|
on Africa |
| By: | Andrew Berg; Luisa Charry; Rafael A Portillo; Jan Vlcek |
| Abstract: | Many central banks in low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are modernising their monetary policy frameworks. Standard statistical procedures have had limited success in identifying the channels of monetary transmission in such countries. Here we take a narrative approach, following Romer and Romer (1989), and center on a significant tightening of monetary policy that took place in 2011 in four members of the East African Community: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. We find clear evidence of the transmission mechanism in most of the countries, and argue that deviations can be explained by differences in the policy regime in place. |
| Date: | 2013–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/197&r=afr |
| By: | Sumon K. Bhaumik; Ralitza Dimova; Ira N. Gang |
| Abstract: | Our analysis of a rich representative household survey for Malawi, where patrilineal and matrilineal institutions coexist, suggests that (a) in matrilineal societies the likelihood of cash crop cultivation by a household increases with the extent of land owned (or de facto controlled) by males, and (b) and cultivation of cash crops increases household welfare. The policy implication is that facilitating female ownership of assets through informal and formal institutions does not, on its own, increase welfare, if women do not have access to complementary resources that are needed to generate income from those assets. |
| Keywords: | female ownership of assets, informal institutions, cash crops, household welfare |
| JEL: | Q12 O2 O13 J16 |
| Date: | 2013–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2013-1055&r=afr |
| By: | Batista, Catia (Universidade Nova de Lisboa); Silverman, Dan (Arizona State University); Yang, Dean (University of Michigan) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the determinants of giving in a lab-in-the-field experiment with large stakes. Study participants in urban Mozambique play dictator games where their counterpart is the closest person to them outside their household. Dictators share more with counterparts when they have the option of giving in kind (in the form of goods), compared to giving that must be in cash. Qualitative post-experiment responses suggest that this effect is driven by a desire to control how recipients use gifted resources. Standard economic determinants such as the rate of return to giving and the size of the endowment also affect giving, but the effects of even large changes in these determinants are significantly smaller than the effect of the in-kind option. Our results support theories of giving where the utility of givers depends on the composition (not just the level) of gift-recipient expenditures, and givers thus seek control over transferred resources. |
| Keywords: | sharing, altruism, giving, dictator game, inter-household transfers, Mozambique |
| JEL: | C92 C93 D01 D03 D64 O17 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7629&r=afr |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. African Dept. |
| Date: | 2013–09–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:13/288&r=afr |
| By: | Demachi, Kazue |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the influence of international resource price movements on capital outflows from resource-rich developing countries (RRDCs) by distinguishing capital flight and capital transfers. The volume of capital flight and transfers are calculated and their determinants are analyzed using macro-panel data constituting 21 resource-rich developing countries from 1990 to 2011. Through the regression analysis, the linkage between capital flight and resource revenue as well as that between capital flight and debt is suggested. The results of this analysis suggest the need to focus on capital outflow from RRDCs through transnational companies. |
| Keywords: | Africa, Asia, capital flight, resource rich developing countries |
| JEL: | F21 F23 |
| Date: | 2013–09–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:50273&r=afr |