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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Yhlas Sovbetov |
| Abstract: | This paper has two contributions to the International Financial Reporting Stands (IFRS) adoption literature. First is the scrutinizing impact of IFRS adoption on value relevance in the UK with TEST-A analysis under the H01 hypothesis. The second contribution is capturing the impact of IFRS adoption on key financial indicators of firms with the TEST-B analysis that hypothesizes H02.The statistical differences of items of two different reporting standards are examined with non-parametric tests as all input variables failed the Shapiro-Wilk and Lilliefors normality tests in TEST-A. The finding rejects the H01 hypothesis for BvMv, and agrees that IFRS has impact on value relevance. Besides, Ohlson's (1995) model documents that the coefficient of dummy variable (MODE) is positive. Therefore, the analysis concludes that IFRS has positive impact on value relevance. The aftermath of TEST-B rejects the H02 hypothesis for all profitability ratios (ROE, ROCE, ROA, PM) and gearing ratios (GR). It concludes that profitability and gearing ratios are affected by IFRS adoption, whereas efficiency-liquidity ratios are not. Also, in Forward Stepwise regression analysis only ROCE, ROA, and PM ratios show significant results. The analysis documents positive and significant impact of IFRS on these three ratios. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.02480 |
| By: | Eberhartinger Eva; Speitmann Raffael (European Commission - JRC); Sureth-sloane Caren |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the impact of mandatory public country-by-country reporting (CbCR) on European banks’ engagement in tax and regulatory havens characterized by financial secrecy. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, we find that following the introduction of CbCR, European banks reduced their number of tax haven subsidiaries by approximately one-third compared to insurers, which were exempt from the disclosure requirement. Further analysis reveals that this decline is primarily driven by withdrawals from economically insignificant “dot tax havens” and from countries that serve as both tax and regulatory havens. Additionally, we observe that banks with low exposure to reputational risk prior to the reform are more likely to reduce their presence in bank havens. These results reveal that public CbCR prompts withdrawals from low-tax locations but only under specific conditions. Public CbCR curtails tax haven presence when both financial secrecy and reputational concerns are at play, but on its own may not curb tax haven use. These insights contribute to ongoing tax policy debates by highlighting the limitations and conditional effectiveness of transparency-driven regulations. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:taxref:202505 |
| By: | Varjonen-Ollus, Reetta |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) for the top 1% of income earners, utilising a change in taxation in 2013, when a new top tax bracket was added to the earned income tax schedule in Finland. The response of top earners is crucial in determining the revenue-maximising level of top income taxation, and this study contributes to the top income ETI literature by employing a differences-in-differences method comparing changes in income within the same income groups for different time periods. The results suggest that the ETI for top wage earners (0.5) may be higher than found in previous population estimates. This finding is primarily driven by individuals experiencing fewer labour market frictions, such as those who have changed employer or have multiple concurrent employers. |
| Keywords: | Behavioural response, income taxation, labour supply, H21, H24, fi=Verotus|sv=Beskattning|en=Taxation|, |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fer:wpaper:180 |
| By: | Salvatore Ciucci (Dipartimento di Economia, Università degli Studi della Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”) |
| Abstract: | This study extends the theory of tax evasion by presenting a model of collaborative tax evasion between buyers and sellers. Buyers differ only in their level of tax morale, and tax evasion occurs when the seller fails to issue a receipt for the transaction. To counteract this, the government can disrupt the collusion between sellers and buyers by offering a tax rebate to buyers who request and retain the transaction receipt. The theoretical findings show that the tax rebate introduces a policy trade-off for the government between aggregate quantity and tax revenue. Furthermore, the marginal effect of the rebate on aggregate quantity, tax revenue, and social welfare is ambiguous. This study provides a theoretical foundation for understanding and managing the economic inefficiencies that may arise from tax rebate policies. |
| Keywords: | Tax rebate, cooperative tax evasion, tax morale |
| JEL: | H00 H20 H26 H30 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2025.26 |