| By: |
Disli, Mustafa (BOFIT);
Schoors , Koen (BOFIT);
Meir, Jos (BOFIT) |
| Abstract: |
We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a
sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm
enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician’s
party is currently in power – less so if the former politician served as a
minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former
politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection
effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal
severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to
the bank during their term tend to leave with them. |
| Keywords: |
depositor discipline; political connections; banks |
| JEL: |
D70 G10 G21 |
| Date: |
2013–04–23 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2013_006&r=ara |