nep-afr New Economics Papers
on Africa
Issue of 2026–07–20
five papers chosen by
Sam Sarpong, Xiamen University Malaysia Campus


  1. Africa as a Success Story: Political Organization in Pre-Colonial Africa By Henn, Soeren; Robinson, James A.
  2. Relationship between Health and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan African Countries: Examining the Moderating Effect of Institutional Quality By Titus, Agness; Sikiru, Babalola Jimoh; Suleiman, Purokayo Gambiyo
  3. A Strategic Compass for Navigating Senegal's Debt Crisis By Ndiaye, Abdoulaye; Kessler, Martin
  4. Polygyny and the Economic Determinants of Family Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa By Tapsoba, Augustin
  5. Credit Constraints and Capital Allocation in Agriculture: Theory and Evidence from Uganda By Burchardi, Konrad; Lerva, Benedetta; de Quidt, Jonathan; Tripodi, Stefano

  1. By: Henn, Soeren; Robinson, James A.
    Abstract: We provide an overview of the explanations for the relative lack of state formation historically in Africa. In doing so we systematically document for the first time the extent to which Africa was politically decentralized, calculating that in 1880 there were probably 45, 000 independent polities which were rarely organized on ethnic lines. At most 2% of these could be classified as states. We advance a new argument for this extreme political decentralization positing that African societies were deliberately organized to stop centralization emerging. In this they were successful. We point out some key aspects of African societies that helped them to manage this equilibrium. We also emphasize how the organization of the economy was subservient to these political goals.
    Keywords: Political centralization; State formation; Economic institutions; International relations
    JEL: D7 N47 O55 P5
    Date: 2026–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21115
  2. By: Titus, Agness; Sikiru, Babalola Jimoh; Suleiman, Purokayo Gambiyo
    Abstract: This study investigates health-growth relationship with the moderating effect of institutional quality (control of corruption) in Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 to 2022. Utilizing Driscoll-Kraay fixed effect regression with standard errors, the analysis addresses autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. Empirical results highlight that while school enrolment and life expectancy positively impact GDP per capita, control of corruption does not have a significant direct effect. Gross fixed capital formation shows a minor negative effect, and labour force participation has a small yet significant negative impact. The interaction between health improvements and institutional quality reveals that higher life expectancy significantly boosts economic growth, especially when corruption is reduced. The study underscores the crucial role of control of corruption on health improvements and economic growth. Strong institutions are important in converting health improvements into sustainable economic benefits, indicating that improving institutional quality can amplify the positive impacts of health on economic growth. The findings emphasize the importance of addressing institutional weaknesses to fully realize the benefits of health investments in the region. These insights are crucial for policymakers aiming to foster economic growth through investments in health human capital and institutional reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa.
    Keywords: Health-Growth Relationship, Sub-Saharan Africa and Institutional Quality
    JEL: O1 O10 O11 O2
    Date: 2026–01–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129905
  3. By: Ndiaye, Abdoulaye; Kessler, Martin
    Abstract: With public debt at around 130% of GDP, Senegal’s options are limited: there are no good solutions. This paper reviews the constraints and difficult choices the government faces in managing the debt crisis. We explore two possible paths. In the first approach, the government seeks to avoid restructuring at all costs. For debt to remain sustainable, it needs to maintain extremely tight fiscal policy for an extended period and refinance existing debt at very low interest rates. We provide quantification of both efforts, and show that such a strategy could work, albeit under very narrow – and to some extent – unlikely, assumptions: the level of consolidation expected would probably deteriorate economic growth and be counterproductive, or politically unsustainable. Moreover, the level of bilateral or multilateral support would need to be substantial: only by securing partners willing to take risks at low interest rates could Senegal refinance its debt due in 2026 and 2027. It would also require large net financing from regional banks, thus transferring risks to the monetary union. In the second approach, the government aims to negotiate with its bilateral and private external creditors to restructure its debt under an IMF program. We argue that this could be achieved through a less radical fiscal adjustment than in the previous scenario, where restructuring is avoided. It would seek to avoid implicating regional lenders, arguing that doing so would worsen the country's prospects and even those of its external creditors. Such a strategy would also involve mobilizing the international community through new multilateral concessional loans, along with high-level political commitments from its main bilateral creditors, France and China, to achieve fast and comprehensive debt relief, comparable to that achieved by private creditors. It also requires strengthening fiscal and prudential oversight within the zone. We argue that while there are considerable pressures to repay, the economic literature teaches us that the costs of delaying a restructuring are higher.
    Keywords: International lending; Debt crisis; Public debt; Senegal
    JEL: F34 O55 H63
    Date: 2026–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21078
  4. By: Tapsoba, Augustin
    Abstract: Social norms and formal institutions governing marriage markets vary widely across societies. This paper examines how polygyny norms in Sub-Saharan Africa shape marriage market responses to aggregate economic shocks and the resulting welfare implications. Contrary to monogamous markets, polygynous markets feature intense competition for brides between young bachelors and older married men seeking a second (junior) wife. In this paper, I show both theoretically and empirically that the latter group is more responsive than the former to aggregate income shocks in areas where the shadow price of marrying a junior wife is low. This difference in sensitivity leads to distinct equilibrium market outcomes: adverse shocks increase the quantity of child marriages in monogamous areas but have no detectable effect in polygynous areas. These divergent equilibrium outcomes result in drastic differences in the long-term impact of these shocks on female education, literacy, and the utilization of preventive care services.
    Keywords: Marriage market
    JEL: J1 O15
    Date: 2025–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20936
  5. By: Burchardi, Konrad; Lerva, Benedetta; de Quidt, Jonathan; Tripodi, Stefano
    Abstract: Fertilizer adoption is persistently low among Sub-Saharan African farmers. Numerous governments have responded by introducing substantial price subsidies, but solving an allocation problem by introducing price distortions has unclear welfare implications. This paper presents results from a theory-guided experiment on fertilizer adoption among Ugandan farmers, finding that there exists a group of farmers with high returns to fertilizer, who would not adopt at the market price but can be induced to adopt with a 30% subsidy. Furthermore, consistent with adoption frictions due to liquidity constraints, the results indicate that a cash transfer is sufficient to eliminate the need for subsidies. These findings tie into broader ideas on second-best policymaking (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) and have important implications for fertilizer policy in Africa.
    Keywords: Technology adoption; Second-best policy; Subsidies; Selective trials; Development
    Date: 2026–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21023

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