nep-ara New Economics Papers
on Arab World
Issue of 2012‒10‒27
six papers chosen by
Quentin Wodon
World Bank

  1. "Riba in La-riba contracts: where to turn in Islamic home financing? By Hasan, Zubair
  2. Political Ambiguity and Economic Development: The MENA Countries Pre-Commercial Procurement of Innovation By Juliane Brach; Willem Spanjers
  3. Establishing Monetary Union in the Gulf Cooperation Council: What Lessons for Regional Cooperation? By Takagi, Shinji
  4. Linkages between Defence Spending and Income Inequality in Iran By Muhammad, Shahbaz; Reza , Sherafatian-Jahromi; Muhammad, Nasir Malik
  5. Wages and On-the-Job Training in Tunisia By Christophe Muller; Christophe J. Nordman
  6. LA CRISE DU REGIME RENTIER D'ACCUMULATION EN ALGERIE By Samir Bellal

  1. By: Hasan, Zubair
    Abstract: This note demonstrates that the Msharakah Mutanaqisa home financing model is worsethan the conventional interest bearing loan financing; it is not only based oncompounding of return italso passes the ownership to the customer at a slower rate. The purpose is to draw attention of the Shari'ah scholars, bankers and regulators of Islamic bankers with a view to elisit comments for editing before its publication.
    Keywords: Islamic ban on interest; Compounding of return on investment; Islamic verdict
    JEL: G28 G21
    Date: 2012–04–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38166&r=ara
  2. By: Juliane Brach (The Knowledge Company, Germany and Maastricht School of Management, The Netherlands, Contact: jbrach@knowledgecompany.eu); Willem Spanjers (Kingston University, United Kingdom and Rimini Center for Economic Analysis, Italy. Contact: w.spanjers@kingston.ac.uk)
    Abstract: In this paper we provide a coherent framework for analyzing the impact of incalculable political risk, i.e. political ambiguity, on economic development and the choice of development strategy. Using indicators for the levels of internal and external political ambiguity, we analyze the growth paths of MENA countries based on annual data for the period from 1980 to 2008. Succession rules for governments are our indicator for internal political ambiguity, the potential for becoming involved in disruptive international conflicts serves as an indicator for external political ambiguity. Our results show that political ambiguity has a negative impact on both the level of per capita GDP and its growth. Our theoretical model suggests that political ambiguity biases development strategies, leading to an underinvestment in intensive sources of growth.
    Keywords: economic development, decision making, ambiguity, development strategy, political economy, Middle East and North Africa
    JEL: O14 O33 O53 D81
    Date: 2012–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:msm:wpaper:2012/39&r=ara
  3. By: Takagi, Shinji (Asian Development Bank Institute)
    Abstract: The paper reviews the experience of regional economic cooperation in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Conceived as a regional security alliance, the GCC has evolved to become a common market in the making. All six GCC countries participate in the common market project, and additional countries may join. But the timing of introducing a common currency, initially targeted for 2010, remains uncertain, especially in the light of the ongoing euro area crisis. Two countries have withdrawn from the common currency project; another has ceased to comply with a prerequisite for entering the monetary union. But the GCC is not the same as the GCC Monetary Union, nor should the success of the GCC be judged solely on the basis of how many member states end up participating in the single currency.
    Keywords: monetary union; gulf cooperation council; regional cooperation; common market; common currency; single currency; euro area
    JEL: F15 F36 F55 O53
    Date: 2012–10–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0390&r=ara
  4. By: Muhammad, Shahbaz; Reza , Sherafatian-Jahromi; Muhammad, Nasir Malik
    Abstract: This paper contributes in economic literature by investigating the impact of defence spending on income inequality in a case of Iran using time series data over the period of 1969-2011. For this purpose, we have applied the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration for long run relationship in the presence of structural breaks arising in the series. The stationarity properties of the variables are tested using structural break unit root tests. The causal relationship between defence spending and income inequality is examined by employing the VECM Granger causality approach. Our findings validate the long run relationship between the series. The results indicated that defence spending improves income distribution in Iran. An inverted-U shaped relationship exists between defence spending and income inequality. Economic growth deteriorates income inequality. The causality analysis reveals that defence spending Granger causes income inequality and feedback effect exists between income inequality and economic growth.
    Keywords: Defense Spending; Income Inequality
    JEL: D6
    Date: 2012–10–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:41983&r=ara
  5. By: Christophe Muller (Aix-Marseille Université); Christophe J. Nordman (IRD, DIAL and IZA)
    Abstract: In this paper, we conduct an econometric analysis of the links of on-the-job training (OJT) and worker remuneration in the area of Tunis using a case study data based on eight firms. We pay particular attention to the way the OJT cost may be shared between firms and workers. This is done through analysing the sign of various OJT variables and different wage information. This is important because training costs may be a major obstacle to intra-firm human capital accumulation in Tunisia. However, in this emerging economic context where severe tensions are present on the labour market, firms may be tempted to extract most of the labour relation surplus by having workers implicitly paying for their within-firm training. Our estimates show that: (1) The duration of former OJT negatively influences starting wages, while there is no anticipated effect of future training on wages at the firm entry; (2) Current wages are positively affected by former OJT but negatively affected by ongoing OJT; (3) Trend factors seem too much affect the influence of OJT on wages growth; (4) OJT main determinants are education, gender, family situation and firm characteristics, but neither experience nor tenure. Overall, our estimation results are consistent with popular human capital theory and broader OJT cost sharing theories. They suggest that firms bear much of the cost of OJT, which may jeopardize their profitability. Public subsidies for OJT programmes may be an appropriate policy response. However, the latter are sustainable only if they are supported by adequate public education systems, allowing efficient OJT within firms.
    Keywords: wage, on-the-job training, matched worker-firm data, Tunisia.
    JEL: J24 J31 O12
    Date: 2012–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1222&r=ara
  6. By: Samir Bellal (Faculté des Sciences Economiques - Université de Guelma)
    Abstract: Ce papier se propose de fournir, en s'appuyant sur une approche empruntée à l'Ecole de la régulation, une spécification de la crise structurelle du régime rentier à l'œuvre en Algérie. L'analyse nous permettra d'en diagnostiquer les sources et d'en identifier les principales manifestations au plan macroéconomique et au niveau du comportement des acteurs de l'accumulation.
    Keywords: Régime rentier, mode de régulation, crise, arrangement institutionnel, fordisme.
    Date: 2012–10–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00569330&r=ara

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