New Economics Papers
on Banking
Issue of 2006‒06‒17
three papers chosen by
Roberto J. Santillán–Salgado, EGADE-ITESM


  1. Banks'procyclicality behavior : does provisioning matter ?. By Vincent Bouvatier; Laetitia Lepetit
  2. COMPETENCIA EN EL MERCADO ESPAÑOL DE CRÉDITOS BANCARIOS: UN MODELO DE VARIACIONES CONJETURALES By Francisco J. Mas; Antonio Ladrón de Guevara Martínez; Felipe Ruiz Moreno
  3. Ineffective Controls on Capital Inflows Under Sophisticated Financial Markets: Brazil in the Nineties By Bernardo S. de M. Carvalho; Márcio G.P. Garcia

  1. By: Vincent Bouvatier (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Laetitia Lepetit (LAPE, Université de Limoges)
    Abstract: A panel of 186 European banks is used for the period 1992-2004 to determine if banking behaviors induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the provisioning system, amplify credit fluctuations. Our finding is consistent with the bank capital channel hypothesis, which means that poorly capitalized banks are constrained to expand credit. We also find that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover identified credit losses (non discretionary LLP) amplify credit fluctuations. Indeed, non discretionary LLP evolve cyclically. This leads to a misevaluation of expected credit risk which affect banks' incentives to grant new loans since lending costs are misstated. By contrast, LLP use for management objectives (discretionary LLP) do not affect credit fluctuations. The findings of our research are consistent with the call for the implementation of dynamic provisioning in Europe.
    Keywords: Bank lending, loan loss provisions, capital requirement.
    JEL: G21
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla06035&r=ban
  2. By: Francisco J. Mas (Universidad de Alicante); Antonio Ladrón de Guevara Martínez (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Felipe Ruiz Moreno (Universidad de Alicante)
    Abstract: The main objective of this work is to propose an oligopolistic competition model thatincorporates product differentiation through quality of service in the Spanish bank loansmarket. This model allows us to detect the competitive behavior patterns in terms of the outputof all the financial entities with respect to three strategic groups defined in terms of size. Thismodel of competitive interactions is tested with a sample of 100 firms in the Spanish bank loanmarket between 1992 and 1994. This period of time is characterized by both, the end of a longprocess of deregulation and the integration of the Spanish Banking System in the EuropeanBanking System. The findings evidence a stronger aggressiveness from the larger-size groupwhen the medium and smaller-size groups increase their output. Besides, the results detect anaggressive conduct between the entities within the larger-size group. El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en proponer un modelo de competencia oligopolísticacon diferenciación de producto vía calidad de servicio en el mercado de créditos bancarios, elcual permite detectar el patrón de conducta competitiva del output (variaciones conjeturales anivel de cantidades de créditos vendidos) para todas y cada una de las entidades financierasrespecto de cada uno de los grupos estratégicos definidos por tamaño. Este modelo deinteracciones competitivas es contrastado con 100 entidades del mercado español de créditosbancarios entre 1992 y 1994, período temporal que marca la culminación de un proceso dedesregulación e integración europea del sistema bancario español y que incide directamente enla competencia en términos de cantidades de créditos vendidos. Los resultados obtenidosevidencian que el grupo de entidades de mayor tamaño tiene una actitud agresiva ante unaumento del output de los grupos de entidades pequeñas y medianas. Además, se detecta unaconducta agresiva entre las entidades del grupo de mayor tamaño.
    Keywords: Variación Conjetural, Comportamiento Competitivo, Grupos Estratégicos, Banking; Competition; Strategic Groups.
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2006-07&r=ban
  3. By: Bernardo S. de M. Carvalho; Márcio G.P. Garcia
    Abstract: We analyze the Brazilian experience in the 1990s to assess the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows in restricting financial inflows and changing their composition towards long term flows. Econometric exercises (VARs) showed that controls on capital inflows were effective in deterring financial inflows for only a brief period, from two to six months. The hypothesis to explain the ineffectiveness of the controls is that financial institutions performed several operations aimed at avoiding capital controls. To check this hypothesis, we conducted interviews with market players. We collected several examples of the financial strategies engineered to avoid the capital controls and invest in the Brazilian fixed income market. The main conclusion is that controls on capital inflows, while they may be desirable, are of very limited effectiveness under sophisticated financial markets.
    JEL: E44 F32 F34 F36 G15
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12283&r=ban

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