nep-age New Economics Papers
on Economics of Ageing
Issue of 2017‒06‒04
six papers chosen by
Claudia Villosio
LABORatorio R. Revelli

  1. Pension Funds in Chile: Bringing the State Back In By Anna Zabkowicz
  2. Problems of Reforming the Institute of Early Pensions for Work in Harmful and Hazardous Conditions By Gorlin, Yury; Galieva, Nadezhda; Grishina, Elena; Eliseeva, Marina; Kartavtsev, Vladimir; Cheremnykh, Anna
  3. More Schooling, More Generous? Estimating the effect of education on intergenerational transfers By YIN Ting; ZHANG Junchao
  4. Future-biased Intergenerational Altruism By Francisco M. Gonzalez; Itziar Lazkano; Sjak A. Smulders
  5. Social Security and Total Replacement Rates in Disability and Retirement By Mashfiqur R. Khan; Matthew S. Rutledge; Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher
  6. Nonparametric Regressions with Thresholds: Identification and Estimations By Yan-Yu Chiou; Mei-Yuan Chen; Jau-er Chen

  1. By: Anna Zabkowicz (Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland)
    Abstract: The privatized and capitalized old-age insurance in Chile has recently witnessed reforms under President Bachelet which extended the social safety net as well as re-introduced publicly-administered programs on behalf of retirees. The article reviews the performance of the system up to the most recent reform and presents results of pension engineering in a systematic way in attempt to estimate the scope of change. The method relies on orderly analysis which is founded on review of the literature relevant to the subject. Bringing the state back into Chile's pension system can be viewed as a plan to subsidize total retirement benefits in order to improve the distressing rates of replacement and, in such indirect way, to support the longevity of privately-managed pension funds.
    Keywords: the political economy of pension reforms - funded pensions - solidarity benefits
    JEL: P16 B52
    Date: 2017–05
  2. By: Gorlin, Yury (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Galieva, Nadezhda (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Grishina, Elena (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Eliseeva, Marina (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Kartavtsev, Vladimir (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Cheremnykh, Anna (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))
    Abstract: One of the main lines of the strategy for long-term development of the pension system of the Russian Federation, approved by the Resolution of the Russian Government is the reform of early retirement institute. In this area Russian Government set an additional tariff of insurance premiums for employers who offer hazardous work; a special assessment of the working conditions is being made, according to it the the size of the additional tariff of insurance premiums from employers determined. In this context the monitoring of the strategy for long-term development of the pension system in terms of reforming early retirement institute for hazardous work appears to be important. A survey of employees engaged in hazardous work and having the right to early retirement, as well as expert interviews with employees who occupy senior positions in companies with hazardous working conditions, allowed to analyse labor behavior and motivation of workers in hazardous and dangerous conditions, how the workers assess their own health condition; to investigate the opinions of employees and employers on the future prospects of reforming the institute of early pensions with regard to the abolition of early retirement for beginner workers and current consequences of the special assessment of working conditions and the introduction of an additional rate of insurance contributions for employees, engaged in hazardous work.
    Date: 2017–02
  3. By: YIN Ting; ZHANG Junchao
    Abstract: This paper studies the causal effect of education on intergenerational transfers from/to adult children. Using micro-data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we exploit exogenous variations in parents' schooling induced by China's Great Famine to take account of the endogeneity of education, and then estimate the effect of schooling on the probability of receiving/giving transfers from/to adult children. The instrumental variable estimates show that an additional year of schooling has a negative effect on the probability of receiving transfers, but a positive effect on the probability of giving transfers at old age. Our results have some policy implications on social security in aging societies.
    Date: 2017–05
  4. By: Francisco M. Gonzalez (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo); Itziar Lazkano (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee); Sjak A. Smulders (Tilburg University)
    Abstract: We show that intergenerational altruism suffers from future bias if generations overlap and people?s altruism concerns the well-being of immediate ancestors and descendants. Future bias involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience, which can create a con?flict of interest between current and future governments representing living generations. We explore the implications of this con?flict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments choosing policies independently over time. We show that future-biased governments can have an incentive to legislate and sustain a pay-as-you-go pension system, which can be understood, from the viewpoint of every government, as a self-enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old-age transfers.
    JEL: D71 D72 H55
    Date: 2017–04
  5. By: Mashfiqur R. Khan; Matthew S. Rutledge; Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher
    Abstract: Social Security provides higher replacement rates to disability insurance beneficiaries than retired beneficiaries. This fact reflects two factors: 1) Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries have lower career earnings, and Social Security benefits are progressive; and 2) SSDI benefits are not reduced for claiming early. This project uses the 1992-2010 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to Social Security Administration earnings records to decompose the differences between the Social Security replacement rates for retired worker and SSDI beneficiaries into these two factors. The project also examines how the total replacement rate – which accounts for other sources of income in addition to Social Security – differs between retirees and SSDI beneficiaries to capture the difference in overall retirement security between the two groups. The results indicate that about half of the 10-percentage-point advantage in Social Security replacement rates for SSDI beneficiaries is due to the actuarial adjustment applied to retirement benefits, implying that career earnings are not that different between retired workers and SSDI beneficiaries. But total replacement rates are substantially lower for SSDI beneficiaries, which indicates that, despite Social Security’s vital role in providing a reliable income source, SSDI beneficiaries have much lower post-career well-being than retired workers.
    Date: 2017–05
  6. By: Yan-Yu Chiou; Mei-Yuan Chen; Jau-er Chen
    Abstract: This paper examines nonparametric regressions with an exogenous threshold variable, allowing for an unknown number of thresholds. Given the number of thresholds and corresponding threshold values, we first establish the asymptotic properties of the local-constant estimator for a nonparametric regression with multiple thresholds. We then determine the unknown number of thresholds and derive the limiting distribution of the proposed test. The Monte Carlo simulation results indicate the adequacy of the modified test and accuracy of the sequential estimation of the threshold values. We apply our testing procedure to an empirical study of the 401(k) retirement savings plan with income thresholds.
    Date: 2017–05

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