nep-acc New Economics Papers
on Accounting and Auditing
Issue of 2013‒03‒02
five papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Quality of the Administration of Value-Added Tax in OECD countries and Russia By Alexander Knobel; Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev; Ilya Sokolov
  2. Efficiency and Equity Effects of Taxing the Financial Sector: Lessons from a CGE Model for Belgium By O. Chisari; Antonio Estache; Gaëtan Nicodème
  3. The long-run history of income inequality in Denmark: Top incomes from 1870 to 2010 By A. B. Atkinson; J. E. Søgaard
  4. On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures By Yutao Han; Patrice Pieretti; Benteng Zou
  5. "Sugar Policy Reform, Tax Policy and Price Transmission in the Soft Drink Industry" By Bonnet, Céline; Réquillart, Vincent

  1. By: Alexander Knobel (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Ilya Sokolov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)
    Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of the quality of VAT administration in OECD countries and Russia. Econometric analysis of the factors which influence the quality of VAT administration, demonstrate a positive effect of the level of institutional development on the efficiency of tax collection. However this tendency takes place only when there are no additional tax exemptions being implemented alongside the economic development where ex-emptions, in addition to causing a direct loss, complicate the taxation system and lower the quality of its administration
    Keywords: administration efficiency, optimal taxation, VAT.
    JEL: C23 C51 C53 H21 H23
    Date: 2013
  2. By: O. Chisari; Antonio Estache; Gaëtan Nicodème
    Abstract: This paper assesses the effects of applying VAT or a sales tax on (intermediate or final) sales of the financial sector. It uses a CGE Model calibrated for a small open economy. It highlights the differentiated sectoral and redistributional effects of these taxes and shows the importance of the financial openness of the economy on these results.
    Keywords: taxation; financial sector; VAT; sales tax; modeling; Belgium
    JEL: H20 H25 H30 H87
    Date: 2013–01
  3. By: A. B. Atkinson (Nuffield College, Oxford and Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School); J. E. Søgaard (University of Copenhagen and the Danish Ministry of Finance)
    Abstract: We use historical publications and – for more recent years – micro-data from the income tax and wealth tax returns to estimate the development in income inequality in Denmark over the last 140 years. The paper breaks new ground in treating the specific features of the Danish Tax system and in analysing the implications of the switch from joint to individual taxation. We show that income inequality have declined substantially over the last century with an income share for the top 1 per cent dropping from 27.6 per cent from its peak in 1917 to 6.4 in 2010. However the decline is not simply a secular downward trend consistent with the downward part of a Kuznets curve. Instead there seems to be several distinct phases, interleaved with periods of stability.
    Keywords: Income inequality, Income distribution, Wealth distribution, Top incomes, Taxation, Denmark
    JEL: D31 H2 J3 N3
    Date: 2013–02
  4. By: Yutao Han (CREA, University of Luxembourg); Patrice Pieretti (CREA, University of Luxembourg); Benteng Zou (CREA, University of Luxembourg)
    Abstract: In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions differ in the quality of their institutions. If tax revenue is used to gauge the desirability of coordination, our model shows that imposing a uniform tax rate is Pareto-inferior to the non cooperative equilibrium when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures. This result is completely reversed with pure tax competition if countries are not too uneven in size. If a minimum tax rate lying between those resulting from the non-cooperative equilibrium is set, the low tax country will never be better off. Finally the paper shows that the potential social welfare gains from tax harmonization crucially depend on how heterogeneous the competing countries are.
    Keywords: Tax competition, infrastructures, tax coordination, tax revenue, social welfare
    JEL: H21 H87 H73 F21 C72
    Date: 2013
  5. By: Bonnet, Céline; Réquillart, Vincent
    Date: 2013–01

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