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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Peter J. Lambert and Thor O. Thoresen (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | The overall inequality effects of a dual income tax (DIT) system, combining progressive taxation of labor income with proportional taxation of income from capital, are investigated. Simple examples show that correlations between distributions of wage and capital income, the degree of tax rate differentiation in the DIT, and reranking of tax-payers can be expected to complicate the analysis. We trace out what can be said definitively, obtaining sufficient conditions for unambiguous inequality reduction and identifying the nature of the implicit redistribution between labor and capital income which is involved, with the help of Norwegian income tax data. |
| Keywords: | Personal income tax; dual income tax; redistributive effect |
| JEL: | D31 D63 H31 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:663&r=acc |
| By: | Jan Wouters and Katrien Meuwissen |
| Abstract: | The international financial crisis which broke out in 2008 has had a major impact on fiscal sustainability of countries all over the world. Countries have responded with varying measures. Moreover, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, international initiatives regarding tax governance have gained political momentum; various initiatives regarding fiscal policy have been taken at the global level, and several policies with implications for national tax policy and law are conducted at that level . Therefore, this paper will give an overview of the international tax initiatives at the level of the Group of Twenty (G-20), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These international tax initiatives cannot be referred to as 'international tax law'. It would be more appropriate to see them as a hesitant beginning of a form of global tax governance''. This contribution will show that the unequivocal fiscal principle of ‘no taxation without representation’ poses an important challenge for the emergence of legitimate global tax governance, as most of the international initiatives lack an inclusive process. Whereas multiple international tax initiatives exist, we cannot yet discern the existence of globally effective tax governance. |
| Date: | 2011–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0280&r=acc |
| By: | Johann K. Brunner (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria); Susanne Pech (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | Inherited wealth creates a second distinguishing characteristic of individuals, in addition to earning abilities. We incorporate this fact into a model of optimal labor income taxation, with bequests motivated by joy of giving. We find that taxes on bequests or on inheritances allow further redistribution, if in the parent generation initial wealth and earning abilities are positively related. On the other hand, these taxes distort the bequest decision; thus, the overall effect on social welfare is ambiguous. A tax on all expenditures of a generation (a uniform tax on consumption plus bequests) has the same redistributive effect as an inheritance tax but does not distort the bequest decision. |
| Keywords: | optimal taxation, inheritance tax, expenditure tax, intergenerational wealth transfer |
| JEL: | H21 H24 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2011_12&r=acc |
| By: | Paul Eckerstorfer (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | This paper extends the previous literature on optimal redistributive taxation in the presence of externalities to a multi-externality setting. While taxes on income and on 'clean' commodities are still unaffected by the externalities, which confirms previous results, I find that the existence of more than one externality-generating commodity has important implications for the optimal Pigouvian tax rates. In general the Pigouvian parts of taxation depend also on the externalities induced by the consumption of the other commodities, implying that the interdependence of the externality-generating commodities is relevant for tax policy. |
| Keywords: | Optimal Taxation, Externalities |
| JEL: | D82 H21 H23 H24 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2011_10&r=acc |
| By: | Julien Daubanes (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Pierre Lasserre (Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada) |
| Abstract: | Optimum commodity taxation theory asks how to raise a given amount of tax revenue while minimizing distortions. We reexamine Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule in presence of Hotelling-type non-renewable natural resources. Under standard assumptions borrowed from the non-renewable-resource-extraction and from the optimum-commodity-taxation literatures, a non-renewable resource should be taxed in priority whatever its demand elasticity and whatever the demand elasticity of regular commodities. It should also be taxed at a higher rate than other commodities having the same demand elasticity and, while the tax on regular commodities should be constant, the resource tax should vary over time. There are two basic ways to alleviate resource supply limitations; one is to produce reserves for subsequent extraction; the other one is to rely on imports. When the generation of reserves by exploration is determined by the net-of-tax rents derived during the extraction phase, reserves become a conventional form of capital and royalties tax its income; our results contradict Chamley’s conclusion that capital should not be taxed at all in the very long run. When the economy is autarkic, in the absence of any subsidy to reserve discoveries, the optimal tax rate on extraction obeys an inverse elasticity rule almost identical to that of a commodity whose supply is perfectly elastic. As a matter of fact, there is a continuum of optimal combinations of reserve subsidies and extraction taxes, irrespective of whether taxes are applied on consumption or on production. When the government cannot commit, extraction rents are completely expropriated and subsidies are maximum. In general the optimum Ramsey tax not only causes a distortion of the extraction path, as happens when reserves are given, but also distorts the level of reserves developed for extraction. When that distortion is the sole effect of the tax, it is determined by a rule reminiscent of the inverse elasticity rule applying to elastically-supplied commodities. In an open economy, Ramsey taxes further acquire an optimum-tariff dimension, capturing foreign resource rents. For countries that import the resource, the result that domestic resource consumption is to be taxed at a higher rate than conventional commodities having the same demand elasticity emerges reinforced. |
| Keywords: | Optimum commodity taxation, Inverse elasticity rule, Non-renewable resources, Hotelling resource, Supply elasticity, Demand elasticity, Capital income taxation. |
| JEL: | Q31 Q38 H21 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:11-151&r=acc |
| By: | Ahmed, Khalil |
| Abstract: | Recent innovations in Islamic finance have changed the dynamics of the Islamic finance industry especially, in the area of sukuk or Islamic securities. Sukuk have become increasingly popular in the last few years, both as a means of raising government finance through sovereign issues, and as a way for companies to obtain funding through offering corporate sukuk. In this paper an attempt is made is to define sukuk and show the structure of sukuk. Furthermore, the paper shades some light on some accounting risk issues of sukuk. Finally, the paper presents benefits of sukuk for shareholders. However, this paper is a humble attempt to explain certain issues of sukuk. Certainly, for further information about sukuk, there are many publications that may assist the reader to derive the knowledge about sukuk. |
| Keywords: | Sukuk; structure; recognition; measurement and risk |
| JEL: | G3 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:33675&r=acc |