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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Bunget, Ovidiu-Constantin; Farcane, Nicoleta; Dumitrescu, Alin-Constantin; Popa, Adina |
| Abstract: | An overview of the accounting profession’s evolution in Romania can only be a cause for reflection. As far as Romania is concerned, the accounting profession’s development rhythm followed the pace of the economic, social and political development of the country: first, formally speaking, as an association of graduates, subsequently organized as an association of public interest. The character of a liberal profession could occur whenever the market economy worked. The political and social changes of the mid-20th century generated a decrease of the economic importance of professional accounting mechanisms, as well as its position within the socialist system, especially in view of achieving accounting regulation expertise. Actually, the political events of 1989 led to a return to a period interrupted, about 50 years before. But the size and economic specificities were much different. This caused a rethinking of the accounting expert’s position, divisions in the accounting profession (Romanian Body of Experts and Chartered Accountants, Romanian Chamber of Auditors, the Chamber of Tax Consultants, etc.). |
| Keywords: | accountants; audit; Romanian Chamber of Auditor; Romanian Body of Experts and Chartered Accountants |
| JEL: | M40 |
| Date: | 2009–11–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:18408&r=acc |
| By: | Bezemer, Dirk (Groningen University) |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:rugsom:09002&r=acc |
| By: | Antoine BOUET; Devesh ROY |
| Abstract: | Trade protection and tax evasion: evidence from Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tac:wpaper:1&r=acc |
| By: | Matthias Wrede (University of Marburg and CESifo, Am Plan 2, 35032 Marburg, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes asymmetric tax competition under formula apportionment. It sets up a model with multinationals where two welfare-maximizing jurisdictions of different size levy source-based corporate taxes and allocate taxes using the formula approach. At the Nash equilibrium, tax rates are too low and public goods quantities are too small. The paper shows that the larger country levies a larger tax rate compared to the smaller country as it does under separate accounting. Citizens of the larger country are worse off than those of the smaller country. |
| Keywords: | Multinational enterprises, corporate taxation, formula apportionment, asymmetric tax competition. |
| JEL: | H25 H42 H73 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:200943&r=acc |
| By: | David M. Arseneau; Sanjay K. Chugh; André Kurmann |
| Abstract: | This paper clarifies the role of initial asset value constraints in Ramsey models of incomplete factor taxation. We show that the optimal long-run capital tax is zero in the long run if and only if there is no binding constraint on the initial capital tax rate. This finding contrasts with Armenter (2008) who argues that zero long-run capital taxes reappear in models of incomplete factor taxation as long as the government is barred from manipulating initial asset wealth. The reason for this difference is that the two constraints cannot both be binding at the same time. Hence, in Armenter’s (2008) analysis, the initial asset value constraint is necessarily more restrictive than the constraint on the initial capital tax rate. |
| Keywords: | Ramsey equilibrium, incomplete factor taxation |
| JEL: | E62 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0949&r=acc |
| By: | Aureo de Paula (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Jose A. Scheinkman (Department of Economics, Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates determinants of informal economic activity. We present an equilibrium model of informality and test its implications using a survey of 48,000+ small firms in Brazil. We define informality as tax avoidance; firms in the informal sector avoid tax payments but suffer other limitations. A novel theoretical contribution in this model is the role of value added taxes in transmitting informality. It predicts that the informality of a firm is correlated to the informality of firms from which it buys or sells. The model also implies that higher tolerance for informal firms in one production stage increases tax avoidance in downstream and upstream stages. Empirical analysis shows that, in fact, various measures of formality of suppliers and purchasers (and its enforcement) are correlated with the formality of a firm. Even more interestingly, when we look at sectors where Brazilian firms are not subject to the credit system of value added tax, but instead the value added tax is applied at some stage of production at a rate that is estimated by the tax authorities, this chain effect vanishes. |
| Keywords: | Informal Sector, VAT, Tax Avoidance |
| JEL: | H2 H3 K4 |
| Date: | 2009–08–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:09-041&r=acc |
| By: | Fernández de Pinedo Echevarría, Nadia (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | If we compare the Castilian fiscal system with English, French or Dutch, two basic differences are apparent: in one hand, in England, France and Holland the fiscal system was a mixture of indirect taxes and direct taxes and in the other hand, the financial revolution had been carried out in the 16th century in Castilia (central Spain), when for different reasons national short-term debt was turned into juros - or long-term debt. But the Dutch Republic in the 16th century and England by the end of 17th century and the beginning of 18th century were able to finance wars thanks to an efficient financial revolution. Traditionally, wars have been the excuse to impose new taxes or to reorganize public funds in order to obtain greater economic resources for financing the deficit originated by the war. Since most of the monarchies’ tax expenses stemmed from war, it is no surprise that the conflict known as the Jenkins´ Ear (1739) contributed to increase the deficit and fuelled a debate regarding a tax reform that would augment income and would be collected in a more egalitarian way. The Castilian tax system was based almost exclusively on indirect taxes. The taxation (alcabalas, millones, cientos, tobacco monopolies, customs…) of consumables ensured that whilst some taxes affected primarily rich consumers (for example tobacco), most taxes targeted the masses. Increasing the fiscal charge via indirect taxes seemed like an unfeasible and damaging option for trade and craftwork. This is the reason why there was an attempt to create a direct tax, similar to the Catalan cadastre. One of these attempts prior to the Marquis of the Ensenada’s cadastre was la décima. It was devised as a direct tax but its manner of collection ultimately depended on the willingness of the local cabildos. |
| Keywords: | Taxation, Spain, Madrid, Indirect/Direct Taxes, 18th Century Tax Collection, War Expenses, Jenkin’s Ear War, The “Décima” |
| JEL: | N33 E62 H71 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uam:wpapeh:200905&r=acc |
| By: | Paliu-Popa, Lucia; Dina, Ionela Claudia |
| Abstract: | Information regarding production costs occupy a central slot, determined by their implications regarding the present and future evolution of a company. The value of information regarding the cost of production justifies its use both in decisions regarding the current activity and in the company’s future strategy. The efficient organization of economic activity in the carboniferous mining industry imposes a constant improvement of management methods, which also implies a reconsideration of administration accountancy methods and cost control, which have to become capable of offering information that can be compatible to the requirements for an efficient management of the production process, in a market economy. |
| Keywords: | Classic Methods; Administration Accountacy; Carboniferous Mining Industry |
| JEL: | M41 H83 |
| Date: | 2009–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:18567&r=acc |