New Economics Papers
on Banking
Issue of 2008‒08‒21
four papers chosen by
Roberto J. Santillán–Salgado, EGADE-ITESM
  1. The Early History of Irish Savings Banks By Cormac Ó Gráda
  2. Política de Fechamento de Bancos com Regulador Não-Benevolente: Resumo e Aplicação By Adriana Soares Sales
  3. Non-Performing Loans and Productivity in Chinese Banks: 1997-2006 By Matthews, Kent; Guo, Jianguang; Zhang, Nina
  4. Modelos para a Utilização das Operações de Redesconto pelos Bancos com Carteira Comercial no Brasil By Sérgio Mikio Koyama; Márcio Issao Nakane
  1. By: Cormac Ó Gráda (University College of Dublin)
    Date: 2008–02–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200804&r=ban
  2. By: Adriana Soares Sales
    Abstract: Using Boot and Thakor model (1993), the paper summarizes for which parameter interval regarding regulator’s reputation the closure of banks could signalize imperfect monitoring of banks assets choice. If the regulator is non-benevolent, that is if he maximizes a welfare function that gives weight different from zero to his own reputation, the authors show that the private optimum policy (of the regulator) of banking closure increase the risk level banks bear comparing to the social optimum policy, which occurs when the regulator only maximizes the social welfare. This result, however, is only maintained under certain parameters interval. Under this interval, measures such as clear rules for banking closure to reduce the discretionary power of the regulator, and, for example, separation between the monitoring function and the closure function could incentive banks to make better portfolio choices, which would enable the regulator to decrease the systemic risk in the banking system.
    Date: 2008–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:170&r=ban
  3. By: Matthews, Kent (Cardiff Business School); Guo, Jianguang; Zhang, Nina
    Abstract: This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China over the ten years to 2006. Using a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index estimates of productivity growth are constructed with appropriate confidence intervals. The paper adjusts for the quality of the output by accounting for the non-performing loans on the balance sheets and test for the robustness of the results by examining alternative sets of outputs. The productivity growth of the state-owned banks is compared with the Joint-stock banks and it determinants evaluated. The paper finds that average productivity of the Chinese banks improved modestly over this period. Adjusting for the quality of loans, by treating NPLs as an undesirable output, the average productivity growth of the state-owned banks was zero or negative while productivity of the Joint-Stock banks was markedly higher.
    Keywords: Bank Efficiency; Productivity; Malmquist index; Bootstrapping
    JEL: D24 G21
    Date: 2007–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2008/17&r=ban
  4. By: Sérgio Mikio Koyama; Márcio Issao Nakane
    Abstract: Many models were used to identify the factors affecting the demand for overnight funds by commercial banks. Theses models overcome overdispersion problems caused by excess of zeros found in the dataset. Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMM) constitute a class of models which allows the identification of both the direct and indirect effects of rediscount rate through the inclusion of random effects in the intercept (incorporating specific effects for each bank) and other coefficients (identifying individual behavior of each bank regarding the same stimuli). The results suggest the use of overnight funds is mainly influenced by the opening amount in bank reserves, by the net value of operations in the SELIC clearinghouse, by the rediscount rate, by the volatility of in bank reserves and by the reserve requirements on demand deposits.
    Date: 2008–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:171&r=ban
This issue is ©2008 by Roberto J. Santillán–Salgado. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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