nep-agr New Economics Papers
on Agricultural Economics
Issue of 2006‒09‒30
six papers chosen by
Angelo Zago
Universita degli Studi di Verona

  1. Seasonal Cycles in European Agricultural Commodity Prices By Jumah, Adusei; Kunst, Robert M.
  2. Green Revolutions and Miracle Economies : Agricultural Innovation, Trade and Growth By Brishti Guha
  3. The Value of Third-Party Certification of Preconditioning Claims at Iowa Feeder Cattle Auctions By Bulut, Harun; Lawrence, John D.
  4. Financing and Access in Cooperatives By REY, Patrick; TIROLE, Jean
  5. Trade performances, product quality perceptions and the estimation of trade price-elasticities By Matthieu Crozet; Hélène Erkel-Rousse
  6. Collective Voluntary Agreements and the Production of Less Polluting Products By Rasha Ahmed; Kathleen Segerson

  1. By: Jumah, Adusei (Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria and Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Austria); Kunst, Robert M. (Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria and Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Austria)
    Abstract: This paper explores the seasonal cycles of European agricultural commodity prices. We focus on three food crops (barley, soft and durum wheat) and on beef. We investigate whether seasonality is deterministic or unit-root stochastic and whether seasonal cycle for specific agricultural commodities have converged over time. Finally, we develop time-series models that are capable of forecasting agricultural prices on a quarterly basis. Firstly, we find that seasonal cycles in agricultural commodity prices are mainly deterministic and that evidence on common cycles across countries varies over agricultural commodities. The prediction experiments, however, yield a ranking with respect to accuracy that does not always match the statistical in-sample evidence.
    Keywords: Seasonal cycles, Seasonal unit roots, Forecasting, Agricultural commodities
    JEL: C32 C53 Q11
    Date: 2006–09
  2. By: Brishti Guha (School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University)
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model of an economy in which growth is driven by a combination of exogenous technical change in agriculture as well as by a rising world demand for labor-intensive manufactured exports. We explore the relative roles of agricultural innovation and rising export demand in a model with two traded industrial goods and a non-traded agricultural good, food. When the non-traded sector uses a specific factor, we show that technical change in agriculture may be the key to sustained factor accumulation in industry, in particular driving intersectoral labor migration. A key assumption is a less than unitary price elasticity of demand for food. Our results could form a crucial link in capturing the story of labor-abundant economies which experienced structural transformation and growth through labor-intensive manufactured exports, without prior technology breakthroughs in industry. They contribute to explaining the massive growth in factor accumulation which shows up in some growth accounting studies : they may also imply that some of the contribution of “technical progress” is mistakenly attributed solely to factor accumulation.
    Keywords: Structural change, agricultural productivity, labor migration, terms of trade.
    JEL: O3 O4 F1
    Date: 2005–09
  3. By: Bulut, Harun; Lawrence, John D.
    Abstract: After controlling a variety of feeder cattle characteristics and market and sale conditions, we estimate the price premiums for preconditioning (vaccinations and minimum 30 days weaning) claims with and without third-party certification (TPC) as $6.15/cwt and $3.40/cwt, respectively, in Iowa feeder cattle auctions. These premiums differ statistically (p-value less than 0.0001) and their difference exceeds the additional participation cost of TPC ($1/cwt) on average. This indicates that the third party certification is valued in the market to credibly signal preconditioning investment under asymmetric information.
    Keywords: Asymmetric information, Feeder cattle auctions, Quality, Signaling, Third party certification.
    JEL: C2 Q1
    Date: 2006–09–25
  4. By: REY, Patrick; TIROLE, Jean
    JEL: L2 L3 D7
    Date: 2006–06
  5. By: Matthieu Crozet (TEAM - Théories et Applications en Microéconomie et Macroéconomie - [CNRS : UMR8059] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]); Hélène Erkel-Rousse (TEAM - Théories et Applications en Microéconomie et Macroéconomie - [CNRS : UMR8059] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I], DP - Direction de la Prévision - [Ministère de l'Economie des Finances et de l'Industrie])
    Abstract: Traditional trade models ignoring the dimension of product quality generally lead to excessively low trade price elasticities. In this paper, we show that higher estimated trade price elasticities, more in conformity with theory, can be obtained by controlling product quality in trade equations. To do so, we have estimated trade equations including a product quality proxy derived from survey data. Our estimation results, based on panel data for the four main EU member States, confirm the part played by product quality in the estimation of trade price elasticities, at least for traditionally highly differentiated products.
    Keywords: Trade performances ; trade equations ; trade price elasticities ; imperfect competition ;<br />product differentiation ; quality ; unit value indices
    Date: 2006–09–20
  6. By: Rasha Ahmed (University of Connecticut); Kathleen Segerson (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: Recently, some industries have collectively agreed not to produce models that do not meet an energy efficiency (and hence an environmental) standard. This paper presents a simple model that can be used to examine a voluntary collective agreement to limit or completely eliminate the low efficiency model of a given product (e.g., a low efficiency washing machine). We show that, when there is competition between firms, a collective agreement to limit or even eliminate production of the polluting model can actually increase profits for all firms in the industry. This suggests that a collective agreement of this type might actually be beneficial to firms, while at the same time improving environmental quality. However, the implicit enforcement that comes from the public nature of the commitment is necessary to ensure this outcome. This suggests that, by promoting such agreements, policymakers may be able to achieve substantial environmental gains with relatively little inducement. The impact on social welfare will then depend on whether these gains are sufficiently large to offset consumer losses from reductions in product variety and the associated price increases.
    Keywords: Voluntary agreements, collective agreements, energy/fuel efficiency
    JEL: Q48 Q58
    Date: 2006–07

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