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on Accounting |
| By: | Andreas Hackethal; Reinhard H. Schmidt; Marcel Tyrell |
| Abstract: | The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing. |
| JEL: | G32 G34 G3 |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fra:franaf:146&r=acc |
| By: | Tian, Lihui (London Business School and Peking University); Estrin, Saul (London Business School and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | The role of government shareholding in corporate performance is central to an understanding of China’s newly privatized large firms. In this paper, we analyze shareholders as agents that can both harm and benefit companies. We examine the ownership structure of 826 listed corporations and find that government shareholding is surprisingly large. Its effect on corporate value is found to be negative, but non-monotonic. Up to a certain threshold, corporate value decreases as government shareholding stakes increase, but beyond this corporate value begins to increase. We interpret this in terms of ownership concentration and the advantages of government partiality. |
| Keywords: | government shareholding, corporate governance, China |
| JEL: | G32 G34 G15 L33 |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1493&r=acc |
| By: | Michael Higl (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics); Peter Welzel (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We look at an industry of Cournot oligopolists each of which consists of production facilities which enjoy some degree of freedom in deciding their output quantities and that way influence the total output of a firm. This structure can be motivated e.g. the existence of profit centers or by the specifics of a cooperative firm. The extent of coordination inside the firms is captured in a simple way, and market equilibrium is derived for potentially asymmetric firms using the concept of a replacement function. We use this model to address the question of profitability of horizontal mergers and of the welfare consequences of such mergers. Contrary to the standard literature, we find a wide range of potentially profitable mergers without having to refer to cost synergies. This result is driven by the effect of size in terms of the number of production facilities and by the strategic consequences of intra-firm decentralization. A number of seemingly conflicting results from the literature can be considered special cases of our model. |
| Keywords: | merger, oligopoly, organization, vertical coordination |
| JEL: | L22 L13 |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0269&r=acc |
| By: | Michael R. King and Maksym Padalko |
| Abstract: | The authors study the price–--volume dynamics ahead of the first public announcement of a takeover for 420 Canadian firms from 1985 to 2002. Pre-bid price run-ups in a target firm's shares may be caused by some combination of information leakage due to illegal insider trading or market anticipation based on rumours in the press. The authors review empirical studies of illegal insider trading and trading ahead of unscheduled announcements to generate predictions for abnormal returns and abnormal volume ahead of the takeover announcement. They observe serially correlated volume and a pattern of return reversals in their sample. Pre-bid run-ups occur shortly before the actual announcement, accompanied by significantly positive abnormal returns and share volume. The stock prices of the target firm react significantly to the actual announcement, with both positive and negative reactions. These price–volume dynamics are more consistent with the predictions of the market anticipation hypothesis than the hypothesis of illegal insider trading. |
| Keywords: | Financial markets |
| JEL: | G14 G18 G34 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:05-3&r=acc |
| By: | Enrique Yacuzzi; Fernando Martín; Gabriel Vignola; Verónica Mayochi; Dante Tollio |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the sources of quality of a pharmaceutical product. After identifying eight quality dimensions, a framework of hypothetical sources that contribute the most to shape those dimensions is established. The framework, based on Garvin’s pioneering work, is applied to case studies of laboratories operating in Argentina. Framework relevance is considered using correlation analysis. Laboratories are ranked through expert opinion by the quality of its products using the eight dimensions mentioned above; it is observed that there is no perfect parallelism in ranking along all dimensions, possibly revealing different managerial priorities and uses of resources among laboratories, as well as different sources of quality and different business strategies. Correlation analysis also suggests that the study of a pharmaceutical product is a complex task when a modern concept of quality is considered. Once the existence of different quality dimensions is accepted, the following two questions are investigated: (1) Are there specific sources of quality that support some dimensions (and not others) and that are based on identifiable organizational aspects or specific technologies? (2) What are the generic sources of quality (affecting all dimensions) and in what way do they contribute to improve performance or highlight quality dimensions? It is assumed as a starting point that among the sources of quality there are generic sources, affecting all dimensions, and specific sources, which affect only some dimensions. In concrete cases, specific quality sources are identified, although the search for specific quality sources for each dimension is not conclusive. The study of generic quality sources, however, suggests that corporate systems, corporate culture, and management policies contribute to incorporate quality in a product. Thus quality results from the interaction between generic and specific sources. In the final part of the paper, recommendations for academics and industrialists are provided, as well as some conclusions. |
| Keywords: | Pharmaceutical product, Garvin’s quality dimensions, quality sources, pharmaceutical laboratories in Argentina, corporate systems, corporate culture. |
| JEL: | M10 M11 M14 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cem:doctra:284&r=acc |