nep-acc New Economics Papers
on Accounting
Issue of 2005‒05‒29
four papers chosen by
Bernardo Batiz-Lazo
London South Bank University

  1. Responsible ownership, shareholder value and the new shareholder activism By John Roberts; Paul Sanderson; John Hendry; Richard Barker
  2. Board Independence and CEO Turnover By Volker Laux
  4. Timing Tax Evasion By Dirk Niepelt

  1. By: John Roberts; Paul Sanderson; John Hendry; Richard Barker
    Abstract: In this paper we use interview data to explore the Ônew shareholder activism of mainstream UK institutional investors. We describe contemporary practices of corporate governance monitoring and engagement and how they vary across institutions, and explore the motivations behind them. Existing studies of shareholder activism mainly assume that it is motivated by a desire to maximise shareholder value, and we find some evidence both of this and of alternative political/moral motivations related to ideas of responsible ownership. We conclude, however, that in the current situation both these act primarily as rationalisations rather than as genuine motivators. The main driving force behind the new shareholder activism is the institutions own profit maximisation and the need to position themselves against competitor institutions in the context of political and regulatory changes that have significantly changed the non-financial expectations of their clients.
    Keywords: corporate governance, institutional investors, shareholder value, stock market
    JEL: G3 G2 G30
    Date: 2204–12
  2. By: Volker Laux
    Abstract: It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).
    Keywords: Corporate Governance; Board Independence; Severance Pay; CEO Turnover; Incentive Compensation
    Date: 2005–04
  3. By: Juan-José Ganuza; José S. Penalva Zuasti (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)
    Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between the auctioneer's provision of information and the level of competition in private value auctions. We use a general notion of informativeness which allows us to compare the efficient with the (privately) optimal amount of information provided by the auctioneer. We show that it is not optimal for the auctionner to provide the efficient level of information. We also look at the effect of competition as parameterized by the number of participants in the auction. We find that both the optimal and the efficient level of information increase with the number of participants in the auction, and both converge when the number of bidders goes to infinity.
    Keywords: Auctions, competition, private values, optimal and efficient provision of information.
    JEL: D44 D82 D83
    Date: 2005–02
  4. By: Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee)
    Abstract: Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: Fines depending on the duration of an evasion spell, and different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of tax evasion dynamics.
    Date: 2004–11

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