nep-acc New Economics Papers
on Accounting and Auditing
Issue of 2011‒01‒30
eight papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. ACCOUNTING, TRANSPARENCY AND “TRANSLATION” : THE CASE OF HUMANITARIAN CROSS CULTURAL GOVERNANCE By Rémi Jardat
  2. Taxation of Foreign Investments in Malawi. Lessons from Japan By James , Kenani
  3. Tax Morale, Entrepreneurship, and the Irregular Economy By Gaetano Lisi; Maurizio Pugno
  4. From IRAP to CBIT: tax distortions and redistributive effects By Manzo, Marco; Monteduro, Maria Teresa
  5. Tax Competition in an Expanding European Union By Ronald B. Davies; Johannes Voget
  6. Tax mix corners and other kinks By Federico Revelli
  7. International Financial Contagion: the Role of Banks By Robert Kollmann; Frédéric Malherbe
  8. Development of auditing in Malaysia: legal, political and historical influences By Azham, Ali; Teck Heang, Lee; Yusof, Nor Zalina; Ojo, Marianne

  1. By: Rémi Jardat (ISTEC - Institut supérieur des Sciences, Techniques et Economie Commerciales - ISTEC)
    Abstract: We have conducted a field research on philanthropic “tsunami” projects in South-eastern India that are embedded in a quiet complex governance scheme (French Firm funding, execution by local NGOs, consolidated management by a French federation of NGOs), in which the classical notions of fraud and transparency prove to very ambiguous, so that accounting cannot be the main source of control. We show that the opacity of events at microscopic operational level is a mandatory condition for institutionalization of accounted “facts”. Therefore, we establish the importance of “translation” effects in the sense of Actor Network Theory (ANT). Beyond transparency that translation institutionalizes trough accounts, we raise an irreducible part of ignorance and incertitude that necessarily comes with every attempt to build knowledge for governance.
    Keywords: Transparency, ANT, Translation, India, NGO, Institutionalization
    Date: 2010–01–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00520080&r=acc
  2. By: James , Kenani
    Abstract: Foreign investments remain an important source of economic growth in both developing and developed countries. Their contribution to capital formation, employment opportunities, revenues and technology to the host countries are likely to continue creating strong competition among countries in attracting them. In order to be competitive, developing countries provide generous tax incentives to MNEs which tend to encourage high incidence of tax avoidance and evasion. With inadequate institutional capacity to ensure tax compliance, governments are losing more tax revenues from the MNEs who use complex accounting mechanisms to avoid tax payments. This paper has explained how Malawi Government has been taxing foreign investments to achieve optimal balance of increasing domestic resource mobilization and considerably attract new foreign investments. The central objective of the paper was to investigate taxation of the foreign investments in Malawi. The study primarily focused on Malawi tax system in comparison with international taxation from Japanese tax system. Furthermore, the paper investigated tax anti-avoidance measures that are available in domestic legislations which ensure tax compliance from the MNEs. The paper also discussed tax erosion practices that are associated with MNEs such as transfer pricing, internal debt arrangements among others that help to reduce taxable income of the MNEs. The paper has provided the shortfalls of Malawi international taxation system and some practical solutions have been recommended emanating from Japanese tax system.
    Keywords: Malaw; Japan; MNEs;Foreign Investments; International Taxation
    JEL: P33
    Date: 2010–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28191&r=acc
  3. By: Gaetano Lisi (University of Cassino); Maurizio Pugno (University of Cassino)
    Abstract: This paper incorporates tax morale into a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment, with on-the-job search, extended to both the irregular sector and entrepreneurship. Tax morale is modelled as a social norm for tax compliance which renders evasion costly. The moral cost of tax evasion (the strength of the social norm) is negatively related to the fraction of entrepreneurs that evades taxes. Precisely, if the relationship is nonlinear, multiple equilibria may emerge, thus accounting for differences in-between regions and countries in the size of the irregular sector. The "good" equilibrium is in fact characterised, with respect to the "bad" one, by a smaller irregular sector and a stronger tax morale.
    Keywords: tax morale; tax evasion; entrepreneurship; job search; irregular economy; shadow economy
    JEL: A13 E26 H26 J24 J64 L26 K42 O17
    Date: 2011–01–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:css:wpaper:2011-01&r=acc
  4. By: Manzo, Marco; Monteduro, Maria Teresa
    Abstract: The paper explores the differences between IRAP (the Regional Tax on Productive Activities) and CBIT (the Comprehensive Business Income Tax), which approximately corresponds to allow the deduction of labor cost from the taxable base of IRAP. By developing a DSGE model that ncorporates business taxes, like IRAP or CBIT, we find that tax distortions due to IRAP are more contractionary than those caused by the presence of CBIT. Empirically, tax revenues and redistributive effects are more carefully analyzed. We implement a microsimulation model (MSM) based on a dataset of more than 150,000 incorporated firms. We show that small incorporated firms are particularly harmed by IRAP, especially when business run a loss instead of a profit. This is due to the fact that IRAP is a business tax on value added, which does not allow for the deduction of labor cost. For this purpose, we focus on the introduction of a reform based on the CBIT principle. Our result is that CBIT is particularly costly and more able to enhance the profitability for larger enterprises. Moreover, the tax design of CBIT is more regressive compared to the IRAP including tax allowances. Consequently, an efficiency-equity trade-off between IRAP and CBIT might be emphasized
    Keywords: business cycles; tax distortions; micro-simulations models; distributive effects; Italy.
    JEL: E62 E32 H25 H32
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28070&r=acc
  5. By: Ronald B. Davies (Ronald B. Davies, School of Economics, University College Dublin, Newman Building (G215), Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland); Johannes Voget (Johannes Voget, Mannheim University, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation , CentER Tilburg University. L9,7, 68131 Mannheim, Germany)
    Abstract: This paper empirically examines whether expansion of the EU has increased international tax competition. To do so, we use a market potential weighting scheme to estimate the slope of best responses. We find robust evidence for tax competition. In particular, our estimates suggest that EU membership affects responses with EU members responding more to the tax rates of other members. This lends credence to the above noted concerns.
    Keywords: Tax Competition; Foreign Direct Investment; Spatial Econometrics
    JEL: F1 F2 H2 H7
    Date: 2010–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mde:wpaper:0033&r=acc
  6. By: Federico Revelli (University of Torino)
    Abstract: This paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of state-wide tax limitations and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants (the conventionally and somewhat misleadingly called flypaper effect) arises in the endogenously generated constrained tax mix and cannot in general be taken as a symptom of local government overspending. By means of a panel data switching regression approach that allows for fixed effects and endogenous selection, the paper exploits the clustering of Italian Provinces at the corners produced by upper and lower tax limitations, and provides evidence of considerable cap-generated excess sensitivity.
    Keywords: Flypaper effect, excess sensitivity, tax mix, switching regression, endogenous selection
    JEL: C23 C25 H72
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2010/11/doc2010-50&r=acc
  7. By: Robert Kollmann; Frédéric Malherbe
    Abstract: This paper provides an overview of recent theories of international financial contagion, with a focus on models in which the balance sheet constraints of global banks (and other financial institutions) are the key of international transmission.
    Keywords: global financial crisis; international financial contagion; international financial multiplier; global banks; bank balance sheets; capital ratio; leverage ratio; international interbank market; asset prices; credit losses; bank runs
    Date: 2011–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/73556&r=acc
  8. By: Azham, Ali; Teck Heang, Lee; Yusof, Nor Zalina; Ojo, Marianne
    Abstract: This work investigates the role and contribution of external auditing as practised in the Malaysian society during the forty year period from independence in 1957 to just before the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. It applies the political economic theory introduced by Tinker (1980) and refined by Cooper & Sherer (1984), which focuses on the social relations aspects of professional activity rather than economic forces alone. In a case study format where qualitative data was gathered mainly from primary and secondary source materials, the study found that the function of auditing in the Malaysian society in most cases is devoid of any essence of mission; instead it is created, shaped and transformed by the pressures which give rise to its development over time. The largely insignificant role that it serves is intertwined within the contexts in which it operates.
    Keywords: external audit; Malaysia; politics; history; economy; Companies Act 1965; Companies Act 1985; British Companies Acts; Accountants Act 1967; Asian Financial Crisis
    JEL: K2 M4
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28138&r=acc

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