nep-acc New Economics Papers
on Accounting and Auditing
Issue of 2009‒08‒02
seven papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Leverage Bubbles By Fares Triki
  2. Evaluarea pe baza de active: analiza critica By Goagara, Daniel; Giurca Vasilescu, Laura
  3. Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive By Thomas Hemmelgarn; Gaetan Nicodeme
  4. Generational policy and the macroeconomic measurement of tax incidence By Juan Carlos Conesa; Carlos Garriga
  5. Choix de l’auditeur externe, honoraires d’audit et gouvernance des entreprises françaises By Mehdi Nekhili; Wafa Masmoudi; Dhikra Chebbi Nehkili
  6. Capital account liberalization, financial development and industry growth: a synthetic view By Eichengreen, Barry; Gullapalli, Rachita; Panizza, Ugo
  7. Does tax policy affect executive compensation? evidence from postwar tax reforms By Carola Frydman; Raven S. Molloy

  1. By: Fares Triki (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between liquidity and asset prices. It shows that, when banks balance sheets are marked to market and banks are targeting a financial leverage level - a situation similar to current environment - formation of Leverage Bubble phenomenon and suggests a new regulation rule based on a Dynamic Leverage Ratio (DLR) rule.
    Keywords: Financial crises, rational bubbles, Dynamic Leverage Ratio, mark to market accounting, asset pricing, macroprudential regulation, market liquidity.
    Date: 2009–05
  2. By: Goagara, Daniel; Giurca Vasilescu, Laura
    Abstract: For estimation the value of the firm, there can be used three approaches: the approach based on assets, the approach based on incomes and the approach based on comparison. Each type of approach include more methods and techniques of evaluation and, in practice can be used all three approaches in order to estimate the value of the firm. Among the patrimonial methods (evaluation based on assets) the most representative are the followings: Net Accounting Asset (ANC); Net Corrected Accounting Asset (ANCc); Net Liquidation Asset (ANL); the substantial value; the permanent capital necessary for exploitation. A comparative analysis of the methods ANC and ANCc reveals the main advantages and disadvantages of them. But the selection of a certain approach or methods depends on the type of firm, on its situation at the evaluation date, on the available information, on the purpose of evaluation etc. and the option for a method or another is based finally on the evaluator’s choice which select the used methods in function of the specific conditions where the evaluation is done and of the existing advantages/disadvantages.
    Keywords: patrimonial evaluation; evaluation methods; Net Accounting Asset; Net Corrected Accounting Asset
    JEL: M41 G31
    Date: 2009–08–28
  3. By: Thomas Hemmelgarn (European Commission); Gaetan Nicodeme (European Commission)
    Abstract: This paper reviews the economic effects of the EU Savings Taxation Directive. The Directive aims at enabling taxation of foreign interest payments received by individuals in accordance with the rules of their State of residence. The data suggest that the Directive, which is based on automatic information exchange, has not led to major shifts in international savings. However, this result has to be interpreted with caution since the available data is scarce and not always conclusive.
    Keywords: Savings Taxation, Withholding Tax, Information Exchange, European Union
    JEL: F21 F33 G12 G28 H24 H26 H87 K34 O16
    Date: 2009–06
  4. By: Juan Carlos Conesa; Carlos Garriga
    Abstract: In this paper we show that the generational accounting framework used in macroeconomics to measure tax incidence can, in some cases, yield inaccurate measurements of the tax burden across age cohorts. This result is very important for policy evaluation, because it shows that the selection of tax policies designed to change generational imbalances could be misleading. We illustrate this problem in the context of a Social Security reform where we show how fiscal policy can affect the intergenerational gap across cohorts without impacting the distribution of welfare. We provide a more accurate procedure that only measures changes in generational imbalances derived from policies with real effects.
    Keywords: Fiscal policy ; Taxation
    Date: 2009
  5. By: Mehdi Nekhili (Université de Reims Champagne Ardennes); Wafa Masmoudi (Université de Sfax (Tunisie)); Dhikra Chebbi Nehkili (Université de Bourgogne)
    Abstract: (VF)L’objectif de cette recherche est d’examiner la relation entre la taille de l’auditeur externe et le montant des honoraires d’audit. Le choix de l’auditeur est, quant à lui, expliqué par les caractéristiques de gouvernance et de propriété de la firme. Sur la base d’un échantillon de 96 entreprises françaises cotées pendant la période 2004-2006, nous appliquons, pour tenir compte de cette double relation, un modèle de sélection de type Heckman. Les résultats du modèle montrent principalement le rôle prépondérant des comités d’audit indépendants dans la sélection des auditeurs de grande taille et la présence d’une prime d’audit en faveur des auditeurs de grande taille. (VA)The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the external auditor size and the audit fees. The selection of an external auditor is, however, explained by governance and ownership characteristics of the firm. Based on a sample of 96 listed French firms over the period 2004-2006, we use, to take account of this dual relationship, a Heckman’s selection model. Results show mainly the important role of independent audit committees in the selection of big auditors and the presence of a “Big auditor” premium.
    Keywords: auditeur externe;Big Four;honoraires d’audit;gouvernance;structure de propriété;external auditor;audit fees;governance;ownership structure.
    JEL: G30 M40
    Date: 2009–05
  6. By: Eichengreen, Barry; Gullapalli, Rachita; Panizza, Ugo
    Abstract: This paper synthesizes previous studies analyzing the effects of capital account liberalization on industry growth while controlling for financial crises, domestic financial development and the strength of institutions. We find reasonably strong evidence that financial openness has positive effects on the growth of financially-dependent industries, although these growth-enhancing effects evaporate during financial crises. Further analysis indicates that the positive effects of capital account liberalization are limited to countries with relatively well-developed financial systems, good accounting standards, strong creditor rights and rule of law. It suggests that countries must reach a certain threshold in terms of institutional and economic development before they can expect to benefit from capital account liberalization.
    Keywords: Capital account liberalization, Financial development, External dependence
    JEL: F34 F36
    Date: 2009–06
  7. By: Carola Frydman; Raven S. Molloy
    Abstract: Evidence since the 1980s suggests that the level and structure of executive compensation in U.S. public corporations are largely unresponsive to tax incentives. However, the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay has been relatively small during this period. Using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005, we find little response of salaries, qualified stock options, long-term incentive pay, or bonuses paid after retirement to changes in tax rates on labor income--even though tax rates were significantly higher and more heterogeneous across individuals in the first several decades following WWII. To explain this lack of response, we find suggestive evidence that concerns about within-firm equality may have limited firms' ability to differentiate top executives' compensation packages based on their marginal income tax rates.
    Date: 2009

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