nep-age New Economics Papers
on Economics of Ageing
Issue of 2014‒06‒07
seven papers chosen by
Claudia Villosio
LABORatorio R. Revelli

  1. Early retirement and post retirement health By Hallberg, Daniel; Johansson, Per; Josephson, Malin
  2. Delaying the normal and early retirement ages in Spain: behavioural and welfare consequences for employed and unemployed workers By Alfonso R. Sánchez Martín; Jose Ignacio García Pérez; Sergi Jiménez Martín
  3. The Future of Spanish Pensions By Javier Diaz Gimenez; Julian Diaz Saavedra
  4. Pension Design with a Large Informal Labor Market: Evidence from Chile By Joubert, Clement
  5. Mesurer la fragilité des personnes âgées en population générale : une comparaison entre ESPS et SHARE By Nicolas Sirven
  6. Means-tested long term care and family transfers By Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre
  7. Incluir socialmente a los adultos mayores: ¿es suficiente Pensión 65? By Luis García

  1. By: Hallberg, Daniel (The Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate (ISF)); Johansson, Per (IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy); Josephson, Malin (the Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate (ISF))
    Abstract: This paper studies empirically the consequences of retirement on health. We make use of a targeted retirement offer to army employees 55 years of age or older. Before the offer was implemented in the Swedish defense, the normal retirement age was 60 years of age. Estimating the effect of the offer on individuals’ health within the age range 56-70, we find support for a reduction in both mortality and in inpatient care as a consequence of the early retirement offer. Increasing the mandatory retirement age may thus not only have positive government income effects but also negative effects on increasing government health care expenditures.
    Keywords: Health; mortality; inpatient care; retirement; health care; pensions; occupational pensions
    JEL: I18 J22 J26
    Date: 2014–05–19
  2. By: Alfonso R. Sánchez Martín (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Jose Ignacio García Pérez (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Sergi Jiménez Martín (Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
    Abstract: In this paper, we explore the links between pension reform, early retirement, and the use of unemployment as an alternative pathway to retirement. We use a dynamic rational expectations model to analyze the search and retirement behaviour of employed and unemployed workers aged 50 or over. The model is calibrated to reproduce the main reemployment and retirement patterns observed between 2002 and 2008 in Spain. It is subsequently used to analyze the effects of the 2011 pension reform in Spain, characterized by two-year delays in both the early and the normal retirement ages. We ?nd that this reform generates large increases in labour supply and sizable cuts in pension costs, but these are achieved at the expense of very large welfare losses, especially among unemployed workers. As an alternative, we propose leaving the early retirement age unchanged, but penalizing the minimum pension (reducing its generosity in parallel to the cuts imposed on individual pension bene?ts, and making it more actuarially fair with age). This alternative reform strikes a better balance between individual welfare and labour supply stimulus.
    Keywords: Retirement; Unemployment; Incentives; Pension system; Early Retirement; Pension reform; Spain
    JEL: H55 J14 J26 J64
    Date: 2014–06
  3. By: Javier Diaz Gimenez (IESE Business School); Julian Diaz Saavedra (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)
    Abstract: We use an overlapping generations model economy with endogenous retirement to study the 2011 and 2013 reforms of the Spanish public pension system. We nd that this latest reforms, which extend the number of years os contributions used to compute the pensions, delay the retirement ages, introduce two sustainability factors, and eectively transform the Spanish pay-as-yougo system into a dened-contribution system, succeed in making Spanish pensions sustainable until 2037, but they fail to do so afterwards. The success until 2037 is achieved reducing the real value of the average pension and leaving the many loopholes of the contributivity and the transparency of the system unchanged. This reduction in pensions is progressive and, by 2037, the average pension will be approximately 20 percent smaller in real terms than what it would have been under the pension rules prevailing in 2010. The 2013 pension reform fails after 2037 because, from that year onwards, approximately 50 percent of the Spanish retirees will be paid the minimum pension, which is exempt from the sustainability factors. We conjecture that further reforms lurk in the future of Spanish pensions.
    Keywords: Computable general equilibrium, social security reform, retirement.
    JEL: C68 H55 J26
    Date: 2014–05–27
  4. By: Joubert, Clement (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
    Abstract: This paper investigates empirically the fiscal and welfare trade-offs involved in designing a pension system when workers can avoid participation by working informally. A dynamic behavioral model captures a household's labor supply, formal/informal sector choice and saving decisions under the rules of Chile's canonical privatized pension system. The parameters governing household preferences and earnings opportunities in the formal and the informal sector are jointly estimated using a longitudinal survey linked with administrative data from the pension system's regulatory agency. The parameter estimates imply that formal jobs rationing is limited and that mandatory pension contributions play an sizeable role in encouraging informality. Our policy experiments show that Chile could achieve a reduction of 23% of minimum pension costs, while guaranteeing the same level of income in retirement, by increasing the rate at which the benefits taper off.
    Keywords: informality, pensions
    JEL: J24 J26 E21 E26 O17
    Date: 2014–05
  5. By: Nicolas Sirven (IRDES Institut de recherche et de documentation en économie de la santé)
    Abstract: Le concept de fragilité de la personne âgée, bien que très populaire dans les études sur la perte d’autonomie, n’est pas univoque et sa mesure ne fait pas consensus. Même si l’on se réfère au modèle de Fried comme un cadre analytique commun, le choix des variables composant l’indice de fragilité n’est pas arrêté. Un des enjeux méthodologiques est de savoir si la mesure de la fragilité en population générale peut s’accommoder d’un certain degré de liberté dans la mise en œuvre du recueil de l’information (choix des variables, modes de passation de l’enquête, etc.) ou si des mesures rigoureuses devraient être réalisées de manière identique dans chaque enquête. L’objectif de cette étude est de comparer les mesures de fragilité en France à partir de deux enquêtes en population générale. Deux questionnaires sont utilisés pour construire une mesure de fragilité, l’un propre à Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), avec des mesures objectives et subjectives de santé, l’autre propre à l’Enquête santé et protection sociale (ESPS), avec des mesures uniquement déclarées. Les taux de prévalence de fragiles sont comparés entre les deux sources et les déterminants de la fragilité sont analysés. Nos résultats indiquent que la mesure de la fragilité et ses déterminants demeurent relativement stables pour des populations de 65 ans et plus, malgré une méthodologie d’enquête différente ; une certaine liberté dans le choix des variables est donc permise.
    Keywords: Demande de santé, Perte d’autonomie, Inégalités sociales de santé
    JEL: I12 J14 C23
    Date: 2014–06
  6. By: Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre
    Abstract: One of the pervasive problems with means-tested public long term care (LTC) programs is their inability to prevent individuals who could a¤ord private long term services from taking advantage of public care. They often manage to elude the means-test net through strategic impoverishment. We show in a simple model how this problem comes about, how it a¤ects welfare and how it can be mitigated.
    Keywords: Long term care, means-testing, strategic impoverishment, opting out, public insurance, altruism.
    JEL: H2 H5
    Date: 2014–05
  7. By: Luis García (Departamento de Economía de la PUC del Perú)
    Abstract: La población peruana presenta un lento pero progresivo proceso de envejecimiento esperándose que en los próximos años el número de adultos mayores aumente. Las estadísticas actuales muestran que en la actualidad un importante porcentaje de adultos mayores de 65 años o más no cuentan ni con seguros de salud ni con pensiones de jubilación. Pese a que en los últimos años han existido algunos programas y políticas aplicadas directamente a los adultos mayores —como por ejemplo el Seguro Integral de Salud, o el reciente programa Pensión 65—, estas políticas parecen ser insuficientes. Otras políticas más antiguas como el Sistema Privado de Pensiones, las Empresas Prestadoras de Salud (EPS), y las modalidades de nuevos seguros independientes de EsSalud tampoco presentan avances importantes que nos lleven a pensar que el problema de los adultos mayores del futuro esté totalmente resuelto. En este documento se revisa la problemática de este importante sector, se revisan críticamente los alcances y limitaciones de estas políticas, y de políticas recientes dadas en el siglo XXI que buscan corregir errores y llegar al objetivo de la universalidad de la seguridad social. JEL Classification-JEL: I13, J26, H55
    Keywords: Seguros de Salud, Pensiones, Envejecimiento, Seguridad Social.
    Date: 2014

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