|
on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Simone Pellegrino (Department of Economics and Finance G. Prato, University of Turin (Italy)); Massimiliano Piacenza (Department of Economics and Finance G. Prato, University of Turin (Italy)); Gilberto Turati (Department of Economics and Finance G. Prato, University of Turin (Italy)) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study how prior tax notice (following audit and detection of tax fraud by Tax Authorities) affects individual behaviour in terms of tax compliance. We start with a very stylised theoretical framework, considering a situation in which an individual has been already audited and caught as tax evader, and knows that the Tax Authorities are looking for her to cash the due amount of taxes. We concentrate on the decision to move in order to avoid paying the bill, and derive the optimal number of times an individual should move equalising marginal costs and benefits of the decision. We then carry out an empirical analysis based on real data provided by an Italian collection agency for the period 2004-2007. Our results show that previous notice reduces the probability to move, but its cost is not large enough to correct the individual incentive to escape Tax Authorities. |
| Keywords: | tax-enforcement, individual compliance decisions, prior notice |
| JEL: | H26 H31 K42 D81 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tur:wpaper:1&r=acc |
| By: | Cazavan-Jeny, Anne (ESSEC Business School); Margaine, Julien (ESSEC Business School); Missonier-Piera, Franck (EM-Lyon Business School) |
| Abstract: | Ces dernières années, la publication du niveau de rémunération des dirigeants a soulevé d’intenses controverses. Un certain nombre d’études ont mis en évidence une relation positive entre le salaire des dirigeants et la performance de la société, aux Etats-Unis et en Grande- Bretagne. La rémunération des dirigeants est également proche de la structure du gouvernement d’entreprise. Or la structure française de gouvernement d’entreprise est différente de celle observée aux États-Unis ou en Grande-Bretagne. En France, la tradition voulait que l’on ne divulgue pas ou peu d’information sur le niveau de rémunération des dirigeants. Cependant depuis 2002, les sociétés cotées doivent indiquer dans leurs rapports annuels le montant des rémunérations des dirigeants et des membres du conseil d’administration. (loi NRE, 15 mai 2001). A partir d’un échantillon de 110 sociétés cotées françaises sur la période 2002-2004 (indice SBF 120), l’objet de cette recherche est d’apporter des éclairages sur la rémunération des dirigeants dans un pays connu pour être plutôt conservateur sur le sujet. Pour étudier les déterminants de la rémunération des dirigeants, nous avons utilisé trois mesures de cette rémunération : la partie fixe du salaire, le bonus annuel et la rémunération globale. Les premiers résultats montrent que les trois mesures de la rémunération des dirigeants peuvent être expliquées par la taille de la société, et la partie variable (bonus) par la performance boursière. Les résultats sur le risque sont plus mitigés et indiquent que le risque spécifique de la firme est négativement associé à la rémunération des dirigeants, ce qui confirme les résultats de Gray et Cannela (1997). Enfin, les variables de gouvernance ont un impact significatif sur le niveau de rémunération des dirigeants. |
| Keywords: | CEO compensation; Corporate governance; Performance |
| JEL: | G35 M41 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-08015&r=acc |
| By: | Hill, Berkeley; Blandford, David |
| Abstract: | Economists have rarely considered the implications of taxation systems for the agricultural sector. Management specialists and accountants have usually approached the issue from the perspective of how farmers and landowners can avoid it. Little has been written on the extent to which the special treatments that agriculture commonly receives in national tax systems impact on the sector and its performance. This paper considers these broader issues and builds on an inventory of tax treatments compiled for the OECD by one of the authors. Tax concessions can act as forms of support to incomes and wealth accumulation, though the identification and quantification of this support present fundamental conceptual difficulties and practical problems. Taxes are often advocated as instruments of environmental policy, and these may have income implications. Concessions given by capital taxes, in particular, constrain structural adjustment. Differential tax treatments can also impact on patterns of international trade by distorting comparative advantage, as perceived by farm operators. Some of these effects are of major importance to agricultural adjustment and to policy. This paper examines the main issues involved in achieving a more adequate understanding of the tax treatments applied to agriculture. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, |
| Date: | 2008–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aes007:7976&r=acc |
| By: | Rosanne Altshuler; Alan J. Auerbach; Michael Cooper; Matthew Knittel |
| Abstract: | Recent data present a puzzle: the ratio of corporate tax losses to positive income was much higher around 2001 than in earlier recessions. Using a comprehensive 1982-2005 sample of U.S. corporation tax returns, we explore a variety of potential explanations for this surge in tax losses, taking account of the significant use of executive compensation stock options beginning in the 1990s and recent temporary tax provisions that might have had important effects on taxable income. We find that losses rose because the average rate of return of C corporations fell, rather than because of an increase in the dispersion of returns or an increase in the gap between corporate profits subject to tax and NIPA corporate profits. Our analysis also suggests that the increasing importance of S corporations may help explain the recent experience within the C corporate sector, as S corporations have exhibited a different pattern of losses in recent years. However, we can identify no simple explanation for this differing experience. Our investigation concludes with some new puzzles: why did rates of return of C corporations fall so much early in the decade and why has the incidence of losses among C and S corporations diverged? |
| JEL: | H25 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14405&r=acc |