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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Peter C. Dawson (Dallas, Texas); Stephen M. Miller (Department of Economics, University of Nevada, Las Vegas) |
| Abstract: | We review and extend the core literature on international transfer price manipulation to avoid or evade taxes. Under negotiated transfer pricing with a viable bargaining structure, including performance evaluation disconnected from the transfer price, divisions voluntarily exchange accurate information to obtain firm-wide optimality, a result not dependent on restraint from exercising internal market power. For intangible licenses, a larger optimal profit shift for a given tax rate change strengthens incentives for transfer pricing abuse. In practice, an intangible’s arm’s length range is viewed as a guideline, a context where incentives for abuse materialize. Transfer pricing for intangibles obliges greater tax authority scrutiny. |
| Keywords: | Negotiated transfer pricing, licensing intangibles, decentralized MNC. |
| JEL: | F23 H25 H26 L29 O34 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nlv:wpaper:0901&r=acc |
| By: | Itsuo Sakuma |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to give some suggestions on the treatment of intangible assets in national accounting. Knowledge (``World 3'' in Karl Popper's term) is a sort of environment for human beings. As people more and more come to think that knowledge is an important factor for economic growth, the society comes to believe knowledge is capital. However, it is not easy to treat knowledge as capital. First of all, it is because knowledge creation is not economic production. In this paper, it is proposed that knowledge access should be focused instead. In addition, by drawing attention to striking similarities between expenditures for certain intangible fixed assets and certain work]in]progress]type expenditures, it is suggested that the concept of intangible fixed assets in the 1993SNA may be better interpreted when you consider them as a special type of work]in]progress. Finally, the treatment of intangible non]produced assets is discussed. |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hituec:a507&r=acc |
| By: | Nistor, Cristina Silvia |
| Abstract: | Balanced Scorecard is a new control tool in public entities, especially in universities. The aim of this paper is to analyze the possibility of implementation in Romanian universities. At an international level, this concept was used at the beginning by the private sector, followed by its usage by the public sector as well. In universities of the Anglo – Saxon states, there have been debates on the subject for a long period of time in relation to the opportunity of introducing this concept; these debates have been supported by pro and against arguments. At a national level, this concept is virtually unknown in the higher education state institution system. Through the present paper, we would like to test the opportunity of introducing the concept starting from the identification at a global level of the conditions and regulations specific to the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) concept. Our results will present the first overview of this new subject, which is not yet developed in Romania. |
| Keywords: | Balanced Scorecard Concept; Public University; Managerial Accounting |
| JEL: | M41 I28 |
| Date: | 2009–02–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:13208&r=acc |
| By: | Holmlund, Bertil (Department of Economics, Uppsala University); Söderström, Martin (Ministry of Finance) |
| Abstract: | We study income responses to income tax changes by using a large panel of Swedish tax payers over the period 1991–2002. Changes in statutory tax rates as well as discretionary changes in tax bracket thresholds provide exogenous variations in tax rates that can be used to identify income responses. We estimate dynamic income models which allow us to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects in a straightforward fashion. For men, the estimates of the long-run elasticity of income with respect to the net-of-tax rate hover in a range between 0.10 and 0.30. The estimates for women are imprecise and statistically insignificant. We simulate the fiscal consequences of a tax reform that reduces the top marginal tax rate by five percentage points. Such a reform may have negligible effects on tax revenues even for relatively small elasticities when the interactions between income taxes and other taxes are taken into account. |
| Keywords: | Marginal tax rates; progressive taxes; earned income; tax reform |
| JEL: | H24 H31 J22 |
| Date: | 2008–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2008_028&r=acc |