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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Tristan Boyer (CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg); Elena Chane-Alune |
| Abstract: | We aim at giving a general view of the context in which appears the latest accounting evolutions, linked with the actual financialization of the financial market. Isn’t there a risk that the new IFRS standards and their concern about transparency and comparability impoverish the information by giving to accounting, with the application of the right value, the function of capital fundamental evaluation? We also show the importance of non-financial information able to supplement the provision of information, which is useful for the economic players in order to take decisions, and described on the reworking of the financial information by the players led to use it. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance, IFRS, Financial Information, Non-Financial Information. |
| JEL: | G30 G14 M41 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crf:wpaper:08-06&r=acc |
| By: | Winter, Peter |
| Abstract: | The construction, analysis, and review of "controlling conceptions" (conceptions regarding the managerial accounting and control function) are important and influental branch as well a characteristic of management accounting and control research in German speaking countries. This discourse contains strong aspects if an identification and justification process for finding the unique position and specific role of controlling in academia and business functions. Still, a widely accepted and sustainable delineation against other business economics and management diciplines has not been accomplished. However, a clear picture of the scientific object is regarded as beneficial for forming and directing research endeavours. This paper aims at structuring the course of the controlling conceptions discourse by presenting criteria for judging the quality of the existing conceptions (theoretic fountdation, precision, consitency, empiracal validity), and applying these to the conceptions. Building on the assumed adequacy of the proposed critera and the thusly extracted shortcomings of the conceptions, five theses are presented, which summarise the requirements on further conceptional controlling research and propose a new direction for these endeavours regarding the scientific object. |
| Keywords: | conceptional management accounting and control research; Germany; Controlling conpections; Controlling theory |
| JEL: | M40 |
| Date: | 2008–09–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:10503&r=acc |
| By: | Oxelheim, Lars (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | The process of globalization encompasses economic and financial integration. Abolition of capital controls and dismantling of barriers of different kinds are important ingredients of the process that will entirely change the exposure of previously sheltered companies to shocks on the global economic arena. Lessons learned by policy-makers in already globalized countries are that market participants should be prepared to meet the new exposure to fluctuating exchange rates, interest rates and inflation rates. China has recently adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in her efforts to improve the quality of information available for risk management and for pricing of risk. This paper claims that further improvements are needed and presents a new framework for how to understand and measure the impact of different scenarios on corporate performance. It also elaborates on how to communicate the macroeconomic effects to external stakeholders of the firm in a way that fosters further economic growth in China. |
| Keywords: | International Financial Reporting Standards; Transparency; Economic Growth; Macroeconomic Impact; Globalization |
| JEL: | E22 E32 E44 F15 F23 F37 G18 G32 L25 M21 |
| Date: | 2008–09–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0768&r=acc |
| By: | Giovanni Immordino (Università di Salerno and CSEF); Marco Pagano (Università di Napoli Federico II, CSEF, EIEF and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We analyze corporate fraud in a model where managers have superior information but, due to private benefits from empire building, are biased against liquidation. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To restrain fraud, shareholders optimally choose auditing quality and the performance sensitivity of managerial pay, taking into account external corporate governance and auditing regulation. For given managerial pay, it is optimal to rely on auditing when external governance is in an intermediate range. When both auditing and managerial incentive pay are used, worse external governance must be balanced by heavier reliance on both of these incentive mechanisms. In designing managerial pay, equity can improve managerial incentives while options worsen them. |
| Keywords: | accounting fraud, auditing, managerial compensation, corporate governance, regulation |
| JEL: | G28 K22 M42 |
| Date: | 2008–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:203&r=acc |