|
on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Bach, Stefan; Corneo, Giacomo; Steiner, Viktor |
| Abstract: | This paper analytically derives optimal top marginal tax rates when couples are taxed according to income splitting between spouses, consumption is taxed, and the skill distribution is unbounded. Optimal top marginal income tax rates are then quantified for Germany. Estimation results based on an exhaustive dataset of top taxpayers suggest that the optimal asymptotic tax rate is close to 2/3 and only applies to incomes that are considerably higher than those currently subject to the actual top tax rate. |
| Keywords: | optimal income tax; top incomes |
| JEL: | D31 D72 H23 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8435&r=acc |
| By: | Billard, Olivier (Bredin Prat); Ivaldi, Marc (Toulouse School of Economics); Mitraille, Sébastien (Toulouse Business School) |
| Abstract: | The financial crisis drew attention to the crucial role of transparency and the independence of financial certification intermediaries, in particular, statutory auditors. Now any anticompetitive practice involving coordinated increases in prices or concomitant changes in quality that impacts financial information affects the effectiveness of this intermediation. It is therefore not surprising that the competitive analysis of the audit market is a critical factor in regulating financial systems, all the more so as this market is marked by various barriers to entry, such as the incompatibility of certification tasks with the preparation of financial statements or consulting, the expertise on (and the ability to apply) international standards for the presentation of financial information, the need to attract top young graduates, the prohibition of advertising, or the two-sided nature of this market where the quality of financial information results from the interaction between the reputation of auditors and audited firms. Against this backdrop, we propose a legal and economic study of the risks of collective dominance in the statutory audit market in France using the criteria set by Airtours case and, in particular, by analyzing how regulatory obligations incumbent on statutory auditors may favour the appearance of tacit collusion. Our analysis suggests that nothing prevents collective dominance of the auditors of the Big Four group in France to exist, which is potentially detrimental to the economy as a whole as the audit industry may fail to provide the optimal level of financial information. |
| Keywords: | Collective dominance ; Airtours criteria; Audit industry |
| Date: | 2011–05–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:24548&r=acc |
| By: | Huizinga, H.P.; Voget, J.; Wagner, W.B. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines empirically how international taxation affects the volume and pricing of cross-border banking activities for a sample of banks in 38 countries over the 1998-2008 - period. Home country corporate income taxation of foreign-source bank income is found to reduce banking-sector FDI. Furthermore, such taxation is almost fully passed on into higher interest margins charged abroad. These results imply that international double taxation distorts the activities of international banks, and that the incidence of international double taxation of banks is on bank customers in the foreign subsidiary country. Our analysis informs the debate about additional taxation of the financial sector that has emerged in the wake of the recent financial crisis. |
| Keywords: | Cross-border banking;International taxation;Interest margins. |
| JEL: | G21 F23 H25 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011066&r=acc |
| By: | Bilin Neyapti (Bilkent University); Zeynep Burcu Bulut-Cevik (METU) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the welfare implications of a transfer mechanism in a fiscally decentralized economy where local governments select their tax collection effort to maximize their lifetime utility. We consider a transfer rule that both punishes for the lack of efficiency in tax-collection and compensates for the deviation of pre-tax or transfer income from a target level; in addition, a portion of transfers is considered to be directed towards investment. Simulations of the model’s optimal solution reveal that increasing punishment always results in increased steady state effort, despite the disincentives that increasing income compensation or directed investment may generate. Increasing punishment also improves capital accumulation the lower the rate of directed investments and the lower the tax rate. Further, efficiency in tax collection is achieved the lower the rate of directed investment and the higher the punishment rate. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal decentralization, redistribution |
| JEL: | E62 H71 O23 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koc:wpaper:1114&r=acc |
| By: | Stephen Coate |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits the classic argument that a system of local governments financing public service provision via property taxes will produce an efficient allocation of both housing and services if communities can implement zoning ordinances. The novel feature of the analysis is a dynamic model in which housing stocks and public policies are endogenously determined. In each period, citizens choose both the level of services for their communities and the zoning ordinances that govern future new construction. The main result of the paper is that there does not exist an equilibrium which has a steady state that is both efficient and satisfies a local stability property. The paper also develops examples in which equilibrium allocations converge to a steady state in which there is over-zoning and households are forced to over-consume housing. The findings of the paper challenge the well-known Benefit View of the property tax. |
| JEL: | H21 H72 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17145&r=acc |