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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Angel de la Fuente; Rafael Doménech; Vasja Rant |
| Abstract: | Conflict among member states regarding the distribution of net financial burdens has been allowed to contaminate the entire design of the EU budget with very negative consequences in terms of equity, efficiency and transparency. To get around this problem and pave the way for a substantive budget reform, we propose to decouple distributional negotiations from the rest of the budget process by linking member state net balances in a rigid manner to relative prosperity. This would be achieved through the introduction of a system of compensating horizontal transfers that would take to its logical conclusion the Commission's proposal for a generalized compensation mechanism. We discuss the impact of the proposed scheme on member states? incentives and illustrate its financial implications using revenue and expenditure projections for 2013 that are based on the current Financial Perspectives and Own Resources Decision. |
| Keywords: | EU budget |
| JEL: | H87 |
| Date: | 2008–02–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:738.08&r=acc |
| By: | Lengsfeld, Stephan; Wielenberg, Stefan |
| Abstract: | Im Referentenentwurf zum BilMoG wird die Untergrenze der Herstellungskosten neu gefasst, in die neben den Einzelkosten nun auch die variablen Gemeinkosten einzubeziehen sind. Der Beitrag klärt zunächst, wie variable Gemeinkosten aus Sicht der Kostenrechnung zu ermitteln sind. Anschließend wird gezeigt, dass die Neuregelung einige Interpretationsprobleme der alten Regulierung klärt, zugleich jedoch neue Interpretations- und Gestaltungsspielräume geschaffen werden. Nur ansatzweise erreicht wird die laut Entwurfsbegründung angestrebte Annäherung an die in Steuerrecht und IFRS verwendeten vollen Herstellungskosten, was aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht jedoch durchaus zu begrüßen ist. |
| Keywords: | Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, Referentenentwurf, Kostenrechnung, Herstellkosten, variable Kosten |
| JEL: | M41 M42 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-395&r=acc |
| By: | Christian Traxler (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Andreas Reutter (University of Konstanz) |
| Abstract: | We study tax evasion and decentralized tax enforcement in a federal economy with mobile capital and the endogenous formation of multiregional companies. Regions use their enforcement policy as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. Within this framework, we analyze the uncoordinated policy choice under formula apportionment (FA) and compare it to the incentives which derive from fiscal equalization (FE). As both systems redistribute collected revenues but not enforcement costs, they distort the regions' incentives to enforce taxes. At the same time, jurisdictions partially internalize the fiscal externalities caused by their enforcement policy. We show that the tradeoff between these two opposing effects differs between FA and FE, and crucially depends on the degree of interregional firm integration under FA. We discuss conditions under which FA, FE or a joint system of FA cum FE provides the ‘best’ incentives for decentralized tax enforcement. |
| Keywords: | Tax Enforcement, Tax Evasion, Formula Apportionment, Fiscal Equalization, Tax Revenue Sharing |
| JEL: | H77 H71 H26 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_21&r=acc |