nep-acc New Economics Papers
on Accounting and Auditing
Issue of 2012‒10‒20
five papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Le riforme dell'imposizione diretta sulle imprese italiane By Francesco Crespi; Antonio Di Majo; Maria Grazia Pazienza
  2. Tax incentives and capital structure choice: Evidence from Germany By Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas; Stein, Ingrid; Stöter, Alwin
  3. Employment and Taxes in Latin America: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Payroll, Corporate Income and Value-Added Taxes on Labor Outcomes By Eduardo Lora; Deisy Johanna Fajardo
  4. Estimating dynamic tax revenue elasticities for Germany By Koester, Gerrit B.; Priesmeier, Christoph
  5. Shadow Economies in Highly Developed OECD Countries: What Are the Driving Forces? By Schneider, Friedrich; Buehn, Andreas

  1. By: Francesco Crespi; Antonio Di Majo; Maria Grazia Pazienza (0164)
    Abstract: The aim of this essay is to analyse the evolution of the tax design for corporate taxation in Italy with specific reference to most recent reforms. A micro-simulation model applied to a large sample of Italian companies is built to estimate the effects of the introduction of the ACE in 2012. The analysis shows that the frequent attempts to modify the design of corporate taxation generated a high instability in this specific sector of the tax system rather than relevant effects in terms of economic growth. This result suggests that future tax changes should be more directly linked to capital accumulation by firms.
    Keywords: Tax Design, Corporate Taxation
    JEL: H25 H32 H87
    Date: 2012–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0164&r=acc
  2. By: Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas; Stein, Ingrid; Stöter, Alwin
    Abstract: This paper provides new evidence that taxes affect capital structure choice, using a unique and comprehensive panel data set which covers 86,173 German non-financial firms over the years 1973-2008. Following the Graham methodology to simulate marginal tax rates, we find a statistically and economically significant positive relationship between the marginal tax benefit of debt (net and gross of investor taxes) and the debt ratio. A 10% increase in the net (gross) marginal tax benefit of debt causes a 1.5% (1.6%) increase in the debt ratio, ceteris paribus. The results are robust to various specifications like using changes in debt or debt to capital ratios. A significantly positive effect of taxes on the debt ratio can also be identified in a partial adjustment model. --
    Keywords: debt,capital structure,marginal tax rate,corporate taxes,personal taxes
    JEL: G32 H20
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdps:182012&r=acc
  3. By: Eduardo Lora; Deisy Johanna Fajardo
    Abstract: This paper empirically explores the effects of payroll taxes, value-added taxes and corporate income taxes on a variety of labor market outcomes such as employment, unemployment, informality, and wages. Using national-level data on labor variables for 15 Latin American countries, the results indicate that the effects of each tax are distinctly different and may depend on several aspects of labor and tax institutions. Payroll taxes reduce employment and increase labor costs when their benefits are not valued by workers, but otherwise increase labor participation and do not raise labor costs. Value-added taxes increase informality and reduce skilled labor demand. In contrast, corporate income taxes may help reduce informality, especially among low-education workers but, when tax enforcement capabilities are strong, may reduce labor participation and employment of medium- and high-education workers.
    JEL: H24 H25 J21 J30 J32
    Date: 2012–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:wpaper:4791&r=acc
  4. By: Koester, Gerrit B.; Priesmeier, Christoph
    Abstract: We analyse tax revenue elasticities by applying dynamic models to a new disaggregated dataset for Germany, which is adjusted for the effects of tax reforms. We estimate long-run elasticities that are substantially lower than in comparable studies for profit-related taxes and are slightly lower for value-added taxes, whereas the long-run elasticity for wage taxes is close to the consensus estimate in the literature. Additionally, we find that differences between short- and long-run elasticities are particularly important with respect to profit-related taxes. Here we estimate a far lower contemporaneous response to tax base changes than other studies and a dynamic reaction pattern spanning several years, which can be explained, for example, by tax collection lags. --
    Keywords: Dynamic tax revenue elasticities,Disaggregated analysis,Error correction models
    JEL: H2 H24 H25 E26
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdps:232012&r=acc
  5. By: Schneider, Friedrich (University of Linz); Buehn, Andreas (Utrecht University)
    Abstract: In this paper the main focus lies on 'driving forces' of the development and size of the shadow economy in highly developed 39 OECD countries. The influential factors on the shadow economy are tax policies and state regulation, which, if they rise, increase the shadow economy, but also other factors like economic ones (unemployment) are considered, too. Specifically it is shown that the main driving forces are unemployment, self-employment and the tax burden, which have different weights in these 39 countries. Between 1999 and 2010 indirect taxes have by far the largest relative impact (29.4%), followed by self-employment (22.2%), unemployment (16.9%), personal income taxes (13.1%) and tax morale (9.5%).
    Keywords: state regulation, tax pressure, tax morale, shadow economy, undeclared work
    JEL: K42 H26 D78
    Date: 2012–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6891&r=acc

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