nep-acc New Economics Papers
on Accounting and Auditing
Issue of 2015‒08‒19
seven papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Tax Havens and Effective Tax Rates: An Analysis of Private versus Public European Firms By Aziz Jaafar; John Thorton
  2. Financial Sector Accounts: The Chilean Experience in Their Use for Financial Stability Monitoring By Pablo García; Josué Pérez
  3. Ordering collective performance manipulation practices: How do leaders manipulate financial reporting figures in conglomerates? By François-Régis Puyou
  4. The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts By Takuya Iwasaki; Shota Otomasa; Atsushi Shiiba; Akinobu Shuto
  5. Does Credit-card Information Reporting Improve Small-business Tax Compliance? By Joel Slemrod; Brett Collins; Jeffrey Hoopes; Daniel Reck; Michael Sebastiani
  6. Reforming Fiscal Governance in the European Union By Michal Andrle; John C Bluedorn; Luc Eyraud; Tidiane Kinda; Petya Koeva Brooks; Gerd Schwartz; Anke Weber
  7. What future for taxation in the EU ? By Catherine Mathieu; Henri Sterdyniak

  1. By: Aziz Jaafar (Bangor University); John Thorton (Bangor University)
    Abstract: We examine the impact of tax-haven operations on the effective corporate tax burdens of publicly listed and privately held firms domiciled in Europe. In particular, we consider how European firmsÕ tax haven operations interacts with factors such listing status and home-country tax reporting systems to determine the relative tax burdens of publicly listed and private firms. Our main empirical results show that tax haven operations is associated with lower effective tax rates for both private and public firms, and that the impact of tax havens in lowering effective tax rates is more pronounced for private firms than for public firms.Home country characteristics are also important determinants of effective tax rates for both private and public firms with tax havens. Given that firms, regardless of their listing status, use tax havens as tax avoidance mechanism in lowering tax burdens, regulatory and tax enforcement bodies should focus not only on public firms but also on private firms.
    Keywords: Effective tax rates, Publicly listed firms, Private firms, Tax havens
    JEL: H20 M41
    Date: 2015–05
  2. By: Pablo García; Josué Pérez
    Abstract: The Central Bank of Chile has been disseminating quarterly sectoral balance sheets and financial flows since 2008. These accounts are compiled for institutional units, based on their respective balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements. They integrate production, income and expenditure, accumulation, and financial accounts. The ending balances of the accounts, which are also the opening balances of the next accounts, are then reconciled. This document describes possible uses of the financial accounts for financial stability monitoring, particularly regarding the assessment of households leverage, public finances, loan to deposit ratios in financial corporation, and derivative exposure.
    Date: 2015–07
  3. By: François-Régis Puyou (Audencia Recherche - Audencia)
    Abstract: This article explores some of the resources, tactics and skills used by managers involved in the manipulation of performance reporting by looking at management accounting practices in a conglomerate. Prior research on reporting manipulation in large corporations has focused on why executives manipulate figures. The present paper documents how BU leaders compensate for the uncertainties impacting the performance of their activities. Empirical evidence comes from a field study of a diversified French conglomerate. Performance reporting practices within and between a parent company and two subsidiaries are analyzed. The article shows that the conglomerate constitutes a strategic action field ( Fligstein and McAdam, 2011) where skillful group leaders use the resources granted by their power position to frame other actors' interests and identities to initiate stable cooperation around manipulation practices. This study clarifies the collective and collaborative dimensions of practices granting greater control over reporting figures.
    Abstract: Cet article étudie les ressources, les tactiques et les savoir-faire mobilisés par les managers impliqués dans le pilotage des indicateurs de performance en observant les pratiques de reporting au sein d'un groupe de sociétés. Les recherches portant sur le pilotage des chiffres dans les grandes entreprises ont jusqu'à présent surtout insisté sur la question du " pourquoi " observe-t-on des manipulations. Cet article s'intéresse au " comment " les responsables de centres de responsabilité compensent les incertitudes qui pèsent sur les performances de leurs activités. Les données empiriques proviennent d'une étude de cas d'un conglomérat français. Les pratiques associées au reporting des indicateurs de performance entre une maison mère et deux de ses filiales sont étudiées. L'article montre que le groupe de société constitue un " champ d'action stratégique " (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011) sur lequel des managers " socialement compétents " se saisissent de ressources liées à leur position hiérarchique pour orienter les intérêts et l'identité des autres acteurs en faveur de coopérations stables permettant un pilotage des données du reporting. Cette étude clarifie le caractère collectif et collaboratif des manipulations faites des données dans le but de se doter d'un plus grand contrôle sur les chiffres du reporting.
    Date: 2014–09–29
  4. By: Takuya Iwasaki (Kansai University); Shota Otomasa (Kansai University); Atsushi Shiiba (Osaka University); Akinobu Shuto (The University of Tokyo)
    Abstract: To test the implication of WattsÂf (2003) argument that accounting conservatism increases the efficiency of executive compensation contracts, we investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings-based executive compensation contracts in Japanese firms. We focus on Japanese executive compensation practices because the demand for accounting conservatism is likely to be larger for Japanese than U.S. firms because of the predominance of earnings-based executive compensation contracts and lack of explicit compensation contracts in Japan. Consistent with our arguments, we find a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and the compensation earnings coefficient. Furthermore, this positive relationship is greater for firms with poor ex-ante information environment. These results suggest that the demand for accounting conservatism is higher for firms that use more earnings-based executive compensation contracts and have more serious ex post settling up problems.
    Date: 2015–07
  5. By: Joel Slemrod; Brett Collins; Jeffrey Hoopes; Daniel Reck; Michael Sebastiani
    Abstract: We investigate the response of small businesses operating as sole proprietorships to Form 1099-K, an information report released in 2011 which provides the Internal Revenue Service with information about payment card sales. Theory and distributional analysis isolates affected taxpayers, who report receipts equal to or slightly exceeding the receipts reported on 1099-K. Information reporting made these taxpayers more likely to file a return declaring business income, and increased filers’ reported receipts by up to 24 percent. Taxpayers largely offset increased reported receipts with increased reported expenses, which do not face information reporting, diminishing the impact on reported net taxable income.
    JEL: H26
    Date: 2015–07
  6. By: Michal Andrle; John C Bluedorn; Luc Eyraud; Tidiane Kinda; Petya Koeva Brooks; Gerd Schwartz; Anke Weber
    Abstract: Successive reforms have brought many positive elements to the European Union’s fiscal framework. But they have also increased its complexity. The current system involves an intricate set of fiscal constraints, which hampers effective monitoring and public communication. Compliance has also been weak. This note discusses medium-term reform options to simplify the framework and improve compliance. Based on model simulations and practical considerations, it argues for moving to a two-pillar approach, with a single fiscal anchor (public debt-to-GDP) and a single operational target (an expenditure growth rule, possibly with an explicit debt correction mechanism) linked to the anchor.
    Keywords: European Economic and Monetary Union;Euro Area;Fiscal reforms;Fiscal policy;Fiscal rules;Fiscal Governance, European Economic, Monetary Union, debt, expenditure, public debt, budget, deficit, General, Intergovernmental Relations,
    Date: 2015–05–21
  7. By: Catherine Mathieu (OFCE); Henri Sterdyniak (OFCE)
    Abstract: The 11th EUROFRAME Conference on economic policy issues in the European Union was held in Paris on 6 June 2014. The aim of the conference is to provide an economic forum for debate on economic policy issues relevant in the European context. In June 2014 the Conference topic was: “What future for taxation in the EU?”. The programme and conference papers are available at the EUROFRAME Conference webpage: Six of the papers given at the Conference are released in this issue of the Revue de l’OFCE. European economies have high taxation levels, which allow financing the European Social Model,characterised by a high level of public and social spending. In 2012, the tax-to-GDP ratio was 39.4% for the whole EU, 40.4% for the euro area, as compared to 39.4% for Japan and 24.5% for the US. There are however wide disparities within the area. The tax-to-GDP ratio is higher than 45% in Denmark, Belgium and France, and ranges between 45% and 40% in Sweden, Finland, Italy and Austria. But it is below 35% in Greece, Spain, Poland, and Portugal; 30% in Slovakia, Ireland, Romania, and Bulgaria. There was no trend in the tax-to-GDP ratio developments at the EU level over the last 20 years.
    Keywords: Taxation; Prospective évonomique; Union européenne
    Date: 2015–07

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