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on Africa |
| By: | Ozili, Peterson K |
| Abstract: | This article presents a discussion on what a central bank digital currency (CBDC) can achieve in African countries and what a central bank digital currency may not achieve in African countries. The study shows that a central bank digital currency can achieve the following. CBDC can become a monetary policy tool; it can reduce the size of the informal economy; it can increase financial inclusion; it can increase digital financial literacy; it can reduce the circulation of counterfeit paper money; it can deepen existing payments system; it can improve social programmes and targeted welfare; it will increase transaction monitoring and surveillance; it can address tax evasion and increase tax revenue in African countries. The study also shows that a central bank digital currency may not completely replace cash in African countries; the issuance and use of CBDC won’t make African countries earn a ‘developed country’ status; CBDC adoption may not stop institutional corruption; CBDC adoption will not stop illicit activities in African countries; and CBDC adoption may not reduce the level of poverty in African countries. |
| Keywords: | central bank digital currency, CBDC, Africa, poverty, financial inclusion, monetary policy, remittance, informal economy, welfare, corruption. |
| JEL: | E52 E58 E59 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120966&r= |
| By: | Hany Abdel-Latif; Mr. Antonio David; Rasmané Ouedraogo; Markus Specht |
| Abstract: | This paper quantifies the macroeconomic spillover effects of conflict within sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries using a new Conflict Spillover Index (CSI), which accounts for conflict intensity and distance from conflict-affected countries. Our findings reveal an escalation in conflict spillovers across SSA since 2011, marked by considerable cross-country heterogeneity. Impulse responses show that conflict spillovers shocks significantly and persistently hinder economic growth, while concurrently elevating inflation in the “home” country. Conflict spillover shocks are also associated with increases in (current) government spending and government debt. Furthermore, the international trade transmission channel of spillovers operates mostly through increased imports, while negative effects on FDI winddown over time. Moreover, state-dependent impulse responses underscore the importance of good governance, fiscal space, and foreign aid in attenuating the adverse macroeconomic spillover effects of conflict. The detrimental impact of conflict on output is more severe in environments with weaker governance and limited fiscal space. Government expenditures tend to rise following a spillover shock in contexts of high governmental effectiveness, possibly reflecting the use of policy buffers to respond to shocks. In that context, the papers shed light on important factors to promote resilience in SSA economies. |
| Keywords: | Macroeconomic Spillovers; Conflict; Sub-Saharan Africa |
| Date: | 2024–05–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/100&r= |
| By: | Lionel Fontagné; Stephen Karingi; Simon Mevel; Cristina Mitaritonna; Yu Zheng |
| Abstract: | The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement aims to create a single market for goods and services, increase intra-Africa trade and promote sustainable socioeconomic development in Africa. African countries need to balance efforts to address these goals with the urgency of climate change. As of the 27th session of the Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2022, most African countries had submitted their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to mitigate the impact of climate change. Establishing a carbon market is now on the policy agenda. This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with different sources of energy (including renewable energy) and an in-depth presentation of greenhouse gas emissions to assess the economic and environmental impacts of implementing the AfCFTA Agreement and adopting various climate policies in Africa, including those NDCs and the International Monetary Fund’s proposal of carbon price floors. It shows that implementing the agreement and achieving Africa’s climate objectives are compatible. Continental coordination of emissions reduction among African countries proves most efficient for climate action. |
| Keywords: | International Trade;Climate Change;AfCFTA |
| JEL: | F13 F17 F18 Q56 |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2024-04&r= |
| By: | Désiré Kanga; Mr. Boileau Loko; Gomez Agou; Mr. Kangni R Kpodar |
| Abstract: | We examine push and pull factors, including demographic, geography, culture, economic and human development, politics and climate, and uncover the key determinants shaping migration patterns within Africa. Our findings emphasize the significance of political (instability, ethnic tensions) and socio-demographic (human development, common language, population size and structure) factors, climate shocks, along with economic motivations, in driving intra-African migration. Understanding these multifaceted factors is vital for policymakers in formulating effective strategies to leverage human capital mobility to promote sustainable development in the region. |
| Keywords: | Migration; climate shocks; human development; political risk |
| Date: | 2024–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/097&r= |
| By: | Pritchett, Lant |
| Abstract: | This essay argues that the existing paradigm in discussions of the acquisition of human capital has been focused on the drive to universal schooling and expanding access and grade attainment. This focus has been quite successful. The expansion of schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the last decades has been impressively rapid, in percentage growth terms much faster than other regions of the world, because SSA at political independence began far behind most other regions. However, the paradigm needs to shift as “invest in human capital”, which implicitly focuses on the acquisition of valued skills, has mostly been treated as equivalent of “spend on school” and this conceptual elision has produced very mixed results on learning and the creation of cognitive skills, which were, and are, taken to be an important goal of schooling. This section therefore focuses on some facts about schooling and learning with an emphasis on both the question of whether: (i) “Sub- Saharan Africa” has been distinctive as a region; and (ii) the heterogeneity across SSA both in sub-regions and across countries that make generalizations about SSA problematic (if not outright unhelpful). The conclusion is that there needs to be a shift from the crude “accumulationist” model of “invest in human capital” as exclusively: (i) more years spent in school; and (ii) more spend on school. “Invest” in human capital must mean: (i) acquisition of valued skills, capabilities, dispositions; and (ii) effective spending. This implies three major changes in the research paradigm: (i) stop using “year of schooling” as the major “outcome” to be pursued; (ii) stop using a naïve “education production function” to evaluate impact of inputs towards a systems approach; and (iii) as part of that, work towards a more realistic positive model of the politics of learning |
| Keywords: | education production function; education; schooling; learning outcomes |
| JEL: | R14 J01 |
| Date: | 2024–05–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:123655&r= |