2013-05-24 papers

on MENA - Middle East and North Africa

Issue of 2013–05–24
one paper chosen by
Paul Makdissi, Université d’Ottawa

Political connections and depositor discipline By Disli, Mustafa; Schoors , Koen; Meir, Jos

Political connections and depositor discipline

By:	Disli, Mustafa (BOFIT); Schoors , Koen (BOFIT); Meir, Jos (BOFIT)
Abstract:	We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician’s party is currently in power – less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to leave with them.
Keywords:	depositor discipline; political connections; banks
JEL:	D70 G10 G21
Date:	2013–04–23
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2013_006

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