nep-acc New Economics Papers
on Accounting and Auditing
Issue of 2026–04–06
five papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
  1. "On the Desirability of the Global Minimum Tax - A Dynamic View" By Nora Paulus; Weihua Ruan; Benteng Zou
  2. Auditing Blockchain Innovations: Technical Challenges Beyond Traditional Finance By Shayan Eskandari; Leid Zejnilovic; Jeremy Clark
  3. Prospects for Shrinking the Fed’s Balance Sheet: A speech at the Economic Club of Miami, Miami, Florida., March 26, 2026 By Stephen I. Miran
  4. Unveiling Risk on Bank Balance Sheets: From Risk Disclosure to Credit Reallocation By Brunella Bruno; Imma Marino
  5. At times, the data presented in firms’ audited financial statements can seem puzzling. This article describes instances in which the reported figures could leave the firm’s stakeholders with a first impression that the data must be in error, as they are difficult to believe or even counterintuitive. As student detectives address the discussion questions provided, they encounter the discretion provided to firms in designating quarterly-reporting periods, computing gross-profit percentages, and influencing the gains and losses reported on disposal of depreciable assets. In addition, their learn that sizable differences between a firm’s current and quick ratios and spectacular returns on stockholders’ equity might not signify what usually is implied when they are encountered by stakeholders. Other situations addressed include a firm with huge gross profits that nevertheless felt it necessary to liquidate, a retailer of discretionary goods that somehow fared much better than a service firm during an economic meltdown, and a firm reporting different amounts for its account changes depending on which financial statement one looks at. A teaching note provides suggested answers to the discussion questions, learning takeaways, and follow-up discussion points for instructors. By Martin Gosman; Zach Idinopulos; Sophia Lindus; Michael Manieri
  1. By: Nora Paulus (DF, Université du Luxembourg); Weihua Ruan (Purdue University Northwest, USA); Benteng Zou (DEM, Université du Luxembourg)
    Abstract: "Corporate tax competition has driven statutory rates downward for decades, eroding fiscal capacity and raising concerns about global equity. The OECD/G20 Global Minimum Tax (GMT) seeks to halt this “race to the bottom, ” yet its dynamic implications remain unclear. We study the GMT with a differential game of international tax competition with mobile capital. Governments set corporate tax rates while multinational firms reallocate capital in response to effective taxwedges created by the minimum tax and the substance-based income exclusion. We distinguish between Markovian behavior, in which governments adjust tax rates in response to current capital allocations, and open-loop behavior, in which they commit to tax paths in advance. We also compare enforcement through Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Taxes (QDMTT) and the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR). In the Markovian game, the GMT does not pin down a unique long-run outcome: a continuum of steady states arises under both enforcement regimes, including low-tax configurations. By contrast, under open-loop commitment the dynamic system is saddle-point stable, implying convergence to a unique transition path for given initial conditions. Commitment therefore acts as a dynamic selection device. Whether the economy converges to high- or low-tax configurations depends on enforcement: under QDMTT, a race to the bottom may emerge when public revenue is used inefficiently and the minimum tax is sufficiently high, whereas under IIR such dynamics are ruled out. Overall, the GMT can stabilize tax competition under commitment but does not, in general, eliminate downward pressure on statutory rates."
    Keywords: "Dynamic Tax Competition; Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Taxes; Income InclusionRule; Global Minimum Taxation."
    JEL: C73 F21 H21 H87
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:26-07
  2. By: Shayan Eskandari; Leid Zejnilovic; Jeremy Clark
    Abstract: Blockchain technology introduces asset types and custody mechanisms that fundamentally break traditional financial auditing paradigms. This paper presents an autoethnographic analysis of cryptoasset auditing challenges, build on top of prior research on a comprehensive framework addressing existence, ownership, valuation, and internal control verification. Drawing from lived experience implementing blockchain systems as an engineer, smart contract auditor, and CTO of a publicly traded cryptoasset firm, we demonstrate how autoethnographic methodology becomes necessary for understanding technical complexities that external analysis cannot capture. Through detailed examination of token airdrops, multi-signature smart contracts, and real-time on-chain reporting, we provide experimental approaches and common scenarios that auditing firms can analyze to address blockchain innovations currently considered technically insurmountable.
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2603.26361
  3. By: Stephen I. Miran
    Date: 2026–03–26
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgsq:102946
  4. By: Brunella Bruno (Bocconi University); Imma Marino (University of Naples Federico II and CSEF)
    Abstract: We examine how banks adjust credit allocation when hidden credit risk is revealed. Using supervisory risk disclosure data from the European Central Bank’s 2014 Asset Quality Review, we find that banks experiencing larger increases in non-performing loans and provisions significantly reduce risk-weighted exposures while keeping total credit volumes largely unchanged. This suggests that de-risking primarily occurs through portfolio reallocation-particularly within portfolios-rather than through credit contraction. We document heterogeneous responses depending on the rating approach used to measure credit risk and we show that capital constraints amplify, but are not the sole driversof, de-risking. Finally, we provide evidence that supervisory risk disclosure plays a key role in shaping banks’ risk-taking behavior, even in the absence of observable adjustments in their financial statements.
    Keywords: Transparency, Bank Supervision, Credit risk, Non-performing loans
    JEL: G21 G28 M48
    Date: 2026–03–17
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:773
  5. By: Martin Gosman (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University); Zach Idinopulos (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University); Sophia Lindus (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University); Michael Manieri (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University)
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wes:weswpa:2026-007
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