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on Agricultural Economics |
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Issue of 2008‒06‒13
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Cust, J.; Singh, A.; Neuhoff, K. |
| Abstract: | The paper assesses the demand for rural electricity services and contrasts it with the technology options available for rural electrification. Decentralised Distributed Generation can be economically viable as reflected by case studies reported in literature and analysed in our field study. Project success is driven by economically viable technology choice; however it is largely contingent on organisational leadership and appropriate institutional structures. While individual leadership can compensate for deployment barriers, we argue that a large scale roll out of rural electrification requires an alignment of economic incentives and institutional structures to implement, operate and maintain the scheme. This is demonstrated with the help of seven case studies of projects across north India. |
| Keywords: | Rural Electrification, Distributed Generation, Renewable Energy, India. |
| JEL: | D23 L94 Q42 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0763&r=agr |
| By: | S. S. M. Sadrul Huda, Ahmed Taneem Muzaffar and Jashim Uddin Ahmed (East West University, Bangladesh; East West University, Bangladesh; North South University, Bangladesh) |
| Abstract: | Contaminated and unhygienic food intake is a major problem in the urban cities of Bangladesh. This raises a serious concern for health of the urban citizens. The research investigates into the attitude of the urban educated people on their awareness of food safety. The findings of the study suggest a high degree of awareness amongst respondents of the attitudinal survey. People with higher educational background show higher degree of awareness of how the quality of food should be maintained. A lack of confidence on the functions of government regulatory agency in testing the food standard is also reflected in the study. |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aiu:abewps:65&r=agr |
| By: | Munro, Alistair |
| Abstract: | Decision-makers have a wide variety of competing and complementary methods for non-market valuation, but there is little formal advice on the choice of method. I offer a formal approach, using a loss function (the mean square error) to compare contingent valuation, Citizens'Jury and methods where by intention only a portion of total value is estimated, when a) preferences vary across the population and b) methods are more or less susceptible to framing effects. Illustrative simulations suggest con-ditions under which the Citizens'Jury may dominate contingent valuation when framing effects are significant. |
| Keywords: | contingent valuation; Citizens' Jury; optimal decisions; framing effects; cost-benefit analysis |
| JEL: | D61 Q51 D01 |
| Date: | 2007–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:8978&r=agr |
| By: | Christopher Bruce; Jeremy Clark (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | In one of the most ambitious forms of environmental decision-making, representatives of interested parties – environmentalists, developers, farmers, loggers, miners, etc. - are charged with the responsibility of developing a set of public policies that is acceptable to all of them. Although this approach has become increasingly popular, and has been widely discussed in the academic literature, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached in this type of negotiation. We do not know, for example, whether these outcomes meet the standard criteria for efficiency or equity. In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to test whether a number of axiomatic models of bargaining can predict the behavior of the parties to environmental decision making. In recognition of the multi-dimensional aspect of most public land use conflicts, we ask pairs of subjects to negotiate over two goods, without the possibility of cash side payments. We thus provide one of the first experimental tests of a prediction associated with the Edgeworth Box: that parties with an initial endowment that is Pareto inefficient will make trades until they reach a Pareto efficient allocation. We further test whether parties in particular reach the Nash bargain when it coincides with or conflicts with outcomes that maximise the parties’ joint payoffs and with outcomes at which the parties’ receive equal payoffs. Finally, the effect of providing parties with full or partial information regarding payoffs is also examined. |
| Keywords: | Axiomatic models of bargaining; Experimental tests; Land use conflicts; Collaborative policymaking |
| JEL: | C92 D74 H41 J52 Q51 |
| Date: | 2008–05–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:08/08&r=agr |