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on Accounting and Auditing |
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Issue of 2024‒08‒12
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Shafik Hebous; Andualem Mengistu |
| Abstract: | The international agreement on a corporate minimum tax is a milestone in global corporate tax arrangements. The minimum tax disturbs the equivalence between otherwise equivalent forms of efficient economic rent taxation: cash-flow tax and allowance for corporate equity. The marginal effective tax rate initially declines as the statutory tax rate rises, reaching zero where the minimum tax is inapplicable, and increases thereafter. This kink occurs at a lower statutory rate under cash-flow taxation. We relax the assumption of full loss offset; provide a routine for computing effective rates under different designs; and discuss policy implications of the minimum tax. |
| Keywords: | investment, minimum taxation, corporate tax reform, international taxation, rent tax |
| JEL: | H21 H25 F23 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11147 |
| By: | BARRIOS Salvador (European Commission - JRC); DELIS Fotis (European Commission - JRC); LANDABASO ALVAREZ Mikel (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | We provide evidence on the differences in the effective tax rate by firm size, highlighting that effective tax rates tend to follow a bump-shaped curve, increasing from micro to small firms and then decreasing for medium to large firms. Our analysis, based on microdata from several EU countries, shows that both corporate and labour taxation follow this pattern. Econometric analysis reveals that a 1% increase in effective corporate taxation results in a 2.6% decrease in firm turnover growth, with new firms and micro firms being particularly affected. The negative impact of corporate taxation on firm growth is much larger for new firms compared to older firms, and this is especially pronounced in Spain, where a 1% tax hike leads to a turnover growth decrease of 8%. Examining the 2015 Spanish corporate tax reduction for new firms, we find that the reform's overall positive impact was insignificant for micro firms, suggesting the need for more targeted policies considering firm size, age, and ownership. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:taxref:202407 |
| By: | Giese, Henning; Koch, Reinald; Sureth, Caren |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes the impact of tax complexity on the location of tax employees and tax risk. Using a hand-collected dataset of more than 7, 500 tax employees from 348 European-listed multinationals, we identify two types of firm-level costs associated with tax complexity-tax employees, and tax risk. We find that firms locate more tax employees in countries with greater tax complexity. This association is particularly pronounced for complexity in tax procedures. We also find that multinationals operating in countries with high tax complexity are associated with higher tax risk. The incremental tax risk vanishes for firms that locate more tax employees in countries with highly complex tax procedures, while we find no risk reduction from additional tax employees in countries with complex tax rules. Our results reveal that multinationals eliminate 25 percent of overall tax complexity-related tax risk through targeted location of tax employees. |
| Keywords: | tax complexity, tax complexity cost, tax department, tax employees, tax risk |
| JEL: | H25 H26 M12 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:arqudp:300270 |
| By: | Gunther Capelle-Blancard (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | Debates on the taxation of financial transactions (FTT) are longstanding and primarily focus on its effects on markets and the economy. In practice, however, the FTT is less of a regulatory tool and more of a fiscal instrument. This article examines the FTT from this perspective. Our contribution specifically aims to address two questions generally overlooked in previous studies: who pays the FTT and how? Our analysis focuses mainly on the FTT in force in France (FTT-F). In practice, the FTT-F is not a tax on transactions, but only on transfers OF SHARES that are recorded on a daily basis. A large portion of transactions is excluded from the scheme, which significantly reduces the tax base. It is estimated that the transactions actually taxed represent, in the end, only 15% of the total. The incidence of the FTT primarily impacts financial intermediaries, for whom the reduction in trades represents a loss of income, while individuals bear a minimal cost. Additionally, approximately half of the tax is collected from abroard, and the FTT-F has a strong redistributive aspect. The collection of the FTT-F is not carried out by the public administration but is delegated to Euroclear France, a private company subsidiary of an international group. We propose that the collection should instead be directly handled by the General Directorate of Public Finances (DGFiP), with the support of the Fiancial Markets Authority (AMF), which has the necessary data; there are real synergies between its activity of monitoring stock market transactions and the collection of the FTT-F. This, of course, implies that the human and financial resources of the AMF are increased accordingly. Changing the collection system would improve controls, broaden the tax base, and significantly increase tax revenues, while enhancing transparency and equity |
| Keywords: | Financial transaction tax; Securities Transaction Tax; Innovative financing |
| JEL: | G21 H25 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24008 |
| By: | İrem Güçeri; Xipei Hou; Jing Xing; Irem Guceri |
| Abstract: | We examine how investor-level tax incentives affect financing for start-ups using the introduction of a generous tax deduction for qualified angel and VC investment in China as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that the tax incentive increases funding for eligible start-ups, with stronger responses from larger and more experienced investors. The tax incentive leads to substitution between eligible and non-eligible investments. There is no evidence that the tax incentive lowers investment quality. We further show that the investor-level tax incentive encourages firm entry into affected industries, especially in cities more exposed to venture capital funds. |
| Keywords: | venture capital, angel investment, tax incentives, entrepreneurship |
| JEL: | G24 G32 H25 L26 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11180 |