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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Yuri Biondi; Antoine Rebérioux |
| Abstract: | When capital markets are assumed to be (informationally) efficient and the firm a mere collection of marketable resources, corporate governance and accounting are expected to be primarily concerned with making corporate insiders sensitive to external pressure: financial reporting and the board should replicate the market in the context of the firm. In particular, no firm-specific information is required to perform an effective control: independence of board members is the best quality to assure the monitoring of corporate insiders. However, whenever intangibles become significant, firm-specific information becomes as important as market prices to gauge the past and future performance of the business firm. Specific knowledge of the firm is then required to both disclose high-quality information and monitor corporate executives. This argues for the role of improved historical-cost accounting systems coupled with non-independent, proficient board members. |
| JEL: | G30 M41 D80 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2008-36&r=acc |
| By: | Dzhumashev, Ratbek; Gahramanov, Emin |
| Abstract: | Simply by extending a well-known Yitzhaki (1974) static income tax evasion model to a dynamic one with Ak(t) technology, Lin and Yang (2001) conclude that higher taxes encourage tax evasion. We show that once the Lin and Yang (2001) model becomes fully compatible with the Yitzhaki (1974) model, a completely opposite analytical result follows. We then extend the Lin and Yang (2001) setting to account for a productive government and costly compliance, and derive corresponding analytical conditions for the ecient size of the public sector. |
| Keywords: | Tax Evasion; Optimal Taxation; Economic Growth |
| JEL: | H21 D91 H26 |
| Date: | 2008–11–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11960&r=acc |
| By: | Harris, Thomas; Alevy, Jonathan; Kim, Man-Keun; Fadali, Betsy |
| Abstract: | Changes in allocation of federal grazing permits to ranchers can impact not only local ranchers but the entire county economy itself. Regional impacts of changing grazing rights and grazing fees are measured by linking cattle production through a linear programming framework with a county level social accounting matrix (SAM) model. |
| Keywords: | Livestock Production/Industries, |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saeaed:8213&r=acc |