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on MENA - Middle East and North Africa |
| By: | Aysoy, Cem; Aysoy, Cevriye; Tumen, Semih |
| Abstract: | Using a national panel of housing units, this paper documents that the rate of nominal rigidity in housing rents is high in Turkey between 2008 and 2011. We find that, on average, 31.5 percent of the rents did not change from year to year in nominal terms. We then ask if the incidence of nominal rigidity depends on the turnover status of the housing unit. We show that 35.4 percent of the nonturnover units had rigid rents, while for only 17.1 percent of the turnover units rents did not change. We also present evidence that grid pricing is associated with more than half of the nominal rigidity in housing rents in our sample. The household- and individual-level determinants of the nominal rigidity in rents and turnover status are also investigated using the micro-level details available in our dataset. We document that, relative to the low-income tenants, high-income tenants are less likely to have rigid rents and they are also less likely to change units frequently. This finding suggests that search and moving costs impose frictions that amplify the opportunity costs of high-income tenants; thus, they are more likely to agree on reasonable rent increases for the purpose of saving time and reducing emotional stress. |
| Keywords: | Housing rents; nominal rigidities; turnover; grid pricing |
| JEL: | E31 R21 R31 |
| Date: | 2014–04–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:55292&r=ara |
| By: | Mehri, Meryem |
| Abstract: | This paper considers an international sample of conventional and Islamic mutual funds to assess whether law, culture, and political risk affect the performance, risk-taking behavior and compensation fees of mutual funds. Overall, the results show strongly that legal conditions, culture, and political risk have robust differential effects on fees, performance and risk-taking behavior of Islamic funds and conventional funds. We find that Islamic mutual funds in countries with higher legal conditions receive lower fees, whereas conventional funds receive higher carried interest, lower fixed management fees and weaker expense ratio. In such conditions, conventional and Islamic fund managers have lower performance and take higher specific and systematic risk. Overall, Hoefsted culture’s measures affect significantly the fees structure, performance and risk-taking behavior with robust differential effects on Islamic and conventional funds. Focusing on political risk effects, we show that, in countries with higher political risk, carried interest and performance will be higher, whereas the specific and systematic risk will be stronger for Islamic and conventional funds. The components of country legality and political risk Index have significant differential effects on Islamic and conventional funds’ characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Performance; Risk; Managerial Compensation; Incentive Contracts; Mutual funds; Law and finance; Political risk; |
| JEL: | K29 G23 G24 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/13099&r=ara |