|
on All new papers |
| By: | Michele Fratianni (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business); John Pattison (Independent) |
| Abstract: | Financial regulation has shifted from a system managed as an oligopoly dominated by the G2/G5 to expanded club membership like the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS). Expansive clubs have to agree to terms that are closer to the preferences of softregulation members. Yet, once a global agreement on minimum standards, such as Basel III, is reached, the implementation is left to national or regional regulators. Deviations from the Basel III standards are bound to occur; the complexity of the agreement will facilitate an asymmetric implementation of national regulation and supervision. On the high side, countries like the US, UK, Australia, some Scandinavian countries and Canada have chosen higher standards. On the low side, we expect deviations to take place in those member countries of the Eurozone that are heterogeneous, have different preferences and tradeoffs between regulatory stringency and economic activity. The requirements of both global clubs and the EU regional club for transparency, monitoring and a level playing field will cause a collision between the interests of the clubs and their members, threatening to undermine global standard setting at the BCBS. |
| Keywords: | Basel III, clubs, financial regulation, Eurozone, asymmetries |
| JEL: | F33 F36 F42 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2014-10&r=acc |
| By: | Henrekson, Magnus (Research Institute of Industrial Economics); Waldenström, Daniel (Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the evolution of the modern Swedish inheritance taxation from its introduction in 1885 to its abolishment in 2004. Our contribution is twofold. First, we compute annual effective inheritance tax rates for differently sized bequests and different types of inherited assets (non-firm wealth and family firm equity), ac-counting for all relevant exemptions, deductions and valuation discounts. Second, we try to account for the changes in inheritance taxation. Ideology rather than mass mobili-zation or revenue maximization appears to drive the sharp tax increases of the 1930s through the 1960s. We document increased opportunities for tax planning for the wealthy, in particular a series of drastic tax cuts on inherited family firms from the 1970s onwards. This rise of avoidance opportunities for the rich, while more and more middle-class heirs paid notable inheritance taxes, contributed to a loss of legitimacy for the tax and its ultimate repeal in 2004 |
| Keywords: | Gift tax; Inheritance tax; Estate tax; Tax avoidance; Excess burden; Entre-preneurship; Ownership transfers of family firms |
| JEL: | D31 H20 K34 |
| Date: | 2014–07–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uufswp:2014_009&r=acc |
| By: | Diego Focanti; Mark Hallerberg; Carlos Scartascini |
| Abstract: | The literature on taxes and public finance generally focuses on revenues, an easily observable and generally available variable, as the observable measure of tax policy. Still, revenues depend on many determinants other than the political will and policy objectives of the government. It is therefore important, when studying the politics of taxation, to evaluate specific changes to the tax code such as rates, bases and exemptions. With the underlying goal of exploring the political process and the determinants of tax policy, this paper compiles a novel and highly comprehensive database of tax reforms for Latin America between 1990 and 2004. The paper present a description of the database as well as the stylized facts of tax reforms in Latin America. Examples of the database’s uses are discussed, as is motivation for future research. |
| JEL: | D72 H2 K34 |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:wpaper:idb-wp-457&r=acc |
| By: | Ernesto H. Stein; Lorena Caro |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of ideology on tax revenues in Latin America, using a panel of 17 countries from 1990 to 2010. As a first approach, a fixed- effects model is used to identify the impact of ideology on taxation; left-leaning governments are associated with increases in total tax revenues and income tax revenues of 2. 1 and 1. 3 percent of GDP, respectively. There is no effect on revenues from VAT or social security taxes. To deal with endogeneity problems, an event study and a difference in difference methodology are used to track the behavior of revenues around the time of the shifts to the left. Tax revenues and income tax revenues increase by 1. 5 and 0. 8 percent of GDP when comparing revenues immediately before and after the shift in ideology. The pattern of tax revenues around ideological shifts suggests that the effects are causal. |
| JEL: | H20 P16 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:wpaper:idb-wp-407&r=acc |