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200927&r=ban
  15. By: Michael D. Bordo; Harold James
    Abstract: This paper examines three areas in which analogies have been made between the interwar depression and the financial crisis of 2007 which reached a dramatic climax in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the rescue of AIG: they can be labeled macro-economic, micro-economic, and geo-political. First, the paper considers the story of monetary policy failures; second, there follows an examination of the micro-economic issues concerned with bank regulation and the reorganization of banking following the failure of one or more major financial institutions and the threat of systemic collapse; third, the paper turns to the issue of global imbalances and asks whether there are parallels that might be found in this domain too between the 1930s and the events of today.
    JEL: E58 N0 N12
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15584&r=ban
  16. By: Ojo, Marianne
    Abstract: This paper traces the developments that have contributed to the importance of risk in regulation. Not only does it consider theories associated with risk, it also discusses explanations as to why risk has become so important within regulatory and governmental circles. Two forms of risk regulation, namely risk based regulation and meta regulation are considered. As well as considering the application of both in jurisdictions such as the UK, the paper places greater focus in discussing the importance of meta regulation in jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy and the US. The preference for meta regulation is based on the premises, not only of the advantages considered in this paper but also on the application of Basel II in several jurisdictions. Whilst meta regulation also has its disadvantages, the impact of risk based regulation on the use of external auditors plays a part in the preference for meta regulation.
    Keywords: risk; regulation; meta; Basel II; financial
    JEL: K2
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:19117&r=ban
  17. By: Lana Embree; Tom Roberts
    Abstract: Analysis of the characteristics and structure of a network of financial institutions can provide insight into the complex relationships and interdependencies that exist in a payment, clearing, and settlement system (PCSS), and allow an intuitive understanding of the PCSS's efficiency, stability, and resiliency. The authors review the literature related to the PCSS network and describe the daily and intraday network structure of payment activity in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS), which is an integral component of Canada's financial system. The picture that emerges confirms that the LVTS is highly centralized among a few key participants, similar to other PCSSs, based on the network of relationships. This could heighten the systemic importance of these participants, and the susceptibility of the system to financial contagion. There have been small variations in the relative importance of individual banks, but the network-wide pattern of relationships has remained stable from 2004 to 2008, even through the credit crisis.
    Keywords: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Financial stability
    JEL: D85 G10
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocadp:09-13&r=ban
  18. By: Francesco Columba (Bank of Italy); Leonardo Gambacorta (Bank for International Settlements); Paolo Emilio Mistrulli (Bank of Italy JEL classification: D82, G21, G30, O16)
    Abstract: A large body of literature has shown that small firms experience difficulties in accessing the credit market due to informational asymmetries. Banks can overcome these asymmetries through relationship lending, or at least mitigate their effects by asking for collateral. Small firms, especially if they are young, have little collateral and short credit histories, and thus may find it difficult to raise funds from banks. In this paper, we show that even in this case, small firms may improve their borrowing capacity by joining Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGI). Our empirical analysis shows that small firms affiliated to MGIs pay less for credit compared with similar firms. We obtain this result for interest rates charged on loan contracts which are not backed by mutual guarantees. We then argue that our findings are consistent with the view that MGIs are better at screening and monitoring opaque borrowers than banks are. Thus, banks benefit from the willingness of MGIs to post collateral since this implies that firms are better screened and monitored.
    Keywords: credit guarantee schemes, joint liability, microfinance, peer monitoring, small business finance
    Date: 2009–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_735_09&r=ban
  19. By: Hamerle, Alfred; Liebig, Thilo; Schropp, Hans-Jochen
    Abstract: “Arbitrage CDOs” have recorded an explosive growth during the years before the outbreak of the financial crisis. In the present paper we discuss potential sources of such arbitrage opportunities, in particular arbitrage gains due to mispricing. For this purpose we examine the risk profiles of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) in some detail. The analyses reveal significant differences in the risk profile between CDO tranches and corporate bonds, in particular concerning the considerably increased sensitivity to systematic risks. This has farreaching consequences for risk management, pricing and regulatory capital requirements. A simple analytical valuation model based on the CAPM and the single-factor Merton model is used in order to keep the model framework simple. Then, the conditional expected loss curve (EL profile) is studied in some detail. In the next step, the asset correlation associated with a CDO tranche is estimated treating the structured instrument as a single-name credit instrument (i.e., a loan equivalent). While tractable, the loan-equivalent approach requires appropriate parameterization to achieve a reasonable approximation of the tranche´s risk profile. We consider the tranche as a “virtual” borrower or bond for which a single-factor model holds. Then, the correlation parameter is calculated via a non-linear optimization. This “bond representation” allows to approximate the risk profile (expressed by the EL profile) using a single-factor model and to express the dependence on the systematic risk factor via the corresponding asset correlation. It turns out that the resulting asset correlation is many times higher than that of straight bonds. Then, the Merton type valuation model for the corresponding bond representations is applied for valuation of the CDO tranches. Using a sample CDO portfolio, some opportunities for “CDO arbitrage” are described where it is assumed that investors are guided solely by the tranches’ rating and ignore the increased systematic risk for pricing. In the next section we discuss how tranches with high systematic risk can be generated and how CDO arrangers can exploit this to their advantage. It comes as no surprise that precisely these types of structures featured in many of the CDOs issued prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis. --
    Keywords: Collateralized debt obligations (CDO),arbitrage CDOs,credit rating,expected loss profile,bond representation,systematic risk of CDO tranches,CDO pricing
    JEL: C13 G12 G24
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:200913&r=ban
  20. By: Paul Bedford; Chris Bloor (Reserve Bank of New Zealand)
    Abstract: Financial turbulence over the past two years has generated increased interest in the analysis of financial stability. However, such analysis often suffers from conceptual difficulties and a lack of measurability. This paper develops a ‘cobweb model’ for analysing financial stability in New Zealand. A key objective of this cobweb model is to depict the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s assessment of financial stability in a single diagram that will enable better communication of the main risks facing New Zealand’s financial system. The results of this model are displayed using a cobweb-style diagram, with five dimensions constructed using a wide range of quantitative indicators, supplemented by expert judgement where necessary. It is anticipated that this cobweb diagram will become the focal point of the Reserve Bank’s Financial Stability Report.
    JEL: E32 E44
    Date: 2009–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nzb:nzbdps:2009/11&r=ban
  21. By: Ying Jiao (PMA)
    Abstract: We study multiple defaults where the global market information is modelled as progressive enlargement of filtrations. We shall provide a general pricing formula by establishing a relationship between the enlarged filtration and the reference default-free filtration in the random measure framework. On each default scenario, the formula can be interpreted as a Radon-Nikodym derivative of random measures. The contagion risks are studied in the multi-defaults setting where we consider the optimal investment problem in a contagion risk model and show that the optimization can be effectuated in a recursive manner with respect to the default-free filtration.
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:0912.3132&r=ban
  22. By: David E. Allen (School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Edith Cowan University); Michael McAleer (Econometric Institute, Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Marcel Scharth (VU University Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute)
    Abstract: In this paper we document that realized variation measures constructed from high-frequency returns reveal a large degree of volatility risk in stock and index returns, where we characterize volatility risk by the extent to which forecasting errors in realized volatility are substantive. Even though returns standardized by ex post quadratic variation measures are nearly gaussian, this unpredictability brings considerably more uncertainty to the empirically relevant ex ante distribution of returns. Carefully modeling this volatility risk is fundamental. We propose a dually asymmetric realized volatility (DARV) model, which incorporates the important fact that realized volatility series are systematically more volatile in high volatility periods. Returns in this framework display time varying volatility, skewness and kurtosis. We provide a detailed account of the empirical advantages of the model using data on the S&P 500 index and eight other indexes and stocks.
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2009cf693&r=ban

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