New Economics Papers
on Banking
Issue of 2009‒10‒24
seven papers chosen by
Roberto J. Santillán–Salgado, EGADE-ITESM

  1. Cyclical effects of bank capital requirements with imperfect credit markets By Agenor, Pierre-Richard; Pereira da Silva, Luiz A.
  2. Bank incentives and optimal CDOs By Pagès, H.
  3. The spatial structure of the financial development in Brazil By Marco Crocco; Fabiana Santos; Pedro Amaral
  4. Off-Balance-Sheet Activities and the Shadow Banking System: An Application of the Hausman Test with Higher Moments Instruments By Christian Calmès; Raymond Théoret
  5. Productivity Changes in Indonesian Banking: Application of a New Approach to Estimating Malmquist Indices By Muliaman D. Hadad; Maximilian J. B. Hall; Wimboh Santoso; Karligash Kenjegalieva; Richard Simper
  6. Creditor Protection and Banking System Development in India By Gregory James; Simon Deakin; Panicos Demetriades
  7. Iceland: The Financial and Economic Crisis By David Carey

  1. By: Agenor, Pierre-Richard; Pereira da Silva, Luiz A.
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the cyclical effects of bank capital requirements in a simple model with credit market imperfections. Lending rates are set as a premium over the cost of borrowing from the central bank, with the premium itself depending on firms’ effective collateral. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined and a capital channel is introduced through a signaling effect of capital buffers on the cost of bank deposits. The macroeconomic effects of various shocks (a drop in output, an increase in the refinance rate, and a rise in the capital adequacy ratio) are analyzed, under both binding and nonbinding capital requirements. Factors affecting the procyclicality of each regime (defined in terms of the behavior of the risk premium) are also identified and policy implications are discussed.
    Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Currencies and Exchange Rates,Debt Markets
    Date: 2009–09–01
  2. By: Pagès, H.
    Abstract: The paper examines a delegated monitoring problem between investors and a bank holding a portfolio of correlated loans displaying “contagion.” Moral hazard prevents the bank from monitoring continuously unless it is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. The asset pool is liquidated when losses exceed a state-contingent cut-off rule. The bank bears a relatively high share of the risk initially, as it should have high-powered incentives to monitor, but its long term financial stake tapers off as losses unfold. Liquidity regulation based on securitization can replicate the optimal contract. The sponsor provides an internal credit enhancement out of the proceeds of the sale and extends protection in the form of weighted tranches of collateralized debt obligations. In compensation the trust pays servicing and rent-preserving fees if a long enough period elapses with no losses occurring. Rather than being detrimental, well-designed securitization seems an effective means of implementing the second best.
    Keywords: Credit risk transfer, Default Risk, Contagion.
    JEL: G21 G28 G32
    Date: 2009
  3. By: Marco Crocco (Cedeplar-UFMG); Fabiana Santos (Cedeplar-UFMG); Pedro Amaral (Cedeplar-UFMG)
    Abstract: This paper explores the financial development in Brazil. It focuses on the impacts of the development level of a municipality’s financial system over its neighborhood, under the light of the Central Place Theory. Using a GMM estimator for a spatial panel model with an endogenous spatial lag and spatial moving average errors we investigate the spatial structure of the financial system in Brazil. The results point to a negative spatial association between the Brazilian municipalities’ financial system, in the way that a municipality with more developed financial system tends to be surrounded by municipalities with less developed financial systems.
    Keywords: financial development, spatial structure, bank strategy, Brazil
    JEL: O16 R12 G21
    Date: 2009–09
  4. By: Christian Calmès (Département des sciences administratives, Université du Québec (Outaouais), et Chaire d'information financière et organisationnelle, ESG-UQAM); Raymond Théoret (Département de stratégie des affaires, Université du Québec (Montréal), et Chaire d'information financière et organisationnelle, ESG-UQAM)
    Abstract: The noninterest income banks generate from their off-balance-sheet activities contributes greatly to the volatility of their operating revenues. Using Canadian data, we apply a modified Hausman procedure based on higher moments instruments and revisit this phenomenon to establish that the share of noninterest income (snonin) is actually endogenous to banks returns. In 1997, after the adoption of the Value at Risk (VaR) as a measure of banks risk, the snonin sign turns positive in the returns equations, indicating the emergence of diversification gains from banks non-traditional activities. ARCH-M estimations corroborate the idea that banks have gradually adapted to their new business lines, with an adjustment process begun even before 1997. However, the banks risk premium associated to OBS activities has continuously increased since that date.
    Keywords: Bank Risk Measures; Diversification; Noninterest income; Hausman test; Endogeneity; ARCH-M.
    JEL: G20 G21 C32
    Date: 2009–10–01
  5. By: Muliaman D. Hadad (Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia); Maximilian J. B. Hall (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University); Wimboh Santoso (Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia); Karligash Kenjegalieva (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University); Richard Simper (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University)
    Abstract: In this study, we utilise a new, non-parametric efficiency measurement approach which combines the semi-oriented radial measure data envelopment analysis (SORM DEA) approach for dealing with negative data (Emrouznejad et al., 2010) with the slacks-based efficiency measure of Tone (2001, 2002), to analyse efficiency and productivity changes for Indonesian banks over the period Quarter I 2003 to Quarter IV 2007. Using quarterly data based on supervisory data provided by Bank Indonesia we find that, under the intermediation-based approach to efficiency estimation, average Indonesian bank efficiency somewhat declined during the sample period, from 73% to 63%, reaching a nadir of 53% at end-June 2007. With respect to the bank groupings, Indonesian ‘state-owned’ banks were the most efficient at the beginning of the sample period (with average efficiency of 92%) but, by the end of the sample period, they had been usurped by the ‘joint-venture’ and ‘non-foreign exchange private’ banks. The regional government-owned banks were found to be the least efficient throughout. Finally, Malmquist results for the Indonesian banking industry suggest that the main driver of productivity growth is technological progress. A strategy based on the gradual adoption of newer technology, according to our results, thus seems to have the highest potential for boosting the productivity of the financial intermediary operations of Indonesian banks.
    Keywords: Indonesian Finance and Banking; Productivity; Efficiency.
    JEL: C23 C52 G21
    Date: 2009–09
  6. By: Gregory James (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University); Simon Deakin (Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge); Panicos Demetriades (Dept of Economics, University of Leicester)
    Abstract: We use a new legal dataset tracking changes in creditor protection law over several decades to study the impact of legal reforms on banking system development in India. Cointegration analysis is used to show that the strengthening of creditor rights in relation to the enforcement of security interests in the 1990s and 2000s led to an increase in bank credit. We show that the change in the law was not endogenous to trends in stock market development and GDP per capita, and that the direction of causation ran from legal reform to banking development, rather than the reverse.
    Keywords: creditor rights; legal origin; banking development; India.
    JEL: G21 G38 K22 O16
    Date: 2009–08
  7. By: David Carey
    Abstract: The global financial and economic crisis has struck Iceland with extreme force. Iceland’s three main banks, accounting for almost all of the banking system, failed in October 2008. They were unable to resist the deterioration in global financial markets following the failure of Lehman Brothers. The banks had pursued risky expansion strategies – notably borrowing in foreign capital markets to finance the aggressive international expansion of Icelandic investment companies – that made them vulnerable to the deterioration in global financial markets. They had also grown to be too big for the government to rescue. When access to foreign capital eventually closed, the banks failed. Non-financial firms and households were also vulnerable to the deterioration in global financial conditions, having taken on a lot of debt in recent years based on inflated collateral values. In some cases, the debt was foreign-currency denominated, without matching foreign-currency assets or revenues. In the wake of the banking crisis, the government obtained an IMF Stand-By Arrangement to provide favourable access to foreign capital markets and creditability for the recovery programme. Even so, the recession is likely to be deeper in Iceland than in most other OECD countries owing to the seriousness of the banking crisis and the weakness of private sector balance sheets. Reforms are needed to strengthen prudential regulation and supervision. This Working Paper relates to the 2009 Economic Survey of Iceland.<P>Islande : La crise économique et financière<BR>La crise économique et financière mondiale a frappé l’Islande avec une violence extrême. Les trois principales banques du pays, qui représentaient pratiquement l’ensemble du système bancaire, ont fait faillite en octobre 2008. Elles n’ont pas réussi à résister à la détérioration des marchés de capitaux mondiaux dans le sillage de la faillite de Lehman Brothers. Les banques avaient suivi des stratégies de développement risquées – empruntant notamment sur des marchés financiers étrangers pour soutenir une expansion internationale dynamique des sociétés d’investissement islandaises – ce qui les a rendues vulnérables à la détérioration des marchés de capitaux mondiaux. Elles avaient également atteint une taille trop importante pour que le gouvernement puisse venir à leur rescousse. Lorsque l’accès aux capitaux étrangers a été finalement fermé, les banques ont fait faillite. Les entreprises non financières et les ménages – qui s’étaient massivement endettés ces dernières années profitant de la forte valorisation de leurs garanties – étaient aussi vulnérables à la détérioration de la situation financière mondiale. Dans certains cas, la dette était libellée en devises sans que les emprunteurs n’aient d’actifs ou de revenus dans ces devises susceptibles de compenser le risque de change. À la suite de la crise du système bancaire, les pouvoirs publics ont conclu un accord de confirmation avec le FMI pour assurer des conditions d’accès favorables aux marchés de capitaux étrangers et soutenir la crédibilité du programme de redressement économique. Malgré cela, il est probable que la récession sera plus profonde en Islande que dans la plupart des autres pays de l’OCDE en raison de la gravité de la crise bancaire et de la faiblesse des bilans des entreprises et des patrimoines des ménages dans le secteur privé. Des réformes sont nécessaires pour renforcer la réglementation et la surveillance prudentielle.
    Keywords: currency crisis, Islande, Iceland, financial crisis, crise financière, deleveraging, réduction de l’effet de levier, banking crisis, crise bancaire, IMF stand-by arrangement, accord de confirmation avec le FMI, envolée du cours des actions induite par le crédit, position d’investissements internationaux, crise monétaire, sociétés d’investissement, surveillance et réglementation prudentielle, micro-prudential supervision, surveillance micro-prudentielle, macro-prudential supervision, surveillance macro-prudentielle, credit-induced asset price boom, foreign exchange exposure, investment companies, international investment position, prudential supervision and regulation
    JEL: E44 G21 G24 G28 R21
    Date: 2009–10–09

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