|
on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Marie-Laure Breuillé (INRA); Pascale Duran-Vigneron (University of Exeter); Anne-Laure Samson (Université Paris Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of inter-municipal cooperation on local taxation. Municipalities that join/create an inter-municipal jurisdiction choose between three tax regimes, which may induce both horizontal and vertical tax externalities. Using the differences in differences method with a quasi-exhaustive panel for French municipalities over the 1994-2010 period, we show a positive causal effect of cooperation on the level of cumulative tax rates (i.e. the sum of municipal and inter-municipal tax rates). Moreover, we show that cooperation leads to a convergence of tax rates within an inter-municipal structure, which thus reduces tax disparities among municipalities. |
| Keywords: | Inter-municipal cooperation, tax competition, fiscal disparities |
| JEL: | H23 H7 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2011/7/doc2011-13&r=acc |
| By: | Szarowska, Irena |
| Abstract: | The aim of the paper is to analyze changes in taxation and their impact on economic growth in the European Union. The analysis is performed on adjusted annual panel data of 24 European Union countries in a period 1995–2008. Panel regression with fixed effects is used as a basic method of research. The panel regression is based on analysis the effect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of changes in its components (social contribution, direct and indirect tax quotas) in model 2 and of personal and corporate income tax quota changes in model 3. Results of empirical tests verify statistically significant negative effect of tax burden on GDP growth. Total tax quota increased by 1% decreases the GDP growth rate by 0.29% in the same year. Estimations confirm a statistically significant negative effect of direct taxes on GDP growth as well. A cut in the direct tax quota by 1% raises the GDP growth rate by 0.43%. The model also presents a high negative impact of an increase in the corporate income tax quota on GDP growth (a value of the regression coefficient is minus 1.28%) expresses the high negative. The effect of social contribution quota on GDP growth is not statistically significant in any estimation. |
| Keywords: | taxation; tax burden; economic growth; panel regression |
| JEL: | E62 C23 H25 |
| Date: | 2010–12–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32354&r=acc |
| By: | Nicolas Veron (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | In this Policy Brief, PIIE Visiting Fellow Nicolas Véron provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategic challenges facing the attempt to harmonize the world's accounting practices through the global spread of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). After taking stock of the initial successes of IFRS adoption, he identifies unsustainable features in the current governance framework of the IFRS Foundation, the organization that hosts IFRS standard-setting, and advocates reform to make the IFRS Foundation accountable not only to individual governments but also to the global investor community. He also proposes a variety of incentives for individual jurisdictions to converge towards IFRS, as such convergence looks set to be more gradual than had been envisaged by the IFRS Foundation in the past. |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb11-11&r=acc |
| By: | Michelle J. White |
| Abstract: | Bankruptcy is the legal process by which the debts of firms, individuals, and occasionally governments in financial distress are resolved. Bankruptcy law always includes three components. First, it provides a collective framework for simultaneously resolving all debts of the bankrupt entity, regardless of when they are due. Second, it provides rules for determining how the assets and earnings used to repay are divided among creditors. Third, bankruptcy law specifies punishments intended to discourage debtors from defaulting on their debts and filing for bankruptcy. This review discusses and evaluates bankruptcy law by examining whether and when the law encourages debtors and creditors to behave in economically efficient ways. It also considers how bankruptcy law might be changed to improve economic efficiency. The review shows that there are multiple economic objectives of bankruptcy law, because the law affects has very diverse effects. Some of these objectives differ for individuals versus corporations in bankruptcy. |
| JEL: | G33 K2 K35 K36 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17237&r=acc |
| By: | Estrada, Fernando; Mutascu, Mihai; Tiwari, Aviral |
| Abstract: | The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach in the panel framework, using a country-level panel data from 59 countries for the period 2002 to 2008. The salient features of this model are: (a) simplicity is based on a limited number of variables (five) are categorical or continuous and not dependent on complex interactions or nonlinear effects. (b) accuracy: a low level of errors, the model achieves a high percentage of accuracy in distinguishing countries with inclination to political instability, compared to countries with political stability, (c) generality: the model allows to distinguish types of political instability, both resulting from acts of violence and failure of democracies to show, and (d) novelty: the model incorporates a tool that helps evaluate and exclude many variables used by the conventional literature. This approach is mainly based on the recognition of state structures and the relations between elites and parties. |
| Keywords: | Taxation; Political Stability; Connection; Effects; Panel VAR analysis |
| JEL: | E62 N10 B22 C93 D53 D70 E17 C02 C72 H20 O50 E63 C70 C33 C53 B23 A12 C23 D72 B41 |
| Date: | 2011–07–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32414&r=acc |
| By: | Tommaso Monacelli; Roberto Perotti |
| Abstract: | With perfect credit markets, any (lump-sum) tax redistribution is neutral. We study the e¤ects of a tax redistribution in an economy with heterogenous agents and borrowing constraints. Under ?exible prices, a tax redistribution that favors "the poor" (i.e., the credit constrained) is neutral, or, possibly, even mildly contractionary. When nominal prices are sticky, that result is overturned: a tax redistribution from the savers to the constrained borrowers is expansionary on output. Key to the non-neutrality result is the agents?heterogenous sensitivity to movements in the credit premium. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:408&r=acc |