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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Frank Barry and Rosemary Healy-Rae |
| Abstract: | Corporation tax rates significantly influence the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as company decisions on corporate borrowing, transfer pricing, dividend and royalty payments, and research and development. While direct taxation remains within the competence of individual EU member states, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has faced an increasing number of corporation-tax-related cases over recent years and its judgements have significantly redrawn the European tax landscape. The present paper reviews and synthesises these ECJ decisions and analyses their implications for the FDI decisions of Multinational Corporations. |
| Date: | 2008–11–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp270&r=acc |
| By: | John Creedy; Norman Gemmell |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the way in which the asymmetric treatment of losses within corporate tax codes can be expected to affect behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. The paper introduces the concept of an equivalent tax function, raising the same present value of tax payments as the actual function, in which the effective rate on losses in any period, and thus the degree of asymmetry, is explicit. The influence on the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate of this effective rate is then examined, where ‘loss-shifting’ occurs. Results suggest that estimates of the behavioural effect of changes in tax rates on tax revenues can be expected in general to be smaller in regimes that involve greater asymmetries in the tax treatement of losses. As losses vary over the economic cycle, asymmetric treatment also generates effects on tax revenues that are asymmetric (non-linear) between above-trend and below-trend parts of the cycle. |
| Keywords: | n/a |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1028&r=acc |
| By: | Nitsch, H.; Osterburg, B. |
| Abstract: | Cross compliance has been introduced in the EU partly to improve compliance with pre-existing EU legislation in the Member States. Considerable effort has been put into implementing this instrument and the corresponding control systems. This presents an opportunity to assess factors for an efficient enforcement of standards and discuss these with regard to cross compliance. The paper characterizes the enforcement system connected with cross compliance in the EU and implications of interactions with the national control systems for specialized legislation. Economic theories on mechanisms and the behavior, which form the basis of controls, are applied to cross compliance in order to draw conclusions on the implementation of controls and sanctions. The potential contribution of cross compliance to an efficient enforcement of mandatory standards is critically discussed. In view of the insecure future of direct payments any further development of cross compliance within the EU should aim at increasing the effectiveness of the enforcement of legal standards and strengthen national specialized control systems in the long term. |
| Keywords: | Cross compliance, control theory, efficiency, Farm Management, |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaae08:44152&r=acc |
| By: | DEHEZ, Pierre (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)); TELLONE, Daniela (CEREC, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis) |
| Abstract: | A group of agents considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements owned by some of them. These elements are pure public goods with exclusion i.e. nonrival but excludable goods like for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how should agents be compensated for the goods they own. It is shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game – called "data game" – to which standard cost sharing rules like the Shapley value or the nucleolus can then be applied and compared. |
| Keywords: | cost sharing, compensation, Shapley value. |
| JEL: | C71 D46 M41 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2008010&r=acc |