|
on MENA - Middle East and North Africa |
| By: | Kohnert. Dirk |
| Abstract: | As early as 1991, Ali Mazrui argued that the Red Sea was not suitable for separating Africa from Arabia. For the two were inextricably intertwined through languages, religions (particularly Islam) and identities in both the Sahara and the Red Sea in a historical fusion of Arabism and African identity. Their separation was closely linked to a broader trend in which the white world closed ranks and created a system of global apartheid. The historical origins of the Africa-Middle East divide, i.e. the views of the Red Sea and the Sahara as racial and civilizational boundaries created by European Enlightenment ideology and early colonial expansionism were reinforced by postcolonial authoritarian regimes and Cold War rivalries, as well as by nationalist currents in Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increasingly viewed the Horn of Africa as their 'Western security flank'. They were united in their desire to prevent the growing influence of Turkey, Iran and Qatar in this part of the world. These Gulf rivalries formed the basis for growing economic cooperation with SSA as well as military support and security alliances, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which together have become the largest Gulf investors in Africa, compete with each other, particularly with Qatar, which has established embassies in most SSA countries. In addition, state and non-state actors from the Middle East and North Africa were closely involved in the destabilization of the Sahel in the 2010s by providing military, intelligence and ideological support to SSA states and terrorist groups. On the other hand, the Gulf States became increasingly dependent on migrant labour and the steady increase in migration from SSA to these countries, reinforced by the massive influx from African migrant-sending countries given the restrictions on African migration to Europe. As early as the seventh century AD, Arabia had relied heavily on the slave trade and the supply of labour from SSA, founded on the philosophy that it was legitimate to enslave black people because they were no better than animals. During this time, Black Africa became the largest slave depot in the Islamic world. To this day, there are significant African migrant and diaspora communities in the Middle East. Their presence has at times helped to perpetuate long-standing derogatory views and attitudes towards Africa and its peoples. These attitudes, based on an Arab-centric social hierarchy and expressing contempt for African cultures, remain prevalent today and shape social relationships between employers and African migrants in the emirates of the Arabian Peninsula. |
| Abstract: | Bereits 1991 vertrat Ali Mazrui die These, dass das Rote Meer nicht dazu geeignet sei, Afrika von Arabien zu trennen. Denn beide waren durch Sprachen, Religionen (insbesondere den Islam) und Identitäten sowohl in der Sahara als auch im Roten Meer in einer historischen Verschmelzung von Arabismus und afrikanischer Identität untrennbar miteinander verwoben. Deren Trennung sei eng verbunden mit einem allgemeineren Trend, gemäß dem die weiße Welt ihre Reihen schloss und ein System der globalen Apartheid schuf. Die historischen Ursprünge der Kluft zwischen Afrika und dem Nahen Osten, d. h. die durch die Ideologie der europäischen Aufklärung und den frühen kolonialen Expansionismus geschaffene Sicht auf das Rote Meer und die Sahara als Rassen- und Zivilisationsgrenzen, wurden durch postkoloniale autoritäre Regime und Rivalitäten im Kalten Krieg sowie durch nationalistische Strömungen in Afrika, dem Nahen Osten und Nordafrika verstärkt. Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate betrachteten das Horn von Afrika zunehmend als ihre "westliche Sicherheitsflanke". Sie waren sich einig in dem Wunsch, den wachsenden Einfluss der Türkei, Irans und Katars in diesem Teil der Welt zu verhindern. Diese Rivalitäten am Golf bildeten die Grundlage für die wachsende wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit SSA sowie für militärische Unterstützungs- und Sicherheitsallianzen, insbesondere am Horn von Afrika. Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, die zusammen zu den größten Golfinvestoren in Afrika geworden sind, konkurrieren miteinander, insbesondere mit Katar, das in den meisten SSA-Ländern Botschaften eingerichtet hat. Zudem waren staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure aus dem Nahen Osten und Nordafrika in den 2010er Jahren eng an der Destabilisierung der Sahelzone beteiligt, unter anderem durch die Bereitstellung militärischer, geheimdienstlicher und ideologischer Unterstützung für SSA-Staaten und Terrorgruppen. Andererseits wurden die Golfstaaten zunehmend abhängig von Wanderarbeitskräften und der stetigen Zunahme der Migration aus SSA in diese Länder, verstärkt durch den massiven Zustrom aus afrikanischen Migranten-Entsendeländern angesichts der Einschränkungen afrikanischer Migration nach Europa. Bereits ab dem siebten Jahrhundert n. Chr. stützte sich Arabien stark auf den Sklavenhandel und die Bereitstellung von Arbeitskräften aus SSA, begründet mit der Philosophie, dass es legitim sei, schwarze Menschen zu versklaven, weil sie nicht besser als Tiere seien. In dieser Zeit wurde Schwarzafrika zum größten Sklavendepot der islamischen Welt. Bis heute gibt es im Nahen Osten bedeutende afrikanische Migranten- und Diasporagemeinschaften. Ihre Anwesenheit hat zeitweise dazu beigetragen, seit langem bestehende abwertende Ansichten und Einstellungen gegenüber Afrika und seinen Völkern aufrechtzuerhalten. Diese Einstellungen, die auf einer arabisch-zentrierten sozialen Hierarchie basieren und eine Verachtung gegenüber afrikanischen Kulturen zum Ausdruck bringen, sind bis heute vorherrschend und prägen die sozialen Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und afrikanischen Migranten in den Emiraten der Arabischen Halbinsel. |
| Keywords: | GCC, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Sub-Saharan Africa, Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Islamic terrorism |
| JEL: | D74 E26 F55 H56 N47 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300911 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Since the 1960s, both the regime of Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) and, subsequently starting from 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran, have intervened in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While the Shah's policies were motivated by a virulent anti-communist stance, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) pursued a 'radical' policy of changing the political status of the Western world, including the Western Arab allies, who were hostile to the survival of the mullah regime. While the Shah focused on geopolitical interests, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the vital sea route to the Red Sea, and in South Africa, and ignored the interests of African Muslims, the IRI exploited increasingly radicalized Islamists to expand Iranian influence on the continent. For example, the IRI has spent billions of dollars in the region to provide Muslim schools and free social services through hospitals and orphanages supported by the Iranian Red Crescent. The IRI's strategy aimed to build grassroots support among Muslim communities rather than focusing exclusively on African governments. Tehran's expansionist policies included arms sales to state and non-state actors and the destabilization of regimes. The goal was to build partnerships that would help evade international sanctions while opening new terrain for its axis of resistance against its global and regional adversaries, particularly its arch-enemy Israel. Tehran's version of political Islam involved building up proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels, most recently in Yemen, who have wreaked havoc on international shipping lanes in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Tehran expanded its influence in the Sahel region, taking advantage of self-serving French Africa policy and the policies of other Western powers in West Africa to establish contacts with the anti-Western ASE military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Russia, China and Turkey paved the way for this new alignment. The rivalry between Iran and Israel has intensified in recent decades, with several confrontations between the two countries in the Red Sea and East Africa since the 2010s. Iran has continuously expanded its engagement throughout the region, leading to a ‘balance of deterrence’ between the two countries. |
| Keywords: | Iran; Israel; State of Palestine; Sub-Saharan Africa; political Islam; jihadism; Houthi rebels; Hezbollah; Horn of Africa; Yemen; Red Sea; Sahel; South Africa; Nigeria, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia; France; Turkey; Russia; China; |
| JEL: | E26 F13 F22 F35 F51 F54 F63 H56 N17 N47 O55 P45 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–08–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121656 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | In the 19th and 20th centuries, Turkey considered only North Africa a substantial part of the Ottoman Empire and neglected sub-Saharan Africa unless vital interests were at stake. However, the apathy of successive Turkish governments changed with the 1998 "Africa Action Plan". Since then, the Turkish state has intensified its diplomatic, political, economic and cultural interactions with sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish-African relations received a further boost when Ankara declared 2005 the "Year of Africa". Although the predominantly Muslim region of North Africa is the focus of Turkish foreign policy due to their shared history, the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa has also increased due to the growing demand for military and medical supplies. Since 2005, Ankara promoted state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, although it does not follow Western democratization policies. Turkey's growing economic, political and security involvement in Africa aims to open new markets for its manufactured goods, particularly its defence and security industries. Presenting itself as a relevant regional power without colonial ballast, Turkey sets itself apart from traditional Western players on the continent. Turkey's engagement in sub-Saharan Africa differed markedly from that of other emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. While Ankara shared the disregard for Western sanctions due to BRICS members' democratic deficits, it went beyond traditional state-to-state relations and increasingly relied on cooperation with non-state actors. African partners value Turkish products and expertise. In addition, Ankara has taken a coordinated approach to working with African states and leaders, avoiding entanglements with international organizations or other alliances, as in Somalia and Kenya, but more recently in much of East, South and West Africa. This has been demonstrated using the example of the three West African countries Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast. |
| Abstract: | Im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert betrachtete die Türkei nur Nordafrika als einen wesentlichen Teil des Osmanischen Reiches und vernachlässigte Afrika südlich der Sahara, es sei denn, es standen lebenswichtige Interessen auf dem Spiel. Die Apathie aufeinanderfolgender türkischer Regierungen änderte sich jedoch mit dem „Afrika-Aktionsplan“ von 1998. Seitdem hat der türkische Staat seine diplomatischen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Interaktionen mit Subsahara-Afrika intensiviert. Einen weiteren Schub erhielten die türkisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen, als Ankara 2005 zum „Jahr Afrikas“ erklärte. Obwohl die überwiegend muslimische Region Nordafrikas aufgrund der gemeinsamen Geschichte im Fokus der türkischen Außenpolitik steht, hat die Bedeutung der Subsahara-Region auch aufgrund der wachsenden Nachfrage nach militärischen und medizinischen Gütern zugenommen. Seit 2005 betreibt Ankara Förderung in Form von Staatsaufbau in Subsahara-Afrika, obwohl es nicht der westlichen Demokratisierungspolitik folgt. Das wachsende wirtschaftliche, politische und sicherheitspolitische Engagement der Türkei in Afrika zielt darauf ab, neue Märkte für seine Industriegüter zu erschließen, insbesondere für seine Verteidigungs- und Rüstungsindustrie. Indem es sich als relevante Regionalmacht ohne kolonialen Ballast präsentiert, grenzt sich die Türkei von traditionellen westlichen Akteuren auf dem Kontinent ab. Das Engagement der Türkei in Subsahara-Afrika unterschied sich deutlich von dem anderer aufstrebender Mächte wie Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika. Während Ankara die Missachtung westlicher Sanktionen aufgrund demokratischer Defizite der BRICS-Mitglieder teilte, ging es über herkömmliche Staat-zu-Staat-Beziehungen hinaus und setzte zunehmend auf die Zusammenarbeit mit nichtstaatlichen Akteuren. Afrikanische Partner schätzen türkische Produkte und Expertise. Darüber hinaus hat Ankara einen koordinierten Ansatz zur Zusammenarbeit mit afrikanischen Staaten und Führern gewählt und Verstrickungen mit internationalen Organisationen oder anderen Allianzen vermieden, wie in Somalia und Kenia, aber in jüngerer Zeit auch in weiten Teilen Ost-, Süd- und Westafrikas. Dies wird am Beispiel der drei westafrikanischen Staaten Nigeria, Ghana und Elfenbeinküste gezeigt. |
| Keywords: | Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa, international trade, migration, sustainable development |
| JEL: | E26 F22 F54 I31 J46 L31 N17 O55 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300932 |
| By: | Jadouri Echaimaa (UM5 - Université Mohammed V de Rabat [Agdal]); Aziz Ragbi (UM5 - Université Mohammed V de Rabat [Agdal]) |
| Abstract: | The unemployment rate in Morocco has plummeted exponentially in recent years, with multiple potential causes for unemployment. The objective of this article is to estimate the effects of individual characteristics on unemployment using a logit model. The resulting findings indicate that the main determinants of unemployment are age, level of education, place of residence, and gender. The statistical analysis of these elements reveals that these determinants significantly influence unemployment at a 5% threshold. |
| Abstract: | Le taux de chômage au Maroc a dégringolé d'une manière exponentielle ces dernières uméannées, dont les causes qui peuvent déterminées le chômage sont multiples. L'objectif de cet article est d'estimer les effets des caractéristiques individuelles sur le chômage en utilisant un modèle logit. Les résultats qui en découlent indiquent que les principaux déterminants du chômage sont l'âge, le niveau d'éducation, le milieu de résidence et le genre. L'analyse statistique de ces éléments révèlent que ces déterminants influencent significativement le chômage au seuil de 5%. |
| Keywords: | Unemployment, Logistic regression, Employment, Public policy, Chômage, Régression logistique, Emploi, Politique publique |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04667140 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | For decades, the history of Sudan, Africa's third largest country with around 46 million inhabitants, has been marked by violent clashes between the northern, Muslim and Arab military elites of the capital Khartoum at the expense of the civilian population. Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, there have been 16 attempted coups, six of which were successful. That was more than in any other country on a continent that has itself seen more coups than any other region in the world. Two civil wars between the government in Khartoum and the southern regions claimed around 1.5 million victims. In addition, the ongoing conflict in the western Darfur region has killed more than 200, 000 people and displaced two million people. In these conflicts, borders mean little. Control of resources and subjects is the primary objective, and forces arising in the borderlands seek revenge on the despised metropolitan elites. Sudan's geopolitical importance in a volatile region bordering the Red Sea, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, as well as its agricultural prosperity, attracted regional and global actors and hampered the successful transition to civilian-led government and sustainable development. In addition to Great Britain, the former colonial power, Russia, the USA, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other neighbouring countries were fighting for influence in Sudan, including Ethiopia, Chad and South Sudan. They, too, were affected by political unrest and conflict and suffered under the burden of Sudanese refugees fleeing the fighting to neighbouring countries. The British colonial rulers had already used existing differences to divide the population according to ethnic and regional affiliations, a practice that survives to this day. Militia activism deepened divisions among rebel supporters. This divide-and-conquer policy corresponded to a well-established tactic used by African governments in ethnic civil wars, often exploiting the militias to encourage and facilitate ethnic migration by integrating the militias into the national army. Transnational, well-entrenched criminal networks involved in drug-, arms- and human trafficking also stood ready to take advantage of the chaos. This made Sudan one of the most fragile countries in the world. Sudan's collapse would not only shake its neighbours, but could also upset several other African countries, including fragile states in the Sahel, and East and North Africa. The side effects of such an incalculable conflict zone and the resulting chaos would also affect Western Europe, which is already suffering from the influx of refugees from Syria and other war zones in the Middle East and Africa. |
| Abstract: | Seit Jahrzehnten ist die Geschichte des Sudan, dem drittgrößten Land Afrikas mit rund 46 Millionen Einwohnern, von gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den nördlichen, muslimischen und arabischen Militäreliten der Hauptstadt Khartum auf Kosten der Zivilbevölkerung geprägt. Seit der Unabhängigkeit Sudans im Jahr 1956 kam es zu 16 Putschversuchen, von denen sechs erfolgreich waren. Das war mehr als in jedem anderen Land auf einem Kontinent, der selbst mehr Staatsstreiche erlebt hat als jede andere Region der Welt. Zwei Bürgerkriege zwischen der Regierung in Khartum und den südlichen Regionen forderten rund 1, 5 Millionen Opfer. Darüber hinaus hat der anhaltende Konflikt in der westlichen Darfur-Region mehr als 200.000 Menschen getötet und zwei Millionen Menschen vertrieben. In diesen Konflikten bedeuten Grenzen wenig. Die Kontrolle über Ressourcen und Untertanen ist das Hauptziel, und in den Grenzgebieten entstehende Kräfte streben nach Rache an den verachteten Eliten der Metropolen. Die geopolitische Bedeutung des Sudan in einer instabilen Region an der Grenze zum Roten Meer, der Sahelzone und dem Horn von Afrika sowie sein landwirtschaftlicher Wohlstand zogen regionale und globale Akteure an und behinderten den erfolgreichen Übergang zu einer zivil geführten Regierung und einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Neben Großbritannien, der ehemaligen Kolonialmacht, kämpften Russland, die USA, Saudi-Arabien, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate und weitere Nachbarländer um Einfluss im Sudan, darunter Äthiopien, Tschad und Süd-Sudan. Auch sie waren von politischen Unruhen und Konflikten betroffen und litten unter der Last der sudanesischen Flüchtlinge, die vor den Kämpfen in die Nachbarländer flohen. Bereits die britischen Kolonialherren nutzten bestehende Unterschiede, um die Bevölkerung nach ethnischen und regionalen Zugehörigkeiten aufzuteilen, eine Praxis, die bis heute Bestand hat. Der Aktivismus der Milizen vertiefte die Spaltungen unter den Rebellenanhängern. Diese „Teile-und-herrsche“-Politik entsprach einer bewährten Taktik afrikanischer Regierungen in ethnischen Bürgerkriegen, bei der die Milizen häufig ausgenutzt wurden, um ethnische Migration zu fördern und zu erleichtern, indem sie in die nationale Armee integriert wurden. Auch transnationale, fest verwurzelte kriminelle Netzwerke im Drogen-, Waffen- und Menschenhandel standen bereit, das Chaos auszunutzen. Dies machte den Sudan zu einem der fragilsten Länder der Welt. Der Zusammenbruch des Sudan würde nicht nur seine Nachbarn erschüttern, sondern könnte auch zahlreiche andere afrikanische Länder in Mitleidenschaft ziehen, darunter fragile Staaten in der Sahelzone sowie in Ost- und Nordafrika. Die Nebenwirkungen einer solch unkalkulierbaren Konfliktzone und das daraus resultierende Chaos würden auch Westeuropa treffen, das bereits unter dem Zustrom von Flüchtlingen aus Syrien und anderen Kriegsgebieten im Nahen Osten und in Afrika leidet. |
| Keywords: | Sudan conflict 2023, Sudan, South Sudan, Sub-Saharan Africa, trafficking, famine, refugees, post-colonialism, nationalizm, Russia |
| JEL: | E26 F22 F35 F54 H12 H56 I31 J46 L31 N17 O17 O55 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300928 |
| By: | Hassan Khafif (University Hassan II [Casablanca], FSJES AIN SEBAA, Hassan II University –Casablanca); Naoual Ouazzani Touhami (University Hassan II [Casablanca], FSJES AIN SEBAA, Hassan II University –Casablanca) |
| Abstract: | Inclusive growth constitutes a new framework, encompassing the economic and social spheres, to encourage the participation of the different categories of society in the creation of wealth, thereby enabling them to benefit from the profits generated, both monetary and non-monetary. The process requires the inclusion of the most disadvantaged populations, notably young people, who carry a very significant weight in the formulation of Moroccan society. The aim of this article is, firstly, to define the concept of inclusive growth, determine its foundations and measures and, secondly, to analyze the impact of exclusion from the perspective of inclusive growth on its relationship with inequality and poverty, and its implications for the situation of young people in Morocco. In order to meet these objectives, an exploratory empirical study was carried out, through the creation of a composite indicator, reflecting the socio-economic situation of young Moroccans with regard to inclusive growth. This indicator is composed of a monetary dimension, represented by growth, and a social dimension, represented by the active population, employment, health and education. Overall, the results show strong initial growth until 2010, reflecting good economic and social performance. From 2011 onwards, it declines, signaling challenges in these areas. In 2016, it reaches its lowest level, followed by a slight improvement until 2020, despite a general trend towards stagnation. These fluctuations indicate insufficient efforts to reverse the downward trend in economic and social inclusiveness. |
| Abstract: | La croissance inclusive constitue un nouveau cadre, englobant la sphère économique et la sphère sociale, pour inciter à participer les différentes catégories de la société dans la création de la richesse, par conséquent, de leur permettre de bénéficier des profits générés, monétaire et non monétaire. Le processus exige l'inclusion des populations les plus défavorisées, notamment les jeunes, qui ont un poids très important dans la formulation de la société marocaine. Ce présent article a pour objet, d'une part, de délimiter la notion de la croissance inclusive, de déterminer ses fondements et mesures et, d'autre part, d'analyser l'impact de l'exclusion sous la perspective de la croissance inclusive sur sa relation avec l'inégalité et la pauvreté et sur ses enjeux du point de vue de la situation des jeunes au Maroc. Dans le but de répondre à ces objectifs, une étude empirique exploratoire a été menée, par le biais de la création d'un indicateur composite, reflétant la situation socio-économique des jeunes Marocaines au regard de la croissance inclusive. Cet indicateur est composé de dimension monétaire qui est représentée par la croissance et sociale qui est représenté par la population active, l'emploi, la santé et l'éducation. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats montrent une forte croissance initiale jusqu'en 2010, reflétant de bonnes performances économiques et sociales. À partir de 2011, il décline, signalant des défis dans ces domaines. En 2016, il atteint son niveau le plus bas, suivi par une légère amélioration jusqu'en 2020, malgré une tendance générale à la stagnation. Ces fluctuations indiquent des efforts insuffisants pour renverser la tendance à la baisse de l'inclusivité économique et sociale. |
| Keywords: | Exclusion, jeune, inégalité, pauvreté, Youth, Inequality, Poverty |
| Date: | 2024–07–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04663967 |
| By: | Brailey, Thomas; Kelly, Edmund; Odermatt, Angela; Ward, Albert |
| Abstract: | Kao et al. (2024) use phone-based survey experiments in Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco to test whether established theories about the effect of descriptive representation on perceived democratic legitimacy hold in the Middle East. They find that the presence of women in deliberative bodies legitimizes decision-making even in more socially conservative, less democratic societies. We blindly reproduced their study, and then extend their analysis with five additional robustness checks. We find that their analysis is reproducible and robust in several ways, although there were ambiguities in the original text which prolonged this process. Finally, we also extended their analysis by using iterative machine learning models to study heterogeneous treatment effects. We find that marital status as well as pre-treatment attitudes on related issues affect the response to the treatment. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:146 |
| By: | Jeguirim, Khaled; Ben Salem, Leila |
| Abstract: | We follow a non-linear dynamic correlation approach using a combination of a DCC-GARCH model and a copula model to capture the dependence between oil price changes and inflation in Tunisia. The case of Tunisia is particularly instructive since, after having been an exporter and a major producer, it became a net oil importer in the 2000s. The study, based on monthly data spanning decades, selects a Gumbel copula and shows that beyond weak average dependencies, there is a strong correlation between extreme values, suggesting that inflation in Tunisia is more sensitive to extreme (positive) variations in oil prices than to average variations. The implications of these empirical results for economic policy are crucial for the Tunisian economy. |
| Keywords: | oil price, inflation, copula, dynamic conditional correlation, Tunisia |
| JEL: | E31 Q41 Q43 |
| Date: | 2024–07–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121616 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Policy actions taken in March as part of a strengthened program package, including unification of the exchange rate and a significant increase in the policy rate, combined with the augmentation of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement, the recent investment deal with Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company (ADQ) and the announcement of financing from the European Union, the World Bank, and other international partners, improved FX liquidity and helped restore confidence. Inflation has started to fall, though remains elevated, and there are signs that the three-and-a-half-year contraction of private sector activity is reversing. |
| Date: | 2024–08–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/274 |
| By: | Aminorroaya, Arya; Saeedi Moghaddam, Sahar; Tavolinejad, Hamed; Aryan, Zahra; Heidari, Behnam; Ebrahimi, Hedyeh; Naderian, Mohammadreza; Shobeiri, Parnian; Ghanbari, Ali; Rezaei, Nazila; Malekpour, Mohammad‐Reza; Haghshenas, Rosa; Rezaei, Negar; Larijani, Bagher; Farzadfar, Farshad |
| Abstract: | The North Africa and Middle East (NAME) region has one of the highest burdens of ischemic heart disease (IHD) worldwide. This study reports the contemporary epidemiology of IHD in NAME. We estimated the incidence, prevalence, deaths, years of life lost, years lived with disability, disability‐adjusted life years (DALYs), and premature mortality of IHD, and its attributable risk factors in NAME from 1990 to 2019 using the results of the GBD (Global Burden of Disease study 2019). In 2019, 0.8 million lives and 18.0 million DALYs were lost due to IHD in NAME. From 1990 to 2019, the age‐standardized DALY rate of IHD significantly decreased by 33.3%, mostly due to the reduction of years of life lost rather than years lived with disability. In 2019, the proportion of premature death attributable to IHD was higher in NAME compared with global measures: 26.8% versus 16.9% for women and 18.4% versus 14.8% for men, respectively. The age‐standardized DALY rate of IHD attributed to metabolic risks, behavioral risks, and environmental/occupational risks significantly decreased by 28.7%, 37.8%, and 36.4%, respectively. Dietary risk factors, high systolic blood pressure, and high low‐density lipoprotein cholesterol were the top 3 risks contributing to the IHD burden in most countries of NAME in 2019. In 2019, IHD was the leading cause of death and lost DALYs in NAME, where premature death due to IHD was greater than the global average. Despite the great reduction in the age‐standardized DALYs of IHD in NAME from 1990 to 2019, this region still had the second‐highest burden of IHD in 2019 globally. |
| Keywords: | coronary artery disease, epidemiology, global burden of disease, ischemic heart disease, mortality, North Africa and Middle East |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:301880 |
| By: | Alfadul, Hanan; Siddig, Khalid; Ahmed, Mosab; Abushama, Hala; Kirui, Oliver |
| Abstract: | Livestock in Sudan plays a crucial role in the national economy, particularly in alleviating poverty and enhancing food security. Despite its significance, the last comprehensive livestock census for the country was conducted in 1975, resulting in now outdated and often unreliable data. Recent estimates by USAID indicate that Sudan ranks among the top three African countries in terms of livestock numbers, with an estimated 105.6 million animals. The livestock population in Sudan is predominantly composed of camels, goats, sheep, and cattle. The spatial distribution of livestock is variable and influenced by local factors such as feed resources, land use, and ecological conditions. The Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions have the largest livestock numbers. However, discrepancies between official statistics and field data show the need for updated and accurate livestock data. The livestock sector provides 40 percent of employment and 34 percent of Sudan’s agricultural gross domestic product (GDP). The livestock sector is a vital source of foreign exchange for the Sudanese economy through exports of livestock and livestock products. Besides its economic contributions, the livestock sector provides essential food products, including meat, eggs, and milk, and draught power for agricultural operations and transportation, particularly in rural areas. However, relative to irrigated agriculture, the sector faces challenges due to underinvestment and minimal government attention. |
| Keywords: | REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN; EAST AFRICA; AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA; AFRICA; livestock; poverty; food security; exports; employment; animal products |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ssspwp:19 |
| By: | Mohamed Elsayed, Ashraf |
| Abstract: | The thesis hence aims at studying the economic dimensions of capital flows from developing countries phenomenon with an application of Egypt’s Economy The important results stem from this work are as fllowing: 1. There is no agreement in the economic literature on the definition of the capital flows from developing countries. This may lead to different estimations of the volume of the phenomenon. 2. Studying the trend and simultaneity of capital flows from the developing countries as a whole and on the level of the geographical regions and from Egyptian economy showed the following points: 2/1: The capital outflows are fluctuated, during the period of study, (1977 to 2004). 2/2: The simultaneity in capital flows from the developing countries on the geographical region has been achieved from 1977 to 1979, 1982 to 1986 and during year 1987. 2/3: The capital flows from the Egyptian economy are not in one trend, they are the most volatile compared to the capital flows from the developing countries on the Aggregate level and from the Middle East and North Africa during the period from 1977 to 2004. 3. Results of the econometric model of the determinants of capital flows from the Egyptian economy are represented in the following. 3/1: There is a positive relationship between the external debt and the capital flows from the Egyptian economy with statistically Significant at 0% level; the increase of the external debt with one billion dollars leads to the increase of the capital flows from the Egyptian economy as a percentage of the Gross Domestic production of 1.5%. 3/2: There is a positive relationship between the Capital Gains of the Egyptian stock exchange and the capital flows from the Egyptian economy with statistically Significant at 0% level; the increase of the Capital Gains of the Egyptian stock exchange by 1% leads to the increase of the capital flows from the Egyptian economy to the Gross Domestic production ratio by 0.1%. 3/3: There is a positive relationship between the financial repression and the capital flows from the Egyptian economy with statistically Significant at 1% level; The financial repression rise of 1% leads to the increase of the capital flows from the Egyptian economy to the Gross Domestic production ratio by 0.03%. 3/4: There is a negative relationship between the interest rates on the Domestic Deposits and the capital flows from the Egyptian economy at level of statistically Significant 0% , the increase of interest rates on the deposits by 1% leads to reduction in the ratio of the capital flows from the Egyptian economy to the Gross Domestic production by 1.41%. 3/5: There is a positive relationship between Egyptian exchange rate overvaluation and capital flows from Egyptian economy at level of statistically Significant at 1%; the overvaluation of Egyptian exchange rate with only one leads the increase of the ratio of capital flows from the Egyptian economy to the Gross Domestic production by 8.97%. 3/6: There is a positive relationship between inflation and the capital flows from the Egyptian economy at level of statistically Significant 1%; increase of consumers prices index by 1% leads to the increase of capital flows from the Egyptian economy to the Gross Domestic production ratio by 4.46%. 3/7: There is a positive relationship between the political instability and the economic crises and the capital flows from the Egyptian economy at level of statistically Significant 0%; the political instability and the economic crises leads to the increase of capital flow from the Egyptian economy to the GDP ratio by 4.05%. 3/8: The econometric model explains 92.3% of changes in the ratio of capital flows from Egyptian economy while the rest 7.7% is explained by other variables that are specified outside of the model at level of statistically Significant at 0%. 4. Results of the econometric model of the capital flows effects from the Egyptian economy on the economic growth in the long run by using the “Cointegration” are represented in the following: 4/1: There is a negative relationship between the capital flows from the Egyptian economy and the economic growth in the long run at level of statistically Significant of 10%; increase of the ratio of capital outflows - that are estimated by the world bank methodology - to the GDP leads to the decrease of GDP per Capita by 1.01%. 4/2: There is a negative relationship between the capital flows from the Egyptian economy and annual growth rate of population in the long run at level of statistically Significant of 1%; increase of the annual growth rate of population by 1%, leads to decrease of GDP per capita by 3.23%. 4/3: There is a positive relationship between the capital flows from the Egyptian economy and the technological improvements in the long run at level of ratio Significant of 1%; the one percent (1%) technological improvements radio leads to the increase of GDP per capita by 0.43%. 4/4: The econometric model explains 69.3% of changes in the long run economic growth, while 30.7% is explained by other variables that are specified outside the model at level of statistically Significant of 1%. 5. The developing countries must depend on restricting capital outflows for a fixed time to avoid dodge of these restrictions and give the opportunity for applying the economic reform policies and eliminating economic distortion, in facing the phenomenon of capital flows from developing countries. |
| Keywords: | Economic Dimensions - Capital Flows - Developing Countries - Egyptian Economy |
| JEL: | F32 |
| Date: | 2024–08–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121674 |
| By: | Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, Jonathan |
| Abstract: | *** You can read, quote, reference and link this working paper, but you cannot reproduce or post it in any form unless permitted in writing by the authors ***** The war that started in 2023 between Hamas and Israel is driven by various long-lasting processes, but it also brings to the fore a new cause that hitherto seemed marginal: the armed militias of the Rabbinate and Islamic churches. The Rabbinate militias, embodied in Jewish settler organizations, have taken over not only Palestinian lands, but, gradually, also Israeli society. The Islamic militias, represented by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, rose to prominence after the traditional resistance groups of the Palestinians – primarily the PLO and the PFLP and, by extension, also the Palestinian Authority – weakened and proved unable to reverse, let alone stop, the Israeli occupation. The rise of these militias, though, is hardly unique to Israel/Palestine, or even the Middle East. It is part of a broader, global process, in which ‘private’ military organizations, financed by states, church-related NGOs and/or organized crime, fight for and against states as well as each other. The ascent of such groups is closely related to the decline of the nation-state and its popular armies, a model that developed in the wake of the French Revolution but no longer resonates with the increasingly globalized nature of capital accumulation. Our previous studies of Middle East wars emphasized the ‘state of capital’ – our notion that the capitalist mode of power fuses state and capital into a single logic in which dominant capital groups are driven by the power quest for differential accumulation. We showed that, in the Middle East, this logic was imposed by a Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition of large oil and armament corporations, OPEC, financial institutions and construction firms, whose differential incomes and profits were tightly correlated with – and helped predict – the cyclical eruption of ‘energy conflicts’. But this mode of power comprises not two elements, but three. In addition to state and capital, it also includes the supreme-God churches, and in this paper we outline the role of these churches and their militias in capitalism generally and in Middle East wars specifically. |
| Keywords: | capitalism, capitalist mode of power, Christianity, church, dominant capital, energy conflicts, Gaza, Islam, Israel, Jehovah, Jesus, Judaism, Middle East, militias, modes of power, Occupied Territories, oligarchy, oil, Palestine, Rabbinate church, religion, state of capital, Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition |
| JEL: | P00 P18 P5 E31 H56 N4 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:capwps:301395 |
| By: | Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, Jonathan |
| Abstract: | Our recent article on ‘The Road to Gaza’ examined the history of the three supreme-God churches and the growing role of their militias in armed conflicts and wars around the world. The present paper situates these militia wars in the broader vista of the capitalist mode of power. Focusing specifically on the Middle East, we show the impact these militia wars have on relative oil prices and differential oil profits and explain how the wars themselves, those who stir them and the subjects that fight them all get discounted into capitalized power. |
| Keywords: | capitalization, church, corporation, differential accumulation, dominant capital, energy conflicts, Gaza, Middl East, militias, oil, OPEC, religion, war, Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition |
| JEL: | P00 P1 P12 P18 H56 N4 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:capwps:301398 |
| By: | Moussa, Mohamed Aymen Ben; Hedfi, Chedia |
| Abstract: | Liquidity is the risk to a bank's earnings and capital arising from its inability to timely meet obligations when they come due without incurring unacceptable losses. Bank management must ensure that sufficient funds are available at a reasonable cost to meet potential demands from both fund providers and borrowers. Also, Lending is the process by which a financial institution provides funds to a borrower. Often called a lender, the institution typically receives interest in return for the loan. Lending in banking benefits lenders and borrowers alike by increasing liquidity within the marketplaces where loans are originated and used. This article aims to identify the impact of liquidity on bank lending. We used a sample of 12 banks in Tunisia over the period (2005….2022). By employing a method of panel static we found that liquidity has a significant impact on bank lending. |
| Keywords: | Liquidity, bank, lending, Tunisia |
| JEL: | M21 |
| Date: | 2024–06–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121669 |
| By: | Caroline Krafft; Ragui Assaad; Jackline Wahba |
| Abstract: | As of 2022, Sudan was home to 1.1 million refugees and 3.7 million internally displaced persons(IDPs), along with a substantial population that had previously experienced displacement. TheSudan Labor Market Panel Survey (SLMPS) 2022 over-sampled locations hosting the displacedin order to facilitate research on refugees and IDPs. This paper investigates the geographicdistribution of the displaced, their demographics, their labor market and socioeconomic statusand outcomes, and their education, health, food security outcomes. It also reviews theirexperiences of shocks, their coping strategies, and the types of social assistance they receive.Important distinctions are made between current and returned IDPs and refugees and theiroutcomes are compared to those of Sudanese who were never displaced. Analyses also exploredifferences by location of residence (in host communities and camps), by sex, and acrossdifferent age groups. |
| Keywords: | demographics, displacement, education, health, internally displaced persons, labor, refugees, sudan |
| JEL: | F22 I14 I24 J11 J21 O15 R23 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hic:wpaper:413 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Depuis des décennies, l'histoire du Soudan, troisième plus grand pays d'Afrique avec environ 46 millions d'habitants, est marquée par de violents affrontements entre les élites militaires du Nord, musulmanes et arabes de la capitale Khartoum aux dépens de la population civile. Depuis que le Soudan a obtenu son indépendance en 1956, il y a eu 16 tentatives de coup d'État, dont six ont réussi. C'était plus que dans tout autre pays sur un continent qui a lui-même connu plus de coups d'État que toute autre région du monde. Deux guerres civiles entre le gouvernement de Khartoum et les régions du sud ont fait environ 1, 5 million de victimes. En outre, le conflit en cours dans la région occidentale du Darfour a tué plus de 200 000 personnes et déplacé deux millions de personnes. Dans ces conflits, les frontières ont peu d'importance. Le contrôle des ressources et des sujets est l'objectif principal, et les forces qui surgissent dans les régions frontalières cherchent à se venger des élites métropolitaines méprisées. L'importance géopolitique du Soudan dans une région instable, bordant la mer Rouge, le Sahel et la Corne de l'Afrique, ainsi que sa prospérité agricole, ont attiré des acteurs régionaux et mondiaux et ont entravé la réussite de la transition vers un gouvernement dirigé par des civils et le développement durable. Outre la Grande-Bretagne, l'ancienne puissance coloniale, la Russie, les États-Unis, l'Arabie Saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et d'autres pays voisins se battaient pour l'influence au Soudan, notamment l'Éthiopie, le Tchad et le Soudan du Sud. Eux aussi ont été touchés par les troubles politiques et les conflits et ont souffert sous le fardeau des réfugiés soudanais fuyant les combats vers les pays voisins. Les dirigeants coloniaux britanniques avaient déjà utilisé les différences existantes pour diviser la population en fonction des affiliations ethniques et régionales, une pratique qui survit à ce jour. L'activisme des milices a approfondi les divisions entre les partisans des rebelles. Cette politique, de diviser pour régner correspondait à une tactique bien établie, utilisée par les gouvernements africains dans les guerres civiles ethniques, exploitant souvent les milices pour encourager et faciliter la migration ethnique en intégrant les milices dans l'armée nationale. Des réseaux criminels transnationaux bien établissent impliqués dans le trafic de drogue, d'armes et d'êtres humains étaient également prêts à profiter du chaos. Cela a fait du Soudan l'un des pays les plus fragiles au monde. L'effondrement du Soudan ébranlerait non seulement ses voisins, mais pourrait également bouleverser plusieurs autres pays africains, y compris des États fragiles du Sahel et d'Afrique de l'Est et du Nord. Les effets secondaires d'une zone de conflit aussi incalculable et le chaos qui en résulte affecteraient également l'Europe occidentale, qui souffre déjà de l'afflux de réfugiés de Syrie et d'autres zones de guerre au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique. |
| Abstract: | For decades, the history of Sudan, Africa's third largest country with around 46 million inhabitants, has been marked by violent clashes between the northern, Muslim and Arab military elites of the capital Khartoum at the expense of the civilian population. Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, there have been 16 attempted coups, six of which were successful. That was more than in any other country on a continent that has itself seen more coups than any other region in the world. Two civil wars between the government in Khartoum and the southern regions claimed around 1.5 million victims. In addition, the ongoing conflict in the western Darfur region has killed more than 200, 000 people and displaced two million people. In these conflicts, borders mean little. Control of resources and subjects is the primary objective, and forces arising in the borderlands seek revenge on the despised metropolitan elites. Sudan's geopolitical importance in a volatile region bordering the Red Sea, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, as well as its agricultural prosperity, attracted regional and global actors and hampered the successful transition to civilian-led government and sustainable development. In addition to Great Britain, the former colonial power, Russia, the USA, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other neighbouring countries were fighting for influence in Sudan, including Ethiopia, Chad and South Sudan. They, too, were affected by political unrest and conflict and suffered under the burden of Sudanese refugees fleeing the fighting to neighbouring countries. The British colonial rulers had already used existing differences to divide the population according to ethnic and regional affiliations, a practice that survives to this day. Militia activism deepened divisions among rebel supporters. This divide-and-conquer policy corresponded to a well-established tactic used by African governments in ethnic civil wars, often exploiting the militias to encourage and facilitate ethnic migration by integrating the militias into the national army. Transnational, well-entrenched criminal networks involved in drug-, arms- and human trafficking also stood ready to take advantage of the chaos. This made Sudan one of the most fragile countries in the world. Sudan's collapse would not only shake its neighbours, but could also upset several other African countries, including fragile states in the Sahel, and East and North Africa. The side effects of such an incalculable conflict zone and the resulting chaos would also affect Western Europe, which is already suffering from the influx of refugees from Syria and other war zones in the Middle East and Africa. |
| Keywords: | Soudan, Soudan du Sud, conflit soudanais de 2023, trafic, réfugiés, famine, Afrique subsaharienne, nationalisme, post-colonialisme, Russie |
| JEL: | E26 F54 H12 H56 I31 J46 N17 O55 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300929 |
| By: | Saïd Balhadj (ENCGT - Ecole Nationale de Commerce et de Gestion de Tanger - UAE - Abdelmalek Essaadi University [Tétouan] = Université Abdelmalek Essaadi [Tétouan]); Maryam EL MOUDDEN (ENCGT - Ecole Nationale de Commerce et de Gestion de Tanger - UAE - Abdelmalek Essaadi University [Tétouan] = Université Abdelmalek Essaadi [Tétouan]) |
| Keywords: | innovation organisationnelle l'avantage compétitif performance organisationnelle PME exportatrice marocaine Classification JEL : O31 Organizational innovation competitive advantage organizational performance Moroccan-exporting SMEs JEL Classification: O31 Paper type: Empirical research, innovation organisationnelle, l'avantage compétitif, performance organisationnelle, PME exportatrice marocaine, competitive advantage, organizational performance, Moroccan-exporting SMEs |
| Date: | 2022–09–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04653608 |