nep-age New Economics Papers
on Economics of Ageing
Issue of 2023‒12‒04
25 papers chosen by
Claudia Villosio, LABORatorio R. Revelli


  1. Long-term Care in Japan By Rong Fu; Toshiaki Iizuka; Haruko Noguchi
  2. What Happened to Late Boomers’ Retirement Wealth? By Anqi Chen; Alicia H. Munnell; Laura D. Quinby
  3. Assessing old-age poverty with income and assets: Generational insights and policy directions By Lee, Seunghee
  4. Long-term care in the Netherlands By Pieter Bakx; Eddy Van Doorslaer; Bram Wouterse
  5. Why Did Disability Insurance Rolls Drop from 2015 to 2019? By Siyan Liu; Laura D. Quinby
  6. How Well Do People Perceive Their Retirement Preparedness? By Anqi Chen; Yimeng Yin; Alicia H. Munnell
  7. Long-term Care in England By James Banks; Eric French; Jeremy McCauley
  8. Should Social Security Invest in Equities? By Alicia H. Munnell; Michael Wicklein
  9. Transferring Control of Finances: Timing Poses a Risk By John Ameriks; Andrew Caplin; Minjoon Lee; Matthew D. Shapiro; Christopher Tonetti
  10. What Drives the Racial Housing Wealth Gap for Older Homeowners? By Siyan Liu; Laura D. Quinby
  11. Universalizing the Access to Long-term Care: Evidence from Spain By Joan Costa-Font; Sergi Jimenez-Martin; Cristina Vilaplana-Prieto; Analía Viola
  12. Demographic aging and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve By Ambrocio, Gene
  13. Economic usefulness of older workers in terms of productivity in the modern world By Janis Kudins
  14. The Determinants of Institutional Capital Allocation to Real Estate By Alexander Carlo; Nils Kok; Piet Eichholtz
  15. The Sustainability of State & Local Pensions: A Public Finance Approach By Louise Sheiner
  16. Social Security’s Financial Outlook: The 2023 Update in Perspective By Alicia H. Munnell
  17. Wills, Wealth, and Race By Jean-Pierre Aubry; Alicia H. Munnell; Gal Wettstein
  18. Public Pension Funded Levels Improve Amidst Rising Interest Rates By Jean-Pierre Aubry; Yimeng Yin
  19. Look at your old men dying: long-run effect of civil war on mortality By Mikko Myrskylä; Torsten Santavirta
  20. Examining recent mortality trends: The impact of demographic change By David Morgan; Paul Lukong; Philip Haywood; Gabriel Di Paolantonio
  21. Population Aging and Small Business Dynamics By XU Peng
  22. Unionization of retired workers in Europe By Pyka, Vinzenz; Schnabel, Claus
  23. Trends in cognitive impairment among older adults in the USA and Europe, 1996-2018 By Mikko Myrskylä; Jo M. Hale; Daniel C. Schneider; Neil K. Mehta
  24. High Inflation and Wage Rigidity: The Implicit Response of the Italian Tax-Benefit System By Stefano Boscolo; Francesco Figari
  25. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONGEVITY ECONOMY IN THE REGIONS OF RUSSIA By Grishina, Irina (Гришина, Ирина); Polynev, Andrey (Полынев, Андрей); Filatov, Artemiy (Филатов, Артемий)

  1. By: Rong Fu; Toshiaki Iizuka; Haruko Noguchi
    Abstract: Japan, renowned for its significantly aged population, presents a distinctive landscape in elderly care. Notably, there exists no apparent correlation between the economic well-being of the elderly and the limitations they experience in Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs). In response to the escalating demand for elderly care, Japan introduced the public Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) system in 2000. This comprehensive program offers a wide spectrum of long-term care services, aiming to facilitate aging in place for seniors and alleviate the burdens on informal caregivers. Nevertheless, the LTCI system faces substantial challenges, predominantly related to financial sustainability and a shortage of human resources. Ongoing discussions center on achieving cost-effective service delivery, potential adjustments to premium rates and copayments, especially for individuals with ample financial resources or minimal care needs. Furthermore, debates surround the reduction of the age of eligibility for LTCI, with opposition stemming from intricate financial and structural considerations. Japan grapples with a deficiency of social security contributors and skilled care workers, necessitating endeavors to enhance labor force participation and foster innovation in the long-term care sector. Japan's LTCI system offers invaluable insights for countries grappling with akin demographic and care-related predicaments.
    JEL: I10 I13 I18 I19
    Date: 2023–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31829&r=age
  2. By: Anqi Chen; Alicia H. Munnell; Laura D. Quinby
    Abstract: Late Boomers have surprisingly low levels of retirement wealth compared to earlier cohorts. A decline in some wealth components had been expected as a result of the rise in Social Security’s Full Retirement Age and the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. But increasing 401(k)/IRA balances were predicted to offset the gap, since Late Boomers were the first generation where workers could have spent their whole career covered by a 401(k) plan. That did not happen: retirement wealth dropped across all but the top quintile. Why do Late Boomers have so little wealth? And what do the patterns imply for Early Gen Xers and subsequent cohorts? This brief, which is based on a recent paper, attempts to answer these questions using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to look at actual patterns of wealth accumulation by cohort and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to gather insights on the experience of Late Boomers over their work life.1 The HRS also serves as the basis for a decomposition exercise to evaluate the role of the various factors that depressed Late Boomer wealth. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section documents the decline in wealth for Late Boomers and explores whether variation by race and ethnicity might have contributed. The second section looks at an alternative factor that might explain the drop in Late Boomers’ wealth – namely, their labor market experience in the Great Recession. The third section uses a decomposition technique to sort out the relative contribution of shifting demographics versus labor-market experience in explaining the drop in wealth. The results show that two factors were at play – a shift in the population towards lower-wealth households and, more importantly, a weakening of the link between work and wealth accumulation. The final section concludes that to the extent that the decline in wealth is a Great Recession story, some of the downward pressure on wealth holdings should abate – potential goods news for younger cohorts.
    Date: 2023–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-16&r=age
  3. By: Lee, Seunghee
    Abstract: Korea's old-age poverty rate, based solely on income, ranks among the highest in the OECD. While the rate drops slightly when assets are considered, it remains persistently high. There are marked disparities in poverty rates across different elderly birth cohorts, with older groups facing higher rates. A greater share of the low-income, low-asset segment also marks the observed inequality. To effectively address poverty among the elderly, policy efforts should prioritize support for the oldest members of this vulnerable low-income, low-asset segment. Concurrently, financial assistance for seniors in the low-income, high-asset group should be scaled back. A practical move toward this direction would be revising the eligibility criteria for the Basic Pension to include asset-inclusive pensionable earnings.
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kdifoc:279690&r=age
  4. By: Pieter Bakx; Eddy Van Doorslaer; Bram Wouterse
    Abstract: We describe the financing and use of long-term care in the Netherlands. Public long-term care insurance is universal and comprehensive; user fees are low compared to other countries. We use linked survey and administrative data to document the distribution of the need for long-term care in the 65+ population, long-term care costs and how they are paid for. The findings reveal that no other country spends more per capita on publicly financed formal care than The Netherlands. A potential reason is that the threshold to receive formal care appears to be lower in the Netherlands than in other countries. Still, a considerable share of the adult population provides informal care. Caregiving is concentrated in specific demographic groups. The costs of informal care provision are considerable, but as a share of total spending on long term care they are smaller than in most developed countries. Adding the costs of informal care to formal care expenditures changes the view on who bears the costs of long-term care.
    JEL: I10 I13 I18
    Date: 2023–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31823&r=age
  5. By: Siyan Liu; Laura D. Quinby
    Abstract: In 2015, the number of individuals receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits began to drop, reversing an upward trend that had persisted for two decades. Policymakers are interested in the extent to which this drop, which has substantially improved the program’s finances, reflects a permanent shift. This recent drop in DI rolls is due to increased terminations, as beneficiaries age into Social Security’s retirement program, combined with a steep decline in the incidence rate (the number of new DI awards relative to the insured population) starting in 2010. Three factors could be playing a role in the declining incidence rate. First, population aging may have reduced the number of DI applications as workers instead claimed their retirement benefits. Second, a strong economy following the Great Recession made DI less attractive to prospective applicants with some ability to work. And third, policy changes at the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) – specifically, field office closures and a comprehensive retraining of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) to reduce the rate of benefits awarded on appeal – increased the difficulty of applying and reduced the share of applicants who were accepted. This brief, which is based on a recent study, determines the relative contribution of each factor to the drop in the incidence rate from 2010-2019. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section provides background on the DI program. The second section highlights trends in the DI rolls over the past 30 years. The third section describes the three factors that could explain the recent decline in the incidence rate. The fourth section outlines the data and methodology for our analysis, while the fifth section displays the results. The final section concludes that a strong economy and the stricter ALJ appeals process each account for about half of the total drop in the incidence rate, while population aging has had only a modest impact.
    Date: 2023–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-18&r=age
  6. By: Anqi Chen; Yimeng Yin; Alicia H. Munnell
    Abstract: The National Retirement Risk Index (NRRI) measures the percentage of working-age households that is at risk of being financially unprepared for retirement. Since the Great Recession, the calculations show that even if households work to age 65 and annuitize all their financial assets, including the receipts from reverse mortgages on their homes, roughly half of households are at risk of being unable to maintain their standard of living. This brief examines whether households have a good sense of their own retirement preparedness – do their expectations match the reality they face? That is, do households at risk know they are at risk? Understanding households’ self-assessed retirement preparedness is important because misperceptions can distort saving behaviors. Households that are not worried enough about their retirement income may not save enough even if they have the opportunity; households that are too worried may unnecessarily sacrifice their pre-retirement standard of living. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes the NRRI. The second section compares households’ self-assessed preparedness to the objective measure provided by the NRRI to gauge whether households have accurate perceptions and how those perceptions have changed over time. The third section identifies the characteristics of the households with inaccurate perceptions – those that are either “not worried enough†or “too worried.†The final section concludes that almost 60 percent of self-assessments agree with the NRRI results and that the 40 percent of households that get it wrong do so for predictable reasons. The issue remains, however, whether unprepared households that recognize their situation are any more likely to take corrective action than those that do not.
    Date: 2023–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-12&r=age
  7. By: James Banks; Eric French; Jeremy McCauley
    Abstract: This paper describes the state of Long-Term Care (LTC) in England, which is facing increasing strain due to population aging. We piece together microeconomic and aggregate data in order to give an overview of the demand and supply of LTC in England in a way that facilitates comparisons with other countries, and briefly discuss current LTC policy and recent reforms.
    JEL: H51 I1
    Date: 2023–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31826&r=age
  8. By: Alicia H. Munnell; Michael Wicklein
    Abstract: Investing some of the Social Security trust fund’s assets in equities has obvious appeal. Equity investment has higher expected returns relative to safer assets, so Social Security might need less in tax increases or benefit cuts to achieve long-term solvency. On the other hand, equity investments involve greater risk and raise concerns about interference in private markets and about misleading accounting that suggests the government can get rich simply by issuing bonds and buying equities. The real world provides a convincing case that governments can invest in equities in a sensible manner. Canada has a large actively managed fund, follows fiduciary standards, and uses conservative return assumptions. In the United States, the Railroad Retirement system has also invested in a broad array of assets without interfering in the private market, as has the Federal Thrift Savings Plan, where the government plays an essentially passive role. But do the demonstrated successes mean that equity investment should be part of a solution for Social Security? The prerequisite for such activity is a trust fund with significant assets to invest. The current trust fund is rapidly heading to zero; the likelihood of raising taxes to rebuild it is low; and borrowing to do so does not guarantee any additional resources for Social Security. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section provides background on motivation for equity investment and the concerns of the critics. The second section describes investing initiatives by three retirement plans – the Canada Pension Plan, the Railroad Retirement system, and the Federal Thrift Savings Plan – and evaluates them against the critics’ concerns. The third section explores whether, even if the concerns were addressed, equity investment could be part of a package to restore financial stability to Social Security. The final section concludes that while the mechanics are totally manageable, the time may have passed for raising taxes enough to accumulate a large enough trust fund to make the effort worthwhile.
    Date: 2023–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-14&r=age
  9. By: John Ameriks; Andrew Caplin; Minjoon Lee; Matthew D. Shapiro; Christopher Tonetti
    Abstract: As older Americans approach the end of their lives, many have to make major financial decisions, including estate planning and long-term care arrangements. Unfortunately, with age comes the risk of cognitive decline, which may affect the quality of such decisions as well as making people easier targets for financial scams. One way to help individuals protect their finances against mistakes is to involve a third party (an “agent†), commonly a family member, to take over financial decisions. But several conditions need to be met to make it work. First, the agent must be capable of making good decisions on behalf of the individual and be trustworthy. Second, the agent must be available when needed. Lastly, the transfer of control must be made at the right time, in particular before the aging individual makes irreversible mistakes. This brief, which summarizes a recent study of the authors published by the American Economic Association, assesses the perceptions of individuals ages 55+ about the roles and limits of an agent in addressing cognitive decline, based on a sample of retail investors at the Vanguard Group. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section provides background on the prevalence of cognitive decline and related financial mistakes; and it describes the survey and the sample. The remaining sections summarize the results of the survey. The second section reports that most respondents are confident that they have a suitable agent in mind. The third section explains, though, that respondents anticipate a significant chance that they might transfer control too late, primarily due to a failure to quickly detect their own cognitive decline. The fourth section summarizes the consequences of delay – respondents think it could substantially damage their finances and well-being. The last section concludes that any measure that can help the timely detection of cognitive decline could protect against serious financial mistakes, thereby improving late-life financial security.
    Date: 2023–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-13&r=age
  10. By: Siyan Liu; Laura D. Quinby
    Abstract: Homeownership is one of the largest sources of retirement wealth for most households and is promoted as a key tool for wealth accumulation. However, a long history of discrimination in the housing market has constrained the ability of Black households to accumulate housing wealth relative to their White counterparts. Consequently, Black households approaching retirement are less likely to own homes and, when they do, they see lower wealth accumulation compared to White homeowners. This brief, which is based on a recent paper, focuses on the homeowners. The goal is to determine what share of the age-55 housing wealth gap is due to disadvantage at the time of first purchase – namely, less parental assistance with the mortgage down payment – and what share is due to slower appreciation of subsequent housing wealth? To isolate the impact of these factors, the analysis compares older Black and White homeowners who seem equally able to accumulate housing wealth based on their socioeconomic characteristics, but who still ended up with different outcomes. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section provides background on how older Black families faced disadvantage in nearly every aspect of the housing market. The second section outlines the data and methodology used to evaluate the racial housing wealth gap over the lifecycle for otherwise similar homeowners. The third section presents the results, which show that both factors – disparities at first purchase and subsequent appreciation – play an important role in explaining the gap at age 55. The final section concludes that future research should consider how structural changes in the housing market over the past 30 years might have alleviated some barriers for younger homebuyers.
    Date: 2023–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-07&r=age
  11. By: Joan Costa-Font; Sergi Jimenez-Martin; Cristina Vilaplana-Prieto; Analía Viola
    Abstract: Spain together with Scotland are two countries that exhibit the largest expansions in long term care (LTC) in the last two decades, universalizing subsidies and supports. This paper is part of a global effort to provide a snapshot of the trends in LTC use and access, as well as the financing, and organization of the LTC system compared to other higher-income countries. The passage of Act 39/2006 on the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent Persons (SAAD in Spanish) on December 14th, 2006, universalized coverage for care subsidies and supports, allowing access to care conditioned only on individuals’ assessment of care needs. As a consequence, LTC spending as a percentage of GDP has risen from 0.5% in 2003 to nearly 0.9% in 2019, despite private LTC insurance playing a minor role. Still today, LTC remains heavily reliant on informal care, which is now partially subsidized by a caregiving subsidy as part of SAAD. Long-term care spending in Spain amounts to between 1.27% (conservative estimates) and 1.70% (flexible estimation) of GDP. Finally, the system reveals significant gender imbalances in the provision of care, with women accounting for most caregivers in both formal (87%) and informal (58%) care.
    JEL: D14 G22 I18
    Date: 2023–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31825&r=age
  12. By: Ambrocio, Gene
    Abstract: I document a statistical link between old-age dependency ratios and average markups. I propose that a mechanism whereby households develop deep habits in consumption as they age could explain this feature of the data. I show that when this mechanism is embedded in an overlapping generations New Keynesian model, the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve flattens as the population ages. Further, the contractionary effects of monetary policy surprises on output are amplified. These results suggest that the challenges faced by monetary policy may become more pronounced as populations age.
    Keywords: population aging, Phillips curve, deep habits, market power, markups
    JEL: D11 E21 E32 E52 J11
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofrdp:279566&r=age
  13. By: Janis Kudins (Daugavpils University)
    Abstract: Along with the modern phenomenon of population aging, economists are also concerned about a shift in the composition of the workforce from relatively young to relatively old workers. This study is aimed to empirically prove the hypothesis that in the modern world the economic usefulness of older workers in terms of productivity is determined, in addition to the characteristics of the el derly workforce, by factors characterizing the level of territory development. The theoretical background and methodology of this study is formed on the basis of the concept of "specific human capital" by G. Becker and the conception of endogenous growth. The author uses the latest statistics for 63 countries of the world and several methods of quantitative data analysis: correlation analysis, regression analysis and cluster analysisin order to detect not only correlational parallelism, but also causal relationships between the variables included in the proof of the research hypothesis. The results of the empirical analysis show that technological readiness, along with a high level of lifelong learning in the country, are the catalysts that ensure the economic usefulness of older workers in terms of productivity in the countries of the modern world. The author also concludes that a baseless raising the retirement age in the country, without considering the above factors that characterize the level of development of this country in technological and learning aspects, does not allow the effective use of the economic potential of older workers.
    Keywords: older workers, economic usefulness, productivity, specific human capital, endogenous growth
    Date: 2022–03–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04242553&r=age
  14. By: Alexander Carlo; Nils Kok; Piet Eichholtz
    Abstract: Pension funds worldwide have experienced increasing allocations to alternative assets, the most important being real estate. The question is, however, what the drivers of that real estate allocation are. We exploit the global pension fund database of CEM to shed light on this issue. We find that pension funds’ strategic allocation (net of performance effects) to real estate is the result of the historical performance of the asset class compared to other asset classes and that pension funds adjust their actual allocation percentage quickly to the strategic allocation: we find allocation reductions in years after high returns, and increases in years after low returns. Market risk attitudes – measured by the credit risk spread and the term spread – do not play a role in the overall real estate allocations. Last, we observe that while pension funds’ allocation to real estate has grown over time, this is not the case after we adjust for capital appreciation: In terms of physical real estate assets, pension funds’ portfolios are generally shrinking, with the US leading the way.
    Keywords: Capital flows; Pension funds; real estate
    JEL: R3
    Date: 2023–01–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2023_74&r=age
  15. By: Louise Sheiner
    Abstract: State and local government pension plans are important economic institutions in the United States. They hold nearly $5 trillion in assets; their annual payments to beneficiaries are equal to about 1.5 percent of national GDP; and over 11 million beneficiaries rely on these payments to support themselves in retirement. In recent years, attention has focused on the plans’ large unfunded liabilities and the need to fully fund these obligations. But is full funding the only way to achieve fiscal sustainability? This brief, which is based on a recent paper, explores an alternative path to the fiscal sustainability of state and local pension plans – namely, stabilizing their pension debt as a share of the economy.1 To assess the feasibility of this approach requires: 1) projecting the annual cash flows for a nationally-representative sample of 40 state and local pension systems to see the future evolution of each plan under current contribution levels; and 2) estimating the contribution increases needed to stabilize the ratio of pension debt to the economy. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section provides background on the fiscal stability of state and local plans. The second section describes the data and methodology. The third section presents the results for when plans will exhaust their assets under current funding levels and benefit provisions. A key finding is that pension benefits, as a share of the economy, are currently near their peak and will decline significantly over time due to the reforms instituted by many plans. Nevertheless, many plans are at risk over the long term of exhausting their assets, so action will be needed. The fourth section presents the results on the alternative path, specifically the contribution changes required to stabilize pension debt, both in the long run and to get the ratio at the end of 30 years back to today’s level. The final section concludes that the United States is not facing a state and local pension crisis but, over the longer term, a large share of plans face the risk of insolvency. Hence, they would need to increase contributions to achieve sustainability. But the required adjustments to stabilize debt relative to the economy are generally moderate in size and, in all cases, substantially lower than the adjustments required under the typical full prefunding framework.
    Date: 2023–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-08&r=age
  16. By: Alicia H. Munnell
    Abstract: The 2023 Trustees Report slightly increased the 75-year deficit to 3.61 percent of taxable payroll, compared to 3.42 percent in 2022, and moved up depletion of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund assets from 2034 to 2033. Yes, the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund has enough to pay benefits for the full 75-year period and the date of exhaustion for the combined OASDI trust funds is 2034. But combining the two systems would require a change in the law; hence, under current law the relevant date is 2033 – a decade from now. The fact that in 2033 Social Security would be able to pay only 77 percent of scheduled benefits should focus our collective minds. Thinking of ways to restore balance to the program is not hard; the Social Security Actuaries publish an annual booklet with more than a hundred possible benefits cuts or revenue increases. Indeed, a lot can be said for maintaining a self-financed program. And if the cost of currently scheduled benefits simply exceeds what today’s workers are paying into the system, the traditional proposals to reduce benefits or raise payroll taxes would be most relevant. However, the cause of the shortfall lies elsewhere. Specifically, the program’s “pay-as-you-go†financing – with the exception of the recent build-up and spend-down of the current modest trust fund – makes the program look expensive. This financing approach is the result of a policy decision in the late 1930s to pay benefits far in excess of contributions for the early cohorts of workers. The decision essentially gave away the trust fund that would have accumulated and, importantly, gave away the interest on those contributions. The “Missing Trust Fund†provides a strong justification for an infusion of general revenues into the program. This brief updates the numbers for 2023 and emphasizes the need to act to avoid draconian benefit cuts. To that end, it also lays out the case for spreading across all taxpayers – not just today’s workers – the burden associated with giving away the trust fund. If policymakers accepted this rationale for a general revenue infusion, the pathway to eliminating OASI’s 75-year deficit would be much easier. Fixing Social Security sooner rather than later would distribute the burden more equitably across cohorts, restore confidence in the nation’s major retirement program, and give people time to adjust to needed changes.
    Date: 2023–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-09&r=age
  17. By: Jean-Pierre Aubry; Alicia H. Munnell; Gal Wettstein
    Abstract: Inheritances make up a substantial share of national wealth, but are often overlooked in discussions of retirement security. Racial gaps in inheritances are likely to exacerbate racial disparities in wealth. One reason that Black and Hispanic decedents are less likely to pass down meaningful estates is that they are far less likely to have a will than Whites. This brief, which is based on a recent paper, uses the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to document how the likelihood of receiving an inheritance, the plan to leave a bequest, having a will, and actual bequests vary by race and how the four are interrelated. That is, to what extent does receiving an inheritance increase the likelihood of planning to leave a bequest and having a will, and to what extent does having a will relate to the realization of bequest expectations? Specifically, the analysis uses the HRS exit interviews of proxy informants for HRS participants who have died to explore whether the existence of a will affects the extent to which bequest intentions are actually realized. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section discusses why wills are important. The second describes the data and methods of the analysis. The third section summarizes the factors affecting the likelihood of receiving an inheritance, the plan to leave a bequest of at least $10, 000, $100, 000, and $500, 000, and the presence of a will. The fourth section turns to the results that relate bequest expectations to realized bequests to see whether expectations are a good predictor of real outcomes and how that relationship is affected by the presence of a will and the race of the individual. The final section concludes that race is strongly correlated with the likelihood of having received an inheritance, of having a will, and of leaving a bequest, while wills are positively related to the likelihood that bequest expectations become reality.
    Date: 2023–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-17&r=age
  18. By: Jean-Pierre Aubry; Yimeng Yin
    Abstract: Since fiscal year 2019, financial markets have been jostled by a series of unusual events: 1) the onset of COVID; 2) the subsequent COVID stimulus; 3) declining interest rates; 4) rising inflation; and then 5) rising interest rates. Despite the volatility of asset values over this period, the 2023 funded status of state and local pension plans is about 78 percent, which is 5 percentage points higher than in 2019. This brief reports the change in the funded status of public plans; documents that, despite the turbulence, values for most asset classes are ahead of their 2019 levels; and then looks more closely at the major exception – fixed-income assets (“bonds†). The discussion is organized as follows. The first section shows trends in the funded status and costs of state and local pension plans. The second section documents the general performance of major asset classes since 2019 – highlighting the overall positive portfolio gains despite the relatively poor performance of bonds. The third section quantifies how much the rise in interest rates has hurt bond prices. The final section concludes that the funded status of pension plans has improved, with the recent rise in interest rates only marginally impacting their overall finances.
    Date: 2023–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2023-15&r=age
  19. By: Mikko Myrskylä (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Torsten Santavirta
    Abstract: We study the long-run effect of early adulthood prison camp exposure on mortality using an examiner design and data on 6, 961 former prisoners during the Finnish Civil War of 1918. Our descriptive analysis shows a statistically significant adverse association and a dose response between prison sentence length and old-age mortality. Our instrumental variable design exploits the variation in judge sentence tendency across quasi-randomly assigned judges. We document an effect of sentence length on old-age mortality that is five times larger than the estimated associations. We show that our causal estimates have a local average treatment effect interpretation for the compliers. Keywords: Civil war, Ageing, Mortality, Examiner design
    JEL: J1 Z0
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dem:wpaper:wp-2023-045&r=age
  20. By: David Morgan; Paul Lukong; Philip Haywood; Gabriel Di Paolantonio
    Abstract: The pandemic resulted in a significant increase in the number of deaths in many OECD countries. With detailed data now available by age and sex, this OECD Health Working Paper examines the trends and differences in mortality patterns over the three-year span of the pandemic. While a simple comparison of the raw number of deaths with reference to a historical base period has proved to be an important and straightforward indicator to assess the overall impact of the pandemic, most OECD countries have undergone major changes in population size and structure. This paper reviews the methodology of calculating changes in mortality to take account of such demographic trends and, in producing a revised set of estimates using adjusted numbers of deaths, highlights some important variations in mortality across years, countries and age groups.
    Date: 2023–11–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:elsaad:163-en&r=age
  21. By: XU Peng
    Abstract: This paper uses a large sample of small and medium-sized enterprise financial data (2008-2019) to empirically analyze the effect of a prefecture's population aging on successions, mergers, suspensions/closures, and bankruptcies. The higher the proportion of the population aged 65 and over, the more serious the problem of finding successors for small businesses, that is, the decline in the turnover of aged business owners occurring through succession. Compared to inherited small and medium-sized enterprises, bankrupt enterprises, closed enterprises, and acquired enterprises tend to suffer from poor performance and sales. Companies that suffer from sluggish sales or poor performance go bankrupt, close, or merge; in other words, the metabolism of small and medium-sized enterprises also slow down as the population ages, not only impeding small business metabolism, but also performance— profitability, investment and growth rates--decline with increases in the population aged 65 and older. On the other hand, cash holdings of small businesses increase with population aging, likely because of increases in precautionary liquidity demand in preparation for future business closures.
    Date: 2023–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:polidp:23032&r=age
  22. By: Pyka, Vinzenz; Schnabel, Claus
    Abstract: We shed light on an understudied group: retirees in unions. Using representative individual-level data of 19 European countries, we find that the share of retirees in unions and the union density of retirees increased between 2008 and 2020. Econometric analyses indicate that on average retired workers' probability of union membership is 17 percentage points lower than that of active workers. This finding is consistent with social custom models and cost-benefit considerations. We further find that some determinants of union membership differ between active and retired workers and that standard membership models better explain the unionization of active than retired workers.
    Abstract: Wir untersuchen eine untererforschte Gruppe: Rentner in Gewerkschaften. Basierend auf repräsentativen Individualdaten für 19 europäische Länder finden wir, dass der Rentneranteil in Gewerkschaften und der gewerkschaftliche Organisationsgrad von Rentnern zwischen 2008 und 2020 gestiegen sind. Ökonometrische Analysen zeigen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer gewerkschaftlichen Mitgliedschaft für Rentner im Durchschnitt 17 Prozentpunkte geringer ausfällt als für Beschäftigte. Diese Erkenntnis ist vereinbar mit "social custom"-Modellen und Kosten-Nutzen-Überlegungen. Wir finden zudem, dass sich einige Determinanten der gewerkschaftlichen Mitgliedschaft zwischen aktiven und verrenteten Arbeitskräften unterscheiden und dass die üblichen Mitgliedschaftsmodelle besser die gewerkschaftliche Organisierung von aktiven als von verrenteten Arbeitskräften erklären können.
    Keywords: trade union, retirement, union membership, Europe
    JEL: J26 J51
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:279814&r=age
  23. By: Mikko Myrskylä (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Jo M. Hale (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Daniel C. Schneider (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Neil K. Mehta
    Abstract: Background Single-country studies document varying time trends in cognitive impairment. Comparative analyses across several countries are limited. Methods We use data for a total of 13 countries from three large representative surveys (USA: HRS; England: ELSA; 11 European countries: SHARE), across years 1996-2018, and ages 50 and above. Cognitive function is based on the modified Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status. We use linear regression to study trends in average test scores and logistic regression for cognitive impairment. We analyze trend heterogeneity by gender, age, and education and explore mechanisms by adjusting for migration background, education, health and health behaviors, and partnership status. Results The age-adjusted 10-year change in average score is 0.23 standard deviations (SD) (95% confidence interval (CI) 0.21, 0.24) for SHARE countries; 0.08 (95% CI 0.05, 0.10) in England; and -0.02 (95% CI -0.03, -0.01) in the USA The 10-year change in odds ratio for cognitive impairment is 0.63 (95% CI 0.61, 0.66) for SHARE; 0.93 (95% CI 0.85, 1.02) in England; and 1.05 (95% CI 1.02, 1.09) in the USA. The trends are largely similar across gender, education, and age subgroups. Regional differences in trends remain after adjustment for potential mechanisms. Conclusions Time trends in cognitive function and impairment vary across countries. European countries have experienced improvement over the last twenty years, whereas the USA time trend is worsening or stagnating both in mean scores and in indicators for impairment. Uncovering the causes for this “American exceptionalism” should be both a research and public health priority. Keywords: Cognitive impairment, dementia, trends, comparative analysis
    JEL: J1 Z0
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dem:wpaper:wp-2023-044&r=age
  24. By: Stefano Boscolo; Francesco Figari
    Abstract: We study the redistributive effect of inflation-induced revenue and expenditure variations in the Italian tax-benefit system in a context in which pensions and social transfers are indexed to inflation and nominal wage growth struggles to keep up. By means of the EUROMOD microsimulation model, we isolate the contribution of i ) fiscal drag through the personal income tax, ii ) indexation rules and policy changes regarding social insurance contributions and iii ) pension and social transfer indexation rules related to the overall redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system and its vertical and horizontal components. The findings suggest that benefit indexation rules contribute to a non-negligible extent to income redistribution, that fiscal drag has a small regressive effect and that the implicit redistribution favours pensioners over private-sector employees.
    Keywords: inflation; indexation; fiscal drag; redistribution; EUROMOD
    JEL: D31 H23 H24
    Date: 2023–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:cappmo:0187&r=age
  25. By: Grishina, Irina (Гришина, Ирина) (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration); Polynev, Andrey (Полынев, Андрей) (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration); Filatov, Artemiy (Филатов, Артемий) (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)
    Abstract: The relevance of the work is justified by the fact that it is devoted to the rapidly developing sector of the economy associated with the needs of the older generation. The growth of this sector is associated with the global trend of population aging. The subject of the study is the comparative level of the quality of life of senior citizens and the potential for the development of the longevity economy in the regions of Russia. Purpose of work: a comprehensive study of the factors and evaluation of the prospects for the development of the longevity economy in the regions of Russia and development of priority areas of regional policy. To achieve the goal, the following tasks were undertaken: analysis of scientific approaches to the study of the factors of formation and assessment of the prospects of the «longevity economy at the national and regional levels in the framework of foreign and domestic experience; development of an approach to a comprehensive assessment of factors and prospects for the development of the longevity economy in the regions of the Russia, taking into account the specifics of national and regional statistics; analysis of demographic, social and economic factors in the formation of the longevity economy and assessment of the prospects for its development in the regions of the Russia; a typology of the regions of the Russia in accordance with the assessment of the prospects for the development of the longevity economy; development of proposals on the priorities of regional policy, taking into account the course on import substitution in the conditions of sanctions pressure and the obtained estimates of the prospects for the development of the longevity economy in the regions of Russia. The scientific novelty of the work is determined by the justification of the typology of Russian regions on the basis of the developed integral quality of the older generation life index and the prospects for the development of the longevity economy. Research methods applied: system, factor and statistical analysis of sectoral development, index method, etc. Based on the application of the author's approach, several Russian regions that need additional federal support to improve the older generation life quality and to develop a longevity economy were identified. Priority measures of regional policy have been developed for such regions. The application of the authors’ approach is recommended for information and methodological support of the state regional policy of Russia and increasing of its effectiveness.
    Keywords: longevity economy, senior citizens, regions of Russia, comprehensive assessment, quality of life, methods of analysis, national development goals
    JEL: R11 R12 R13 R58
    Date: 2022–11–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rnp:wpaper:w20220272&r=age

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